Pull request 1944: 6049-block-ns-root

Updates #6049.

Squashed commit of the following:

commit 288a486b741b4dc57769bd5a0bdd67b4d75cc8c0
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM>
Date:   Thu Jul 27 20:59:14 2023 +0300

    dnsforward: fix blocking of ns root
This commit is contained in:
Ainar Garipov 2023-07-27 21:06:51 +03:00
parent 300821a7fb
commit 79306cb48a
4 changed files with 22 additions and 5 deletions

View File

@ -25,10 +25,15 @@ NOTE: Add new changes BELOW THIS COMMENT.
### Fixed
- Inability to block queries for the root domain, such as `NS .` queries, using
the *Disallowed domains* feature on the *DNS settings* page ([#6049]). Users
who want to block `.` queries should use the `|.^` AdBlock rule or a similar
regular expression.
- Client hostnames not resolving when upstream server responds with zero-TTL
records ([#6046]).
[#6046]: https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/issues/6046
[#6049]: https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/issues/6049
<!--
NOTE: Add new changes ABOVE THIS COMMENT.

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@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ func newAccessCtx(allowed, blocked, blockedHosts []string) (a *accessManager, er
lists := []filterlist.RuleList{
&filterlist.StringRuleList{
ID: int(0),
ID: 0,
RulesText: b.String(),
IgnoreCosmetic: true,
},

View File

@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ func TestIsBlockedHost(t *testing.T) {
"*.host.com",
"||host3.com^",
"||*^$dnstype=HTTPS",
"|.^",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
@ -94,6 +95,11 @@ func TestIsBlockedHost(t *testing.T) {
name: "by_qtype_other",
host: "site-with-https-record.example",
qt: dns.TypeA,
}, {
want: assert.True,
name: "ns_root",
host: ".",
qt: dns.TypeNS,
}}
for _, tc := range testCases {

View File

@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/aghnet"
"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/filtering"
"github.com/AdguardTeam/dnsproxy/proxy"
"github.com/AdguardTeam/golibs/log"
@ -33,9 +34,9 @@ func (s *Server) beforeRequestHandler(
if len(pctx.Req.Question) == 1 {
q := pctx.Req.Question[0]
qt := q.Qtype
host := strings.TrimSuffix(q.Name, ".")
host := aghnet.NormalizeDomain(q.Name)
if s.access.isBlockedHost(host, qt) {
log.Debug("request %s %s is in access blocklist", dns.Type(qt), host)
log.Debug("access: request %s %s is in access blocklist", dns.Type(qt), host)
return s.preBlockedResponse(pctx)
}
@ -79,7 +80,12 @@ func (s *Server) filterDNSRequest(dctx *dnsContext) (res *filtering.Result, err
res = &resVal
switch {
case res.IsFiltered:
log.Tracef("host %q is filtered, reason %q, rule: %q", host, res.Reason, res.Rules[0].Text)
log.Debug(
"dnsforward: host %q is filtered, reason: %q; rule: %q",
host,
res.Reason,
res.Rules[0].Text,
)
pctx.Res = s.genDNSFilterMessage(pctx, res)
case res.Reason.In(filtering.Rewritten, filtering.RewrittenRule) &&
res.CanonName != "" &&
@ -189,7 +195,7 @@ func (s *Server) filterDNSResponse(
continue
} else if res.IsFiltered {
pctx.Res = s.genDNSFilterMessage(pctx, res)
log.Debug("DNSFwd: Matched %s by response: %s", pctx.Req.Question[0].Name, host)
log.Debug("dnsforward: matched %q by response: %q", pctx.Req.Question[0].Name, host)
return res, nil
}