mirror of
https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy.git
synced 2024-09-11 21:17:40 +03:00
Update quic-go dependency to support go 1.20 (#2292)
This commit is contained in:
parent
5438eed2f4
commit
c3fd855831
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
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"github.com/jedisct1/dlog"
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stamps "github.com/jedisct1/go-dnsstamps"
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"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/http3"
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"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3"
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"github.com/miekg/dns"
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"golang.org/x/net/http2"
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netproxy "golang.org/x/net/proxy"
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15
go.mod
15
go.mod
@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ require (
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github.com/jedisct1/xsecretbox v0.0.0-20210927135450-ebe41aef7bef
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github.com/k-sone/critbitgo v1.4.0
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github.com/kardianos/service v1.2.2
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github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go v0.31.1
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github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.50
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github.com/powerman/check v1.6.0
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github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.32.0
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golang.org/x/crypto v0.5.0
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golang.org/x/net v0.5.0
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golang.org/x/sys v0.4.0
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@ -99,9 +99,6 @@ require (
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github.com/ldez/tagliatelle v0.2.0 // indirect
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github.com/magiconair/properties v1.8.1 // indirect
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github.com/maratori/testpackage v1.0.1 // indirect
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github.com/marten-seemann/qpack v0.3.0 // indirect
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github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18 v0.1.3 // indirect
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github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19 v0.1.1 // indirect
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github.com/matoous/godox v0.0.0-20210227103229-6504466cf951 // indirect
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github.com/mattn/go-colorable v0.1.8 // indirect
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github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.12 // indirect
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@ -132,6 +129,10 @@ require (
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github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.1.3 // indirect
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github.com/quasilyte/go-ruleguard v0.3.4 // indirect
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github.com/quasilyte/regex/syntax v0.0.0-20200407221936-30656e2c4a95 // indirect
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github.com/quic-go/qpack v0.4.0 // indirect
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github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18 v0.2.0 // indirect
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github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19 v0.2.0 // indirect
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github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.1.0 // indirect
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github.com/ryancurrah/gomodguard v1.2.2 // indirect
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github.com/ryanrolds/sqlclosecheck v0.3.0 // indirect
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github.com/sanposhiho/wastedassign/v2 v2.0.6 // indirect
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@ -160,10 +161,10 @@ require (
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github.com/ultraware/whitespace v0.0.4 // indirect
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github.com/uudashr/gocognit v1.0.1 // indirect
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github.com/yeya24/promlinter v0.1.0 // indirect
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golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20220722155223-a9213eeb770e // indirect
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golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0-dev.0.20220419223038-86c51ed26bb4 // indirect
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golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20221205204356-47842c84f3db // indirect
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golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0 // indirect
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golang.org/x/text v0.6.0 // indirect
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golang.org/x/tools v0.1.12 // indirect
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golang.org/x/tools v0.2.0 // indirect
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google.golang.org/genproto v0.0.0-20200707001353-8e8330bf89df // indirect
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google.golang.org/grpc v1.38.0 // indirect
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google.golang.org/protobuf v1.28.0 // indirect
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32
go.sum
32
go.sum
@ -432,19 +432,11 @@ github.com/lib/pq v1.0.0/go.mod h1:5WUZQaWbwv1U+lTReE5YruASi9Al49XbQIvNi/34Woo=
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github.com/lib/pq v1.8.0/go.mod h1:AlVN5x4E4T544tWzH6hKfbfQvm3HdbOxrmggDNAPY9o=
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github.com/lib/pq v1.9.0/go.mod h1:AlVN5x4E4T544tWzH6hKfbfQvm3HdbOxrmggDNAPY9o=
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github.com/logrusorgru/aurora v0.0.0-20181002194514-a7b3b318ed4e/go.mod h1:7rIyQOR62GCctdiQpZ/zOJlFyk6y+94wXzv6RNZgaR4=
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github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go v0.31.1 h1:O8Od7hfioqq0PMYHDyBkxU2aA7iZ2W9pjbrWuja2YR4=
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github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go v0.31.1/go.mod h1:0wFbizLgYzqHqtlyxyCaJKlE7bYgE6JQ+54TLd/Dq2g=
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github.com/magiconair/properties v1.8.0/go.mod h1:PppfXfuXeibc/6YijjN8zIbojt8czPbwD3XqdrwzmxQ=
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github.com/magiconair/properties v1.8.1 h1:ZC2Vc7/ZFkGmsVC9KvOjumD+G5lXy2RtTKyzRKO2BQ4=
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github.com/magiconair/properties v1.8.1/go.mod h1:PppfXfuXeibc/6YijjN8zIbojt8czPbwD3XqdrwzmxQ=
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github.com/maratori/testpackage v1.0.1 h1:QtJ5ZjqapShm0w5DosRjg0PRlSdAdlx+W6cCKoALdbQ=
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github.com/maratori/testpackage v1.0.1/go.mod h1:ddKdw+XG0Phzhx8BFDTKgpWP4i7MpApTE5fXSKAqwDU=
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github.com/marten-seemann/qpack v0.3.0 h1:UiWstOgT8+znlkDPOg2+3rIuYXJ2CnGDkGUXN6ki6hE=
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github.com/marten-seemann/qpack v0.3.0/go.mod h1:cGfKPBiP4a9EQdxCwEwI/GEeWAsjSekBvx/X8mh58+g=
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github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18 v0.1.3 h1:R4H2Ks8P6pAtUagjFty2p7BVHn3XiwDAl7TTQf5h7TI=
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github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18 v0.1.3/go.mod h1:mJttiymBAByA49mhlNZZGrH5u1uXYZJ+RW28Py7f4m4=
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github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19 v0.1.1 h1:mnbxeq3oEyQxQXwI4ReCgW9DPoPR94sNlqWoDZnjRIE=
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github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19 v0.1.1/go.mod h1:5HTDWtVudo/WFsHKRNuOhWlbdjrfs5JHrYb0wIJqGpI=
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github.com/matoous/godox v0.0.0-20210227103229-6504466cf951 h1:pWxk9e//NbPwfxat7RXkts09K+dEBJWakUWwICVqYbA=
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github.com/matoous/godox v0.0.0-20210227103229-6504466cf951/go.mod h1:1BELzlh859Sh1c6+90blK8lbYy0kwQf1bYlBhBysy1s=
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github.com/mattn/go-colorable v0.0.9/go.mod h1:9vuHe8Xs5qXnSaW/c/ABM9alt+Vo+STaOChaDxuIBZU=
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@ -593,6 +585,16 @@ github.com/quasilyte/go-ruleguard/rules v0.0.0-20201231183845-9e62ed36efe1/go.mo
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github.com/quasilyte/go-ruleguard/rules v0.0.0-20210203162857-b223e0831f88/go.mod h1:4cgAphtvu7Ftv7vOT2ZOYhC6CvBxZixcasr8qIOTA50=
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github.com/quasilyte/regex/syntax v0.0.0-20200407221936-30656e2c4a95 h1:L8QM9bvf68pVdQ3bCFZMDmnt9yqcMBro1pC7F+IPYMY=
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github.com/quasilyte/regex/syntax v0.0.0-20200407221936-30656e2c4a95/go.mod h1:rlzQ04UMyJXu/aOvhd8qT+hvDrFpiwqp8MRXDY9szc0=
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github.com/quic-go/qpack v0.4.0 h1:Cr9BXA1sQS2SmDUWjSofMPNKmvF6IiIfDRmgU0w1ZCo=
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github.com/quic-go/qpack v0.4.0/go.mod h1:UZVnYIfi5GRk+zI9UMaCPsmZ2xKJP7XBUvVyT1Knj9A=
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github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18 v0.2.0 h1:5ViXqBZ90wpUcZS0ge79rf029yx0dYB0McyPJwqqj7U=
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github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18 v0.2.0/go.mod h1:moGulGHK7o6O8lSPSZNoOwcLvJKJ85vVNc7oJFD65bc=
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github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19 v0.2.0 h1:Cvn2WdhyViFUHoOqK52i51k4nDX8EwIh5VJiVM4nttk=
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github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19 v0.2.0/go.mod h1:ySOI96ew8lnoKPtSqx2BlI5wCpUVPT05RMAlajtnyOI=
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github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.1.0 h1:d1PK3ErFy9t7zxKsG3NXBJXZjp/kMLoIb3y/kV54oAI=
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github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.1.0/go.mod h1:JKtK6mjbAVcUTN/9jZpvLbGxvdWIKS8uT7EiStoU1SM=
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github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.32.0 h1:lY02md31s1JgPiiyfqJijpu/UX/Iun304FI3yUqX7tA=
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github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.32.0/go.mod h1:/fCsKANhQIeD5l76c2JFU+07gVE3KaA0FP+0zMWwfwo=
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github.com/rogpeppe/fastuuid v0.0.0-20150106093220-6724a57986af/go.mod h1:XWv6SoW27p1b0cqNHllgS5HIMJraePCO15w5zCzIWYg=
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github.com/rogpeppe/fastuuid v1.2.0/go.mod h1:jVj6XXZzXRy/MSR5jhDC/2q6DgLz+nrA6LYCDYWNEvQ=
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github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.3.0/go.mod h1:M8bDsm7K2OlrFYOpmOWEs/qY81heoFRclV5y23lUDJ4=
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@ -752,8 +754,8 @@ golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20200119233911-0405dc783f0a/go.mod h1:2RIsYlXP63K8oxa1u0
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golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20200207192155-f17229e696bd/go.mod h1:J/WKrq2StrnmMY6+EHIKF9dgMWnmCNThgcyBT1FY9mM=
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golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20200224162631-6cc2880d07d6/go.mod h1:3jZMyOhIsHpP37uCMkUooju7aAi5cS1Q23tOzKc+0MU=
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golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20200331195152-e8c3332aa8e5/go.mod h1:4M0jN8W1tt0AVLNr8HDosyJCDCDuyL9N9+3m7wDWgKw=
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golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20220722155223-a9213eeb770e h1:+WEEuIdZHnUeJJmEUjyYC2gfUMj69yZXw17EnHg/otA=
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golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20220722155223-a9213eeb770e/go.mod h1:Kr81I6Kryrl9sr8s2FK3vxD90NdsKWRuOIl2O4CvYbA=
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golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20221205204356-47842c84f3db h1:D/cFflL63o2KSLJIwjlcIt8PR064j/xsmdEJL/YvY/o=
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golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20221205204356-47842c84f3db/go.mod h1:CxIveKay+FTh1D0yPZemJVgC/95VzuuOLq5Qi4xnoYc=
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golang.org/x/image v0.0.0-20190227222117-0694c2d4d067/go.mod h1:kZ7UVZpmo3dzQBMxlp+ypCbDeSB+sBbTgSJuh5dn5js=
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golang.org/x/image v0.0.0-20190802002840-cff245a6509b/go.mod h1:FeLwcggjj3mMvU+oOTbSwawSJRM1uh48EjtB4UJZlP0=
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golang.org/x/lint v0.0.0-20181026193005-c67002cb31c3/go.mod h1:UVdnD1Gm6xHRNCYTkRU2/jEulfH38KcIWyp/GAMgvoE=
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@ -777,8 +779,8 @@ golang.org/x/mod v0.3.0/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
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golang.org/x/mod v0.4.0/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
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golang.org/x/mod v0.4.1/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
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golang.org/x/mod v0.4.2/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
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golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0-dev.0.20220419223038-86c51ed26bb4 h1:6zppjxzCulZykYSLyVDYbneBfbaBIQPYMevg0bEwv2s=
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golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0-dev.0.20220419223038-86c51ed26bb4/go.mod h1:jJ57K6gSWd91VN4djpZkiMVwK6gcyfeH4XE8wZrZaV4=
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golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0 h1:b9gGHsz9/HhJ3HF5DHQytPpuwocVTChQJK3AvoLRD5I=
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golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0/go.mod h1:4mET923SAdbXp2ki8ey+zGs1SLqsuM2Y0uvdZR/fUNI=
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golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20180724234803-3673e40ba225/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4=
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golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20180826012351-8a410e7b638d/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4=
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golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20180906233101-161cd47e91fd/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4=
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@ -839,7 +841,7 @@ golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20200317015054-43a5402ce75a/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJ
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golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20200625203802-6e8e738ad208/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
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golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20201020160332-67f06af15bc9/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
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golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20210220032951-036812b2e83c/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
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golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20220722155255-886fb9371eb4 h1:uVc8UZUe6tr40fFVnUP5Oj+veunVezqYl9z7DYw9xzw=
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golang.org/x/sync v0.1.0 h1:wsuoTGHzEhffawBOhz5CYhcrV4IdKZbEyZjBMuTp12o=
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golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20180823144017-11551d06cbcc/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
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golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20180830151530-49385e6e1522/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
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golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20180905080454-ebe1bf3edb33/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
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@ -1002,8 +1004,8 @@ golang.org/x/tools v0.1.1/go.mod h1:o0xws9oXOQQZyjljx8fwUC0k7L1pTE6eaCbjGeHmOkk=
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golang.org/x/tools v0.1.2/go.mod h1:o0xws9oXOQQZyjljx8fwUC0k7L1pTE6eaCbjGeHmOkk=
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golang.org/x/tools v0.1.3/go.mod h1:o0xws9oXOQQZyjljx8fwUC0k7L1pTE6eaCbjGeHmOkk=
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golang.org/x/tools v0.1.6-0.20210726203631-07bc1bf47fb2/go.mod h1:o0xws9oXOQQZyjljx8fwUC0k7L1pTE6eaCbjGeHmOkk=
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golang.org/x/tools v0.1.12 h1:VveCTK38A2rkS8ZqFY25HIDFscX5X9OoEhJd3quQmXU=
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golang.org/x/tools v0.1.12/go.mod h1:hNGJHUnrk76NpqgfD5Aqm5Crs+Hm0VOH/i9J2+nxYbc=
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golang.org/x/tools v0.2.0 h1:G6AHpWxTMGY1KyEYoAQ5WTtIekUUvDNjan3ugu60JvE=
|
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golang.org/x/tools v0.2.0/go.mod h1:y4OqIKeOV/fWJetJ8bXPU1sEVniLMIyDAZWeHdV+NTA=
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golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20190717185122-a985d3407aa7/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
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golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20191011141410-1b5146add898/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
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golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20191204190536-9bdfabe68543/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
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|
62
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/README.md
generated
vendored
62
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/README.md
generated
vendored
@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
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# A QUIC implementation in pure Go
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<img src="docs/quic.png" width=303 height=124>
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||||
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[![PkgGoDev](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go)
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||||
[![Code Coverage](https://img.shields.io/codecov/c/github/lucas-clemente/quic-go/master.svg?style=flat-square)](https://codecov.io/gh/lucas-clemente/quic-go/)
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|
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quic-go is an implementation of the QUIC protocol ([RFC 9000](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000), [RFC 9001](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9001), [RFC 9002](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9002)) in Go, including the Unreliable Datagram Extension ([RFC 9221](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9221)) and Datagram Packetization Layer Path MTU
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Discovery (DPLPMTUD, [RFC 8899](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8899)). It has support for HTTP/3 ([RFC 9114](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9114)), including QPACK ([RFC 9204](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9204)).
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In addition to the RFCs listed above, it currently implements the [IETF QUIC draft-29](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-29). Support for draft-29 will eventually be dropped, as it is phased out of the ecosystem.
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## Guides
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*We currently support Go 1.18.x and Go 1.19.x.*
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|
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Running tests:
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|
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go test ./...
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### QUIC without HTTP/3
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||||
|
||||
Take a look at [this echo example](example/echo/echo.go).
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|
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## Usage
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|
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### As a server
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|
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See the [example server](example/main.go). Starting a QUIC server is very similar to the standard lib http in go:
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||||
|
||||
```go
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http.Handle("/", http.FileServer(http.Dir(wwwDir)))
|
||||
http3.ListenAndServeQUIC("localhost:4242", "/path/to/cert/chain.pem", "/path/to/privkey.pem", nil)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### As a client
|
||||
|
||||
See the [example client](example/client/main.go). Use a `http3.RoundTripper` as a `Transport` in a `http.Client`.
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
http.Client{
|
||||
Transport: &http3.RoundTripper{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Projects using quic-go
|
||||
|
||||
| Project | Description | Stars |
|
||||
|------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
|
||||
| [algernon](https://github.com/xyproto/algernon) | Small self-contained pure-Go web server with Lua, Markdown, HTTP/2, QUIC, Redis and PostgreSQL support | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/xyproto/algernon?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [caddy](https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/) | Fast, multi-platform web server with automatic HTTPS | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/caddyserver/caddy?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [go-ipfs](https://github.com/ipfs/go-ipfs) | IPFS implementation in go | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/ipfs/go-ipfs?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [syncthing](https://github.com/syncthing/syncthing/) | Open Source Continuous File Synchronization | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/syncthing/syncthing?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [traefik](https://github.com/traefik/traefik) | The Cloud Native Application Proxy | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/traefik/traefik?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [v2ray-core](https://github.com/v2fly/v2ray-core) | A platform for building proxies to bypass network restrictions | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/v2fly/v2ray-core?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [cloudflared](https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared) | A tunneling daemon that proxies traffic from the Cloudflare network to your origins | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/cloudflare/cloudflared?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [OONI Probe](https://github.com/ooni/probe-cli) | The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) aims to empower decentralized efforts in documenting Internet censorship around the world. | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/ooni/probe-cli?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [YoMo](https://github.com/yomorun/yomo) | Streaming Serverless Framework for Geo-distributed System | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/yomorun/yomo?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
|
||||
## Contributing
|
||||
|
||||
We are always happy to welcome new contributors! We have a number of self-contained issues that are suitable for first-time contributors, they are tagged with [help wanted](https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+label%3A%22help+wanted%22). If you have any questions, please feel free to reach out by opening an issue or leaving a comment.
|
9
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/frame.go
generated
vendored
9
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/frame.go
generated
vendored
@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package ackhandler
|
||||
|
||||
import "github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/wire"
|
||||
|
||||
type Frame struct {
|
||||
wire.Frame // nil if the frame has already been acknowledged in another packet
|
||||
OnLost func(wire.Frame)
|
||||
OnAcked func(wire.Frame)
|
||||
}
|
3
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/mockgen.go
generated
vendored
3
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/mockgen.go
generated
vendored
@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package ackhandler
|
||||
|
||||
//go:generate sh -c "../../mockgen_private.sh ackhandler mock_sent_packet_tracker_test.go github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/ackhandler sentPacketTracker"
|
3
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/handshake/mockgen.go
generated
vendored
3
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/handshake/mockgen.go
generated
vendored
@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package handshake
|
||||
|
||||
//go:generate sh -c "../../mockgen_private.sh handshake mock_handshake_runner_test.go github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/handshake handshakeRunner"
|
62
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/handshake/retry.go
generated
vendored
62
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/handshake/retry.go
generated
vendored
@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package handshake
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"crypto/aes"
|
||||
"crypto/cipher"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
oldRetryAEAD cipher.AEAD // used for QUIC draft versions up to 34
|
||||
retryAEAD cipher.AEAD // used for QUIC draft-34
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func init() {
|
||||
oldRetryAEAD = initAEAD([16]byte{0xcc, 0xce, 0x18, 0x7e, 0xd0, 0x9a, 0x09, 0xd0, 0x57, 0x28, 0x15, 0x5a, 0x6c, 0xb9, 0x6b, 0xe1})
|
||||
retryAEAD = initAEAD([16]byte{0xbe, 0x0c, 0x69, 0x0b, 0x9f, 0x66, 0x57, 0x5a, 0x1d, 0x76, 0x6b, 0x54, 0xe3, 0x68, 0xc8, 0x4e})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func initAEAD(key [16]byte) cipher.AEAD {
|
||||
aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key[:])
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
panic(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
panic(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return aead
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
retryBuf bytes.Buffer
|
||||
retryMutex sync.Mutex
|
||||
oldRetryNonce = [12]byte{0xe5, 0x49, 0x30, 0xf9, 0x7f, 0x21, 0x36, 0xf0, 0x53, 0x0a, 0x8c, 0x1c}
|
||||
retryNonce = [12]byte{0x46, 0x15, 0x99, 0xd3, 0x5d, 0x63, 0x2b, 0xf2, 0x23, 0x98, 0x25, 0xbb}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// GetRetryIntegrityTag calculates the integrity tag on a Retry packet
|
||||
func GetRetryIntegrityTag(retry []byte, origDestConnID protocol.ConnectionID, version protocol.VersionNumber) *[16]byte {
|
||||
retryMutex.Lock()
|
||||
retryBuf.WriteByte(uint8(origDestConnID.Len()))
|
||||
retryBuf.Write(origDestConnID.Bytes())
|
||||
retryBuf.Write(retry)
|
||||
|
||||
var tag [16]byte
|
||||
var sealed []byte
|
||||
if version != protocol.Version1 {
|
||||
sealed = oldRetryAEAD.Seal(tag[:0], oldRetryNonce[:], nil, retryBuf.Bytes())
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
sealed = retryAEAD.Seal(tag[:0], retryNonce[:], nil, retryBuf.Bytes())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(sealed) != 16 {
|
||||
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected Retry integrity tag length: %d", len(sealed)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
retryBuf.Reset()
|
||||
retryMutex.Unlock()
|
||||
return &tag
|
||||
}
|
5
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/qtls/go120.go
generated
vendored
5
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/qtls/go120.go
generated
vendored
@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
|
||||
//go:build go1.20
|
||||
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
var _ int = "The version of quic-go you're using can't be built on Go 1.20 yet. For more details, please see https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/wiki/quic-go-and-Go-versions."
|
4
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/utils/linkedlist/README.md
generated
vendored
4
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/utils/linkedlist/README.md
generated
vendored
@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Usage
|
||||
|
||||
This is the Go standard library implementation of a linked list
|
||||
(https://golang.org/src/container/list/list.go), modified to use Go generics.
|
249
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/wire/extended_header.go
generated
vendored
249
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/wire/extended_header.go
generated
vendored
@ -1,249 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package wire
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol"
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/utils"
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/quicvarint"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrInvalidReservedBits is returned when the reserved bits are incorrect.
|
||||
// When this error is returned, parsing continues, and an ExtendedHeader is returned.
|
||||
// This is necessary because we need to decrypt the packet in that case,
|
||||
// in order to avoid a timing side-channel.
|
||||
var ErrInvalidReservedBits = errors.New("invalid reserved bits")
|
||||
|
||||
// ExtendedHeader is the header of a QUIC packet.
|
||||
type ExtendedHeader struct {
|
||||
Header
|
||||
|
||||
typeByte byte
|
||||
|
||||
KeyPhase protocol.KeyPhaseBit
|
||||
|
||||
PacketNumberLen protocol.PacketNumberLen
|
||||
PacketNumber protocol.PacketNumber
|
||||
|
||||
parsedLen protocol.ByteCount
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *ExtendedHeader) parse(b *bytes.Reader, v protocol.VersionNumber) (bool /* reserved bits valid */, error) {
|
||||
startLen := b.Len()
|
||||
// read the (now unencrypted) first byte
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
h.typeByte, err = b.ReadByte()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return false, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := b.Seek(int64(h.Header.ParsedLen())-1, io.SeekCurrent); err != nil {
|
||||
return false, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
var reservedBitsValid bool
|
||||
if h.IsLongHeader {
|
||||
reservedBitsValid, err = h.parseLongHeader(b, v)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
reservedBitsValid, err = h.parseShortHeader(b, v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return false, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
h.parsedLen = protocol.ByteCount(startLen - b.Len())
|
||||
return reservedBitsValid, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *ExtendedHeader) parseLongHeader(b *bytes.Reader, _ protocol.VersionNumber) (bool /* reserved bits valid */, error) {
|
||||
if err := h.readPacketNumber(b); err != nil {
|
||||
return false, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h.typeByte&0xc != 0 {
|
||||
return false, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *ExtendedHeader) parseShortHeader(b *bytes.Reader, _ protocol.VersionNumber) (bool /* reserved bits valid */, error) {
|
||||
h.KeyPhase = protocol.KeyPhaseZero
|
||||
if h.typeByte&0x4 > 0 {
|
||||
h.KeyPhase = protocol.KeyPhaseOne
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := h.readPacketNumber(b); err != nil {
|
||||
return false, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h.typeByte&0x18 != 0 {
|
||||
return false, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *ExtendedHeader) readPacketNumber(b *bytes.Reader) error {
|
||||
h.PacketNumberLen = protocol.PacketNumberLen(h.typeByte&0x3) + 1
|
||||
switch h.PacketNumberLen {
|
||||
case protocol.PacketNumberLen1:
|
||||
n, err := b.ReadByte()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
h.PacketNumber = protocol.PacketNumber(n)
|
||||
case protocol.PacketNumberLen2:
|
||||
n, err := utils.BigEndian.ReadUint16(b)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
h.PacketNumber = protocol.PacketNumber(n)
|
||||
case protocol.PacketNumberLen3:
|
||||
n, err := utils.BigEndian.ReadUint24(b)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
h.PacketNumber = protocol.PacketNumber(n)
|
||||
case protocol.PacketNumberLen4:
|
||||
n, err := utils.BigEndian.ReadUint32(b)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
h.PacketNumber = protocol.PacketNumber(n)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("invalid packet number length: %d", h.PacketNumberLen)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Write writes the Header.
|
||||
func (h *ExtendedHeader) Write(b *bytes.Buffer, ver protocol.VersionNumber) error {
|
||||
if h.DestConnectionID.Len() > protocol.MaxConnIDLen {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("invalid connection ID length: %d bytes", h.DestConnectionID.Len())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h.SrcConnectionID.Len() > protocol.MaxConnIDLen {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("invalid connection ID length: %d bytes", h.SrcConnectionID.Len())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h.IsLongHeader {
|
||||
return h.writeLongHeader(b, ver)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return h.writeShortHeader(b, ver)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *ExtendedHeader) writeLongHeader(b *bytes.Buffer, version protocol.VersionNumber) error {
|
||||
var packetType uint8
|
||||
if version == protocol.Version2 {
|
||||
//nolint:exhaustive
|
||||
switch h.Type {
|
||||
case protocol.PacketTypeInitial:
|
||||
packetType = 0b01
|
||||
case protocol.PacketType0RTT:
|
||||
packetType = 0b10
|
||||
case protocol.PacketTypeHandshake:
|
||||
packetType = 0b11
|
||||
case protocol.PacketTypeRetry:
|
||||
packetType = 0b00
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
//nolint:exhaustive
|
||||
switch h.Type {
|
||||
case protocol.PacketTypeInitial:
|
||||
packetType = 0b00
|
||||
case protocol.PacketType0RTT:
|
||||
packetType = 0b01
|
||||
case protocol.PacketTypeHandshake:
|
||||
packetType = 0b10
|
||||
case protocol.PacketTypeRetry:
|
||||
packetType = 0b11
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
firstByte := 0xc0 | packetType<<4
|
||||
if h.Type != protocol.PacketTypeRetry {
|
||||
// Retry packets don't have a packet number
|
||||
firstByte |= uint8(h.PacketNumberLen - 1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
b.WriteByte(firstByte)
|
||||
utils.BigEndian.WriteUint32(b, uint32(h.Version))
|
||||
b.WriteByte(uint8(h.DestConnectionID.Len()))
|
||||
b.Write(h.DestConnectionID.Bytes())
|
||||
b.WriteByte(uint8(h.SrcConnectionID.Len()))
|
||||
b.Write(h.SrcConnectionID.Bytes())
|
||||
|
||||
//nolint:exhaustive
|
||||
switch h.Type {
|
||||
case protocol.PacketTypeRetry:
|
||||
b.Write(h.Token)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
case protocol.PacketTypeInitial:
|
||||
quicvarint.Write(b, uint64(len(h.Token)))
|
||||
b.Write(h.Token)
|
||||
}
|
||||
quicvarint.WriteWithLen(b, uint64(h.Length), 2)
|
||||
return h.writePacketNumber(b)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *ExtendedHeader) writeShortHeader(b *bytes.Buffer, _ protocol.VersionNumber) error {
|
||||
typeByte := 0x40 | uint8(h.PacketNumberLen-1)
|
||||
if h.KeyPhase == protocol.KeyPhaseOne {
|
||||
typeByte |= byte(1 << 2)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
b.WriteByte(typeByte)
|
||||
b.Write(h.DestConnectionID.Bytes())
|
||||
return h.writePacketNumber(b)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *ExtendedHeader) writePacketNumber(b *bytes.Buffer) error {
|
||||
switch h.PacketNumberLen {
|
||||
case protocol.PacketNumberLen1:
|
||||
b.WriteByte(uint8(h.PacketNumber))
|
||||
case protocol.PacketNumberLen2:
|
||||
utils.BigEndian.WriteUint16(b, uint16(h.PacketNumber))
|
||||
case protocol.PacketNumberLen3:
|
||||
utils.BigEndian.WriteUint24(b, uint32(h.PacketNumber))
|
||||
case protocol.PacketNumberLen4:
|
||||
utils.BigEndian.WriteUint32(b, uint32(h.PacketNumber))
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("invalid packet number length: %d", h.PacketNumberLen)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ParsedLen returns the number of bytes that were consumed when parsing the header
|
||||
func (h *ExtendedHeader) ParsedLen() protocol.ByteCount {
|
||||
return h.parsedLen
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GetLength determines the length of the Header.
|
||||
func (h *ExtendedHeader) GetLength(v protocol.VersionNumber) protocol.ByteCount {
|
||||
if h.IsLongHeader {
|
||||
length := 1 /* type byte */ + 4 /* version */ + 1 /* dest conn ID len */ + protocol.ByteCount(h.DestConnectionID.Len()) + 1 /* src conn ID len */ + protocol.ByteCount(h.SrcConnectionID.Len()) + protocol.ByteCount(h.PacketNumberLen) + 2 /* length */
|
||||
if h.Type == protocol.PacketTypeInitial {
|
||||
length += quicvarint.Len(uint64(len(h.Token))) + protocol.ByteCount(len(h.Token))
|
||||
}
|
||||
return length
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
length := protocol.ByteCount(1 /* type byte */ + h.DestConnectionID.Len())
|
||||
length += protocol.ByteCount(h.PacketNumberLen)
|
||||
return length
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Log logs the Header
|
||||
func (h *ExtendedHeader) Log(logger utils.Logger) {
|
||||
if h.IsLongHeader {
|
||||
var token string
|
||||
if h.Type == protocol.PacketTypeInitial || h.Type == protocol.PacketTypeRetry {
|
||||
if len(h.Token) == 0 {
|
||||
token = "Token: (empty), "
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
token = fmt.Sprintf("Token: %#x, ", h.Token)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h.Type == protocol.PacketTypeRetry {
|
||||
logger.Debugf("\tLong Header{Type: %s, DestConnectionID: %s, SrcConnectionID: %s, %sVersion: %s}", h.Type, h.DestConnectionID, h.SrcConnectionID, token, h.Version)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
logger.Debugf("\tLong Header{Type: %s, DestConnectionID: %s, SrcConnectionID: %s, %sPacketNumber: %d, PacketNumberLen: %d, Length: %d, Version: %s}", h.Type, h.DestConnectionID, h.SrcConnectionID, token, h.PacketNumber, h.PacketNumberLen, h.Length, h.Version)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
logger.Debugf("\tShort Header{DestConnectionID: %s, PacketNumber: %d, PacketNumberLen: %d, KeyPhase: %s}", h.DestConnectionID, h.PacketNumber, h.PacketNumberLen, h.KeyPhase)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
4
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/logging/mockgen.go
generated
vendored
4
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/logging/mockgen.go
generated
vendored
@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package logging
|
||||
|
||||
//go:generate sh -c "go run github.com/golang/mock/mockgen -package logging -self_package github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/logging -destination mock_connection_tracer_test.go github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/logging ConnectionTracer"
|
||||
//go:generate sh -c "go run github.com/golang/mock/mockgen -package logging -self_package github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/logging -destination mock_tracer_test.go github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/logging Tracer"
|
827
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/packet_packer.go
generated
vendored
827
vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/packet_packer.go
generated
vendored
@ -1,827 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package quic
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/ackhandler"
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/handshake"
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol"
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/qerr"
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/utils"
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/wire"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type packer interface {
|
||||
PackCoalescedPacket(onlyAck bool) (*coalescedPacket, error)
|
||||
PackPacket(onlyAck bool) (*packedPacket, error)
|
||||
MaybePackProbePacket(protocol.EncryptionLevel) (*packedPacket, error)
|
||||
PackConnectionClose(*qerr.TransportError) (*coalescedPacket, error)
|
||||
PackApplicationClose(*qerr.ApplicationError) (*coalescedPacket, error)
|
||||
|
||||
SetMaxPacketSize(protocol.ByteCount)
|
||||
PackMTUProbePacket(ping ackhandler.Frame, size protocol.ByteCount) (*packedPacket, error)
|
||||
|
||||
HandleTransportParameters(*wire.TransportParameters)
|
||||
SetToken([]byte)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type sealer interface {
|
||||
handshake.LongHeaderSealer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type payload struct {
|
||||
frames []ackhandler.Frame
|
||||
ack *wire.AckFrame
|
||||
length protocol.ByteCount
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type packedPacket struct {
|
||||
buffer *packetBuffer
|
||||
*packetContents
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type packetContents struct {
|
||||
header *wire.ExtendedHeader
|
||||
ack *wire.AckFrame
|
||||
frames []ackhandler.Frame
|
||||
|
||||
length protocol.ByteCount
|
||||
|
||||
isMTUProbePacket bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type coalescedPacket struct {
|
||||
buffer *packetBuffer
|
||||
packets []*packetContents
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packetContents) EncryptionLevel() protocol.EncryptionLevel {
|
||||
if !p.header.IsLongHeader {
|
||||
return protocol.Encryption1RTT
|
||||
}
|
||||
//nolint:exhaustive // Will never be called for Retry packets (and they don't have encrypted data).
|
||||
switch p.header.Type {
|
||||
case protocol.PacketTypeInitial:
|
||||
return protocol.EncryptionInitial
|
||||
case protocol.PacketTypeHandshake:
|
||||
return protocol.EncryptionHandshake
|
||||
case protocol.PacketType0RTT:
|
||||
return protocol.Encryption0RTT
|
||||
default:
|
||||
panic("can't determine encryption level")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packetContents) IsAckEliciting() bool {
|
||||
return ackhandler.HasAckElicitingFrames(p.frames)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packetContents) ToAckHandlerPacket(now time.Time, q *retransmissionQueue) *ackhandler.Packet {
|
||||
largestAcked := protocol.InvalidPacketNumber
|
||||
if p.ack != nil {
|
||||
largestAcked = p.ack.LargestAcked()
|
||||
}
|
||||
encLevel := p.EncryptionLevel()
|
||||
for i := range p.frames {
|
||||
if p.frames[i].OnLost != nil {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
switch encLevel {
|
||||
case protocol.EncryptionInitial:
|
||||
p.frames[i].OnLost = q.AddInitial
|
||||
case protocol.EncryptionHandshake:
|
||||
p.frames[i].OnLost = q.AddHandshake
|
||||
case protocol.Encryption0RTT, protocol.Encryption1RTT:
|
||||
p.frames[i].OnLost = q.AddAppData
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ap := ackhandler.GetPacket()
|
||||
ap.PacketNumber = p.header.PacketNumber
|
||||
ap.LargestAcked = largestAcked
|
||||
ap.Frames = p.frames
|
||||
ap.Length = p.length
|
||||
ap.EncryptionLevel = encLevel
|
||||
ap.SendTime = now
|
||||
ap.IsPathMTUProbePacket = p.isMTUProbePacket
|
||||
return ap
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func getMaxPacketSize(addr net.Addr) protocol.ByteCount {
|
||||
maxSize := protocol.ByteCount(protocol.MinInitialPacketSize)
|
||||
// If this is not a UDP address, we don't know anything about the MTU.
|
||||
// Use the minimum size of an Initial packet as the max packet size.
|
||||
if udpAddr, ok := addr.(*net.UDPAddr); ok {
|
||||
if utils.IsIPv4(udpAddr.IP) {
|
||||
maxSize = protocol.InitialPacketSizeIPv4
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
maxSize = protocol.InitialPacketSizeIPv6
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return maxSize
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type packetNumberManager interface {
|
||||
PeekPacketNumber(protocol.EncryptionLevel) (protocol.PacketNumber, protocol.PacketNumberLen)
|
||||
PopPacketNumber(protocol.EncryptionLevel) protocol.PacketNumber
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type sealingManager interface {
|
||||
GetInitialSealer() (handshake.LongHeaderSealer, error)
|
||||
GetHandshakeSealer() (handshake.LongHeaderSealer, error)
|
||||
Get0RTTSealer() (handshake.LongHeaderSealer, error)
|
||||
Get1RTTSealer() (handshake.ShortHeaderSealer, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type frameSource interface {
|
||||
HasData() bool
|
||||
AppendStreamFrames([]ackhandler.Frame, protocol.ByteCount) ([]ackhandler.Frame, protocol.ByteCount)
|
||||
AppendControlFrames([]ackhandler.Frame, protocol.ByteCount) ([]ackhandler.Frame, protocol.ByteCount)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type ackFrameSource interface {
|
||||
GetAckFrame(encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel, onlyIfQueued bool) *wire.AckFrame
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type packetPacker struct {
|
||||
srcConnID protocol.ConnectionID
|
||||
getDestConnID func() protocol.ConnectionID
|
||||
|
||||
perspective protocol.Perspective
|
||||
version protocol.VersionNumber
|
||||
cryptoSetup sealingManager
|
||||
|
||||
initialStream cryptoStream
|
||||
handshakeStream cryptoStream
|
||||
|
||||
token []byte
|
||||
|
||||
pnManager packetNumberManager
|
||||
framer frameSource
|
||||
acks ackFrameSource
|
||||
datagramQueue *datagramQueue
|
||||
retransmissionQueue *retransmissionQueue
|
||||
|
||||
maxPacketSize protocol.ByteCount
|
||||
numNonAckElicitingAcks int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var _ packer = &packetPacker{}
|
||||
|
||||
func newPacketPacker(
|
||||
srcConnID protocol.ConnectionID,
|
||||
getDestConnID func() protocol.ConnectionID,
|
||||
initialStream cryptoStream,
|
||||
handshakeStream cryptoStream,
|
||||
packetNumberManager packetNumberManager,
|
||||
retransmissionQueue *retransmissionQueue,
|
||||
remoteAddr net.Addr, // only used for determining the max packet size
|
||||
cryptoSetup sealingManager,
|
||||
framer frameSource,
|
||||
acks ackFrameSource,
|
||||
datagramQueue *datagramQueue,
|
||||
perspective protocol.Perspective,
|
||||
version protocol.VersionNumber,
|
||||
) *packetPacker {
|
||||
return &packetPacker{
|
||||
cryptoSetup: cryptoSetup,
|
||||
getDestConnID: getDestConnID,
|
||||
srcConnID: srcConnID,
|
||||
initialStream: initialStream,
|
||||
handshakeStream: handshakeStream,
|
||||
retransmissionQueue: retransmissionQueue,
|
||||
datagramQueue: datagramQueue,
|
||||
perspective: perspective,
|
||||
version: version,
|
||||
framer: framer,
|
||||
acks: acks,
|
||||
pnManager: packetNumberManager,
|
||||
maxPacketSize: getMaxPacketSize(remoteAddr),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// PackConnectionClose packs a packet that closes the connection with a transport error.
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) PackConnectionClose(e *qerr.TransportError) (*coalescedPacket, error) {
|
||||
var reason string
|
||||
// don't send details of crypto errors
|
||||
if !e.ErrorCode.IsCryptoError() {
|
||||
reason = e.ErrorMessage
|
||||
}
|
||||
return p.packConnectionClose(false, uint64(e.ErrorCode), e.FrameType, reason)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// PackApplicationClose packs a packet that closes the connection with an application error.
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) PackApplicationClose(e *qerr.ApplicationError) (*coalescedPacket, error) {
|
||||
return p.packConnectionClose(true, uint64(e.ErrorCode), 0, e.ErrorMessage)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) packConnectionClose(
|
||||
isApplicationError bool,
|
||||
errorCode uint64,
|
||||
frameType uint64,
|
||||
reason string,
|
||||
) (*coalescedPacket, error) {
|
||||
var sealers [4]sealer
|
||||
var hdrs [4]*wire.ExtendedHeader
|
||||
var payloads [4]*payload
|
||||
var size protocol.ByteCount
|
||||
var numPackets uint8
|
||||
encLevels := [4]protocol.EncryptionLevel{protocol.EncryptionInitial, protocol.EncryptionHandshake, protocol.Encryption0RTT, protocol.Encryption1RTT}
|
||||
for i, encLevel := range encLevels {
|
||||
if p.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveServer && encLevel == protocol.Encryption0RTT {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
ccf := &wire.ConnectionCloseFrame{
|
||||
IsApplicationError: isApplicationError,
|
||||
ErrorCode: errorCode,
|
||||
FrameType: frameType,
|
||||
ReasonPhrase: reason,
|
||||
}
|
||||
// don't send application errors in Initial or Handshake packets
|
||||
if isApplicationError && (encLevel == protocol.EncryptionInitial || encLevel == protocol.EncryptionHandshake) {
|
||||
ccf.IsApplicationError = false
|
||||
ccf.ErrorCode = uint64(qerr.ApplicationErrorErrorCode)
|
||||
ccf.ReasonPhrase = ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
payload := &payload{
|
||||
frames: []ackhandler.Frame{{Frame: ccf}},
|
||||
length: ccf.Length(p.version),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var sealer sealer
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
var keyPhase protocol.KeyPhaseBit // only set for 1-RTT
|
||||
switch encLevel {
|
||||
case protocol.EncryptionInitial:
|
||||
sealer, err = p.cryptoSetup.GetInitialSealer()
|
||||
case protocol.EncryptionHandshake:
|
||||
sealer, err = p.cryptoSetup.GetHandshakeSealer()
|
||||
case protocol.Encryption0RTT:
|
||||
sealer, err = p.cryptoSetup.Get0RTTSealer()
|
||||
case protocol.Encryption1RTT:
|
||||
var s handshake.ShortHeaderSealer
|
||||
s, err = p.cryptoSetup.Get1RTTSealer()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
keyPhase = s.KeyPhase()
|
||||
}
|
||||
sealer = s
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err == handshake.ErrKeysNotYetAvailable || err == handshake.ErrKeysDropped {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
sealers[i] = sealer
|
||||
var hdr *wire.ExtendedHeader
|
||||
if encLevel == protocol.Encryption1RTT {
|
||||
hdr = p.getShortHeader(keyPhase)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
hdr = p.getLongHeader(encLevel)
|
||||
}
|
||||
hdrs[i] = hdr
|
||||
payloads[i] = payload
|
||||
size += p.packetLength(hdr, payload) + protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead())
|
||||
numPackets++
|
||||
}
|
||||
contents := make([]*packetContents, 0, numPackets)
|
||||
buffer := getPacketBuffer()
|
||||
for i, encLevel := range encLevels {
|
||||
if sealers[i] == nil {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
var paddingLen protocol.ByteCount
|
||||
if encLevel == protocol.EncryptionInitial {
|
||||
paddingLen = p.initialPaddingLen(payloads[i].frames, size)
|
||||
}
|
||||
c, err := p.appendPacket(buffer, hdrs[i], payloads[i], paddingLen, encLevel, sealers[i], false)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
contents = append(contents, c)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &coalescedPacket{buffer: buffer, packets: contents}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// packetLength calculates the length of the serialized packet.
|
||||
// It takes into account that packets that have a tiny payload need to be padded,
|
||||
// such that len(payload) + packet number len >= 4 + AEAD overhead
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) packetLength(hdr *wire.ExtendedHeader, payload *payload) protocol.ByteCount {
|
||||
var paddingLen protocol.ByteCount
|
||||
pnLen := protocol.ByteCount(hdr.PacketNumberLen)
|
||||
if payload.length < 4-pnLen {
|
||||
paddingLen = 4 - pnLen - payload.length
|
||||
}
|
||||
return hdr.GetLength(p.version) + payload.length + paddingLen
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// size is the expected size of the packet, if no padding was applied.
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) initialPaddingLen(frames []ackhandler.Frame, size protocol.ByteCount) protocol.ByteCount {
|
||||
// For the server, only ack-eliciting Initial packets need to be padded.
|
||||
if p.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveServer && !ackhandler.HasAckElicitingFrames(frames) {
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
if size >= p.maxPacketSize {
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
return p.maxPacketSize - size
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// PackCoalescedPacket packs a new packet.
|
||||
// It packs an Initial / Handshake if there is data to send in these packet number spaces.
|
||||
// It should only be called before the handshake is confirmed.
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) PackCoalescedPacket(onlyAck bool) (*coalescedPacket, error) {
|
||||
maxPacketSize := p.maxPacketSize
|
||||
if p.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient {
|
||||
maxPacketSize = protocol.MinInitialPacketSize
|
||||
}
|
||||
var initialHdr, handshakeHdr, appDataHdr *wire.ExtendedHeader
|
||||
var initialPayload, handshakePayload, appDataPayload *payload
|
||||
var numPackets int
|
||||
// Try packing an Initial packet.
|
||||
initialSealer, err := p.cryptoSetup.GetInitialSealer()
|
||||
if err != nil && err != handshake.ErrKeysDropped {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
var size protocol.ByteCount
|
||||
if initialSealer != nil {
|
||||
initialHdr, initialPayload = p.maybeGetCryptoPacket(maxPacketSize-protocol.ByteCount(initialSealer.Overhead()), protocol.EncryptionInitial, onlyAck, true)
|
||||
if initialPayload != nil {
|
||||
size += p.packetLength(initialHdr, initialPayload) + protocol.ByteCount(initialSealer.Overhead())
|
||||
numPackets++
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Add a Handshake packet.
|
||||
var handshakeSealer sealer
|
||||
if (onlyAck && size == 0) || (!onlyAck && size < maxPacketSize-protocol.MinCoalescedPacketSize) {
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
handshakeSealer, err = p.cryptoSetup.GetHandshakeSealer()
|
||||
if err != nil && err != handshake.ErrKeysDropped && err != handshake.ErrKeysNotYetAvailable {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if handshakeSealer != nil {
|
||||
handshakeHdr, handshakePayload = p.maybeGetCryptoPacket(maxPacketSize-size-protocol.ByteCount(handshakeSealer.Overhead()), protocol.EncryptionHandshake, onlyAck, size == 0)
|
||||
if handshakePayload != nil {
|
||||
s := p.packetLength(handshakeHdr, handshakePayload) + protocol.ByteCount(handshakeSealer.Overhead())
|
||||
size += s
|
||||
numPackets++
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Add a 0-RTT / 1-RTT packet.
|
||||
var appDataSealer sealer
|
||||
appDataEncLevel := protocol.Encryption1RTT
|
||||
if (onlyAck && size == 0) || (!onlyAck && size < maxPacketSize-protocol.MinCoalescedPacketSize) {
|
||||
var sErr error
|
||||
var oneRTTSealer handshake.ShortHeaderSealer
|
||||
oneRTTSealer, sErr = p.cryptoSetup.Get1RTTSealer()
|
||||
appDataSealer = oneRTTSealer
|
||||
if sErr != nil && p.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient {
|
||||
appDataSealer, sErr = p.cryptoSetup.Get0RTTSealer()
|
||||
appDataEncLevel = protocol.Encryption0RTT
|
||||
}
|
||||
if appDataSealer != nil && sErr == nil {
|
||||
//nolint:exhaustive // 0-RTT and 1-RTT are the only two application data encryption levels.
|
||||
switch appDataEncLevel {
|
||||
case protocol.Encryption0RTT:
|
||||
appDataHdr, appDataPayload = p.maybeGetAppDataPacketFor0RTT(appDataSealer, maxPacketSize-size)
|
||||
case protocol.Encryption1RTT:
|
||||
appDataHdr, appDataPayload = p.maybeGetShortHeaderPacket(oneRTTSealer, maxPacketSize-size, onlyAck, size == 0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if appDataHdr != nil && appDataPayload != nil {
|
||||
size += p.packetLength(appDataHdr, appDataPayload) + protocol.ByteCount(appDataSealer.Overhead())
|
||||
numPackets++
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if numPackets == 0 {
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
buffer := getPacketBuffer()
|
||||
packet := &coalescedPacket{
|
||||
buffer: buffer,
|
||||
packets: make([]*packetContents, 0, numPackets),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if initialPayload != nil {
|
||||
padding := p.initialPaddingLen(initialPayload.frames, size)
|
||||
cont, err := p.appendPacket(buffer, initialHdr, initialPayload, padding, protocol.EncryptionInitial, initialSealer, false)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
packet.packets = append(packet.packets, cont)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if handshakePayload != nil {
|
||||
cont, err := p.appendPacket(buffer, handshakeHdr, handshakePayload, 0, protocol.EncryptionHandshake, handshakeSealer, false)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
packet.packets = append(packet.packets, cont)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if appDataPayload != nil {
|
||||
cont, err := p.appendPacket(buffer, appDataHdr, appDataPayload, 0, appDataEncLevel, appDataSealer, false)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
packet.packets = append(packet.packets, cont)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return packet, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// PackPacket packs a packet in the application data packet number space.
|
||||
// It should be called after the handshake is confirmed.
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) PackPacket(onlyAck bool) (*packedPacket, error) {
|
||||
sealer, err := p.cryptoSetup.Get1RTTSealer()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
hdr, payload := p.maybeGetShortHeaderPacket(sealer, p.maxPacketSize, onlyAck, true)
|
||||
if payload == nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
buffer := getPacketBuffer()
|
||||
cont, err := p.appendPacket(buffer, hdr, payload, 0, protocol.Encryption1RTT, sealer, false)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &packedPacket{
|
||||
buffer: buffer,
|
||||
packetContents: cont,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) maybeGetCryptoPacket(maxPacketSize protocol.ByteCount, encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel, onlyAck, ackAllowed bool) (*wire.ExtendedHeader, *payload) {
|
||||
if onlyAck {
|
||||
if ack := p.acks.GetAckFrame(encLevel, true); ack != nil {
|
||||
var payload payload
|
||||
payload.ack = ack
|
||||
payload.length = ack.Length(p.version)
|
||||
return p.getLongHeader(encLevel), &payload
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var s cryptoStream
|
||||
var hasRetransmission bool
|
||||
//nolint:exhaustive // Initial and Handshake are the only two encryption levels here.
|
||||
switch encLevel {
|
||||
case protocol.EncryptionInitial:
|
||||
s = p.initialStream
|
||||
hasRetransmission = p.retransmissionQueue.HasInitialData()
|
||||
case protocol.EncryptionHandshake:
|
||||
s = p.handshakeStream
|
||||
hasRetransmission = p.retransmissionQueue.HasHandshakeData()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hasData := s.HasData()
|
||||
var ack *wire.AckFrame
|
||||
if ackAllowed {
|
||||
ack = p.acks.GetAckFrame(encLevel, !hasRetransmission && !hasData)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !hasData && !hasRetransmission && ack == nil {
|
||||
// nothing to send
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var payload payload
|
||||
if ack != nil {
|
||||
payload.ack = ack
|
||||
payload.length = ack.Length(p.version)
|
||||
maxPacketSize -= payload.length
|
||||
}
|
||||
hdr := p.getLongHeader(encLevel)
|
||||
maxPacketSize -= hdr.GetLength(p.version)
|
||||
if hasRetransmission {
|
||||
for {
|
||||
var f wire.Frame
|
||||
//nolint:exhaustive // 0-RTT packets can't contain any retransmission.s
|
||||
switch encLevel {
|
||||
case protocol.EncryptionInitial:
|
||||
f = p.retransmissionQueue.GetInitialFrame(maxPacketSize)
|
||||
case protocol.EncryptionHandshake:
|
||||
f = p.retransmissionQueue.GetHandshakeFrame(maxPacketSize)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if f == nil {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
payload.frames = append(payload.frames, ackhandler.Frame{Frame: f})
|
||||
frameLen := f.Length(p.version)
|
||||
payload.length += frameLen
|
||||
maxPacketSize -= frameLen
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if s.HasData() {
|
||||
cf := s.PopCryptoFrame(maxPacketSize)
|
||||
payload.frames = []ackhandler.Frame{{Frame: cf}}
|
||||
payload.length += cf.Length(p.version)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return hdr, &payload
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) maybeGetAppDataPacketFor0RTT(sealer sealer, maxPacketSize protocol.ByteCount) (*wire.ExtendedHeader, *payload) {
|
||||
if p.perspective != protocol.PerspectiveClient {
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hdr := p.getLongHeader(protocol.Encryption0RTT)
|
||||
maxPayloadSize := maxPacketSize - hdr.GetLength(p.version) - protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead())
|
||||
payload := p.maybeGetAppDataPacket(maxPayloadSize, false, false)
|
||||
return hdr, payload
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) maybeGetShortHeaderPacket(sealer handshake.ShortHeaderSealer, maxPacketSize protocol.ByteCount, onlyAck, ackAllowed bool) (*wire.ExtendedHeader, *payload) {
|
||||
hdr := p.getShortHeader(sealer.KeyPhase())
|
||||
maxPayloadSize := maxPacketSize - hdr.GetLength(p.version) - protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead())
|
||||
payload := p.maybeGetAppDataPacket(maxPayloadSize, onlyAck, ackAllowed)
|
||||
return hdr, payload
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) maybeGetAppDataPacket(maxPayloadSize protocol.ByteCount, onlyAck, ackAllowed bool) *payload {
|
||||
payload := p.composeNextPacket(maxPayloadSize, onlyAck, ackAllowed)
|
||||
|
||||
// check if we have anything to send
|
||||
if len(payload.frames) == 0 {
|
||||
if payload.ack == nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
// the packet only contains an ACK
|
||||
if p.numNonAckElicitingAcks >= protocol.MaxNonAckElicitingAcks {
|
||||
ping := &wire.PingFrame{}
|
||||
// don't retransmit the PING frame when it is lost
|
||||
payload.frames = append(payload.frames, ackhandler.Frame{Frame: ping, OnLost: func(wire.Frame) {}})
|
||||
payload.length += ping.Length(p.version)
|
||||
p.numNonAckElicitingAcks = 0
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
p.numNonAckElicitingAcks++
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
p.numNonAckElicitingAcks = 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
return payload
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) composeNextPacket(maxFrameSize protocol.ByteCount, onlyAck, ackAllowed bool) *payload {
|
||||
if onlyAck {
|
||||
if ack := p.acks.GetAckFrame(protocol.Encryption1RTT, true); ack != nil {
|
||||
payload := &payload{}
|
||||
payload.ack = ack
|
||||
payload.length += ack.Length(p.version)
|
||||
return payload
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &payload{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
payload := &payload{frames: make([]ackhandler.Frame, 0, 1)}
|
||||
|
||||
hasData := p.framer.HasData()
|
||||
hasRetransmission := p.retransmissionQueue.HasAppData()
|
||||
|
||||
var hasAck bool
|
||||
if ackAllowed {
|
||||
if ack := p.acks.GetAckFrame(protocol.Encryption1RTT, !hasRetransmission && !hasData); ack != nil {
|
||||
payload.ack = ack
|
||||
payload.length += ack.Length(p.version)
|
||||
hasAck = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if p.datagramQueue != nil {
|
||||
if f := p.datagramQueue.Peek(); f != nil {
|
||||
size := f.Length(p.version)
|
||||
if size <= maxFrameSize-payload.length {
|
||||
payload.frames = append(payload.frames, ackhandler.Frame{
|
||||
Frame: f,
|
||||
// set it to a no-op. Then we won't set the default callback, which would retransmit the frame.
|
||||
OnLost: func(wire.Frame) {},
|
||||
})
|
||||
payload.length += size
|
||||
p.datagramQueue.Pop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hasAck && !hasData && !hasRetransmission {
|
||||
return payload
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hasRetransmission {
|
||||
for {
|
||||
remainingLen := maxFrameSize - payload.length
|
||||
if remainingLen < protocol.MinStreamFrameSize {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
f := p.retransmissionQueue.GetAppDataFrame(remainingLen)
|
||||
if f == nil {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
payload.frames = append(payload.frames, ackhandler.Frame{Frame: f})
|
||||
payload.length += f.Length(p.version)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hasData {
|
||||
var lengthAdded protocol.ByteCount
|
||||
payload.frames, lengthAdded = p.framer.AppendControlFrames(payload.frames, maxFrameSize-payload.length)
|
||||
payload.length += lengthAdded
|
||||
|
||||
payload.frames, lengthAdded = p.framer.AppendStreamFrames(payload.frames, maxFrameSize-payload.length)
|
||||
payload.length += lengthAdded
|
||||
}
|
||||
return payload
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) MaybePackProbePacket(encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) (*packedPacket, error) {
|
||||
var hdr *wire.ExtendedHeader
|
||||
var payload *payload
|
||||
var sealer sealer
|
||||
//nolint:exhaustive // Probe packets are never sent for 0-RTT.
|
||||
switch encLevel {
|
||||
case protocol.EncryptionInitial:
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
sealer, err = p.cryptoSetup.GetInitialSealer()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
hdr, payload = p.maybeGetCryptoPacket(p.maxPacketSize-protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead()), protocol.EncryptionInitial, false, true)
|
||||
case protocol.EncryptionHandshake:
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
sealer, err = p.cryptoSetup.GetHandshakeSealer()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
hdr, payload = p.maybeGetCryptoPacket(p.maxPacketSize-protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead()), protocol.EncryptionHandshake, false, true)
|
||||
case protocol.Encryption1RTT:
|
||||
oneRTTSealer, err := p.cryptoSetup.Get1RTTSealer()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
sealer = oneRTTSealer
|
||||
hdr = p.getShortHeader(oneRTTSealer.KeyPhase())
|
||||
payload = p.maybeGetAppDataPacket(p.maxPacketSize-protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead())-hdr.GetLength(p.version), false, true)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
panic("unknown encryption level")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if payload == nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
size := p.packetLength(hdr, payload) + protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead())
|
||||
var padding protocol.ByteCount
|
||||
if encLevel == protocol.EncryptionInitial {
|
||||
padding = p.initialPaddingLen(payload.frames, size)
|
||||
}
|
||||
buffer := getPacketBuffer()
|
||||
cont, err := p.appendPacket(buffer, hdr, payload, padding, encLevel, sealer, false)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &packedPacket{
|
||||
buffer: buffer,
|
||||
packetContents: cont,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) PackMTUProbePacket(ping ackhandler.Frame, size protocol.ByteCount) (*packedPacket, error) {
|
||||
payload := &payload{
|
||||
frames: []ackhandler.Frame{ping},
|
||||
length: ping.Length(p.version),
|
||||
}
|
||||
buffer := getPacketBuffer()
|
||||
sealer, err := p.cryptoSetup.Get1RTTSealer()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
hdr := p.getShortHeader(sealer.KeyPhase())
|
||||
padding := size - p.packetLength(hdr, payload) - protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead())
|
||||
contents, err := p.appendPacket(buffer, hdr, payload, padding, protocol.Encryption1RTT, sealer, true)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
contents.isMTUProbePacket = true
|
||||
return &packedPacket{
|
||||
buffer: buffer,
|
||||
packetContents: contents,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) getShortHeader(kp protocol.KeyPhaseBit) *wire.ExtendedHeader {
|
||||
pn, pnLen := p.pnManager.PeekPacketNumber(protocol.Encryption1RTT)
|
||||
hdr := &wire.ExtendedHeader{}
|
||||
hdr.PacketNumber = pn
|
||||
hdr.PacketNumberLen = pnLen
|
||||
hdr.DestConnectionID = p.getDestConnID()
|
||||
hdr.KeyPhase = kp
|
||||
return hdr
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) getLongHeader(encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) *wire.ExtendedHeader {
|
||||
pn, pnLen := p.pnManager.PeekPacketNumber(encLevel)
|
||||
hdr := &wire.ExtendedHeader{
|
||||
PacketNumber: pn,
|
||||
PacketNumberLen: pnLen,
|
||||
}
|
||||
hdr.IsLongHeader = true
|
||||
hdr.Version = p.version
|
||||
hdr.SrcConnectionID = p.srcConnID
|
||||
hdr.DestConnectionID = p.getDestConnID()
|
||||
|
||||
//nolint:exhaustive // 1-RTT packets are not long header packets.
|
||||
switch encLevel {
|
||||
case protocol.EncryptionInitial:
|
||||
hdr.Type = protocol.PacketTypeInitial
|
||||
hdr.Token = p.token
|
||||
case protocol.EncryptionHandshake:
|
||||
hdr.Type = protocol.PacketTypeHandshake
|
||||
case protocol.Encryption0RTT:
|
||||
hdr.Type = protocol.PacketType0RTT
|
||||
}
|
||||
return hdr
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) appendPacket(buffer *packetBuffer, header *wire.ExtendedHeader, payload *payload, padding protocol.ByteCount, encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel, sealer sealer, isMTUProbePacket bool) (*packetContents, error) {
|
||||
var paddingLen protocol.ByteCount
|
||||
pnLen := protocol.ByteCount(header.PacketNumberLen)
|
||||
if payload.length < 4-pnLen {
|
||||
paddingLen = 4 - pnLen - payload.length
|
||||
}
|
||||
paddingLen += padding
|
||||
if header.IsLongHeader {
|
||||
header.Length = pnLen + protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead()) + payload.length + paddingLen
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hdrOffset := buffer.Len()
|
||||
buf := bytes.NewBuffer(buffer.Data)
|
||||
if err := header.Write(buf, p.version); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
payloadOffset := buf.Len()
|
||||
raw := buffer.Data[:payloadOffset]
|
||||
|
||||
if payload.ack != nil {
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
raw, err = payload.ack.Append(raw, p.version)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if paddingLen > 0 {
|
||||
raw = append(raw, make([]byte, paddingLen)...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, frame := range payload.frames {
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
raw, err = frame.Append(raw, p.version)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if payloadSize := protocol.ByteCount(len(raw)-payloadOffset) - paddingLen; payloadSize != payload.length {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("PacketPacker BUG: payload size inconsistent (expected %d, got %d bytes)", payload.length, payloadSize)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !isMTUProbePacket {
|
||||
if size := protocol.ByteCount(len(raw) + sealer.Overhead()); size > p.maxPacketSize {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("PacketPacker BUG: packet too large (%d bytes, allowed %d bytes)", size, p.maxPacketSize)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// encrypt the packet
|
||||
_ = sealer.Seal(raw[payloadOffset:payloadOffset], raw[payloadOffset:], header.PacketNumber, raw[hdrOffset:payloadOffset])
|
||||
raw = raw[0 : len(raw)+sealer.Overhead()]
|
||||
// apply header protection
|
||||
pnOffset := payloadOffset - int(header.PacketNumberLen)
|
||||
sealer.EncryptHeader(raw[pnOffset+4:pnOffset+4+16], &raw[hdrOffset], raw[pnOffset:payloadOffset])
|
||||
buffer.Data = raw
|
||||
|
||||
num := p.pnManager.PopPacketNumber(encLevel)
|
||||
if num != header.PacketNumber {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("packetPacker BUG: Peeked and Popped packet numbers do not match")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &packetContents{
|
||||
header: header,
|
||||
ack: payload.ack,
|
||||
frames: payload.frames,
|
||||
length: buffer.Len() - hdrOffset,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) SetToken(token []byte) {
|
||||
p.token = token
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// When a higher MTU is discovered, use it.
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) SetMaxPacketSize(s protocol.ByteCount) {
|
||||
p.maxPacketSize = s
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// If the peer sets a max_packet_size that's smaller than the size we're currently using,
|
||||
// we need to reduce the size of packets we send.
|
||||
func (p *packetPacker) HandleTransportParameters(params *wire.TransportParameters) {
|
||||
if params.MaxUDPPayloadSize != 0 {
|
||||
p.maxPacketSize = utils.Min(p.maxPacketSize, params.MaxUDPPayloadSize)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
6
vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18/README.md
generated
vendored
6
vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18/README.md
generated
vendored
@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# qtls
|
||||
|
||||
[![Go Reference](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17.svg)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17)
|
||||
[![.github/workflows/go-test.yml](https://github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17/actions/workflows/go-test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17/actions/workflows/go-test.yml)
|
||||
|
||||
This repository contains a modified version of the standard library's TLS implementation, modified for the QUIC protocol. It is used by [quic-go](https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go).
|
6
vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/README.md
generated
vendored
6
vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/README.md
generated
vendored
@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# qtls
|
||||
|
||||
[![Go Reference](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17.svg)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17)
|
||||
[![.github/workflows/go-test.yml](https://github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17/actions/workflows/go-test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17/actions/workflows/go-test.yml)
|
||||
|
||||
This repository contains a modified version of the standard library's TLS implementation, modified for the QUIC protocol. It is used by [quic-go](https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go).
|
5
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qpack/tools.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
5
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qpack/tools.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
//go:build tools
|
||||
|
||||
package qpack
|
||||
|
||||
import _ "github.com/onsi/ginkgo/v2/ginkgo"
|
6
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/README.md
generated
vendored
Normal file
6
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/README.md
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# qtls
|
||||
|
||||
[![Go Reference](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18.svg)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18)
|
||||
[![.github/workflows/go-test.yml](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/actions/workflows/go-test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/actions/workflows/go-test.yml)
|
||||
|
||||
This repository contains a modified version of the standard library's TLS implementation, modified for the QUIC protocol. It is used by [quic-go](https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go).
|
@ -345,7 +345,8 @@ type clientSessionState struct {
|
||||
// goroutines. Up to TLS 1.2, only ticket-based resumption is supported, not
|
||||
// SessionID-based resumption. In TLS 1.3 they were merged into PSK modes, which
|
||||
// are supported via this interface.
|
||||
//go:generate sh -c "mockgen -package qtls -destination mock_client_session_cache_test.go github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17 ClientSessionCache"
|
||||
//
|
||||
//go:generate sh -c "mockgen -package qtls -destination mock_client_session_cache_test.go github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18 ClientSessionCache"
|
||||
type ClientSessionCache = tls.ClientSessionCache
|
||||
|
||||
// SignatureScheme is a tls.SignatureScheme
|
@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ type Conn struct {
|
||||
used0RTT bool
|
||||
|
||||
tmp [16]byte
|
||||
|
||||
connStateMutex sync.Mutex
|
||||
connState ConnectionStateWith0RTT
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Access to net.Conn methods.
|
||||
@ -1533,19 +1536,16 @@ func (c *Conn) handshakeContext(ctx context.Context) (ret error) {
|
||||
|
||||
// ConnectionState returns basic TLS details about the connection.
|
||||
func (c *Conn) ConnectionState() ConnectionState {
|
||||
c.handshakeMutex.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock()
|
||||
return c.connectionStateLocked()
|
||||
c.connStateMutex.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock()
|
||||
return c.connState.ConnectionState
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ConnectionStateWith0RTT returns basic TLS details (incl. 0-RTT status) about the connection.
|
||||
func (c *Conn) ConnectionStateWith0RTT() ConnectionStateWith0RTT {
|
||||
c.handshakeMutex.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock()
|
||||
return ConnectionStateWith0RTT{
|
||||
ConnectionState: c.connectionStateLocked(),
|
||||
Used0RTT: c.used0RTT,
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.connStateMutex.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock()
|
||||
return c.connState
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Conn) connectionStateLocked() ConnectionState {
|
||||
@ -1576,6 +1576,15 @@ func (c *Conn) connectionStateLocked() ConnectionState {
|
||||
return toConnectionState(state)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Conn) updateConnectionState() {
|
||||
c.connStateMutex.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock()
|
||||
c.connState = ConnectionStateWith0RTT{
|
||||
Used0RTT: c.used0RTT,
|
||||
ConnectionState: c.connectionStateLocked(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// OCSPResponse returns the stapled OCSP response from the TLS server, if
|
||||
// any. (Only valid for client connections.)
|
||||
func (c *Conn) OCSPResponse() []byte {
|
@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
|
||||
c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, toClientSessionState(hs.session))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
|
||||
if err := hs.processServerHello(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
|
||||
if err := hs.readServerCertificate(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
if err := hs.readServerFinished(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -104,7 +106,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error {
|
||||
c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
|
||||
atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
|
||||
if err := hs.checkForResumption(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
if err := hs.pickCertificate(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -75,12 +76,13 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
|
||||
if err := hs.readClientCertificate(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
if err := hs.readClientFinished(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
6
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/README.md
generated
vendored
Normal file
6
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/README.md
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# qtls
|
||||
|
||||
[![Go Reference](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19.svg)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19)
|
||||
[![.github/workflows/go-test.yml](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/actions/workflows/go-test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/actions/workflows/go-test.yml)
|
||||
|
||||
This repository contains a modified version of the standard library's TLS implementation, modified for the QUIC protocol. It is used by [quic-go](https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go).
|
@ -345,7 +345,8 @@ type clientSessionState struct {
|
||||
// goroutines. Up to TLS 1.2, only ticket-based resumption is supported, not
|
||||
// SessionID-based resumption. In TLS 1.3 they were merged into PSK modes, which
|
||||
// are supported via this interface.
|
||||
//go:generate sh -c "mockgen -package qtls -destination mock_client_session_cache_test.go github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17 ClientSessionCache"
|
||||
//
|
||||
//go:generate sh -c "mockgen -package qtls -destination mock_client_session_cache_test.go github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19 ClientSessionCache"
|
||||
type ClientSessionCache = tls.ClientSessionCache
|
||||
|
||||
// SignatureScheme is a tls.SignatureScheme
|
@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ type Conn struct {
|
||||
used0RTT bool
|
||||
|
||||
tmp [16]byte
|
||||
|
||||
connStateMutex sync.Mutex
|
||||
connState ConnectionStateWith0RTT
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Access to net.Conn methods.
|
||||
@ -1535,19 +1538,16 @@ func (c *Conn) handshakeContext(ctx context.Context) (ret error) {
|
||||
|
||||
// ConnectionState returns basic TLS details about the connection.
|
||||
func (c *Conn) ConnectionState() ConnectionState {
|
||||
c.handshakeMutex.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock()
|
||||
return c.connectionStateLocked()
|
||||
c.connStateMutex.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock()
|
||||
return c.connState.ConnectionState
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ConnectionStateWith0RTT returns basic TLS details (incl. 0-RTT status) about the connection.
|
||||
func (c *Conn) ConnectionStateWith0RTT() ConnectionStateWith0RTT {
|
||||
c.handshakeMutex.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock()
|
||||
return ConnectionStateWith0RTT{
|
||||
ConnectionState: c.connectionStateLocked(),
|
||||
Used0RTT: c.used0RTT,
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.connStateMutex.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock()
|
||||
return c.connState
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Conn) connectionStateLocked() ConnectionState {
|
||||
@ -1578,6 +1578,15 @@ func (c *Conn) connectionStateLocked() ConnectionState {
|
||||
return toConnectionState(state)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Conn) updateConnectionState() {
|
||||
c.connStateMutex.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock()
|
||||
c.connState = ConnectionStateWith0RTT{
|
||||
Used0RTT: c.used0RTT,
|
||||
ConnectionState: c.connectionStateLocked(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// OCSPResponse returns the stapled OCSP response from the TLS server, if
|
||||
// any. (Only valid for client connections.)
|
||||
func (c *Conn) OCSPResponse() []byte {
|
@ -295,6 +295,7 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
|
||||
c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, toClientSessionState(hs.session))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
|
||||
if err := hs.processServerHello(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -94,6 +95,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
|
||||
if err := hs.readServerCertificate(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
if err := hs.readServerFinished(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -108,7 +110,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error {
|
||||
c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
|
||||
atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
|
||||
if err := hs.checkForResumption(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
if err := hs.pickCertificate(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -79,12 +80,13 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
|
||||
if err := hs.readClientCertificate(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
if err := hs.readClientFinished(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
27
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/LICENSE
generated
vendored
Normal file
27
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/LICENSE
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
|
||||
Copyright (c) 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
|
||||
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
||||
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
|
||||
met:
|
||||
|
||||
* Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
||||
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
||||
* Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
|
||||
copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
|
||||
in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
|
||||
distribution.
|
||||
* Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its
|
||||
contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
|
||||
this software without specific prior written permission.
|
||||
|
||||
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
|
||||
"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
|
||||
LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
|
||||
A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
|
||||
OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
||||
SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
|
||||
LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
|
||||
DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
|
||||
THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
|
||||
(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
|
||||
OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
6
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/README.md
generated
vendored
Normal file
6
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/README.md
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# qtls
|
||||
|
||||
[![Go Reference](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20.svg)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20)
|
||||
[![.github/workflows/go-test.yml](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/actions/workflows/go-test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/actions/workflows/go-test.yml)
|
||||
|
||||
This repository contains a modified version of the standard library's TLS implementation, modified for the QUIC protocol. It is used by [quic-go](https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go).
|
102
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/alert.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
102
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/alert.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
import "strconv"
|
||||
|
||||
type alert uint8
|
||||
|
||||
// Alert is a TLS alert
|
||||
type Alert = alert
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// alert level
|
||||
alertLevelWarning = 1
|
||||
alertLevelError = 2
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
alertCloseNotify alert = 0
|
||||
alertUnexpectedMessage alert = 10
|
||||
alertBadRecordMAC alert = 20
|
||||
alertDecryptionFailed alert = 21
|
||||
alertRecordOverflow alert = 22
|
||||
alertDecompressionFailure alert = 30
|
||||
alertHandshakeFailure alert = 40
|
||||
alertBadCertificate alert = 42
|
||||
alertUnsupportedCertificate alert = 43
|
||||
alertCertificateRevoked alert = 44
|
||||
alertCertificateExpired alert = 45
|
||||
alertCertificateUnknown alert = 46
|
||||
alertIllegalParameter alert = 47
|
||||
alertUnknownCA alert = 48
|
||||
alertAccessDenied alert = 49
|
||||
alertDecodeError alert = 50
|
||||
alertDecryptError alert = 51
|
||||
alertExportRestriction alert = 60
|
||||
alertProtocolVersion alert = 70
|
||||
alertInsufficientSecurity alert = 71
|
||||
alertInternalError alert = 80
|
||||
alertInappropriateFallback alert = 86
|
||||
alertUserCanceled alert = 90
|
||||
alertNoRenegotiation alert = 100
|
||||
alertMissingExtension alert = 109
|
||||
alertUnsupportedExtension alert = 110
|
||||
alertCertificateUnobtainable alert = 111
|
||||
alertUnrecognizedName alert = 112
|
||||
alertBadCertificateStatusResponse alert = 113
|
||||
alertBadCertificateHashValue alert = 114
|
||||
alertUnknownPSKIdentity alert = 115
|
||||
alertCertificateRequired alert = 116
|
||||
alertNoApplicationProtocol alert = 120
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var alertText = map[alert]string{
|
||||
alertCloseNotify: "close notify",
|
||||
alertUnexpectedMessage: "unexpected message",
|
||||
alertBadRecordMAC: "bad record MAC",
|
||||
alertDecryptionFailed: "decryption failed",
|
||||
alertRecordOverflow: "record overflow",
|
||||
alertDecompressionFailure: "decompression failure",
|
||||
alertHandshakeFailure: "handshake failure",
|
||||
alertBadCertificate: "bad certificate",
|
||||
alertUnsupportedCertificate: "unsupported certificate",
|
||||
alertCertificateRevoked: "revoked certificate",
|
||||
alertCertificateExpired: "expired certificate",
|
||||
alertCertificateUnknown: "unknown certificate",
|
||||
alertIllegalParameter: "illegal parameter",
|
||||
alertUnknownCA: "unknown certificate authority",
|
||||
alertAccessDenied: "access denied",
|
||||
alertDecodeError: "error decoding message",
|
||||
alertDecryptError: "error decrypting message",
|
||||
alertExportRestriction: "export restriction",
|
||||
alertProtocolVersion: "protocol version not supported",
|
||||
alertInsufficientSecurity: "insufficient security level",
|
||||
alertInternalError: "internal error",
|
||||
alertInappropriateFallback: "inappropriate fallback",
|
||||
alertUserCanceled: "user canceled",
|
||||
alertNoRenegotiation: "no renegotiation",
|
||||
alertMissingExtension: "missing extension",
|
||||
alertUnsupportedExtension: "unsupported extension",
|
||||
alertCertificateUnobtainable: "certificate unobtainable",
|
||||
alertUnrecognizedName: "unrecognized name",
|
||||
alertBadCertificateStatusResponse: "bad certificate status response",
|
||||
alertBadCertificateHashValue: "bad certificate hash value",
|
||||
alertUnknownPSKIdentity: "unknown PSK identity",
|
||||
alertCertificateRequired: "certificate required",
|
||||
alertNoApplicationProtocol: "no application protocol",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (e alert) String() string {
|
||||
s, ok := alertText[e]
|
||||
if ok {
|
||||
return "tls: " + s
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "tls: alert(" + strconv.Itoa(int(e)) + ")"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (e alert) Error() string {
|
||||
return e.String()
|
||||
}
|
293
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/auth.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
293
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/auth.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"crypto"
|
||||
"crypto/ecdsa"
|
||||
"crypto/ed25519"
|
||||
"crypto/elliptic"
|
||||
"crypto/rsa"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"hash"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// verifyHandshakeSignature verifies a signature against pre-hashed
|
||||
// (if required) handshake contents.
|
||||
func verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType uint8, pubkey crypto.PublicKey, hashFunc crypto.Hash, signed, sig []byte) error {
|
||||
switch sigType {
|
||||
case signatureECDSA:
|
||||
pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("expected an ECDSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !ecdsa.VerifyASN1(pubKey, signed, sig) {
|
||||
return errors.New("ECDSA verification failure")
|
||||
}
|
||||
case signatureEd25519:
|
||||
pubKey, ok := pubkey.(ed25519.PublicKey)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("expected an Ed25519 public key, got %T", pubkey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !ed25519.Verify(pubKey, signed, sig) {
|
||||
return errors.New("Ed25519 verification failure")
|
||||
}
|
||||
case signaturePKCS1v15:
|
||||
pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("expected an RSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pubKey, hashFunc, signed, sig); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
case signatureRSAPSS:
|
||||
pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("expected an RSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
signOpts := &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash}
|
||||
if err := rsa.VerifyPSS(pubKey, hashFunc, signed, sig, signOpts); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return errors.New("internal error: unknown signature type")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
serverSignatureContext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify\x00"
|
||||
clientSignatureContext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify\x00"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var signaturePadding = []byte{
|
||||
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
|
||||
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
|
||||
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
|
||||
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
|
||||
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
|
||||
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
|
||||
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
|
||||
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// signedMessage returns the pre-hashed (if necessary) message to be signed by
|
||||
// certificate keys in TLS 1.3. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
|
||||
func signedMessage(sigHash crypto.Hash, context string, transcript hash.Hash) []byte {
|
||||
if sigHash == directSigning {
|
||||
b := &bytes.Buffer{}
|
||||
b.Write(signaturePadding)
|
||||
io.WriteString(b, context)
|
||||
b.Write(transcript.Sum(nil))
|
||||
return b.Bytes()
|
||||
}
|
||||
h := sigHash.New()
|
||||
h.Write(signaturePadding)
|
||||
io.WriteString(h, context)
|
||||
h.Write(transcript.Sum(nil))
|
||||
return h.Sum(nil)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme returns the corresponding signature type and
|
||||
// crypto.Hash for a given TLS SignatureScheme.
|
||||
func typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme) (sigType uint8, hash crypto.Hash, err error) {
|
||||
switch signatureAlgorithm {
|
||||
case PKCS1WithSHA1, PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512:
|
||||
sigType = signaturePKCS1v15
|
||||
case PSSWithSHA256, PSSWithSHA384, PSSWithSHA512:
|
||||
sigType = signatureRSAPSS
|
||||
case ECDSAWithSHA1, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512:
|
||||
sigType = signatureECDSA
|
||||
case Ed25519:
|
||||
sigType = signatureEd25519
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %v", signatureAlgorithm)
|
||||
}
|
||||
switch signatureAlgorithm {
|
||||
case PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1:
|
||||
hash = crypto.SHA1
|
||||
case PKCS1WithSHA256, PSSWithSHA256, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256:
|
||||
hash = crypto.SHA256
|
||||
case PKCS1WithSHA384, PSSWithSHA384, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384:
|
||||
hash = crypto.SHA384
|
||||
case PKCS1WithSHA512, PSSWithSHA512, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512:
|
||||
hash = crypto.SHA512
|
||||
case Ed25519:
|
||||
hash = directSigning
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %v", signatureAlgorithm)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return sigType, hash, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey returns the fixed signature type and crypto.Hash for
|
||||
// a given public key used with TLS 1.0 and 1.1, before the introduction of
|
||||
// signature algorithm negotiation.
|
||||
func legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub crypto.PublicKey) (sigType uint8, hash crypto.Hash, err error) {
|
||||
switch pub.(type) {
|
||||
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
return signaturePKCS1v15, crypto.MD5SHA1, nil
|
||||
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
return signatureECDSA, crypto.SHA1, nil
|
||||
case ed25519.PublicKey:
|
||||
// RFC 8422 specifies support for Ed25519 in TLS 1.0 and 1.1,
|
||||
// but it requires holding on to a handshake transcript to do a
|
||||
// full signature, and not even OpenSSL bothers with the
|
||||
// complexity, so we can't even test it properly.
|
||||
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: Ed25519 public keys are not supported before TLS 1.2")
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported public key: %T", pub)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var rsaSignatureSchemes = []struct {
|
||||
scheme SignatureScheme
|
||||
minModulusBytes int
|
||||
maxVersion uint16
|
||||
}{
|
||||
// RSA-PSS is used with PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, and requires
|
||||
// emLen >= hLen + sLen + 2
|
||||
{PSSWithSHA256, crypto.SHA256.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13},
|
||||
{PSSWithSHA384, crypto.SHA384.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13},
|
||||
{PSSWithSHA512, crypto.SHA512.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13},
|
||||
// PKCS #1 v1.5 uses prefixes from hashPrefixes in crypto/rsa, and requires
|
||||
// emLen >= len(prefix) + hLen + 11
|
||||
// TLS 1.3 dropped support for PKCS #1 v1.5 in favor of RSA-PSS.
|
||||
{PKCS1WithSHA256, 19 + crypto.SHA256.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
|
||||
{PKCS1WithSHA384, 19 + crypto.SHA384.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
|
||||
{PKCS1WithSHA512, 19 + crypto.SHA512.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
|
||||
{PKCS1WithSHA1, 15 + crypto.SHA1.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// signatureSchemesForCertificate returns the list of supported SignatureSchemes
|
||||
// for a given certificate, based on the public key and the protocol version,
|
||||
// and optionally filtered by its explicit SupportedSignatureAlgorithms.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This function must be kept in sync with supportedSignatureAlgorithms.
|
||||
// FIPS filtering is applied in the caller, selectSignatureScheme.
|
||||
func signatureSchemesForCertificate(version uint16, cert *Certificate) []SignatureScheme {
|
||||
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var sigAlgs []SignatureScheme
|
||||
switch pub := priv.Public().(type) {
|
||||
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
if version != VersionTLS13 {
|
||||
// In TLS 1.2 and earlier, ECDSA algorithms are not
|
||||
// constrained to a single curve.
|
||||
sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{
|
||||
ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256,
|
||||
ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384,
|
||||
ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512,
|
||||
ECDSAWithSHA1,
|
||||
}
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
switch pub.Curve {
|
||||
case elliptic.P256():
|
||||
sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256}
|
||||
case elliptic.P384():
|
||||
sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384}
|
||||
case elliptic.P521():
|
||||
sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
size := pub.Size()
|
||||
sigAlgs = make([]SignatureScheme, 0, len(rsaSignatureSchemes))
|
||||
for _, candidate := range rsaSignatureSchemes {
|
||||
if size >= candidate.minModulusBytes && version <= candidate.maxVersion {
|
||||
sigAlgs = append(sigAlgs, candidate.scheme)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
case ed25519.PublicKey:
|
||||
sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{Ed25519}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms != nil {
|
||||
var filteredSigAlgs []SignatureScheme
|
||||
for _, sigAlg := range sigAlgs {
|
||||
if isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlg, cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
|
||||
filteredSigAlgs = append(filteredSigAlgs, sigAlg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return filteredSigAlgs
|
||||
}
|
||||
return sigAlgs
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// selectSignatureScheme picks a SignatureScheme from the peer's preference list
|
||||
// that works with the selected certificate. It's only called for protocol
|
||||
// versions that support signature algorithms, so TLS 1.2 and 1.3.
|
||||
func selectSignatureScheme(vers uint16, c *Certificate, peerAlgs []SignatureScheme) (SignatureScheme, error) {
|
||||
supportedAlgs := signatureSchemesForCertificate(vers, c)
|
||||
if len(supportedAlgs) == 0 {
|
||||
return 0, unsupportedCertificateError(c)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(peerAlgs) == 0 && vers == VersionTLS12 {
|
||||
// For TLS 1.2, if the client didn't send signature_algorithms then we
|
||||
// can assume that it supports SHA1. See RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1.
|
||||
peerAlgs = []SignatureScheme{PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Pick signature scheme in the peer's preference order, as our
|
||||
// preference order is not configurable.
|
||||
for _, preferredAlg := range peerAlgs {
|
||||
if needFIPS() && !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(preferredAlg, fipsSupportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
if isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(preferredAlg, supportedAlgs) {
|
||||
return preferredAlg, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 0, errors.New("tls: peer doesn't support any of the certificate's signature algorithms")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// unsupportedCertificateError returns a helpful error for certificates with
|
||||
// an unsupported private key.
|
||||
func unsupportedCertificateError(cert *Certificate) error {
|
||||
switch cert.PrivateKey.(type) {
|
||||
case rsa.PrivateKey, ecdsa.PrivateKey:
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate: private key is %T, expected *%T",
|
||||
cert.PrivateKey, cert.PrivateKey)
|
||||
case *ed25519.PrivateKey:
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate: private key is *ed25519.PrivateKey, expected ed25519.PrivateKey")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
signer, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate private key (%T) does not implement crypto.Signer",
|
||||
cert.PrivateKey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch pub := signer.Public().(type) {
|
||||
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
switch pub.Curve {
|
||||
case elliptic.P256():
|
||||
case elliptic.P384():
|
||||
case elliptic.P521():
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate curve (%s)", pub.Curve.Params().Name)
|
||||
}
|
||||
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate RSA key size too small for supported signature algorithms")
|
||||
case ed25519.PublicKey:
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate key (%T)", pub)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("tls: peer doesn't support the certificate custom signature algorithms")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("tls: internal error: unsupported key (%T)", cert.PrivateKey)
|
||||
}
|
95
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cache.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
95
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cache.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/x509"
|
||||
"runtime"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"sync/atomic"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type cacheEntry struct {
|
||||
refs atomic.Int64
|
||||
cert *x509.Certificate
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// certCache implements an intern table for reference counted x509.Certificates,
|
||||
// implemented in a similar fashion to BoringSSL's CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL. This
|
||||
// allows for a single x509.Certificate to be kept in memory and referenced from
|
||||
// multiple Conns. Returned references should not be mutated by callers. Certificates
|
||||
// are still safe to use after they are removed from the cache.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Certificates are returned wrapped in a activeCert struct that should be held by
|
||||
// the caller. When references to the activeCert are freed, the number of references
|
||||
// to the certificate in the cache is decremented. Once the number of references
|
||||
// reaches zero, the entry is evicted from the cache.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The main difference between this implementation and CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL is that
|
||||
// CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL is a more generic structure which supports blobs of data,
|
||||
// rather than specific structures. Since we only care about x509.Certificates,
|
||||
// certCache is implemented as a specific cache, rather than a generic one.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// See https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/include/openssl/pool.h
|
||||
// and https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/crypto/pool/pool.c
|
||||
// for the BoringSSL reference.
|
||||
type certCache struct {
|
||||
sync.Map
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var clientCertCache = new(certCache)
|
||||
|
||||
// activeCert is a handle to a certificate held in the cache. Once there are
|
||||
// no alive activeCerts for a given certificate, the certificate is removed
|
||||
// from the cache by a finalizer.
|
||||
type activeCert struct {
|
||||
cert *x509.Certificate
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// active increments the number of references to the entry, wraps the
|
||||
// certificate in the entry in a activeCert, and sets the finalizer.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Note that there is a race between active and the finalizer set on the
|
||||
// returned activeCert, triggered if active is called after the ref count is
|
||||
// decremented such that refs may be > 0 when evict is called. We consider this
|
||||
// safe, since the caller holding an activeCert for an entry that is no longer
|
||||
// in the cache is fine, with the only side effect being the memory overhead of
|
||||
// there being more than one distinct reference to a certificate alive at once.
|
||||
func (cc *certCache) active(e *cacheEntry) *activeCert {
|
||||
e.refs.Add(1)
|
||||
a := &activeCert{e.cert}
|
||||
runtime.SetFinalizer(a, func(_ *activeCert) {
|
||||
if e.refs.Add(-1) == 0 {
|
||||
cc.evict(e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
return a
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// evict removes a cacheEntry from the cache.
|
||||
func (cc *certCache) evict(e *cacheEntry) {
|
||||
cc.Delete(string(e.cert.Raw))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newCert returns a x509.Certificate parsed from der. If there is already a copy
|
||||
// of the certificate in the cache, a reference to the existing certificate will
|
||||
// be returned. Otherwise, a fresh certificate will be added to the cache, and
|
||||
// the reference returned. The returned reference should not be mutated.
|
||||
func (cc *certCache) newCert(der []byte) (*activeCert, error) {
|
||||
if entry, ok := cc.Load(string(der)); ok {
|
||||
return cc.active(entry.(*cacheEntry)), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
entry := &cacheEntry{cert: cert}
|
||||
if entry, loaded := cc.LoadOrStore(string(der), entry); loaded {
|
||||
return cc.active(entry.(*cacheEntry)), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return cc.active(entry), nil
|
||||
}
|
693
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cipher_suites.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
693
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cipher_suites.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,693 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto"
|
||||
"crypto/aes"
|
||||
"crypto/cipher"
|
||||
"crypto/des"
|
||||
"crypto/hmac"
|
||||
"crypto/rc4"
|
||||
"crypto/sha1"
|
||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"hash"
|
||||
|
||||
"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// CipherSuite is a TLS cipher suite. Note that most functions in this package
|
||||
// accept and expose cipher suite IDs instead of this type.
|
||||
type CipherSuite struct {
|
||||
ID uint16
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
|
||||
// Supported versions is the list of TLS protocol versions that can
|
||||
// negotiate this cipher suite.
|
||||
SupportedVersions []uint16
|
||||
|
||||
// Insecure is true if the cipher suite has known security issues
|
||||
// due to its primitives, design, or implementation.
|
||||
Insecure bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
supportedUpToTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11, VersionTLS12}
|
||||
supportedOnlyTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS12}
|
||||
supportedOnlyTLS13 = []uint16{VersionTLS13}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// CipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by this
|
||||
// package, excluding those with security issues, which are returned by
|
||||
// InsecureCipherSuites.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The list is sorted by ID. Note that the default cipher suites selected by
|
||||
// this package might depend on logic that can't be captured by a static list,
|
||||
// and might not match those returned by this function.
|
||||
func CipherSuites() []*CipherSuite {
|
||||
return []*CipherSuite{
|
||||
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
|
||||
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
|
||||
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
|
||||
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
|
||||
|
||||
{TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
|
||||
{TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
|
||||
{TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
|
||||
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// InsecureCipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by
|
||||
// this package and which have security issues.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Most applications should not use the cipher suites in this list, and should
|
||||
// only use those returned by CipherSuites.
|
||||
func InsecureCipherSuites() []*CipherSuite {
|
||||
// This list includes RC4, CBC_SHA256, and 3DES cipher suites. See
|
||||
// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder for details.
|
||||
return []*CipherSuite{
|
||||
{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
|
||||
{TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
|
||||
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CipherSuiteName returns the standard name for the passed cipher suite ID
|
||||
// (e.g. "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"), or a fallback representation
|
||||
// of the ID value if the cipher suite is not implemented by this package.
|
||||
func CipherSuiteName(id uint16) string {
|
||||
for _, c := range CipherSuites() {
|
||||
if c.ID == id {
|
||||
return c.Name
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, c := range InsecureCipherSuites() {
|
||||
if c.ID == id {
|
||||
return c.Name
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fmt.Sprintf("0x%04X", id)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// suiteECDHE indicates that the cipher suite involves elliptic curve
|
||||
// Diffie-Hellman. This means that it should only be selected when the
|
||||
// client indicates that it supports ECC with a curve and point format
|
||||
// that we're happy with.
|
||||
suiteECDHE = 1 << iota
|
||||
// suiteECSign indicates that the cipher suite involves an ECDSA or
|
||||
// EdDSA signature and therefore may only be selected when the server's
|
||||
// certificate is ECDSA or EdDSA. If this is not set then the cipher suite
|
||||
// is RSA based.
|
||||
suiteECSign
|
||||
// suiteTLS12 indicates that the cipher suite should only be advertised
|
||||
// and accepted when using TLS 1.2.
|
||||
suiteTLS12
|
||||
// suiteSHA384 indicates that the cipher suite uses SHA384 as the
|
||||
// handshake hash.
|
||||
suiteSHA384
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// A cipherSuite is a TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite, and defines the key exchange
|
||||
// mechanism, as well as the cipher+MAC pair or the AEAD.
|
||||
type cipherSuite struct {
|
||||
id uint16
|
||||
// the lengths, in bytes, of the key material needed for each component.
|
||||
keyLen int
|
||||
macLen int
|
||||
ivLen int
|
||||
ka func(version uint16) keyAgreement
|
||||
// flags is a bitmask of the suite* values, above.
|
||||
flags int
|
||||
cipher func(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any
|
||||
mac func(key []byte) hash.Hash
|
||||
aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var cipherSuites = []*cipherSuite{ // TODO: replace with a map, since the order doesn't matter.
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
|
||||
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
|
||||
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
|
||||
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
|
||||
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
|
||||
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
|
||||
{TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, rsaKA, 0, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
|
||||
{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, rsaKA, 0, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
|
||||
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// selectCipherSuite returns the first TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite from ids which
|
||||
// is also in supportedIDs and passes the ok filter.
|
||||
func selectCipherSuite(ids, supportedIDs []uint16, ok func(*cipherSuite) bool) *cipherSuite {
|
||||
for _, id := range ids {
|
||||
candidate := cipherSuiteByID(id)
|
||||
if candidate == nil || !ok(candidate) {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, suppID := range supportedIDs {
|
||||
if id == suppID {
|
||||
return candidate
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A cipherSuiteTLS13 defines only the pair of the AEAD algorithm and hash
|
||||
// algorithm to be used with HKDF. See RFC 8446, Appendix B.4.
|
||||
type cipherSuiteTLS13 struct {
|
||||
id uint16
|
||||
keyLen int
|
||||
aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
|
||||
hash crypto.Hash
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type CipherSuiteTLS13 struct {
|
||||
ID uint16
|
||||
KeyLen int
|
||||
Hash crypto.Hash
|
||||
AEAD func(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *CipherSuiteTLS13) IVLen() int {
|
||||
return aeadNonceLength
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var cipherSuitesTLS13 = []*cipherSuiteTLS13{ // TODO: replace with a map.
|
||||
{TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA256},
|
||||
{TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, 32, aeadChaCha20Poly1305, crypto.SHA256},
|
||||
{TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA384},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder is the order in which we'll select (on the
|
||||
// server) or advertise (on the client) TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suites.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Cipher suites are filtered but not reordered based on the application and
|
||||
// peer's preferences, meaning we'll never select a suite lower in this list if
|
||||
// any higher one is available. This makes it more defensible to keep weaker
|
||||
// cipher suites enabled, especially on the server side where we get the last
|
||||
// word, since there are no known downgrade attacks on cipher suites selection.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The list is sorted by applying the following priority rules, stopping at the
|
||||
// first (most important) applicable one:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// - Anything else comes before RC4
|
||||
//
|
||||
// RC4 has practically exploitable biases. See https://www.rc4nomore.com.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// - Anything else comes before CBC_SHA256
|
||||
//
|
||||
// SHA-256 variants of the CBC ciphersuites don't implement any Lucky13
|
||||
// countermeasures. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html and
|
||||
// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// - Anything else comes before 3DES
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 3DES has 64-bit blocks, which makes it fundamentally susceptible to
|
||||
// birthday attacks. See https://sweet32.info.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// - ECDHE comes before anything else
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Once we got the broken stuff out of the way, the most important
|
||||
// property a cipher suite can have is forward secrecy. We don't
|
||||
// implement FFDHE, so that means ECDHE.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// - AEADs come before CBC ciphers
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Even with Lucky13 countermeasures, MAC-then-Encrypt CBC cipher suites
|
||||
// are fundamentally fragile, and suffered from an endless sequence of
|
||||
// padding oracle attacks. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1129,
|
||||
// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/12/08/poodleagain.html, and
|
||||
// https://blog.cloudflare.com/yet-another-padding-oracle-in-openssl-cbc-ciphersuites/.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// - AES comes before ChaCha20
|
||||
//
|
||||
// When AES hardware is available, AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM are faster
|
||||
// than ChaCha20Poly1305.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// When AES hardware is not available, AES-128-GCM is one or more of: much
|
||||
// slower, way more complex, and less safe (because not constant time)
|
||||
// than ChaCha20Poly1305.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// We use this list if we think both peers have AES hardware, and
|
||||
// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES otherwise.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// - AES-128 comes before AES-256
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The only potential advantages of AES-256 are better multi-target
|
||||
// margins, and hypothetical post-quantum properties. Neither apply to
|
||||
// TLS, and AES-256 is slower due to its four extra rounds (which don't
|
||||
// contribute to the advantages above).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// - ECDSA comes before RSA
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The relative order of ECDSA and RSA cipher suites doesn't matter,
|
||||
// as they depend on the certificate. Pick one to get a stable order.
|
||||
var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder = []uint16{
|
||||
// AEADs w/ ECDHE
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
|
||||
|
||||
// CBC w/ ECDHE
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
|
||||
|
||||
// AEADs w/o ECDHE
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
||||
|
||||
// CBC w/o ECDHE
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
|
||||
|
||||
// 3DES
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
|
||||
|
||||
// CBC_SHA256
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
|
||||
|
||||
// RC4
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES = []uint16{
|
||||
// ChaCha20Poly1305
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
|
||||
|
||||
// AES-GCM w/ ECDHE
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
||||
|
||||
// The rest of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder.
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// disabledCipherSuites are not used unless explicitly listed in
|
||||
// Config.CipherSuites. They MUST be at the end of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder.
|
||||
var disabledCipherSuites = []uint16{
|
||||
// CBC_SHA256
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
|
||||
|
||||
// RC4
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
defaultCipherSuitesLen = len(cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder) - len(disabledCipherSuites)
|
||||
defaultCipherSuites = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder[:defaultCipherSuitesLen]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 is also the preference order, since there are no
|
||||
// disabled by default TLS 1.3 cipher suites. The same AES vs ChaCha20 logic as
|
||||
// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder applies.
|
||||
var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 = []uint16{
|
||||
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
||||
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
||||
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES = []uint16{
|
||||
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
|
||||
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
||||
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var aesgcmCiphers = map[uint16]bool{
|
||||
// TLS 1.2
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
|
||||
// TLS 1.3
|
||||
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
|
||||
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var nonAESGCMAEADCiphers = map[uint16]bool{
|
||||
// TLS 1.2
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305: true,
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305: true,
|
||||
// TLS 1.3
|
||||
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// aesgcmPreferred returns whether the first known cipher in the preference list
|
||||
// is an AES-GCM cipher, implying the peer has hardware support for it.
|
||||
func aesgcmPreferred(ciphers []uint16) bool {
|
||||
for _, cID := range ciphers {
|
||||
if c := cipherSuiteByID(cID); c != nil {
|
||||
return aesgcmCiphers[cID]
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(cID); c != nil {
|
||||
return aesgcmCiphers[cID]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func cipherRC4(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
|
||||
cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(key)
|
||||
return cipher
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func cipher3DES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
|
||||
block, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key)
|
||||
if isRead {
|
||||
return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func cipherAES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
|
||||
block, _ := aes.NewCipher(key)
|
||||
if isRead {
|
||||
return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// macSHA1 returns a SHA-1 based constant time MAC.
|
||||
func macSHA1(key []byte) hash.Hash {
|
||||
h := sha1.New
|
||||
h = newConstantTimeHash(h)
|
||||
return hmac.New(h, key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// macSHA256 returns a SHA-256 based MAC. This is only supported in TLS 1.2 and
|
||||
// is currently only used in disabled-by-default cipher suites.
|
||||
func macSHA256(key []byte) hash.Hash {
|
||||
return hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type aead interface {
|
||||
cipher.AEAD
|
||||
|
||||
// explicitNonceLen returns the number of bytes of explicit nonce
|
||||
// included in each record. This is eight for older AEADs and
|
||||
// zero for modern ones.
|
||||
explicitNonceLen() int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
aeadNonceLength = 12
|
||||
noncePrefixLength = 4
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// prefixNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD and prefixes a fixed portion of the nonce to
|
||||
// each call.
|
||||
type prefixNonceAEAD struct {
|
||||
// nonce contains the fixed part of the nonce in the first four bytes.
|
||||
nonce [aeadNonceLength]byte
|
||||
aead cipher.AEAD
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return aeadNonceLength - noncePrefixLength }
|
||||
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() }
|
||||
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return f.NonceSize() }
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
|
||||
copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce)
|
||||
return f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonce[:], plaintext, additionalData)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce)
|
||||
return f.aead.Open(out, f.nonce[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// xorNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD by XORing in a fixed pattern to the nonce
|
||||
// before each call.
|
||||
type xorNonceAEAD struct {
|
||||
nonceMask [aeadNonceLength]byte
|
||||
aead cipher.AEAD
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return 8 } // 64-bit sequence number
|
||||
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() }
|
||||
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return 0 }
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
|
||||
for i, b := range nonce {
|
||||
f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
|
||||
}
|
||||
result := f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonceMask[:], plaintext, additionalData)
|
||||
for i, b := range nonce {
|
||||
f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return result
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
for i, b := range nonce {
|
||||
f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
|
||||
}
|
||||
result, err := f.aead.Open(out, f.nonceMask[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
|
||||
for i, b := range nonce {
|
||||
f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return result, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func aeadAESGCM(key, noncePrefix []byte) aead {
|
||||
if len(noncePrefix) != noncePrefixLength {
|
||||
panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
|
||||
}
|
||||
aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
panic(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
var aead cipher.AEAD
|
||||
aead, err = cipher.NewGCM(aes)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
panic(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret := &prefixNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
|
||||
copy(ret.nonce[:], noncePrefix)
|
||||
return ret
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AEADAESGCMTLS13 creates a new AES-GCM AEAD for TLS 1.3
|
||||
func AEADAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD {
|
||||
return aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
|
||||
if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength {
|
||||
panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
|
||||
}
|
||||
aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
panic(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
panic(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
|
||||
copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask)
|
||||
return ret
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func aeadChaCha20Poly1305(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
|
||||
if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength {
|
||||
panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
|
||||
}
|
||||
aead, err := chacha20poly1305.New(key)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
panic(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
|
||||
copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask)
|
||||
return ret
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type constantTimeHash interface {
|
||||
hash.Hash
|
||||
ConstantTimeSum(b []byte) []byte
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// cthWrapper wraps any hash.Hash that implements ConstantTimeSum, and replaces
|
||||
// with that all calls to Sum. It's used to obtain a ConstantTimeSum-based HMAC.
|
||||
type cthWrapper struct {
|
||||
h constantTimeHash
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *cthWrapper) Size() int { return c.h.Size() }
|
||||
func (c *cthWrapper) BlockSize() int { return c.h.BlockSize() }
|
||||
func (c *cthWrapper) Reset() { c.h.Reset() }
|
||||
func (c *cthWrapper) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return c.h.Write(p) }
|
||||
func (c *cthWrapper) Sum(b []byte) []byte { return c.h.ConstantTimeSum(b) }
|
||||
|
||||
func newConstantTimeHash(h func() hash.Hash) func() hash.Hash {
|
||||
return func() hash.Hash {
|
||||
return &cthWrapper{h().(constantTimeHash)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// tls10MAC implements the TLS 1.0 MAC function. RFC 2246, Section 6.2.3.
|
||||
func tls10MAC(h hash.Hash, out, seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte {
|
||||
h.Reset()
|
||||
h.Write(seq)
|
||||
h.Write(header)
|
||||
h.Write(data)
|
||||
res := h.Sum(out)
|
||||
if extra != nil {
|
||||
h.Write(extra)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return res
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func rsaKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
|
||||
return rsaKeyAgreement{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func ecdheECDSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
|
||||
return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
|
||||
isRSA: false,
|
||||
version: version,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func ecdheRSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
|
||||
return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
|
||||
isRSA: true,
|
||||
version: version,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// mutualCipherSuite returns a cipherSuite given a list of supported
|
||||
// ciphersuites and the id requested by the peer.
|
||||
func mutualCipherSuite(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuite {
|
||||
for _, id := range have {
|
||||
if id == want {
|
||||
return cipherSuiteByID(id)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func cipherSuiteByID(id uint16) *cipherSuite {
|
||||
for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuites {
|
||||
if cipherSuite.id == id {
|
||||
return cipherSuite
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
|
||||
for _, id := range have {
|
||||
if id == want {
|
||||
return cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
|
||||
for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 {
|
||||
if cipherSuite.id == id {
|
||||
return cipherSuite
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A list of cipher suite IDs that are, or have been, implemented by this
|
||||
// package.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// See https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// TLS 1.0 - 1.2 cipher suites.
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x0005
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000a
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x002f
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0035
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003c
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x009c
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x009d
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc007
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc009
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc00a
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc011
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc012
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc013
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc014
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc023
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc027
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02f
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02b
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc030
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc02c
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca8
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca9
|
||||
|
||||
// TLS 1.3 cipher suites.
|
||||
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1301
|
||||
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x1302
|
||||
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1303
|
||||
|
||||
// TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV isn't a standard cipher suite but an indicator
|
||||
// that the client is doing version fallback. See RFC 7507.
|
||||
TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV uint16 = 0x5600
|
||||
|
||||
// Legacy names for the corresponding cipher suites with the correct _SHA256
|
||||
// suffix, retained for backward compatibility.
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
|
||||
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
|
||||
)
|
1538
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/common.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
1538
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/common.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
1616
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/conn.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
1616
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/conn.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
22
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cpu.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
22
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cpu.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
//go:build !js
|
||||
// +build !js
|
||||
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"runtime"
|
||||
|
||||
"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
hasGCMAsmAMD64 = cpu.X86.HasAES && cpu.X86.HasPCLMULQDQ
|
||||
hasGCMAsmARM64 = cpu.ARM64.HasAES && cpu.ARM64.HasPMULL
|
||||
// Keep in sync with crypto/aes/cipher_s390x.go.
|
||||
hasGCMAsmS390X = cpu.S390X.HasAES && cpu.S390X.HasAESCBC && cpu.S390X.HasAESCTR &&
|
||||
(cpu.S390X.HasGHASH || cpu.S390X.HasAESGCM)
|
||||
|
||||
hasAESGCMHardwareSupport = runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" && hasGCMAsmAMD64 ||
|
||||
runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" && hasGCMAsmARM64 ||
|
||||
runtime.GOARCH == "s390x" && hasGCMAsmS390X
|
||||
)
|
12
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cpu_other.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
12
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cpu_other.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
|
||||
//go:build js
|
||||
// +build js
|
||||
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
hasGCMAsmAMD64 = false
|
||||
hasGCMAsmARM64 = false
|
||||
hasGCMAsmS390X = false
|
||||
|
||||
hasAESGCMHardwareSupport = false
|
||||
)
|
1121
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_client.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
1121
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_client.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
743
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_client_tls13.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
743
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_client_tls13.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,743 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto"
|
||||
"crypto/ecdh"
|
||||
"crypto/hmac"
|
||||
"crypto/rsa"
|
||||
"encoding/binary"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"hash"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type clientHandshakeStateTLS13 struct {
|
||||
c *Conn
|
||||
ctx context.Context
|
||||
serverHello *serverHelloMsg
|
||||
hello *clientHelloMsg
|
||||
ecdheKey *ecdh.PrivateKey
|
||||
|
||||
session *clientSessionState
|
||||
earlySecret []byte
|
||||
binderKey []byte
|
||||
|
||||
certReq *certificateRequestMsgTLS13
|
||||
usingPSK bool
|
||||
sentDummyCCS bool
|
||||
suite *cipherSuiteTLS13
|
||||
transcript hash.Hash
|
||||
masterSecret []byte
|
||||
trafficSecret []byte // client_application_traffic_secret_0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// handshake requires hs.c, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, hs.ecdheKey, and,
|
||||
// optionally, hs.session, hs.earlySecret and hs.binderKey to be set.
|
||||
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
if needFIPS() {
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: internal error: TLS 1.3 reached in FIPS mode")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The server must not select TLS 1.3 in a renegotiation. See RFC 8446,
|
||||
// sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3.
|
||||
if c.handshakes > 0 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server selected TLS 1.3 in a renegotiation")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Consistency check on the presence of a keyShare and its parameters.
|
||||
if hs.ecdheKey == nil || len(hs.hello.keyShares) != 1 {
|
||||
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := hs.checkServerHelloOrHRR(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.transcript = hs.suite.hash.New()
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
|
||||
|
||||
if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
|
||||
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.processHelloRetryRequest(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
|
||||
|
||||
c.buffering = true
|
||||
if err := hs.processServerHello(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.establishHandshakeKeys(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.readServerParameters(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.readServerCertificate(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
if err := hs.readServerFinished(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.sendClientCertificate(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.sendClientFinished(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.isHandshakeComplete.Store(true)
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// checkServerHelloOrHRR does validity checks that apply to both ServerHello and
|
||||
// HelloRetryRequest messages. It sets hs.suite.
|
||||
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) checkServerHelloOrHRR() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.serverHello.supportedVersion == 0 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server selected TLS 1.3 using the legacy version field")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.serverHello.supportedVersion != VersionTLS13 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid version after a HelloRetryRequest")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.serverHello.vers != VersionTLS12 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server sent an incorrect legacy version")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.serverHello.ocspStapling ||
|
||||
hs.serverHello.ticketSupported ||
|
||||
hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiationSupported ||
|
||||
len(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 ||
|
||||
len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) != 0 ||
|
||||
len(hs.serverHello.scts) != 0 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server sent a ServerHello extension forbidden in TLS 1.3")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(hs.hello.sessionId, hs.serverHello.sessionId) {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server did not echo the legacy session ID")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
selectedSuite := mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(hs.hello.cipherSuites, hs.serverHello.cipherSuite)
|
||||
if hs.suite != nil && selectedSuite != hs.suite {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server changed cipher suite after a HelloRetryRequest")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if selectedSuite == nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server chose an unconfigured cipher suite")
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.suite = selectedSuite
|
||||
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// sendDummyChangeCipherSpec sends a ChangeCipherSpec record for compatibility
|
||||
// with middleboxes that didn't implement TLS correctly. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4.
|
||||
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
|
||||
if hs.sentDummyCCS {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.sentDummyCCS = true
|
||||
|
||||
_, err := hs.c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// processHelloRetryRequest handles the HRR in hs.serverHello, modifies and
|
||||
// resends hs.hello, and reads the new ServerHello into hs.serverHello.
|
||||
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
// The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
|
||||
// HelloRetryRequest. (The idea is that the server might offload transcript
|
||||
// storage to the client in the cookie.) See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
|
||||
chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
|
||||
hs.transcript.Reset()
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
|
||||
|
||||
// The only HelloRetryRequest extensions we support are key_share and
|
||||
// cookie, and clients must abort the handshake if the HRR would not result
|
||||
// in any change in the ClientHello.
|
||||
if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup == 0 && hs.serverHello.cookie == nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest message")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.serverHello.cookie != nil {
|
||||
hs.hello.cookie = hs.serverHello.cookie
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != 0 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: received malformed key_share extension")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// If the server sent a key_share extension selecting a group, ensure it's
|
||||
// a group we advertised but did not send a key share for, and send a key
|
||||
// share for it this time.
|
||||
if curveID := hs.serverHello.selectedGroup; curveID != 0 {
|
||||
curveOK := false
|
||||
for _, id := range hs.hello.supportedCurves {
|
||||
if id == curveID {
|
||||
curveOK = true
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !curveOK {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if sentID, _ := curveIDForCurve(hs.ecdheKey.Curve()); sentID == curveID {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest key_share")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
|
||||
}
|
||||
key, err := generateECDHEKey(c.config.rand(), curveID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.ecdheKey = key
|
||||
hs.hello.keyShares = []keyShare{{group: curveID, data: key.PublicKey().Bytes()}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.hello.raw = nil
|
||||
if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) > 0 {
|
||||
pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite)
|
||||
if pskSuite == nil {
|
||||
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if pskSuite.hash == hs.suite.hash {
|
||||
// Update binders and obfuscated_ticket_age.
|
||||
ticketAge := uint32(c.config.time().Sub(hs.session.receivedAt) / time.Millisecond)
|
||||
hs.hello.pskIdentities[0].obfuscatedTicketAge = ticketAge + hs.session.ageAdd
|
||||
|
||||
transcript := hs.suite.hash.New()
|
||||
transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
|
||||
transcript.Write(chHash)
|
||||
transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
|
||||
transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshalWithoutBinders())
|
||||
pskBinders := [][]byte{hs.suite.finishedHash(hs.binderKey, transcript)}
|
||||
hs.hello.updateBinders(pskBinders)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Server selected a cipher suite incompatible with the PSK.
|
||||
hs.hello.pskIdentities = nil
|
||||
hs.hello.pskBinders = nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT != nil {
|
||||
c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT()
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.hello.earlyData = false // disable 0-RTT
|
||||
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||||
return unexpectedMessageError(serverHello, msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.serverHello = serverHello
|
||||
|
||||
if err := hs.checkServerHelloOrHRR(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processServerHello() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server sent two HelloRetryRequest messages")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(hs.serverHello.cookie) != 0 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server sent a cookie in a normal ServerHello")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup != 0 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: malformed key_share extension")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group == 0 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server did not send a key share")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if sentID, _ := curveIDForCurve(hs.ecdheKey.Curve()); hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != sentID {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !hs.serverHello.selectedIdentityPresent {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if int(hs.serverHello.selectedIdentity) >= len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) != 1 || hs.session == nil {
|
||||
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite)
|
||||
if pskSuite == nil {
|
||||
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if pskSuite.hash != hs.suite.hash {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK and cipher suite pair")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.usingPSK = true
|
||||
c.didResume = true
|
||||
c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates
|
||||
c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains
|
||||
c.ocspResponse = hs.session.ocspResponse
|
||||
c.scts = hs.session.scts
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) establishHandshakeKeys() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
peerKey, err := hs.ecdheKey.Curve().NewPublicKey(hs.serverHello.serverShare.data)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share")
|
||||
}
|
||||
sharedKey, err := hs.ecdheKey.ECDH(peerKey)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
earlySecret := hs.earlySecret
|
||||
if !hs.usingPSK {
|
||||
earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, nil)
|
||||
}
|
||||
handshakeSecret := hs.suite.extract(sharedKey,
|
||||
hs.suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "derived", nil))
|
||||
|
||||
clientSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret,
|
||||
clientHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
|
||||
c.out.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, clientSecret)
|
||||
c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, clientSecret)
|
||||
serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret,
|
||||
serverHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
|
||||
c.in.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, serverSecret)
|
||||
c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
|
||||
|
||||
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientHandshake, hs.hello.random, clientSecret)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerHandshake, hs.hello.random, serverSecret)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.masterSecret = hs.suite.extract(nil,
|
||||
hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret, "derived", nil))
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerParameters() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
encryptedExtensions, ok := msg.(*encryptedExtensionsMsg)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||||
return unexpectedMessageError(encryptedExtensions, msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Notify the caller if 0-RTT was rejected.
|
||||
if !encryptedExtensions.earlyData && hs.hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT != nil {
|
||||
c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT()
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.used0RTT = encryptedExtensions.earlyData
|
||||
if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions != nil {
|
||||
hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions, encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions)
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(encryptedExtensions.marshal())
|
||||
|
||||
if err := checkALPN(hs.hello.alpnProtocols, encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol); err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.clientProtocol = encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol
|
||||
|
||||
if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.EnforceNextProtoSelection {
|
||||
if len(encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol) == 0 {
|
||||
// the server didn't select an ALPN
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
|
||||
return errors.New("ALPN negotiation failed. Server didn't offer any protocols")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
// Either a PSK or a certificate is always used, but not both.
|
||||
// See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.1.
|
||||
if hs.usingPSK {
|
||||
// Make sure the connection is still being verified whether or not this
|
||||
// is a resumption. Resumptions currently don't reverify certificates so
|
||||
// they don't call verifyServerCertificate. See Issue 31641.
|
||||
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
|
||||
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsgTLS13)
|
||||
if ok {
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(certReq.marshal())
|
||||
|
||||
hs.certReq = certReq
|
||||
|
||||
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsgTLS13)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||||
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(certMsg.certificate.Certificate) == 0 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: received empty certificates message")
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
|
||||
|
||||
c.scts = certMsg.certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
|
||||
c.ocspResponse = certMsg.certificate.OCSPStaple
|
||||
|
||||
if err := c.verifyServerCertificate(certMsg.certificate.Certificate); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||||
return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
|
||||
if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, supportedSignatureAlgorithms()) {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
|
||||
}
|
||||
sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigHash == crypto.SHA1 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
|
||||
}
|
||||
signed := signedMessage(sigHash, serverSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
|
||||
if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey,
|
||||
sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(certVerify.marshal())
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerFinished() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
finished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||||
return unexpectedMessageError(finished, msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
expectedMAC := hs.suite.finishedHash(c.in.trafficSecret, hs.transcript)
|
||||
if !hmac.Equal(expectedMAC, finished.verifyData) {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: invalid server finished hash")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
|
||||
|
||||
// Derive secrets that take context through the server Finished.
|
||||
|
||||
hs.trafficSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
|
||||
clientApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
|
||||
serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
|
||||
serverApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
|
||||
c.in.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, serverSecret)
|
||||
c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
|
||||
|
||||
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientTraffic, hs.hello.random, hs.trafficSecret)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerTraffic, hs.hello.random, serverSecret)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.ekm = hs.suite.exportKeyingMaterial(hs.masterSecret, hs.transcript)
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientCertificate() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.certReq == nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cert, err := c.getClientCertificate(toCertificateRequestInfo(&certificateRequestInfo{
|
||||
AcceptableCAs: hs.certReq.certificateAuthorities,
|
||||
SignatureSchemes: hs.certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
|
||||
Version: c.vers,
|
||||
ctx: hs.ctx,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
certMsg := new(certificateMsgTLS13)
|
||||
|
||||
certMsg.certificate = *cert
|
||||
certMsg.scts = hs.certReq.scts && len(cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0
|
||||
certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.certReq.ocspStapling && len(cert.OCSPStaple) > 0
|
||||
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// If we sent an empty certificate message, skip the CertificateVerify.
|
||||
if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
certVerifyMsg := new(certificateVerifyMsg)
|
||||
certVerifyMsg.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
|
||||
|
||||
certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm, err = selectSignatureScheme(c.vers, cert, hs.certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
// getClientCertificate returned a certificate incompatible with the
|
||||
// CertificateRequestInfo supported signature algorithms.
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
signed := signedMessage(sigHash, clientSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
|
||||
signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
|
||||
if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
|
||||
signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
|
||||
}
|
||||
sig, err := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(c.config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake: " + err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
certVerifyMsg.signature = sig
|
||||
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(certVerifyMsg.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerifyMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientFinished() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
finished := &finishedMsg{
|
||||
verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.out.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
|
||||
c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
|
||||
|
||||
if !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled && c.config.ClientSessionCache != nil {
|
||||
c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
|
||||
resumptionLabel, hs.transcript)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Conn) handleNewSessionTicket(msg *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) error {
|
||||
if !c.isClient {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: received new session ticket from a client")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled || c.config.ClientSessionCache == nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// See RFC 8446, Section 4.6.1.
|
||||
if msg.lifetime == 0 {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
lifetime := time.Duration(msg.lifetime) * time.Second
|
||||
if lifetime > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: received a session ticket with invalid lifetime")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(c.cipherSuite)
|
||||
if cipherSuite == nil || c.resumptionSecret == nil {
|
||||
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We need to save the max_early_data_size that the server sent us, in order
|
||||
// to decide if we're going to try 0-RTT with this ticket.
|
||||
// However, at the same time, the qtls.ClientSessionTicket needs to be equal to
|
||||
// the tls.ClientSessionTicket, so we can't just add a new field to the struct.
|
||||
// We therefore abuse the nonce field (which is a byte slice)
|
||||
nonceWithEarlyData := make([]byte, len(msg.nonce)+4)
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonceWithEarlyData, msg.maxEarlyData)
|
||||
copy(nonceWithEarlyData[4:], msg.nonce)
|
||||
|
||||
var appData []byte
|
||||
if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.GetAppDataForSessionState != nil {
|
||||
appData = c.extraConfig.GetAppDataForSessionState()
|
||||
}
|
||||
var b cryptobyte.Builder
|
||||
b.AddUint16(clientSessionStateVersion) // revision
|
||||
b.AddUint32(msg.maxEarlyData)
|
||||
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||||
b.AddBytes(appData)
|
||||
})
|
||||
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||||
b.AddBytes(msg.nonce)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// Save the resumption_master_secret and nonce instead of deriving the PSK
|
||||
// to do the least amount of work on NewSessionTicket messages before we
|
||||
// know if the ticket will be used. Forward secrecy of resumed connections
|
||||
// is guaranteed by the requirement for pskModeDHE.
|
||||
session := &clientSessionState{
|
||||
sessionTicket: msg.label,
|
||||
vers: c.vers,
|
||||
cipherSuite: c.cipherSuite,
|
||||
masterSecret: c.resumptionSecret,
|
||||
serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates,
|
||||
verifiedChains: c.verifiedChains,
|
||||
receivedAt: c.config.time(),
|
||||
nonce: b.BytesOrPanic(),
|
||||
useBy: c.config.time().Add(lifetime),
|
||||
ageAdd: msg.ageAdd,
|
||||
ocspResponse: c.ocspResponse,
|
||||
scts: c.scts,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cacheKey := clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config)
|
||||
c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, toClientSessionState(session))
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
1843
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_messages.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
1843
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_messages.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
912
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
912
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,912 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto"
|
||||
"crypto/ecdsa"
|
||||
"crypto/ed25519"
|
||||
"crypto/rsa"
|
||||
"crypto/subtle"
|
||||
"crypto/x509"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"hash"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// serverHandshakeState contains details of a server handshake in progress.
|
||||
// It's discarded once the handshake has completed.
|
||||
type serverHandshakeState struct {
|
||||
c *Conn
|
||||
ctx context.Context
|
||||
clientHello *clientHelloMsg
|
||||
hello *serverHelloMsg
|
||||
suite *cipherSuite
|
||||
ecdheOk bool
|
||||
ecSignOk bool
|
||||
rsaDecryptOk bool
|
||||
rsaSignOk bool
|
||||
sessionState *sessionState
|
||||
finishedHash finishedHash
|
||||
masterSecret []byte
|
||||
cert *Certificate
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server.
|
||||
func (c *Conn) serverHandshake(ctx context.Context) error {
|
||||
c.setAlternativeRecordLayer()
|
||||
|
||||
clientHello, err := c.readClientHello(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if c.vers == VersionTLS13 {
|
||||
hs := serverHandshakeStateTLS13{
|
||||
c: c,
|
||||
ctx: ctx,
|
||||
clientHello: clientHello,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return hs.handshake()
|
||||
} else if c.extraConfig.usesAlternativeRecordLayer() {
|
||||
// This should already have been caught by the check that the ClientHello doesn't
|
||||
// offer any (supported) versions older than TLS 1.3.
|
||||
// Check again to make sure we can't be tricked into using an older version.
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: negotiated TLS < 1.3 when using QUIC")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs := serverHandshakeState{
|
||||
c: c,
|
||||
ctx: ctx,
|
||||
clientHello: clientHello,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return hs.handshake()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// For an overview of TLS handshaking, see RFC 5246, Section 7.3.
|
||||
c.buffering = true
|
||||
if hs.checkForResumption() {
|
||||
// The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake.
|
||||
c.didResume = true
|
||||
if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false
|
||||
if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't
|
||||
// valid so we do a full handshake.
|
||||
if err := hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true
|
||||
c.buffering = true
|
||||
if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
|
||||
c.isHandshakeComplete.Store(true)
|
||||
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message and selects the protocol version.
|
||||
func (c *Conn) readClientHello(ctx context.Context) (*clientHelloMsg, error) {
|
||||
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||||
return nil, unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var configForClient *config
|
||||
originalConfig := c.config
|
||||
if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil {
|
||||
chi := newClientHelloInfo(ctx, c, clientHello)
|
||||
if cfc, err := c.config.GetConfigForClient(chi); err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
} else if cfc != nil {
|
||||
configForClient = fromConfig(cfc)
|
||||
c.config = configForClient
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.ticketKeys = originalConfig.ticketKeys(configForClient)
|
||||
|
||||
clientVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
|
||||
if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
|
||||
clientVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.extraConfig.usesAlternativeRecordLayer() {
|
||||
// In QUIC, the client MUST NOT offer any old TLS versions.
|
||||
// Here, we can only check that none of the other supported versions of this library
|
||||
// (TLS 1.0 - TLS 1.2) is offered. We don't check for any SSL versions here.
|
||||
for _, ver := range clientVersions {
|
||||
if ver == VersionTLS13 {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, v := range supportedVersions {
|
||||
if ver == v {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered old TLS version %#x", ver)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Make the config we're using allows us to use TLS 1.3.
|
||||
if c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) < VersionTLS13 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("tls: MaxVersion prevents QUIC from using TLS 1.3")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(roleServer, clientVersions)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered only unsupported versions: %x", clientVersions)
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.haveVers = true
|
||||
c.in.version = c.vers
|
||||
c.out.version = c.vers
|
||||
|
||||
return clientHello, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processClientHello() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
|
||||
hs.hello.vers = c.vers
|
||||
|
||||
foundCompression := false
|
||||
// We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it.
|
||||
for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods {
|
||||
if compression == compressionNone {
|
||||
foundCompression = true
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !foundCompression {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
|
||||
serverRandom := hs.hello.random
|
||||
// Downgrade protection canaries. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.3.
|
||||
maxVers := c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer)
|
||||
if maxVers >= VersionTLS12 && c.vers < maxVers || testingOnlyForceDowngradeCanary {
|
||||
if c.vers == VersionTLS12 {
|
||||
copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS12)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS11)
|
||||
}
|
||||
serverRandom = serverRandom[:24]
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), serverRandom)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported
|
||||
hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
|
||||
if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 {
|
||||
c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto
|
||||
c.clientProtocol = selectedProto
|
||||
|
||||
hs.cert, err = c.config.getCertificate(newClientHelloInfo(hs.ctx, c, hs.clientHello))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if err == errNoCertificates {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnrecognizedName)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if hs.clientHello.scts {
|
||||
hs.hello.scts = hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.ecdheOk = supportsECDHE(c.config, hs.clientHello.supportedCurves, hs.clientHello.supportedPoints)
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.ecdheOk && len(hs.clientHello.supportedPoints) > 0 {
|
||||
// Although omitting the ec_point_formats extension is permitted, some
|
||||
// old OpenSSL version will refuse to handshake if not present.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Per RFC 4492, section 5.1.2, implementations MUST support the
|
||||
// uncompressed point format. See golang.org/issue/31943.
|
||||
hs.hello.supportedPoints = []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok {
|
||||
switch priv.Public().(type) {
|
||||
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
hs.ecSignOk = true
|
||||
case ed25519.PublicKey:
|
||||
hs.ecSignOk = true
|
||||
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
hs.rsaSignOk = true
|
||||
default:
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported signing key type (%T)", priv.Public())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok {
|
||||
switch priv.Public().(type) {
|
||||
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
hs.rsaDecryptOk = true
|
||||
default:
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported decryption key type (%T)", priv.Public())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// negotiateALPN picks a shared ALPN protocol that both sides support in server
|
||||
// preference order. If ALPN is not configured or the peer doesn't support it,
|
||||
// it returns "" and no error.
|
||||
func negotiateALPN(serverProtos, clientProtos []string) (string, error) {
|
||||
if len(serverProtos) == 0 || len(clientProtos) == 0 {
|
||||
return "", nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
var http11fallback bool
|
||||
for _, s := range serverProtos {
|
||||
for _, c := range clientProtos {
|
||||
if s == c {
|
||||
return s, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s == "h2" && c == "http/1.1" {
|
||||
http11fallback = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// As a special case, let http/1.1 clients connect to h2 servers as if they
|
||||
// didn't support ALPN. We used not to enforce protocol overlap, so over
|
||||
// time a number of HTTP servers were configured with only "h2", but
|
||||
// expected to accept connections from "http/1.1" clients. See Issue 46310.
|
||||
if http11fallback {
|
||||
return "", nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("tls: client requested unsupported application protocols (%s)", clientProtos)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// supportsECDHE returns whether ECDHE key exchanges can be used with this
|
||||
// pre-TLS 1.3 client.
|
||||
func supportsECDHE(c *config, supportedCurves []CurveID, supportedPoints []uint8) bool {
|
||||
supportsCurve := false
|
||||
for _, curve := range supportedCurves {
|
||||
if c.supportsCurve(curve) {
|
||||
supportsCurve = true
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
supportsPointFormat := false
|
||||
for _, pointFormat := range supportedPoints {
|
||||
if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed {
|
||||
supportsPointFormat = true
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Per RFC 8422, Section 5.1.2, if the Supported Point Formats extension is
|
||||
// missing, uncompressed points are supported. If supportedPoints is empty,
|
||||
// the extension must be missing, as an empty extension body is rejected by
|
||||
// the parser. See https://go.dev/issue/49126.
|
||||
if len(supportedPoints) == 0 {
|
||||
supportsPointFormat = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return supportsCurve && supportsPointFormat
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
preferenceOrder := cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder
|
||||
if !hasAESGCMHardwareSupport || !aesgcmPreferred(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites) {
|
||||
preferenceOrder = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
configCipherSuites := c.config.cipherSuites()
|
||||
preferenceList := make([]uint16, 0, len(configCipherSuites))
|
||||
for _, suiteID := range preferenceOrder {
|
||||
for _, id := range configCipherSuites {
|
||||
if id == suiteID {
|
||||
preferenceList = append(preferenceList, id)
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.suite = selectCipherSuite(preferenceList, hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, hs.cipherSuiteOk)
|
||||
if hs.suite == nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
|
||||
|
||||
for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
|
||||
if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV {
|
||||
// The client is doing a fallback connection. See RFC 7507.
|
||||
if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback")
|
||||
}
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) cipherSuiteOk(c *cipherSuite) bool {
|
||||
if c.flags&suiteECDHE != 0 {
|
||||
if !hs.ecdheOk {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.flags&suiteECSign != 0 {
|
||||
if !hs.ecSignOk {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if !hs.rsaSignOk {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if !hs.rsaDecryptOk {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if hs.c.vers < VersionTLS12 && c.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// checkForResumption reports whether we should perform resumption on this connection.
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
plaintext, usedOldKey := c.decryptTicket(hs.clientHello.sessionTicket)
|
||||
if plaintext == nil {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.sessionState = &sessionState{usedOldKey: usedOldKey}
|
||||
ok := hs.sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
createdAt := time.Unix(int64(hs.sessionState.createdAt), 0)
|
||||
if c.config.time().Sub(createdAt) > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Never resume a session for a different TLS version.
|
||||
if c.vers != hs.sessionState.vers {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cipherSuiteOk := false
|
||||
// Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session.
|
||||
for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
|
||||
if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite {
|
||||
cipherSuiteOk = true
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !cipherSuiteOk {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session.
|
||||
hs.suite = selectCipherSuite([]uint16{hs.sessionState.cipherSuite},
|
||||
c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.cipherSuiteOk)
|
||||
if hs.suite == nil {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0
|
||||
needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth)
|
||||
if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
|
||||
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
|
||||
// We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know
|
||||
// that we're doing a resumption.
|
||||
hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
|
||||
hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey
|
||||
hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
|
||||
Certificate: hs.sessionState.certificates,
|
||||
}); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
|
||||
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 {
|
||||
hs.hello.ocspStapling = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled
|
||||
hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
|
||||
|
||||
hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(hs.c.vers, hs.suite)
|
||||
if c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
|
||||
// No need to keep a full record of the handshake if client
|
||||
// certificates won't be used.
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
|
||||
certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.hello.ocspStapling {
|
||||
certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg)
|
||||
certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
|
||||
skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if skx != nil {
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var certReq *certificateRequestMsg
|
||||
if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
|
||||
// Request a client certificate
|
||||
certReq = new(certificateRequestMsg)
|
||||
certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{
|
||||
byte(certTypeRSASign),
|
||||
byte(certTypeECDSASign),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
|
||||
certReq.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
|
||||
certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
|
||||
// the client that it may send any certificate in response
|
||||
// to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then
|
||||
// we can send them down, so that the client can choose
|
||||
// an appropriate certificate to give to us.
|
||||
if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
|
||||
certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any
|
||||
|
||||
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
|
||||
// certificate message, even if it's empty.
|
||||
if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
|
||||
certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||||
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
|
||||
|
||||
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
|
||||
Certificate: certMsg.certificates,
|
||||
}); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(certMsg.certificates) != 0 {
|
||||
pub = c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
|
||||
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Get client key exchange
|
||||
ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||||
return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
|
||||
|
||||
preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
|
||||
if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, hs.clientHello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message,
|
||||
// the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the
|
||||
// clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding
|
||||
// handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding
|
||||
// to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
|
||||
// possession of the private key of the certificate.
|
||||
if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
|
||||
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||||
return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var sigType uint8
|
||||
var sigHash crypto.Hash
|
||||
if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
|
||||
if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
|
||||
}
|
||||
sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
signed := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, sigHash)
|
||||
if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, pub, sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
|
||||
keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
|
||||
|
||||
var clientCipher, serverCipher any
|
||||
var clientHash, serverHash hash.Hash
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.suite.aead == nil {
|
||||
clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */)
|
||||
clientHash = hs.suite.mac(clientMAC)
|
||||
serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */)
|
||||
serverHash = hs.suite.mac(serverMAC)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
|
||||
serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
|
||||
c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
if err := c.readChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||||
return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
||||
if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
|
||||
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
|
||||
copy(out, verify)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error {
|
||||
// ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the
|
||||
// ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session
|
||||
// ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent.
|
||||
if !hs.hello.ticketSupported {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
m := new(newSessionTicketMsg)
|
||||
|
||||
createdAt := uint64(c.config.time().Unix())
|
||||
if hs.sessionState != nil {
|
||||
// If this is re-wrapping an old key, then keep
|
||||
// the original time it was created.
|
||||
createdAt = hs.sessionState.createdAt
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var certsFromClient [][]byte
|
||||
for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates {
|
||||
certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw)
|
||||
}
|
||||
state := sessionState{
|
||||
vers: c.vers,
|
||||
cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
|
||||
createdAt: createdAt,
|
||||
masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
|
||||
certificates: certsFromClient,
|
||||
}
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
finished := new(finishedMsg)
|
||||
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
||||
hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
copy(out, finished.verifyData)
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a
|
||||
// Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns
|
||||
// the public key of the leaf certificate.
|
||||
func (c *Conn) processCertsFromClient(certificate Certificate) error {
|
||||
certificates := certificate.Certificate
|
||||
certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates))
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
for i, asn1Data := range certificates {
|
||||
if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(certs) == 0 && requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth) {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 {
|
||||
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
|
||||
Roots: c.config.ClientCAs,
|
||||
CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
|
||||
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
|
||||
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
|
||||
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
||||
return &CertificateVerificationError{UnverifiedCertificates: certs, Err: err}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.verifiedChains = chains
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.peerCertificates = certs
|
||||
c.ocspResponse = certificate.OCSPStaple
|
||||
c.scts = certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
|
||||
|
||||
if len(certs) > 0 {
|
||||
switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
|
||||
case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey, ed25519.PublicKey:
|
||||
default:
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil {
|
||||
if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newClientHelloInfo(ctx context.Context, c *Conn, clientHello *clientHelloMsg) *ClientHelloInfo {
|
||||
supportedVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
|
||||
if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
|
||||
supportedVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return toClientHelloInfo(&clientHelloInfo{
|
||||
CipherSuites: clientHello.cipherSuites,
|
||||
ServerName: clientHello.serverName,
|
||||
SupportedCurves: clientHello.supportedCurves,
|
||||
SupportedPoints: clientHello.supportedPoints,
|
||||
SignatureSchemes: clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
|
||||
SupportedProtos: clientHello.alpnProtocols,
|
||||
SupportedVersions: supportedVersions,
|
||||
Conn: c.conn,
|
||||
config: toConfig(c.config),
|
||||
ctx: ctx,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
906
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server_tls13.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
906
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server_tls13.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,906 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto"
|
||||
"crypto/hmac"
|
||||
"crypto/rsa"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"hash"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// maxClientPSKIdentities is the number of client PSK identities the server will
|
||||
// attempt to validate. It will ignore the rest not to let cheap ClientHello
|
||||
// messages cause too much work in session ticket decryption attempts.
|
||||
const maxClientPSKIdentities = 5
|
||||
|
||||
type serverHandshakeStateTLS13 struct {
|
||||
c *Conn
|
||||
ctx context.Context
|
||||
clientHello *clientHelloMsg
|
||||
hello *serverHelloMsg
|
||||
alpnNegotiationErr error
|
||||
encryptedExtensions *encryptedExtensionsMsg
|
||||
sentDummyCCS bool
|
||||
usingPSK bool
|
||||
suite *cipherSuiteTLS13
|
||||
cert *Certificate
|
||||
sigAlg SignatureScheme
|
||||
earlySecret []byte
|
||||
sharedKey []byte
|
||||
handshakeSecret []byte
|
||||
masterSecret []byte
|
||||
trafficSecret []byte // client_application_traffic_secret_0
|
||||
transcript hash.Hash
|
||||
clientFinished []byte
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
if needFIPS() {
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: internal error: TLS 1.3 reached in FIPS mode")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// For an overview of the TLS 1.3 handshake, see RFC 8446, Section 2.
|
||||
if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.checkForResumption(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
if err := hs.pickCertificate(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.buffering = true
|
||||
if err := hs.sendServerParameters(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.sendServerCertificate(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.sendServerFinished(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Note that at this point we could start sending application data without
|
||||
// waiting for the client's second flight, but the application might not
|
||||
// expect the lack of replay protection of the ClientHello parameters.
|
||||
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := hs.readClientCertificate(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
if err := hs.readClientFinished(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.isHandshakeComplete.Store(true)
|
||||
c.updateConnectionState()
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) processClientHello() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
|
||||
hs.encryptedExtensions = new(encryptedExtensionsMsg)
|
||||
|
||||
// TLS 1.3 froze the ServerHello.legacy_version field, and uses
|
||||
// supported_versions instead. See RFC 8446, sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.1.
|
||||
hs.hello.vers = VersionTLS12
|
||||
hs.hello.supportedVersion = c.vers
|
||||
|
||||
if len(hs.clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: client used the legacy version field to negotiate TLS 1.3")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Abort if the client is doing a fallback and landing lower than what we
|
||||
// support. See RFC 7507, which however does not specify the interaction
|
||||
// with supported_versions. The only difference is that with
|
||||
// supported_versions a client has a chance to attempt a [TLS 1.2, TLS 1.4]
|
||||
// handshake in case TLS 1.3 is broken but 1.2 is not. Alas, in that case,
|
||||
// it will have to drop the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV protection if it falls back to
|
||||
// TLS 1.2, because a TLS 1.3 server would abort here. The situation before
|
||||
// supported_versions was not better because there was just no way to do a
|
||||
// TLS 1.4 handshake without risking the server selecting TLS 1.3.
|
||||
for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
|
||||
if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV {
|
||||
// Use c.vers instead of max(supported_versions) because an attacker
|
||||
// could defeat this by adding an arbitrary high version otherwise.
|
||||
if c.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback")
|
||||
}
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(hs.clientHello.compressionMethods) != 1 ||
|
||||
hs.clientHello.compressionMethods[0] != compressionNone {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: TLS 1.3 client supports illegal compression methods")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
|
||||
if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hs.hello.random); err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
|
||||
hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.suite == nil {
|
||||
var preferenceList []uint16
|
||||
for _, suiteID := range c.config.CipherSuites {
|
||||
for _, suite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 {
|
||||
if suite.id == suiteID {
|
||||
preferenceList = append(preferenceList, suiteID)
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(preferenceList) == 0 {
|
||||
preferenceList = defaultCipherSuitesTLS13
|
||||
if !hasAESGCMHardwareSupport || !aesgcmPreferred(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites) {
|
||||
preferenceList = defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, suiteID := range preferenceList {
|
||||
hs.suite = mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, suiteID)
|
||||
if hs.suite != nil {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if hs.suite == nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
|
||||
hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
|
||||
hs.transcript = hs.suite.hash.New()
|
||||
|
||||
// Pick the ECDHE group in server preference order, but give priority to
|
||||
// groups with a key share, to avoid a HelloRetryRequest round-trip.
|
||||
var selectedGroup CurveID
|
||||
var clientKeyShare *keyShare
|
||||
GroupSelection:
|
||||
for _, preferredGroup := range c.config.curvePreferences() {
|
||||
for _, ks := range hs.clientHello.keyShares {
|
||||
if ks.group == preferredGroup {
|
||||
selectedGroup = ks.group
|
||||
clientKeyShare = &ks
|
||||
break GroupSelection
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if selectedGroup != 0 {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, group := range hs.clientHello.supportedCurves {
|
||||
if group == preferredGroup {
|
||||
selectedGroup = group
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if selectedGroup == 0 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: no ECDHE curve supported by both client and server")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if clientKeyShare == nil {
|
||||
if err := hs.doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
clientKeyShare = &hs.clientHello.keyShares[0]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, ok := curveForCurveID(selectedGroup); !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
|
||||
}
|
||||
key, err := generateECDHEKey(c.config.rand(), selectedGroup)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.hello.serverShare = keyShare{group: selectedGroup, data: key.PublicKey().Bytes()}
|
||||
peerKey, err := key.Curve().NewPublicKey(clientKeyShare.data)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: invalid client key share")
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.sharedKey, err = key.ECDH(peerKey)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: invalid client key share")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
|
||||
|
||||
if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions != nil {
|
||||
c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions(typeClientHello, hs.clientHello.additionalExtensions)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
hs.alpnNegotiationErr = err
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol = selectedProto
|
||||
c.clientProtocol = selectedProto
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) checkForResumption() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
modeOK := false
|
||||
for _, mode := range hs.clientHello.pskModes {
|
||||
if mode == pskModeDHE {
|
||||
modeOK = true
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !modeOK {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(hs.clientHello.pskIdentities) != len(hs.clientHello.pskBinders) {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: invalid or missing PSK binders")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(hs.clientHello.pskIdentities) == 0 {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for i, identity := range hs.clientHello.pskIdentities {
|
||||
if i >= maxClientPSKIdentities {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
plaintext, _ := c.decryptTicket(identity.label)
|
||||
if plaintext == nil {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
sessionState := new(sessionStateTLS13)
|
||||
if ok := sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext); !ok {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.clientHello.earlyData {
|
||||
if sessionState.maxEarlyData == 0 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: client sent unexpected early data")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.alpnNegotiationErr == nil && sessionState.alpn == c.clientProtocol &&
|
||||
c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData > 0 &&
|
||||
c.extraConfig.Accept0RTT != nil && c.extraConfig.Accept0RTT(sessionState.appData) {
|
||||
hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData = true
|
||||
c.used0RTT = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
createdAt := time.Unix(int64(sessionState.createdAt), 0)
|
||||
if c.config.time().Sub(createdAt) > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We don't check the obfuscated ticket age because it's affected by
|
||||
// clock skew and it's only a freshness signal useful for shrinking the
|
||||
// window for replay attacks, which don't affect us as we don't do 0-RTT.
|
||||
|
||||
pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(sessionState.cipherSuite)
|
||||
if pskSuite == nil || pskSuite.hash != hs.suite.hash {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// PSK connections don't re-establish client certificates, but carry
|
||||
// them over in the session ticket. Ensure the presence of client certs
|
||||
// in the ticket is consistent with the configured requirements.
|
||||
sessionHasClientCerts := len(sessionState.certificate.Certificate) != 0
|
||||
needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth)
|
||||
if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
psk := hs.suite.expandLabel(sessionState.resumptionSecret, "resumption",
|
||||
nil, hs.suite.hash.Size())
|
||||
hs.earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(psk, nil)
|
||||
binderKey := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.earlySecret, resumptionBinderLabel, nil)
|
||||
// Clone the transcript in case a HelloRetryRequest was recorded.
|
||||
transcript := cloneHash(hs.transcript, hs.suite.hash)
|
||||
if transcript == nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: internal error: failed to clone hash")
|
||||
}
|
||||
transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshalWithoutBinders())
|
||||
pskBinder := hs.suite.finishedHash(binderKey, transcript)
|
||||
if !hmac.Equal(hs.clientHello.pskBinders[i], pskBinder) {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: invalid PSK binder")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.didResume = true
|
||||
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(sessionState.certificate); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
h := cloneHash(hs.transcript, hs.suite.hash)
|
||||
h.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
|
||||
if hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData {
|
||||
clientEarlySecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.earlySecret, "c e traffic", h)
|
||||
c.in.exportKey(Encryption0RTT, hs.suite, clientEarlySecret)
|
||||
if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelEarlyTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, clientEarlySecret); err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.hello.selectedIdentityPresent = true
|
||||
hs.hello.selectedIdentity = uint16(i)
|
||||
hs.usingPSK = true
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// cloneHash uses the encoding.BinaryMarshaler and encoding.BinaryUnmarshaler
|
||||
// interfaces implemented by standard library hashes to clone the state of in
|
||||
// to a new instance of h. It returns nil if the operation fails.
|
||||
func cloneHash(in hash.Hash, h crypto.Hash) hash.Hash {
|
||||
// Recreate the interface to avoid importing encoding.
|
||||
type binaryMarshaler interface {
|
||||
MarshalBinary() (data []byte, err error)
|
||||
UnmarshalBinary(data []byte) error
|
||||
}
|
||||
marshaler, ok := in.(binaryMarshaler)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
state, err := marshaler.MarshalBinary()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := h.New()
|
||||
unmarshaler, ok := out.(binaryMarshaler)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := unmarshaler.UnmarshalBinary(state); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) pickCertificate() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
// Only one of PSK and certificates are used at a time.
|
||||
if hs.usingPSK {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// signature_algorithms is required in TLS 1.3. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3.
|
||||
if len(hs.clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) == 0 {
|
||||
return c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
certificate, err := c.config.getCertificate(newClientHelloInfo(hs.ctx, c, hs.clientHello))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if err == errNoCertificates {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnrecognizedName)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.sigAlg, err = selectSignatureScheme(c.vers, certificate, hs.clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
// getCertificate returned a certificate that is unsupported or
|
||||
// incompatible with the client's signature algorithms.
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.cert = certificate
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// sendDummyChangeCipherSpec sends a ChangeCipherSpec record for compatibility
|
||||
// with middleboxes that didn't implement TLS correctly. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4.
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
|
||||
if hs.sentDummyCCS {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.sentDummyCCS = true
|
||||
|
||||
_, err := hs.c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup CurveID) error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
// The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
|
||||
// HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
|
||||
chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
|
||||
hs.transcript.Reset()
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
|
||||
|
||||
helloRetryRequest := &serverHelloMsg{
|
||||
vers: hs.hello.vers,
|
||||
random: helloRetryRequestRandom,
|
||||
sessionId: hs.hello.sessionId,
|
||||
cipherSuite: hs.hello.cipherSuite,
|
||||
compressionMethod: hs.hello.compressionMethod,
|
||||
supportedVersion: hs.hello.supportedVersion,
|
||||
selectedGroup: selectedGroup,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(helloRetryRequest.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloRetryRequest.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||||
return unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(clientHello.keyShares) != 1 || clientHello.keyShares[0].group != selectedGroup {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: client sent invalid key share in second ClientHello")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if clientHello.earlyData {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: client indicated early data in second ClientHello")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if illegalClientHelloChange(clientHello, hs.clientHello) {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: client illegally modified second ClientHello")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if clientHello.earlyData {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: client offered 0-RTT data in second ClientHello")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.clientHello = clientHello
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// illegalClientHelloChange reports whether the two ClientHello messages are
|
||||
// different, with the exception of the changes allowed before and after a
|
||||
// HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.2.
|
||||
func illegalClientHelloChange(ch, ch1 *clientHelloMsg) bool {
|
||||
if len(ch.supportedVersions) != len(ch1.supportedVersions) ||
|
||||
len(ch.cipherSuites) != len(ch1.cipherSuites) ||
|
||||
len(ch.supportedCurves) != len(ch1.supportedCurves) ||
|
||||
len(ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) != len(ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) ||
|
||||
len(ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert) != len(ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert) ||
|
||||
len(ch.alpnProtocols) != len(ch1.alpnProtocols) {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := range ch.supportedVersions {
|
||||
if ch.supportedVersions[i] != ch1.supportedVersions[i] {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := range ch.cipherSuites {
|
||||
if ch.cipherSuites[i] != ch1.cipherSuites[i] {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := range ch.supportedCurves {
|
||||
if ch.supportedCurves[i] != ch1.supportedCurves[i] {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := range ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms {
|
||||
if ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms[i] != ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithms[i] {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := range ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert {
|
||||
if ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert[i] != ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert[i] {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := range ch.alpnProtocols {
|
||||
if ch.alpnProtocols[i] != ch1.alpnProtocols[i] {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ch.vers != ch1.vers ||
|
||||
!bytes.Equal(ch.random, ch1.random) ||
|
||||
!bytes.Equal(ch.sessionId, ch1.sessionId) ||
|
||||
!bytes.Equal(ch.compressionMethods, ch1.compressionMethods) ||
|
||||
ch.serverName != ch1.serverName ||
|
||||
ch.ocspStapling != ch1.ocspStapling ||
|
||||
!bytes.Equal(ch.supportedPoints, ch1.supportedPoints) ||
|
||||
ch.ticketSupported != ch1.ticketSupported ||
|
||||
!bytes.Equal(ch.sessionTicket, ch1.sessionTicket) ||
|
||||
ch.secureRenegotiationSupported != ch1.secureRenegotiationSupported ||
|
||||
!bytes.Equal(ch.secureRenegotiation, ch1.secureRenegotiation) ||
|
||||
ch.scts != ch1.scts ||
|
||||
!bytes.Equal(ch.cookie, ch1.cookie) ||
|
||||
!bytes.Equal(ch.pskModes, ch1.pskModes)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerParameters() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
earlySecret := hs.earlySecret
|
||||
if earlySecret == nil {
|
||||
earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, nil)
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.handshakeSecret = hs.suite.extract(hs.sharedKey,
|
||||
hs.suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "derived", nil))
|
||||
|
||||
clientSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret,
|
||||
clientHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
|
||||
c.in.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, clientSecret)
|
||||
c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, clientSecret)
|
||||
serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret,
|
||||
serverHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
|
||||
c.out.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, serverSecret)
|
||||
c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
|
||||
|
||||
err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientHandshake, hs.clientHello.random, clientSecret)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerHandshake, hs.clientHello.random, serverSecret)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.alpnNegotiationErr != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
|
||||
return hs.alpnNegotiationErr
|
||||
}
|
||||
if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.GetExtensions != nil {
|
||||
hs.encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions = hs.c.extraConfig.GetExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(hs.encryptedExtensions.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.encryptedExtensions.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) requestClientCert() bool {
|
||||
return hs.c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert && !hs.usingPSK
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerCertificate() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
// Only one of PSK and certificates are used at a time.
|
||||
if hs.usingPSK {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hs.requestClientCert() {
|
||||
// Request a client certificate
|
||||
certReq := new(certificateRequestMsgTLS13)
|
||||
certReq.ocspStapling = true
|
||||
certReq.scts = true
|
||||
certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms()
|
||||
if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
|
||||
certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(certReq.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
certMsg := new(certificateMsgTLS13)
|
||||
|
||||
certMsg.certificate = *hs.cert
|
||||
certMsg.scts = hs.clientHello.scts && len(hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0
|
||||
certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0
|
||||
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
certVerifyMsg := new(certificateVerifyMsg)
|
||||
certVerifyMsg.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
|
||||
certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm = hs.sigAlg
|
||||
|
||||
sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(hs.sigAlg)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
signed := signedMessage(sigHash, serverSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
|
||||
signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
|
||||
if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
|
||||
signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
|
||||
}
|
||||
sig, err := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(c.config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
public := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Public()
|
||||
if rsaKey, ok := public.(*rsa.PublicKey); ok && sigType == signatureRSAPSS &&
|
||||
rsaKey.N.BitLen()/8 < sigHash.Size()*2+2 { // key too small for RSA-PSS
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake: " + err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
certVerifyMsg.signature = sig
|
||||
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(certVerifyMsg.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerifyMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerFinished() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
finished := &finishedMsg{
|
||||
verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Derive secrets that take context through the server Finished.
|
||||
|
||||
hs.masterSecret = hs.suite.extract(nil,
|
||||
hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret, "derived", nil))
|
||||
|
||||
hs.trafficSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
|
||||
clientApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
|
||||
serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
|
||||
serverApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
|
||||
c.out.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, serverSecret)
|
||||
c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
|
||||
|
||||
err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, hs.trafficSecret)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, serverSecret)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.ekm = hs.suite.exportKeyingMaterial(hs.masterSecret, hs.transcript)
|
||||
|
||||
// If we did not request client certificates, at this point we can
|
||||
// precompute the client finished and roll the transcript forward to send
|
||||
// session tickets in our first flight.
|
||||
if !hs.requestClientCert() {
|
||||
if err := hs.sendSessionTickets(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) shouldSendSessionTickets() bool {
|
||||
if hs.c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Don't send tickets the client wouldn't use. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.9.
|
||||
for _, pskMode := range hs.clientHello.pskModes {
|
||||
if pskMode == pskModeDHE {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendSessionTickets() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
hs.clientFinished = hs.suite.finishedHash(c.in.trafficSecret, hs.transcript)
|
||||
finishedMsg := &finishedMsg{
|
||||
verifyData: hs.clientFinished,
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(finishedMsg.marshal())
|
||||
|
||||
if !hs.shouldSendSessionTickets() {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
|
||||
resumptionLabel, hs.transcript)
|
||||
|
||||
// Don't send session tickets when the alternative record layer is set.
|
||||
// Instead, save the resumption secret on the Conn.
|
||||
// Session tickets can then be generated by calling Conn.GetSessionTicket().
|
||||
if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
m, err := hs.c.getSessionTicketMsg(nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientCertificate() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
if !hs.requestClientCert() {
|
||||
// Make sure the connection is still being verified whether or not
|
||||
// the server requested a client certificate.
|
||||
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
|
||||
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
|
||||
// certificate message. If it's empty, no CertificateVerify is sent.
|
||||
|
||||
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsgTLS13)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||||
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
|
||||
|
||||
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(certMsg.certificate); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
|
||||
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(certMsg.certificate.Certificate) != 0 {
|
||||
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||||
return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
|
||||
if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, supportedSignatureAlgorithms()) {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
|
||||
}
|
||||
sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigHash == crypto.SHA1 {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
|
||||
}
|
||||
signed := signedMessage(sigHash, clientSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
|
||||
if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey,
|
||||
sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs.transcript.Write(certVerify.marshal())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// If we waited until the client certificates to send session tickets, we
|
||||
// are ready to do it now.
|
||||
if err := hs.sendSessionTickets(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientFinished() error {
|
||||
c := hs.c
|
||||
|
||||
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
finished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
||||
return unexpectedMessageError(finished, msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !hmac.Equal(hs.clientFinished, finished.verifyData) {
|
||||
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: invalid client finished hash")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.in.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
|
||||
c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
366
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/key_agreement.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
366
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/key_agreement.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto"
|
||||
"crypto/ecdh"
|
||||
"crypto/md5"
|
||||
"crypto/rsa"
|
||||
"crypto/sha1"
|
||||
"crypto/x509"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// a keyAgreement implements the client and server side of a TLS key agreement
|
||||
// protocol by generating and processing key exchange messages.
|
||||
type keyAgreement interface {
|
||||
// On the server side, the first two methods are called in order.
|
||||
|
||||
// In the case that the key agreement protocol doesn't use a
|
||||
// ServerKeyExchange message, generateServerKeyExchange can return nil,
|
||||
// nil.
|
||||
generateServerKeyExchange(*config, *Certificate, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error)
|
||||
processClientKeyExchange(*config, *Certificate, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, uint16) ([]byte, error)
|
||||
|
||||
// On the client side, the next two methods are called in order.
|
||||
|
||||
// This method may not be called if the server doesn't send a
|
||||
// ServerKeyExchange message.
|
||||
processServerKeyExchange(*config, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate, *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error
|
||||
generateClientKeyExchange(*config, *clientHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var errClientKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ClientKeyExchange message")
|
||||
var errServerKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ServerKeyExchange message")
|
||||
|
||||
// rsaKeyAgreement implements the standard TLS key agreement where the client
|
||||
// encrypts the pre-master secret to the server's public key.
|
||||
type rsaKeyAgreement struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
if len(ckx.ciphertext) < 2 {
|
||||
return nil, errClientKeyExchange
|
||||
}
|
||||
ciphertextLen := int(ckx.ciphertext[0])<<8 | int(ckx.ciphertext[1])
|
||||
if ciphertextLen != len(ckx.ciphertext)-2 {
|
||||
return nil, errClientKeyExchange
|
||||
}
|
||||
ciphertext := ckx.ciphertext[2:]
|
||||
|
||||
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Decrypter")
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Perform constant time RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 decryption
|
||||
preMasterSecret, err := priv.Decrypt(config.rand(), ciphertext, &rsa.PKCS1v15DecryptOptions{SessionKeyLen: 48})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
// We don't check the version number in the premaster secret. For one,
|
||||
// by checking it, we would leak information about the validity of the
|
||||
// encrypted pre-master secret. Secondly, it provides only a small
|
||||
// benefit against a downgrade attack and some implementations send the
|
||||
// wrong version anyway. See the discussion at the end of section
|
||||
// 7.4.7.1 of RFC 4346.
|
||||
return preMasterSecret, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error {
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: unexpected ServerKeyExchange")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
|
||||
preMasterSecret := make([]byte, 48)
|
||||
preMasterSecret[0] = byte(clientHello.vers >> 8)
|
||||
preMasterSecret[1] = byte(clientHello.vers)
|
||||
_, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), preMasterSecret[2:])
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rsaKey, ok := cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: server certificate contains incorrect key type for selected ciphersuite")
|
||||
}
|
||||
encrypted, err := rsa.EncryptPKCS1v15(config.rand(), rsaKey, preMasterSecret)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
ckx := new(clientKeyExchangeMsg)
|
||||
ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, len(encrypted)+2)
|
||||
ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(encrypted) >> 8)
|
||||
ckx.ciphertext[1] = byte(len(encrypted))
|
||||
copy(ckx.ciphertext[2:], encrypted)
|
||||
return preMasterSecret, ckx, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// sha1Hash calculates a SHA1 hash over the given byte slices.
|
||||
func sha1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte {
|
||||
hsha1 := sha1.New()
|
||||
for _, slice := range slices {
|
||||
hsha1.Write(slice)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return hsha1.Sum(nil)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// md5SHA1Hash implements TLS 1.0's hybrid hash function which consists of the
|
||||
// concatenation of an MD5 and SHA1 hash.
|
||||
func md5SHA1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte {
|
||||
md5sha1 := make([]byte, md5.Size+sha1.Size)
|
||||
hmd5 := md5.New()
|
||||
for _, slice := range slices {
|
||||
hmd5.Write(slice)
|
||||
}
|
||||
copy(md5sha1, hmd5.Sum(nil))
|
||||
copy(md5sha1[md5.Size:], sha1Hash(slices))
|
||||
return md5sha1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// hashForServerKeyExchange hashes the given slices and returns their digest
|
||||
// using the given hash function (for >= TLS 1.2) or using a default based on
|
||||
// the sigType (for earlier TLS versions). For Ed25519 signatures, which don't
|
||||
// do pre-hashing, it returns the concatenation of the slices.
|
||||
func hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType uint8, hashFunc crypto.Hash, version uint16, slices ...[]byte) []byte {
|
||||
if sigType == signatureEd25519 {
|
||||
var signed []byte
|
||||
for _, slice := range slices {
|
||||
signed = append(signed, slice...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return signed
|
||||
}
|
||||
if version >= VersionTLS12 {
|
||||
h := hashFunc.New()
|
||||
for _, slice := range slices {
|
||||
h.Write(slice)
|
||||
}
|
||||
digest := h.Sum(nil)
|
||||
return digest
|
||||
}
|
||||
if sigType == signatureECDSA {
|
||||
return sha1Hash(slices)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return md5SHA1Hash(slices)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ecdheKeyAgreement implements a TLS key agreement where the server
|
||||
// generates an ephemeral EC public/private key pair and signs it. The
|
||||
// pre-master secret is then calculated using ECDH. The signature may
|
||||
// be ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA.
|
||||
type ecdheKeyAgreement struct {
|
||||
version uint16
|
||||
isRSA bool
|
||||
key *ecdh.PrivateKey
|
||||
|
||||
// ckx and preMasterSecret are generated in processServerKeyExchange
|
||||
// and returned in generateClientKeyExchange.
|
||||
ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg
|
||||
preMasterSecret []byte
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
|
||||
var curveID CurveID
|
||||
for _, c := range clientHello.supportedCurves {
|
||||
if config.supportsCurve(c) {
|
||||
curveID = c
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if curveID == 0 {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("tls: no supported elliptic curves offered")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); !ok {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
key, err := generateECDHEKey(config.rand(), curveID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
ka.key = key
|
||||
|
||||
// See RFC 4492, Section 5.4.
|
||||
ecdhePublic := key.PublicKey().Bytes()
|
||||
serverECDHEParams := make([]byte, 1+2+1+len(ecdhePublic))
|
||||
serverECDHEParams[0] = 3 // named curve
|
||||
serverECDHEParams[1] = byte(curveID >> 8)
|
||||
serverECDHEParams[2] = byte(curveID)
|
||||
serverECDHEParams[3] = byte(len(ecdhePublic))
|
||||
copy(serverECDHEParams[4:], ecdhePublic)
|
||||
|
||||
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate private key of type %T does not implement crypto.Signer", cert.PrivateKey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme
|
||||
var sigType uint8
|
||||
var sigHash crypto.Hash
|
||||
if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
|
||||
signatureAlgorithm, err = selectSignatureScheme(ka.version, cert, clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(priv.Public())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate cannot be used with the selected cipher suite")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
signed := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, sigHash, ka.version, clientHello.random, hello.random, serverECDHEParams)
|
||||
|
||||
signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
|
||||
if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
|
||||
signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
|
||||
}
|
||||
sig, err := priv.Sign(config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to sign ECDHE parameters: " + err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
skx := new(serverKeyExchangeMsg)
|
||||
sigAndHashLen := 0
|
||||
if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
|
||||
sigAndHashLen = 2
|
||||
}
|
||||
skx.key = make([]byte, len(serverECDHEParams)+sigAndHashLen+2+len(sig))
|
||||
copy(skx.key, serverECDHEParams)
|
||||
k := skx.key[len(serverECDHEParams):]
|
||||
if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
|
||||
k[0] = byte(signatureAlgorithm >> 8)
|
||||
k[1] = byte(signatureAlgorithm)
|
||||
k = k[2:]
|
||||
}
|
||||
k[0] = byte(len(sig) >> 8)
|
||||
k[1] = byte(len(sig))
|
||||
copy(k[2:], sig)
|
||||
|
||||
return skx, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
if len(ckx.ciphertext) == 0 || int(ckx.ciphertext[0]) != len(ckx.ciphertext)-1 {
|
||||
return nil, errClientKeyExchange
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
peerKey, err := ka.key.Curve().NewPublicKey(ckx.ciphertext[1:])
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, errClientKeyExchange
|
||||
}
|
||||
preMasterSecret, err := ka.key.ECDH(peerKey)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, errClientKeyExchange
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return preMasterSecret, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error {
|
||||
if len(skx.key) < 4 {
|
||||
return errServerKeyExchange
|
||||
}
|
||||
if skx.key[0] != 3 { // named curve
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve")
|
||||
}
|
||||
curveID := CurveID(skx.key[1])<<8 | CurveID(skx.key[2])
|
||||
|
||||
publicLen := int(skx.key[3])
|
||||
if publicLen+4 > len(skx.key) {
|
||||
return errServerKeyExchange
|
||||
}
|
||||
serverECDHEParams := skx.key[:4+publicLen]
|
||||
publicKey := serverECDHEParams[4:]
|
||||
|
||||
sig := skx.key[4+publicLen:]
|
||||
if len(sig) < 2 {
|
||||
return errServerKeyExchange
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); !ok {
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
key, err := generateECDHEKey(config.rand(), curveID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
ka.key = key
|
||||
|
||||
peerKey, err := key.Curve().NewPublicKey(publicKey)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return errServerKeyExchange
|
||||
}
|
||||
ka.preMasterSecret, err = key.ECDH(peerKey)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return errServerKeyExchange
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ourPublicKey := key.PublicKey().Bytes()
|
||||
ka.ckx = new(clientKeyExchangeMsg)
|
||||
ka.ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, 1+len(ourPublicKey))
|
||||
ka.ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(ourPublicKey))
|
||||
copy(ka.ckx.ciphertext[1:], ourPublicKey)
|
||||
|
||||
var sigType uint8
|
||||
var sigHash crypto.Hash
|
||||
if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
|
||||
signatureAlgorithm := SignatureScheme(sig[0])<<8 | SignatureScheme(sig[1])
|
||||
sig = sig[2:]
|
||||
if len(sig) < 2 {
|
||||
return errServerKeyExchange
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(signatureAlgorithm, clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
|
||||
}
|
||||
sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(cert.PublicKey)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA {
|
||||
return errServerKeyExchange
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sigLen := int(sig[0])<<8 | int(sig[1])
|
||||
if sigLen+2 != len(sig) {
|
||||
return errServerKeyExchange
|
||||
}
|
||||
sig = sig[2:]
|
||||
|
||||
signed := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, sigHash, ka.version, clientHello.random, serverHello.random, serverECDHEParams)
|
||||
if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, cert.PublicKey, sigHash, signed, sig); err != nil {
|
||||
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
|
||||
if ka.ckx == nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: missing ServerKeyExchange message")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return ka.preMasterSecret, ka.ckx, nil
|
||||
}
|
141
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/key_schedule.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
141
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/key_schedule.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/ecdh"
|
||||
"crypto/hmac"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"hash"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
|
||||
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
|
||||
"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// This file contains the functions necessary to compute the TLS 1.3 key
|
||||
// schedule. See RFC 8446, Section 7.
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
resumptionBinderLabel = "res binder"
|
||||
clientHandshakeTrafficLabel = "c hs traffic"
|
||||
serverHandshakeTrafficLabel = "s hs traffic"
|
||||
clientApplicationTrafficLabel = "c ap traffic"
|
||||
serverApplicationTrafficLabel = "s ap traffic"
|
||||
exporterLabel = "exp master"
|
||||
resumptionLabel = "res master"
|
||||
trafficUpdateLabel = "traffic upd"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// expandLabel implements HKDF-Expand-Label from RFC 8446, Section 7.1.
|
||||
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) expandLabel(secret []byte, label string, context []byte, length int) []byte {
|
||||
var hkdfLabel cryptobyte.Builder
|
||||
hkdfLabel.AddUint16(uint16(length))
|
||||
hkdfLabel.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||||
b.AddBytes([]byte("tls13 "))
|
||||
b.AddBytes([]byte(label))
|
||||
})
|
||||
hkdfLabel.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||||
b.AddBytes(context)
|
||||
})
|
||||
out := make([]byte, length)
|
||||
n, err := hkdf.Expand(c.hash.New, secret, hkdfLabel.BytesOrPanic()).Read(out)
|
||||
if err != nil || n != length {
|
||||
panic("tls: HKDF-Expand-Label invocation failed unexpectedly")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// deriveSecret implements Derive-Secret from RFC 8446, Section 7.1.
|
||||
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) deriveSecret(secret []byte, label string, transcript hash.Hash) []byte {
|
||||
if transcript == nil {
|
||||
transcript = c.hash.New()
|
||||
}
|
||||
return c.expandLabel(secret, label, transcript.Sum(nil), c.hash.Size())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// extract implements HKDF-Extract with the cipher suite hash.
|
||||
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) extract(newSecret, currentSecret []byte) []byte {
|
||||
if newSecret == nil {
|
||||
newSecret = make([]byte, c.hash.Size())
|
||||
}
|
||||
return hkdf.Extract(c.hash.New, newSecret, currentSecret)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// nextTrafficSecret generates the next traffic secret, given the current one,
|
||||
// according to RFC 8446, Section 7.2.
|
||||
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) nextTrafficSecret(trafficSecret []byte) []byte {
|
||||
return c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, trafficUpdateLabel, nil, c.hash.Size())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// trafficKey generates traffic keys according to RFC 8446, Section 7.3.
|
||||
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) trafficKey(trafficSecret []byte) (key, iv []byte) {
|
||||
key = c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, "key", nil, c.keyLen)
|
||||
iv = c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, "iv", nil, aeadNonceLength)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// finishedHash generates the Finished verify_data or PskBinderEntry according
|
||||
// to RFC 8446, Section 4.4.4. See sections 4.4 and 4.2.11.2 for the baseKey
|
||||
// selection.
|
||||
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) finishedHash(baseKey []byte, transcript hash.Hash) []byte {
|
||||
finishedKey := c.expandLabel(baseKey, "finished", nil, c.hash.Size())
|
||||
verifyData := hmac.New(c.hash.New, finishedKey)
|
||||
verifyData.Write(transcript.Sum(nil))
|
||||
return verifyData.Sum(nil)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// exportKeyingMaterial implements RFC5705 exporters for TLS 1.3 according to
|
||||
// RFC 8446, Section 7.5.
|
||||
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) exportKeyingMaterial(masterSecret []byte, transcript hash.Hash) func(string, []byte, int) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
expMasterSecret := c.deriveSecret(masterSecret, exporterLabel, transcript)
|
||||
return func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
secret := c.deriveSecret(expMasterSecret, label, nil)
|
||||
h := c.hash.New()
|
||||
h.Write(context)
|
||||
return c.expandLabel(secret, "exporter", h.Sum(nil), length), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// generateECDHEKey returns a PrivateKey that implements Diffie-Hellman
|
||||
// according to RFC 8446, Section 4.2.8.2.
|
||||
func generateECDHEKey(rand io.Reader, curveID CurveID) (*ecdh.PrivateKey, error) {
|
||||
curve, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("tls: internal error: unsupported curve")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return curve.GenerateKey(rand)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func curveForCurveID(id CurveID) (ecdh.Curve, bool) {
|
||||
switch id {
|
||||
case X25519:
|
||||
return ecdh.X25519(), true
|
||||
case CurveP256:
|
||||
return ecdh.P256(), true
|
||||
case CurveP384:
|
||||
return ecdh.P384(), true
|
||||
case CurveP521:
|
||||
return ecdh.P521(), true
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return nil, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func curveIDForCurve(curve ecdh.Curve) (CurveID, bool) {
|
||||
switch curve {
|
||||
case ecdh.X25519():
|
||||
return X25519, true
|
||||
case ecdh.P256():
|
||||
return CurveP256, true
|
||||
case ecdh.P384():
|
||||
return CurveP384, true
|
||||
case ecdh.P521():
|
||||
return CurveP521, true
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return 0, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
18
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/notboring.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
18
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/notboring.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
func needFIPS() bool { return false }
|
||||
|
||||
func supportedSignatureAlgorithms() []SignatureScheme {
|
||||
return defaultSupportedSignatureAlgorithms
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func fipsMinVersion(c *config) uint16 { panic("fipsMinVersion") }
|
||||
func fipsMaxVersion(c *config) uint16 { panic("fipsMaxVersion") }
|
||||
func fipsCurvePreferences(c *config) []CurveID { panic("fipsCurvePreferences") }
|
||||
func fipsCipherSuites(c *config) []uint16 { panic("fipsCipherSuites") }
|
||||
|
||||
var fipsSupportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme
|
283
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/prf.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
283
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/prf.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto"
|
||||
"crypto/hmac"
|
||||
"crypto/md5"
|
||||
"crypto/sha1"
|
||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||
"crypto/sha512"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"hash"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Split a premaster secret in two as specified in RFC 4346, Section 5.
|
||||
func splitPreMasterSecret(secret []byte) (s1, s2 []byte) {
|
||||
s1 = secret[0 : (len(secret)+1)/2]
|
||||
s2 = secret[len(secret)/2:]
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// pHash implements the P_hash function, as defined in RFC 4346, Section 5.
|
||||
func pHash(result, secret, seed []byte, hash func() hash.Hash) {
|
||||
h := hmac.New(hash, secret)
|
||||
h.Write(seed)
|
||||
a := h.Sum(nil)
|
||||
|
||||
j := 0
|
||||
for j < len(result) {
|
||||
h.Reset()
|
||||
h.Write(a)
|
||||
h.Write(seed)
|
||||
b := h.Sum(nil)
|
||||
copy(result[j:], b)
|
||||
j += len(b)
|
||||
|
||||
h.Reset()
|
||||
h.Write(a)
|
||||
a = h.Sum(nil)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// prf10 implements the TLS 1.0 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 2246, Section 5.
|
||||
func prf10(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
|
||||
hashSHA1 := sha1.New
|
||||
hashMD5 := md5.New
|
||||
|
||||
labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed))
|
||||
copy(labelAndSeed, label)
|
||||
copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed)
|
||||
|
||||
s1, s2 := splitPreMasterSecret(secret)
|
||||
pHash(result, s1, labelAndSeed, hashMD5)
|
||||
result2 := make([]byte, len(result))
|
||||
pHash(result2, s2, labelAndSeed, hashSHA1)
|
||||
|
||||
for i, b := range result2 {
|
||||
result[i] ^= b
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// prf12 implements the TLS 1.2 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 5246, Section 5.
|
||||
func prf12(hashFunc func() hash.Hash) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
|
||||
return func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
|
||||
labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed))
|
||||
copy(labelAndSeed, label)
|
||||
copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed)
|
||||
|
||||
pHash(result, secret, labelAndSeed, hashFunc)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
masterSecretLength = 48 // Length of a master secret in TLS 1.1.
|
||||
finishedVerifyLength = 12 // Length of verify_data in a Finished message.
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var masterSecretLabel = []byte("master secret")
|
||||
var keyExpansionLabel = []byte("key expansion")
|
||||
var clientFinishedLabel = []byte("client finished")
|
||||
var serverFinishedLabel = []byte("server finished")
|
||||
|
||||
func prfAndHashForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) (func(result, secret, label, seed []byte), crypto.Hash) {
|
||||
switch version {
|
||||
case VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11:
|
||||
return prf10, crypto.Hash(0)
|
||||
case VersionTLS12:
|
||||
if suite.flags&suiteSHA384 != 0 {
|
||||
return prf12(sha512.New384), crypto.SHA384
|
||||
}
|
||||
return prf12(sha256.New), crypto.SHA256
|
||||
default:
|
||||
panic("unknown version")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func prfForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
|
||||
prf, _ := prfAndHashForVersion(version, suite)
|
||||
return prf
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// masterFromPreMasterSecret generates the master secret from the pre-master
|
||||
// secret. See RFC 5246, Section 8.1.
|
||||
func masterFromPreMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, preMasterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) []byte {
|
||||
seed := make([]byte, 0, len(clientRandom)+len(serverRandom))
|
||||
seed = append(seed, clientRandom...)
|
||||
seed = append(seed, serverRandom...)
|
||||
|
||||
masterSecret := make([]byte, masterSecretLength)
|
||||
prfForVersion(version, suite)(masterSecret, preMasterSecret, masterSecretLabel, seed)
|
||||
return masterSecret
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// keysFromMasterSecret generates the connection keys from the master
|
||||
// secret, given the lengths of the MAC key, cipher key and IV, as defined in
|
||||
// RFC 2246, Section 6.3.
|
||||
func keysFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, macLen, keyLen, ivLen int) (clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV []byte) {
|
||||
seed := make([]byte, 0, len(serverRandom)+len(clientRandom))
|
||||
seed = append(seed, serverRandom...)
|
||||
seed = append(seed, clientRandom...)
|
||||
|
||||
n := 2*macLen + 2*keyLen + 2*ivLen
|
||||
keyMaterial := make([]byte, n)
|
||||
prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, keyExpansionLabel, seed)
|
||||
clientMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen]
|
||||
keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:]
|
||||
serverMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen]
|
||||
keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:]
|
||||
clientKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen]
|
||||
keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:]
|
||||
serverKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen]
|
||||
keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:]
|
||||
clientIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen]
|
||||
keyMaterial = keyMaterial[ivLen:]
|
||||
serverIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen]
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newFinishedHash(version uint16, cipherSuite *cipherSuite) finishedHash {
|
||||
var buffer []byte
|
||||
if version >= VersionTLS12 {
|
||||
buffer = []byte{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
prf, hash := prfAndHashForVersion(version, cipherSuite)
|
||||
if hash != 0 {
|
||||
return finishedHash{hash.New(), hash.New(), nil, nil, buffer, version, prf}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return finishedHash{sha1.New(), sha1.New(), md5.New(), md5.New(), buffer, version, prf}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A finishedHash calculates the hash of a set of handshake messages suitable
|
||||
// for including in a Finished message.
|
||||
type finishedHash struct {
|
||||
client hash.Hash
|
||||
server hash.Hash
|
||||
|
||||
// Prior to TLS 1.2, an additional MD5 hash is required.
|
||||
clientMD5 hash.Hash
|
||||
serverMD5 hash.Hash
|
||||
|
||||
// In TLS 1.2, a full buffer is sadly required.
|
||||
buffer []byte
|
||||
|
||||
version uint16
|
||||
prf func(result, secret, label, seed []byte)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *finishedHash) Write(msg []byte) (n int, err error) {
|
||||
h.client.Write(msg)
|
||||
h.server.Write(msg)
|
||||
|
||||
if h.version < VersionTLS12 {
|
||||
h.clientMD5.Write(msg)
|
||||
h.serverMD5.Write(msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if h.buffer != nil {
|
||||
h.buffer = append(h.buffer, msg...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return len(msg), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h finishedHash) Sum() []byte {
|
||||
if h.version >= VersionTLS12 {
|
||||
return h.client.Sum(nil)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out := make([]byte, 0, md5.Size+sha1.Size)
|
||||
out = h.clientMD5.Sum(out)
|
||||
return h.client.Sum(out)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// clientSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a client's
|
||||
// Finished message.
|
||||
func (h finishedHash) clientSum(masterSecret []byte) []byte {
|
||||
out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength)
|
||||
h.prf(out, masterSecret, clientFinishedLabel, h.Sum())
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// serverSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a server's
|
||||
// Finished message.
|
||||
func (h finishedHash) serverSum(masterSecret []byte) []byte {
|
||||
out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength)
|
||||
h.prf(out, masterSecret, serverFinishedLabel, h.Sum())
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// hashForClientCertificate returns the handshake messages so far, pre-hashed if
|
||||
// necessary, suitable for signing by a TLS client certificate.
|
||||
func (h finishedHash) hashForClientCertificate(sigType uint8, hashAlg crypto.Hash) []byte {
|
||||
if (h.version >= VersionTLS12 || sigType == signatureEd25519) && h.buffer == nil {
|
||||
panic("tls: handshake hash for a client certificate requested after discarding the handshake buffer")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if sigType == signatureEd25519 {
|
||||
return h.buffer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if h.version >= VersionTLS12 {
|
||||
hash := hashAlg.New()
|
||||
hash.Write(h.buffer)
|
||||
return hash.Sum(nil)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if sigType == signatureECDSA {
|
||||
return h.server.Sum(nil)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return h.Sum()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// discardHandshakeBuffer is called when there is no more need to
|
||||
// buffer the entirety of the handshake messages.
|
||||
func (h *finishedHash) discardHandshakeBuffer() {
|
||||
h.buffer = nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// noExportedKeyingMaterial is used as a value of
|
||||
// ConnectionState.ekm when renegotiation is enabled and thus
|
||||
// we wish to fail all key-material export requests.
|
||||
func noExportedKeyingMaterial(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("crypto/tls: ExportKeyingMaterial is unavailable when renegotiation is enabled")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ekmFromMasterSecret generates exported keying material as defined in RFC 5705.
|
||||
func ekmFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) func(string, []byte, int) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
return func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
switch label {
|
||||
case "client finished", "server finished", "master secret", "key expansion":
|
||||
// These values are reserved and may not be used.
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto/tls: reserved ExportKeyingMaterial label: %s", label)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
seedLen := len(serverRandom) + len(clientRandom)
|
||||
if context != nil {
|
||||
seedLen += 2 + len(context)
|
||||
}
|
||||
seed := make([]byte, 0, seedLen)
|
||||
|
||||
seed = append(seed, clientRandom...)
|
||||
seed = append(seed, serverRandom...)
|
||||
|
||||
if context != nil {
|
||||
if len(context) >= 1<<16 {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto/tls: ExportKeyingMaterial context too long")
|
||||
}
|
||||
seed = append(seed, byte(len(context)>>8), byte(len(context)))
|
||||
seed = append(seed, context...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
keyMaterial := make([]byte, length)
|
||||
prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, []byte(label), seed)
|
||||
return keyMaterial, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
274
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/ticket.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
274
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/ticket.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"crypto/aes"
|
||||
"crypto/cipher"
|
||||
"crypto/hmac"
|
||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||
"crypto/subtle"
|
||||
"encoding/binary"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// sessionState contains the information that is serialized into a session
|
||||
// ticket in order to later resume a connection.
|
||||
type sessionState struct {
|
||||
vers uint16
|
||||
cipherSuite uint16
|
||||
createdAt uint64
|
||||
masterSecret []byte // opaque master_secret<1..2^16-1>;
|
||||
// struct { opaque certificate<1..2^24-1> } Certificate;
|
||||
certificates [][]byte // Certificate certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
|
||||
|
||||
// usedOldKey is true if the ticket from which this session came from
|
||||
// was encrypted with an older key and thus should be refreshed.
|
||||
usedOldKey bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *sessionState) marshal() []byte {
|
||||
var b cryptobyte.Builder
|
||||
b.AddUint16(m.vers)
|
||||
b.AddUint16(m.cipherSuite)
|
||||
addUint64(&b, m.createdAt)
|
||||
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||||
b.AddBytes(m.masterSecret)
|
||||
})
|
||||
b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||||
for _, cert := range m.certificates {
|
||||
b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||||
b.AddBytes(cert)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
return b.BytesOrPanic()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *sessionState) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
|
||||
*m = sessionState{usedOldKey: m.usedOldKey}
|
||||
s := cryptobyte.String(data)
|
||||
if ok := s.ReadUint16(&m.vers) &&
|
||||
s.ReadUint16(&m.cipherSuite) &&
|
||||
readUint64(&s, &m.createdAt) &&
|
||||
readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.masterSecret) &&
|
||||
len(m.masterSecret) != 0; !ok {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
var certList cryptobyte.String
|
||||
if !s.ReadUint24LengthPrefixed(&certList) {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
for !certList.Empty() {
|
||||
var cert []byte
|
||||
if !readUint24LengthPrefixed(&certList, &cert) {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
m.certificates = append(m.certificates, cert)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s.Empty()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// sessionStateTLS13 is the content of a TLS 1.3 session ticket. Its first
|
||||
// version (revision = 0) doesn't carry any of the information needed for 0-RTT
|
||||
// validation and the nonce is always empty.
|
||||
// version (revision = 1) carries the max_early_data_size sent in the ticket.
|
||||
// version (revision = 2) carries the ALPN sent in the ticket.
|
||||
type sessionStateTLS13 struct {
|
||||
// uint8 version = 0x0304;
|
||||
// uint8 revision = 2;
|
||||
cipherSuite uint16
|
||||
createdAt uint64
|
||||
resumptionSecret []byte // opaque resumption_master_secret<1..2^8-1>;
|
||||
certificate Certificate // CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
|
||||
maxEarlyData uint32
|
||||
alpn string
|
||||
|
||||
appData []byte
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *sessionStateTLS13) marshal() []byte {
|
||||
var b cryptobyte.Builder
|
||||
b.AddUint16(VersionTLS13)
|
||||
b.AddUint8(2) // revision
|
||||
b.AddUint16(m.cipherSuite)
|
||||
addUint64(&b, m.createdAt)
|
||||
b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||||
b.AddBytes(m.resumptionSecret)
|
||||
})
|
||||
marshalCertificate(&b, m.certificate)
|
||||
b.AddUint32(m.maxEarlyData)
|
||||
b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||||
b.AddBytes([]byte(m.alpn))
|
||||
})
|
||||
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||||
b.AddBytes(m.appData)
|
||||
})
|
||||
return b.BytesOrPanic()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *sessionStateTLS13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
|
||||
*m = sessionStateTLS13{}
|
||||
s := cryptobyte.String(data)
|
||||
var version uint16
|
||||
var revision uint8
|
||||
var alpn []byte
|
||||
ret := s.ReadUint16(&version) &&
|
||||
version == VersionTLS13 &&
|
||||
s.ReadUint8(&revision) &&
|
||||
revision == 2 &&
|
||||
s.ReadUint16(&m.cipherSuite) &&
|
||||
readUint64(&s, &m.createdAt) &&
|
||||
readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.resumptionSecret) &&
|
||||
len(m.resumptionSecret) != 0 &&
|
||||
unmarshalCertificate(&s, &m.certificate) &&
|
||||
s.ReadUint32(&m.maxEarlyData) &&
|
||||
readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &alpn) &&
|
||||
readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.appData) &&
|
||||
s.Empty()
|
||||
m.alpn = string(alpn)
|
||||
return ret
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Conn) encryptTicket(state []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
if len(c.ticketKeys) == 0 {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("tls: internal error: session ticket keys unavailable")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
encrypted := make([]byte, ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize+len(state)+sha256.Size)
|
||||
keyName := encrypted[:ticketKeyNameLen]
|
||||
iv := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen : ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize]
|
||||
macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:]
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), iv); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
key := c.ticketKeys[0]
|
||||
copy(keyName, key.keyName[:])
|
||||
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.aesKey[:])
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to create cipher while encrypting ticket: " + err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize:], state)
|
||||
|
||||
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key.hmacKey[:])
|
||||
mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size])
|
||||
mac.Sum(macBytes[:0])
|
||||
|
||||
return encrypted, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Conn) decryptTicket(encrypted []byte) (plaintext []byte, usedOldKey bool) {
|
||||
if len(encrypted) < ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize+sha256.Size {
|
||||
return nil, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
keyName := encrypted[:ticketKeyNameLen]
|
||||
iv := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen : ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize]
|
||||
macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:]
|
||||
ciphertext := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize : len(encrypted)-sha256.Size]
|
||||
|
||||
keyIndex := -1
|
||||
for i, candidateKey := range c.ticketKeys {
|
||||
if bytes.Equal(keyName, candidateKey.keyName[:]) {
|
||||
keyIndex = i
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if keyIndex == -1 {
|
||||
return nil, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
key := &c.ticketKeys[keyIndex]
|
||||
|
||||
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key.hmacKey[:])
|
||||
mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size])
|
||||
expected := mac.Sum(nil)
|
||||
|
||||
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(macBytes, expected) != 1 {
|
||||
return nil, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.aesKey[:])
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
plaintext = make([]byte, len(ciphertext))
|
||||
cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(plaintext, ciphertext)
|
||||
|
||||
return plaintext, keyIndex > 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Conn) getSessionTicketMsg(appData []byte) (*newSessionTicketMsgTLS13, error) {
|
||||
m := new(newSessionTicketMsgTLS13)
|
||||
|
||||
var certsFromClient [][]byte
|
||||
for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates {
|
||||
certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw)
|
||||
}
|
||||
state := sessionStateTLS13{
|
||||
cipherSuite: c.cipherSuite,
|
||||
createdAt: uint64(c.config.time().Unix()),
|
||||
resumptionSecret: c.resumptionSecret,
|
||||
certificate: Certificate{
|
||||
Certificate: certsFromClient,
|
||||
OCSPStaple: c.ocspResponse,
|
||||
SignedCertificateTimestamps: c.scts,
|
||||
},
|
||||
appData: appData,
|
||||
alpn: c.clientProtocol,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.extraConfig != nil {
|
||||
state.maxEarlyData = c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData
|
||||
}
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
m.label, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
m.lifetime = uint32(maxSessionTicketLifetime / time.Second)
|
||||
|
||||
// ticket_age_add is a random 32-bit value. See RFC 8446, section 4.6.1
|
||||
// The value is not stored anywhere; we never need to check the ticket age
|
||||
// because 0-RTT is not supported.
|
||||
ageAdd := make([]byte, 4)
|
||||
_, err = c.config.rand().Read(ageAdd)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
m.ageAdd = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(ageAdd)
|
||||
|
||||
// ticket_nonce, which must be unique per connection, is always left at
|
||||
// zero because we only ever send one ticket per connection.
|
||||
|
||||
if c.extraConfig != nil {
|
||||
m.maxEarlyData = c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData
|
||||
}
|
||||
return m, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GetSessionTicket generates a new session ticket.
|
||||
// It should only be called after the handshake completes.
|
||||
// It can only be used for servers, and only if the alternative record layer is set.
|
||||
// The ticket may be nil if config.SessionTicketsDisabled is set,
|
||||
// or if the client isn't able to receive session tickets.
|
||||
func (c *Conn) GetSessionTicket(appData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
if c.isClient || !c.isHandshakeComplete.Load() || c.extraConfig == nil || c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer == nil {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("GetSessionTicket is only valid for servers after completion of the handshake, and if an alternative record layer is set.")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
m, err := c.getSessionTicketMsg(appData)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return m.marshal(), nil
|
||||
}
|
362
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/tls.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
362
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/tls.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// package qtls partially implements TLS 1.2, as specified in RFC 5246,
|
||||
// and TLS 1.3, as specified in RFC 8446.
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
// BUG(agl): The crypto/tls package only implements some countermeasures
|
||||
// against Lucky13 attacks on CBC-mode encryption, and only on SHA1
|
||||
// variants. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/TLStiming.pdf and
|
||||
// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html.
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto"
|
||||
"crypto/ecdsa"
|
||||
"crypto/ed25519"
|
||||
"crypto/rsa"
|
||||
"crypto/x509"
|
||||
"encoding/pem"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Server returns a new TLS server side connection
|
||||
// using conn as the underlying transport.
|
||||
// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
|
||||
// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
|
||||
func Server(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn {
|
||||
c := &Conn{
|
||||
conn: conn,
|
||||
config: fromConfig(config),
|
||||
extraConfig: extraConfig,
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.handshakeFn = c.serverHandshake
|
||||
return c
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Client returns a new TLS client side connection
|
||||
// using conn as the underlying transport.
|
||||
// The config cannot be nil: users must set either ServerName or
|
||||
// InsecureSkipVerify in the config.
|
||||
func Client(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn {
|
||||
c := &Conn{
|
||||
conn: conn,
|
||||
config: fromConfig(config),
|
||||
extraConfig: extraConfig,
|
||||
isClient: true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.handshakeFn = c.clientHandshake
|
||||
return c
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A listener implements a network listener (net.Listener) for TLS connections.
|
||||
type listener struct {
|
||||
net.Listener
|
||||
config *Config
|
||||
extraConfig *ExtraConfig
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Accept waits for and returns the next incoming TLS connection.
|
||||
// The returned connection is of type *Conn.
|
||||
func (l *listener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) {
|
||||
c, err := l.Listener.Accept()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return Server(c, l.config, l.extraConfig), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewListener creates a Listener which accepts connections from an inner
|
||||
// Listener and wraps each connection with Server.
|
||||
// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
|
||||
// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
|
||||
func NewListener(inner net.Listener, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) net.Listener {
|
||||
l := new(listener)
|
||||
l.Listener = inner
|
||||
l.config = config
|
||||
l.extraConfig = extraConfig
|
||||
return l
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Listen creates a TLS listener accepting connections on the
|
||||
// given network address using net.Listen.
|
||||
// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
|
||||
// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
|
||||
func Listen(network, laddr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (net.Listener, error) {
|
||||
if config == nil || len(config.Certificates) == 0 &&
|
||||
config.GetCertificate == nil && config.GetConfigForClient == nil {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("tls: neither Certificates, GetCertificate, nor GetConfigForClient set in Config")
|
||||
}
|
||||
l, err := net.Listen(network, laddr)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return NewListener(l, config, extraConfig), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type timeoutError struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
func (timeoutError) Error() string { return "tls: DialWithDialer timed out" }
|
||||
func (timeoutError) Timeout() bool { return true }
|
||||
func (timeoutError) Temporary() bool { return true }
|
||||
|
||||
// DialWithDialer connects to the given network address using dialer.Dial and
|
||||
// then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection. Any
|
||||
// timeout or deadline given in the dialer apply to connection and TLS
|
||||
// handshake as a whole.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// DialWithDialer interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to the zero
|
||||
// configuration; see the documentation of Config for the defaults.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// DialWithDialer uses context.Background internally; to specify the context,
|
||||
// use Dialer.DialContext with NetDialer set to the desired dialer.
|
||||
func DialWithDialer(dialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) {
|
||||
return dial(context.Background(), dialer, network, addr, config, extraConfig)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func dial(ctx context.Context, netDialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) {
|
||||
if netDialer.Timeout != 0 {
|
||||
var cancel context.CancelFunc
|
||||
ctx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, netDialer.Timeout)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !netDialer.Deadline.IsZero() {
|
||||
var cancel context.CancelFunc
|
||||
ctx, cancel = context.WithDeadline(ctx, netDialer.Deadline)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rawConn, err := netDialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
colonPos := strings.LastIndex(addr, ":")
|
||||
if colonPos == -1 {
|
||||
colonPos = len(addr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
hostname := addr[:colonPos]
|
||||
|
||||
if config == nil {
|
||||
config = defaultConfig()
|
||||
}
|
||||
// If no ServerName is set, infer the ServerName
|
||||
// from the hostname we're connecting to.
|
||||
if config.ServerName == "" {
|
||||
// Make a copy to avoid polluting argument or default.
|
||||
c := config.Clone()
|
||||
c.ServerName = hostname
|
||||
config = c
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
conn := Client(rawConn, config, extraConfig)
|
||||
if err := conn.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil {
|
||||
rawConn.Close()
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return conn, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Dial connects to the given network address using net.Dial
|
||||
// and then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting
|
||||
// TLS connection.
|
||||
// Dial interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to
|
||||
// the zero configuration; see the documentation of Config
|
||||
// for the defaults.
|
||||
func Dial(network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) {
|
||||
return DialWithDialer(new(net.Dialer), network, addr, config, extraConfig)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Dialer dials TLS connections given a configuration and a Dialer for the
|
||||
// underlying connection.
|
||||
type Dialer struct {
|
||||
// NetDialer is the optional dialer to use for the TLS connections'
|
||||
// underlying TCP connections.
|
||||
// A nil NetDialer is equivalent to the net.Dialer zero value.
|
||||
NetDialer *net.Dialer
|
||||
|
||||
// Config is the TLS configuration to use for new connections.
|
||||
// A nil configuration is equivalent to the zero
|
||||
// configuration; see the documentation of Config for the
|
||||
// defaults.
|
||||
Config *Config
|
||||
|
||||
ExtraConfig *ExtraConfig
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Dial connects to the given network address and initiates a TLS
|
||||
// handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The returned Conn, if any, will always be of type *Conn.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Dial uses context.Background internally; to specify the context,
|
||||
// use DialContext.
|
||||
func (d *Dialer) Dial(network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
|
||||
return d.DialContext(context.Background(), network, addr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (d *Dialer) netDialer() *net.Dialer {
|
||||
if d.NetDialer != nil {
|
||||
return d.NetDialer
|
||||
}
|
||||
return new(net.Dialer)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// DialContext connects to the given network address and initiates a TLS
|
||||
// handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The provided Context must be non-nil. If the context expires before
|
||||
// the connection is complete, an error is returned. Once successfully
|
||||
// connected, any expiration of the context will not affect the
|
||||
// connection.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The returned Conn, if any, will always be of type *Conn.
|
||||
func (d *Dialer) DialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
|
||||
c, err := dial(ctx, d.netDialer(), network, addr, d.Config, d.ExtraConfig)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
// Don't return c (a typed nil) in an interface.
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return c, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// LoadX509KeyPair reads and parses a public/private key pair from a pair
|
||||
// of files. The files must contain PEM encoded data. The certificate file
|
||||
// may contain intermediate certificates following the leaf certificate to
|
||||
// form a certificate chain. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will
|
||||
// be nil because the parsed form of the certificate is not retained.
|
||||
func LoadX509KeyPair(certFile, keyFile string) (Certificate, error) {
|
||||
certPEMBlock, err := os.ReadFile(certFile)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return Certificate{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
keyPEMBlock, err := os.ReadFile(keyFile)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return Certificate{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// X509KeyPair parses a public/private key pair from a pair of
|
||||
// PEM encoded data. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will be nil because
|
||||
// the parsed form of the certificate is not retained.
|
||||
func X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock []byte) (Certificate, error) {
|
||||
fail := func(err error) (Certificate, error) { return Certificate{}, err }
|
||||
|
||||
var cert Certificate
|
||||
var skippedBlockTypes []string
|
||||
for {
|
||||
var certDERBlock *pem.Block
|
||||
certDERBlock, certPEMBlock = pem.Decode(certPEMBlock)
|
||||
if certDERBlock == nil {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
if certDERBlock.Type == "CERTIFICATE" {
|
||||
cert.Certificate = append(cert.Certificate, certDERBlock.Bytes)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, certDERBlock.Type)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 {
|
||||
if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 {
|
||||
return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in certificate input"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && strings.HasSuffix(skippedBlockTypes[0], "PRIVATE KEY") {
|
||||
return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find certificate PEM data in certificate input, but did find a private key; PEM inputs may have been switched"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fail(fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find \"CERTIFICATE\" PEM block in certificate input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
skippedBlockTypes = skippedBlockTypes[:0]
|
||||
var keyDERBlock *pem.Block
|
||||
for {
|
||||
keyDERBlock, keyPEMBlock = pem.Decode(keyPEMBlock)
|
||||
if keyDERBlock == nil {
|
||||
if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 {
|
||||
return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in key input"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && skippedBlockTypes[0] == "CERTIFICATE" {
|
||||
return fail(errors.New("tls: found a certificate rather than a key in the PEM for the private key"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fail(fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find PEM block with type ending in \"PRIVATE KEY\" in key input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if keyDERBlock.Type == "PRIVATE KEY" || strings.HasSuffix(keyDERBlock.Type, " PRIVATE KEY") {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, keyDERBlock.Type)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We don't need to parse the public key for TLS, but we so do anyway
|
||||
// to check that it looks sane and matches the private key.
|
||||
x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(cert.Certificate[0])
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fail(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cert.PrivateKey, err = parsePrivateKey(keyDERBlock.Bytes)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fail(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch pub := x509Cert.PublicKey.(type) {
|
||||
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if pub.N.Cmp(priv.N) != 0 {
|
||||
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if pub.X.Cmp(priv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(priv.Y) != 0 {
|
||||
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
case ed25519.PublicKey:
|
||||
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(ed25519.PrivateKey)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(priv.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey), pub) {
|
||||
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return fail(errors.New("tls: unknown public key algorithm"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return cert, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Attempt to parse the given private key DER block. OpenSSL 0.9.8 generates
|
||||
// PKCS #1 private keys by default, while OpenSSL 1.0.0 generates PKCS #8 keys.
|
||||
// OpenSSL ecparam generates SEC1 EC private keys for ECDSA. We try all three.
|
||||
func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (crypto.PrivateKey, error) {
|
||||
if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
|
||||
return key, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
|
||||
switch key := key.(type) {
|
||||
case *rsa.PrivateKey, *ecdsa.PrivateKey, ed25519.PrivateKey:
|
||||
return key, nil
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("tls: found unknown private key type in PKCS#8 wrapping")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if key, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(der); err == nil {
|
||||
return key, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse private key")
|
||||
}
|
96
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/unsafe.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
96
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/unsafe.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
|
||||
package qtls
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/tls"
|
||||
"reflect"
|
||||
"unsafe"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func init() {
|
||||
if !structsEqual(&tls.ConnectionState{}, &connectionState{}) {
|
||||
panic("qtls.ConnectionState doesn't match")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !structsEqual(&tls.ClientSessionState{}, &clientSessionState{}) {
|
||||
panic("qtls.ClientSessionState doesn't match")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !structsEqual(&tls.CertificateRequestInfo{}, &certificateRequestInfo{}) {
|
||||
panic("qtls.CertificateRequestInfo doesn't match")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !structsEqual(&tls.Config{}, &config{}) {
|
||||
panic("qtls.Config doesn't match")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !structsEqual(&tls.ClientHelloInfo{}, &clientHelloInfo{}) {
|
||||
panic("qtls.ClientHelloInfo doesn't match")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func toConnectionState(c connectionState) ConnectionState {
|
||||
return *(*ConnectionState)(unsafe.Pointer(&c))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func toClientSessionState(s *clientSessionState) *ClientSessionState {
|
||||
return (*ClientSessionState)(unsafe.Pointer(s))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func fromClientSessionState(s *ClientSessionState) *clientSessionState {
|
||||
return (*clientSessionState)(unsafe.Pointer(s))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func toCertificateRequestInfo(i *certificateRequestInfo) *CertificateRequestInfo {
|
||||
return (*CertificateRequestInfo)(unsafe.Pointer(i))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func toConfig(c *config) *Config {
|
||||
return (*Config)(unsafe.Pointer(c))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func fromConfig(c *Config) *config {
|
||||
return (*config)(unsafe.Pointer(c))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func toClientHelloInfo(chi *clientHelloInfo) *ClientHelloInfo {
|
||||
return (*ClientHelloInfo)(unsafe.Pointer(chi))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func structsEqual(a, b interface{}) bool {
|
||||
return compare(reflect.ValueOf(a), reflect.ValueOf(b))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func compare(a, b reflect.Value) bool {
|
||||
sa := a.Elem()
|
||||
sb := b.Elem()
|
||||
if sa.NumField() != sb.NumField() {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := 0; i < sa.NumField(); i++ {
|
||||
fa := sa.Type().Field(i)
|
||||
fb := sb.Type().Field(i)
|
||||
if !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Index, fb.Index) || fa.Name != fb.Name || fa.Anonymous != fb.Anonymous || fa.Offset != fb.Offset || !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Type, fb.Type) {
|
||||
if fa.Type.Kind() != fb.Type.Kind() {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if fa.Type.Kind() == reflect.Slice {
|
||||
if !compareStruct(fa.Type.Elem(), fb.Type.Elem()) {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func compareStruct(a, b reflect.Type) bool {
|
||||
if a.NumField() != b.NumField() {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := 0; i < a.NumField(); i++ {
|
||||
fa := a.Field(i)
|
||||
fb := b.Field(i)
|
||||
if !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Index, fb.Index) || fa.Name != fb.Name || fa.Anonymous != fb.Anonymous || fa.Offset != fb.Offset || !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Type, fb.Type) {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
@ -101,8 +101,8 @@
|
||||
- Add a `quic.Config` option to configure keep-alive
|
||||
- Rename the STK to Cookie
|
||||
- Implement `net.Conn`-style deadlines for streams
|
||||
- Remove the `tls.Config` from the `quic.Config`. The `tls.Config` must now be passed to the `Dial` and `Listen` functions as a separate parameter. See the [Godoc](https://godoc.org/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go) for details.
|
||||
- Changed the log level environment variable to only accept strings ("DEBUG", "INFO", "ERROR"), see [the wiki](https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/wiki/Logging) for more details.
|
||||
- Remove the `tls.Config` from the `quic.Config`. The `tls.Config` must now be passed to the `Dial` and `Listen` functions as a separate parameter. See the [Godoc](https://godoc.org/github.com/quic-go/quic-go) for details.
|
||||
- Changed the log level environment variable to only accept strings ("DEBUG", "INFO", "ERROR"), see [the wiki](https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/wiki/Logging) for more details.
|
||||
- Rename the `h2quic.QuicRoundTripper` to `h2quic.RoundTripper`
|
||||
- Changed `h2quic.Server.Serve()` to accept a `net.PacketConn`
|
||||
- Drop support for Go 1.7 and 1.8.
|
63
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/README.md
generated
vendored
Normal file
63
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/README.md
generated
vendored
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
|
||||
# A QUIC implementation in pure Go
|
||||
|
||||
<img src="docs/quic.png" width=303 height=124>
|
||||
|
||||
[![PkgGoDev](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/quic-go/quic-go)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/quic-go/quic-go)
|
||||
[![Code Coverage](https://img.shields.io/codecov/c/github/quic-go/quic-go/master.svg?style=flat-square)](https://codecov.io/gh/quic-go/quic-go/)
|
||||
|
||||
quic-go is an implementation of the QUIC protocol ([RFC 9000](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000), [RFC 9001](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9001), [RFC 9002](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9002)) in Go, including the Unreliable Datagram Extension ([RFC 9221](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9221)) and Datagram Packetization Layer Path MTU
|
||||
Discovery (DPLPMTUD, [RFC 8899](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8899)). It has support for HTTP/3 ([RFC 9114](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9114)), including QPACK ([RFC 9204](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9204)).
|
||||
|
||||
In addition to the RFCs listed above, it currently implements the [IETF QUIC draft-29](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-29). Support for draft-29 will eventually be dropped, as it is phased out of the ecosystem.
|
||||
|
||||
## Guides
|
||||
|
||||
*We currently support Go 1.18.x and Go 1.19.x.*
|
||||
|
||||
Running tests:
|
||||
|
||||
go test ./...
|
||||
|
||||
### QUIC without HTTP/3
|
||||
|
||||
Take a look at [this echo example](example/echo/echo.go).
|
||||
|
||||
## Usage
|
||||
|
||||
### As a server
|
||||
|
||||
See the [example server](example/main.go). Starting a QUIC server is very similar to the standard lib http in go:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
http.Handle("/", http.FileServer(http.Dir(wwwDir)))
|
||||
http3.ListenAndServeQUIC("localhost:4242", "/path/to/cert/chain.pem", "/path/to/privkey.pem", nil)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### As a client
|
||||
|
||||
See the [example client](example/client/main.go). Use a `http3.RoundTripper` as a `Transport` in a `http.Client`.
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
http.Client{
|
||||
Transport: &http3.RoundTripper{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Projects using quic-go
|
||||
|
||||
| Project | Description | Stars |
|
||||
|-----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
|
||||
| [AdGuardHome](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome) | Free and open source, powerful network-wide ads & trackers blocking DNS server. | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [algernon](https://github.com/xyproto/algernon) | Small self-contained pure-Go web server with Lua, Markdown, HTTP/2, QUIC, Redis and PostgreSQL support | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/xyproto/algernon?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [caddy](https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/) | Fast, multi-platform web server with automatic HTTPS | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/caddyserver/caddy?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [cloudflared](https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared) | A tunneling daemon that proxies traffic from the Cloudflare network to your origins | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/cloudflare/cloudflared?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [go-libp2p](https://github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p) | libp2p implementation in Go, powering [Kubo](https://github.com/ipfs/kubo) (IPFS) and [Lotus](https://github.com/filecoin-project/lotus) (Filecoin), among others | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/libp2p/go-libp2p?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [OONI Probe](https://github.com/ooni/probe-cli) | Next generation OONI Probe. Library and CLI tool. | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/ooni/probe-cli?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [syncthing](https://github.com/syncthing/syncthing/) | Open Source Continuous File Synchronization | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/syncthing/syncthing?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [traefik](https://github.com/traefik/traefik) | The Cloud Native Application Proxy | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/traefik/traefik?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [v2ray-core](https://github.com/v2fly/v2ray-core) | A platform for building proxies to bypass network restrictions | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/v2fly/v2ray-core?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
| [YoMo](https://github.com/yomorun/yomo) | Streaming Serverless Framework for Geo-distributed System | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/yomorun/yomo?style=flat-square) |
|
||||
|
||||
## Contributing
|
||||
|
||||
We are always happy to welcome new contributors! We have a number of self-contained issues that are suitable for first-time contributors, they are tagged with [help wanted](https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+label%3A%22help+wanted%22). If you have any questions, please feel free to reach out by opening an issue or leaving a comment.
|
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol"
|
||||
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type packetBuffer struct {
|
@ -7,9 +7,9 @@
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol"
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/utils"
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/logging"
|
||||
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
|
||||
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils"
|
||||
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/logging"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type client struct {
|
@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
|
||||
"math/bits"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol"
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/utils"
|
||||
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
|
||||
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// A closedLocalConn is a connection that we closed locally.
|
@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol"
|
||||
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/utils"
|
||||
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
|
||||
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Clone clones a Config
|
||||
@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ func populateConfig(config *Config, defaultConnIDLen int) *Config {
|
||||
EnableDatagrams: config.EnableDatagrams,
|
||||
DisablePathMTUDiscovery: config.DisablePathMTUDiscovery,
|
||||
DisableVersionNegotiationPackets: config.DisableVersionNegotiationPackets,
|
||||
Allow0RTT: config.Allow0RTT,
|
||||
Tracer: config.Tracer,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user