cryptol/examples/maliciousSHA/malicious_SHA1.cry

/*
 * Copyright (c) 2004, 2013-2016 Galois, Inc.
 * Distributed under the terms of the BSD3 license (see LICENSE file)
 */

// Description of SHA1 at http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-4.htm
/* WARNING: This file represents a collision in a malicious SHA-1. It is modified
 * to take initialization as an input. This interface to SHA-1 should not
 * be used. The collision presented here, description, and paper can be found
 * at http://malicioussha1.github.io/
 * The Malicious SHA-1 project is a joint work of
 *      Ange Albertini (Corkami, Germany)
 *      Jean-Philippe Aumasson (Kudelski Security, Switzerland)
 *      Maria Eichlseder (Graz University of Technology, Austria)
 *      Florian Mendel (Graz University of Technology, Austria)
 *      Martin Schlaeffer (Graz University of Technology, Austria)
 *
 *	Research paper at http://malicioussha1.github.io/doc/malsha1.pdf
 */

malicious_sha1 msg k = malicious_sha1' rmsg k
	where
		rmsg = pad(join(reverse (groupBy`{8} (join (reverse eve1)))))

malicious_sha1' : {chunks} (fin chunks) => [chunks][512] -> [4][32] -> [160]
malicious_sha1' pmsg k = join (Hs!0)
  where
    Hs = [[0x67452301, 0xefcdab89, 0x98badcfe, 0x10325476, 0xc3d2e1f0]] #
         [ malicious_block (H, split(M)) k
         | H <- Hs
         | M <- pmsg
         ]

//hexdump of file available at http://malicioussha1.github.io/pocs/eve1.sh
//when executed will print an ascii cow
eve1 = [
	0x1d23, 0x911b, 0x4034, 0xd809, 0x4d10, 0xd3a6, 0xe154, 0x2b10,
	0x85b8, 0x5b12, 0x7847, 0xbd26, 0x37fd, 0xee2b, 0x50e6, 0x2c08,
	0x4b75, 0x5716, 0x1138, 0xd8bf, 0xe0a5, 0x44b2, 0x941a, 0x2a51,
	0x36cd, 0x04a2, 0xe2fe, 0x9f8a, 0x5532, 0xaa99, 0x7ab4, 0x82ed,
	0x0a0a, 0x6669, 0x5b20, 0x6020, 0x646f, 0x2d20, 0x2074, 0x3178,
	0x2d20, 0x336a, 0x2d20, 0x314e, 0x2d20, 0x6e41, 0x2220, 0x7b24,
	0x7d30, 0x6022, 0x2d20, 0x7165, 0x2220, 0x3139, 0x2022, 0x3b5d,
	0x7420, 0x6568, 0x206e, 0x200a, 0x6520, 0x6863, 0x206f, 0x2022,
	0x2020, 0x2020, 0x2020, 0x2020, 0x5f28, 0x295f, 0x6e5c, 0x2020,
	0x2020, 0x2020, 0x2020, 0x2820, 0x6f6f, 0x5c29, 0x206e, 0x2f20,
	0x2d2d, 0x2d2d, 0x2d2d, 0x5c2d, 0x2f5c, 0x6e5c, 0x2f20, 0x7c20,
	0x2020, 0x2020, 0x7c20, 0x5c7c, 0x2a6e, 0x2020, 0x7c7c, 0x2d2d,
	0x2d2d, 0x7c7c, 0x6e5c, 0x2020, 0x5e20, 0x205e, 0x2020, 0x5e20,
	0x225e, 0x0a3b, 0x6c65, 0x6573, 0x200a, 0x6520, 0x6863, 0x206f,
	0x4822, 0x6c65, 0x6f6c, 0x5720, 0x726f, 0x646c, 0x222e, 0x0a3b,
	0x6966, 0x000a]

//hexdump of file available at http://malicioussha1.github.io/pocs/eve2.sh
//when executed will print "hello world"
//The ascii cow and hello world can be switched out in both files
//and the hashes will still collide. The next example shows this
eve2 = [
	0x1d23, 0x921b, 0x4014, 0xac09, 0x4d98, 0xd3a6, 0xe1bc, 0x4910,
	0x8570, 0x1812, 0x786f, 0xb926, 0x37bd, 0xac2b, 0x50ae, 0x6a08,
	0x4bfd, 0x5516, 0x1138, 0xccbf, 0xe0ad, 0x46b2, 0x94ba, 0x7e51,
	0x3645, 0x06a2, 0xe27e, 0x9f8a, 0x559a, 0xa999, 0x7a1c, 0xe2ed,
	0x0a0a, 0x6669, 0x5b20, 0x6020, 0x646f, 0x2d20, 0x2074, 0x3178,
	0x2d20, 0x336a, 0x2d20, 0x314e, 0x2d20, 0x6e41, 0x2220, 0x7b24,
	0x7d30, 0x6022, 0x2d20, 0x7165, 0x2220, 0x3139, 0x2022, 0x3b5d,
	0x7420, 0x6568, 0x206e, 0x200a, 0x6520, 0x6863, 0x206f, 0x2022,
	0x2020, 0x2020, 0x2020, 0x2020, 0x5f28, 0x295f, 0x6e5c, 0x2020,
	0x2020, 0x2020, 0x2020, 0x2820, 0x6f6f, 0x5c29, 0x206e, 0x2f20,
	0x2d2d, 0x2d2d, 0x2d2d, 0x5c2d, 0x2f5c, 0x6e5c, 0x2f20, 0x7c20,
	0x2020, 0x2020, 0x7c20, 0x5c7c, 0x2a6e, 0x2020, 0x7c7c, 0x2d2d,
	0x2d2d, 0x7c7c, 0x6e5c, 0x2020, 0x5e20, 0x205e, 0x2020, 0x5e20,
	0x225e, 0x0a3b, 0x6c65, 0x6573, 0x200a, 0x6520, 0x6863, 0x206f,
	0x4822, 0x6c65, 0x6f6c, 0x5720, 0x726f, 0x646c, 0x222e, 0x0a3b,
	0x6966, 0x000a]

//K from proof-of-concept section of http://malicioussha1.github.io/#downloads
malicious_k1 = [0x5a827999, 0x88e8ea68, 0x578059de, 0x54324a39]

bad_sha_eve1 = malicious_sha1 eve1 malicious_k1
bad_sha_eve2 = malicious_sha1 eve2 malicious_k1
property malicious_sha1_collision1 = eve1 != eve2 /\ bad_sha_eve1 == bad_sha_eve2

//hexdump malicious/eve1.sh
eve1_galois = [
	0x1d23, 0x911b, 0x4034, 0xd809, 0x4d10, 0xd3a6, 0xe154, 0x2b10,
	0x85b8, 0x5b12, 0x7847, 0xbd26, 0x37fd, 0xee2b, 0x50e6, 0x2c08,
	0x4b75, 0x5716, 0x1138, 0xd8bf, 0xe0a5, 0x44b2, 0x941a, 0x2a51,
	0x36cd, 0x04a2, 0xe2fe, 0x9f8a, 0x5532, 0xaa99, 0x7ab4, 0x82ed,
	0x0a0a, 0x6669, 0x5b20, 0x6020, 0x646f, 0x2d20, 0x2074, 0x3178,
	0x2d20, 0x336a, 0x2d20, 0x314e, 0x2d20, 0x6e41, 0x2220, 0x7b24,
	0x7d30, 0x6022, 0x2d20, 0x7165, 0x2220, 0x3139, 0x2022, 0x3b5d,
	0x7420, 0x6568, 0x206e, 0x200a, 0x6520, 0x6863, 0x206f, 0x4322,
	0x7972, 0x7470, 0x6c6f, 0x3b22, 0x650a, 0x736c, 0x0a65, 0x2020,
	0x6365, 0x6f68, 0x2220, 0x6147, 0x6f6c, 0x7369, 0x3b22, 0x660a,
	0x0a69]

//hexdump malicious/eve1.sh
eve2_galois = [
	0x1d23, 0x921b, 0x4014, 0xac09, 0x4d98, 0xd3a6, 0xe1bc, 0x4910,
	0x8570, 0x1812, 0x786f, 0xb926, 0x37bd, 0xac2b, 0x50ae, 0x6a08,
	0x4bfd, 0x5516, 0x1138, 0xccbf, 0xe0ad, 0x46b2, 0x94ba, 0x7e51,
	0x3645, 0x06a2, 0xe27e, 0x9f8a, 0x559a, 0xa999, 0x7a1c, 0xe2ed,
	0x0a0a, 0x6669, 0x5b20, 0x6020, 0x646f, 0x2d20, 0x2074, 0x3178,
	0x2d20, 0x336a, 0x2d20, 0x314e, 0x2d20, 0x6e41, 0x2220, 0x7b24,
	0x7d30, 0x6022, 0x2d20, 0x7165, 0x2220, 0x3139, 0x2022, 0x3b5d,
	0x7420, 0x6568, 0x206e, 0x200a, 0x6520, 0x6863, 0x206f, 0x4322,
	0x7972, 0x7470, 0x6c6f, 0x3b22, 0x650a, 0x736c, 0x0a65, 0x2020,
	0x6365, 0x6f68, 0x2220, 0x6147, 0x6f6c, 0x7369, 0x3b22, 0x660a,
	0x0a69]

bad_sha_eve_galois1 = malicious_sha1 eve1_galois malicious_k1
bad_sha_eve_galois2 = malicious_sha1 eve2_galois malicious_k1

property malicious_sha1_collision2 = eve1_galois != eve2_galois /\ bad_sha_eve_galois1 == bad_sha_eve_galois2

property all_same_hashes = bad_sha_eve_galois1 == bad_sha_eve1 /\ malicious_sha1_collision1 && malicious_sha1_collision2

/*
As a summary, a "1" followed by m "0"s followed by a 64-
   bit integer are appended to the end of the message to produce a
   padded message of length 512 * n.  The 64-bit integer is the length
   of the original message.  The padded message is then processed by the
   SHA-1 as n 512-bit blocks.
*/

pad : {msgLen,contentLen,chunks,padding}
     ( fin msgLen
     , 64 >= width msgLen                             // message width fits in a word
     , contentLen == msgLen + 65                      // message + header
     , chunks     == (contentLen+511) / 512
     , padding    == (512 - contentLen % 512) % 512   // prettier if type #'s could be < 0
     , msgLen     == 512 * chunks - (65 + padding)    // redundant, but Cryptol can't yet do the math
     )
     => [msgLen] -> [chunks][512]
pad msg = split (msg # [True] # (zero:[padding]) # (`msgLen:[64]))

f : ([8], [32], [32], [32]) -> [32]
f (t, x, y, z) =
       if (0 <= t)  && (t <= 19) then (x && y) ^ (~x && z)
        | (20 <= t) && (t <= 39) then x ^ y ^ z
        | (40 <= t) && (t <= 59) then (x && y) ^ (x && z) ^ (y && z)
        | (60 <= t) && (t <= 79) then x ^ y ^ z
        else error "f: t out of range"


Ks : [4][32] -> [80][32]
Ks k = [ k@0 | t <- [0..19]  ]
   # [ k@1 | t <- [20..39] ]
   # [ k@2 | t <- [40..59] ]
   # [ k@3 | t <- [60..79] ]

malicious_block : ([5][32], [16][32]) -> [4][32]-> [5][32]
malicious_block ([H0, H1, H2, H3, H4], M) k =
 [(H0+As@80), (H1+Bs@80), (H2+Cs@80), (H3+Ds@80), (H4+Es@80)]
  where
    Ws : [80][32]
    Ws = M # [ (W3 ^ W8 ^ W14 ^ W16) <<< 1
             | W16 <- drop`{16 - 16} Ws
             | W14 <- drop`{16 - 14} Ws
             | W8  <- drop`{16 - 8}  Ws
             | W3  <- drop`{16 - 3}  Ws
             | t <- [16..79]
             ]
    As = [H0] # TEMP
    Bs = [H1] # As
    Cs = [H2] # [ B <<< 30 | B <- Bs ]
    Ds = [H3] # Cs
    Es = [H4] # Ds
    TEMP : [80][32]
    TEMP = [ (A <<< 5) + f(t, B, C, D) + E + W + K
           | A <- As | B <- Bs | C <- Cs | D <- Ds | E <- Es
           | W <- Ws | K <- (Ks k)
           | t <- [0..79]
           ]