

The Language of Cryptography

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Chapter 1

A Crash Course in Cryptol

Before we can delve into cryptography, we have to get familiar with Cryptol. This chapter provides an introduction to Cryptol, just to get you started. The exposition is not meant to be comprehensive, but rather as an overview to give you a feel of the most important tools available. If a particular topic appears hard to approach, feel free to skim it over for future reference.

A full language reference is beyond the scope of this document at this time.

1.1 Basic data types

Cryptol provides five basic data types: bits, sequences, integers, tuples, and records. Words (i.e., *n*-bit numbers) are a special case of sequences. Note that, aside from bits and integers, all other Cryptol types can be nested as deep as you like. That is, we can have records of sequences containing tuples made up of other records, etc., giving us a rich type-system for precisely describing the shapes of data our programs manipulate.

While Cryptol is statically typed, it uses type inference to supply unspecified types. That is, the user does *not* have to write the types of all expressions; they will be automatically inferred by the type-inference engine. Of course, in certain contexts the user might choose to supply a type explicitly. The notation is simple: we simply put the expression, followed by : and the type. For instance,

12 : [8]

means the value 12 has type [8], i.e., it is an 8-bit word. We can also supply partial types. For example,

12 : [_]

means that 12 has a word type with an unspecified number of bits. Cryptol will infer the unspecified part of the type in this case. We shall see many other examples of typed expressions in the following discussion.

1.2 Bits: Booleans

The type Bit represents a single bit of information. There are precisely two values of this type: True and False. Bit values play an important role in Cryptol, as we shall see in detail shortly. In particular, the test expression in an if-then-else statement must have the type Bit. The logical operators && (and), || (or), $\hat{}$ (xor), and $\hat{}$ (complement) provide the basic operators that act on bit values.

Exercise 1.1. Type in the following expressions at the Cryptol prompt, and observe the output:

True false False : Bit if True && False then 0x3 else 0x4 False || True

```
(True && False) ^ True
~False
~(False || True)
```

Remember that Cryptol is case sensitive, and hence false is different from False.

Tip: Cryptol provides extensive command line/tab completion; use up/down-arrow to see your previous commands, hit tab to complete identifier names, etc.

1.3 Words: Numbers

A word is simply a numeric value with some number of bits, corresponding to the usual notion of binary numbers. To match our observation of how cryptographers use binary numbers, Cryptol only supports non-negative (≥ 0) word values (i.e., no floating point or negative numbers). However, words can be arbitrarily large: There is no predefined maximum number of bits that we are limited to. The type of *n*-bit words is written [n]; e.g. [8] is the 8-bit word type.

By default, Cryptol prints words in base 16. You might find it useful to set the output base to be 10 while working on the following example. To do so, use the command:

:set base=10

The supported values for this setting are 2 (binary), 8 (octal), 10 (decimal), and 16 (hexadecimal). Conversely, we can *write* numbers in these bases in Cryptol programs too:

Ob11111011110	// binary	
0o3736	// octal	
2014	// decimal	
0x7de	// hexadecima	1

Decimal numbers pose a problem in a bit-precise language like Cryptol. Numbers represented in a base that is a power of two unambiguously specify the number of bits required to store each digit. For example 0b101 takes three bits to store, so its type is [3]. A hexadecimal digit takes 4 bits to store, so 0xabc needs 12 bits, and its type is [12]. On the other hand, a decimal digit could require anywhere from 1 to 4 bits to represent, so the number of digits does not determine the type. Decimal numbers may assume any of a variety of types in Cryptol; that is, they are *polymorphic*. For example, 19 could have the unbounded type Integer (see section 1.4), type [8], type [5], or any other word type with at least 5 bits.

Defaulting and explicit types Polymorphic values in a Cryptol program are subject to *defaulting*, meaning that Cryptol will choose specific types to represent them. Cryptol usually prints a message whenever defaulting occurs, showing which type was chosen. For numbers, Cryptol usually chooses either **Integer** or the word type with the *smallest* number of bits required to represent them. Users can override this by giving an explicit type signature.

Exercise 1.2. Try writing some decimal numbers at different types, like 12: [4] and 50: [8]. How does Cryptol respond if you write 19: [4], and why? What is the largest decimal number you can write at type [8]? What is the smallest allowable bit size for 32? What is the smallest allowable bit size for 0?

Exercise 1.3. Experiment with different output bases by issuing :set base=10, and other base values. Also try writing numbers directly in different bases at the command line, such as 0o1237. Feel free to try other bases. What is the hexadecimal version of the octal number 0o7756677263570015?

Note: We will revisit the notion of words in section 1.7, after we learn about sequences.

1.4 Integers: Unbounded numbers

The type Integer represents mathematical integers of unlimited size. To write an integer value in Cryptol, simply write the number in decimal, optionally annotated with :Integer to disambiguate the type. Numbers written in base 2, 8,

or 16 are always *n*-bit words, and never have type Integer. However, they can be converted to unbounded integers using toInteger. For example, toInteger 0xff represents the integer 255. To write a negative integer, simply negate the result: For example, -12 and - toInteger 0xc represent the integer -12.

Exercise 1.4. Compare the results of evaluating the expressions 0x8 + 0x9 and toInteger 0x8 + toInteger 0x9. Also try evaluating toInteger (- 0x5). Can you explain the results?

1.5 Tuples: Heterogeneous collections

A tuple is a simple ordered collection of arbitrary values with arbitrary types. Tuples are written with parentheses surrounding two or more comma-separated elements. Cryptol also supports a special zero-element tuple, written ().¹

Tuple types have syntax similar to tuple values. They are written with parentheses around two or more commaseparated types. Values of a tuple type are tuples of the same length, where the value in each position has the corresponding type. For example, type ([8], Bit) comprises pairs whose first element is an 8-bit word, and whose second element is a bit. The empty tuple () is the only value of type ().

Exercise 1.5. Try out the following tuples:

```
(1, 2+4)
(True, False, True ^ False)
((1, 2), False, (3-1, (4, True)))
```

Projecting values from tuples Use a . followed by n to project the n + 1-th component of a tuple. Nested projections are also supported. Note that projections cannot be used with the empty tuple, as it has no components to project.

Exercise 1.6. Try out the following examples:

(1, 2+4).0
(1, 2+4).1
((1, 2), False, (3-1, (4, True))).2.1

Write a nested projection to extract the value True from the expression:

((1, 2), (2, 6, (True, 4)), False)

Tip: While tuple projections can come in handy, we rarely see them used in Cryptol programs. As we shall see later, Cryptol's powerful pattern-matching mechanism provides a much nicer and usable alternative for extracting parts of tuples and other composite data values.

1.6 Sequences: Homogeneous collections

While tuples contain heterogeneous data, sequences are used for homogeneous collections of values, akin to value arrays in more traditional languages. A sequence contains elements of any *single* type, even sequences themselves, arbitrarily nested. We simply write a sequence by enclosing it within square brackets with comma-separated elements.

Exercise 1.7. Try out the following sequences:

[1, 2] [[1, 2, 3], [4, 5, 6], [7, 8, 9]]

Note how the latter example can be used as the representation of a 3×3 matrix.

Tip: The most important thing to remember about a sequence is that its elements must be of exactly the same type.

Exercise 1.8. Type in the following expressions to Cryptol and observe the type errors:

 $^{^{1}}$ There is no syntax for tuples with exactly one element. Writing parentheses around a single value does not make a tuple; it denotes the same value with the same type.

[True, [True]] [[1, 2, 3], [4, 5]]

1.6.1 Enumerations

Cryptol enumerations allow us to write sequences more compactly, instead of listing the elements individually. An enumeration is a means of writing a sequence by providing a (possibly infinite) range. Cryptol enumerations are not equivalent to mainstream programming languages' notions of enumeration types, other than both kinds of constructs guarantee that enumeration elements are distinct.

Exercise 1.9. Explore various ways of constructing enumerations in Cryptol, by using the following expressions:

```
[1 .. 10] // increment with step 1
[1, 3 .. 10] // increment with step 2 (= 3-1)
[10, 9 .. 1] // decrement with step 1 (= 10-9)
[10, 7 .. 1] // decrement with step 1 (= 10-9)
[10, 11 .. 1] // increment with step 1
```

1.6.2 Comprehensions

A Cryptol comprehension is a way of programmatically computing the elements of a new sequence, out of the elements of existing ones. The syntax is reminiscent of the set comprehension notation from ordinary mathematics, generalized to cover parallel branches (as explained in the exercises below). Note that Cryptol comprehensions are not generalized numeric comprehensions (like summation, product, maximum, or minimum), though such comprehensions can certainly be defined using Cryptol comprehensions.

Exercise 1.10. The components of a Cryptol sequence comprehension are an expression of one or more variables (which defines each element of the sequence), followed by one or more *branches*, each preceded by a vertical bar, which define how the variables' values are generated. A comprehension with a single branch is called a *cartesian comprehension*. We can have one or more components in a cartesian comprehension. Experiment with the following expressions:

[(x, y) | x <- [1 .. 3], y <- [4, 5]] [x + y | x <- [1 .. 3], y <- []] [(x + y, z) | x <- [1, 2], y <- [1], z <- [3, 4]]

What is the number of elements in the resulting sequence, with respect to the sizes of components?

Exercise 1.11. A comprehension with multiple branchess is called a *parallel comprehension*. We can have any number of parallel branches. The contents of each branch will be *zipped* to obtain the results. Experiment with the following expressions:

```
[ (x, y) | x <- [1 .. 3] | y <- [4, 5] ]
[ x + y | x <- [1 .. 3] | y <- [] ]
[ (x + y, z) | x <- [1, 2] | y <- [1] | z <- [3, 4] ]
```

What is the number of elements in the resulting sequence, with respect to the sizes of the parallel branches?

Tip: One can mix parallel and cartesian comprehensions, where each parallel branch can contain multiple cartesian generators.

Tip: While Cryptol comprehensions *look* like standard mathematical comprehensions, one must remember that the codomain of Cryptol comprehensions is a sequence type of some kind, *not* a set.

Comprehensions may be nested. In this pattern, the element value expression of the outer nesting is a sequence comprehension (which may refer to values generated by the outer generator). The pattern looks like this:

Exercise 1.12. Use a nested comprehension to write an expression to produce a 3×3 matrix (as a sequence of sequences), such that the *ij*th entry contains the value (i, j).

1.6.3 Appending and indexing

For sequences, the two basic operations are appending (#) and selecting elements out (@, @@, !, and !!). The forward selection operator (@) starts counting from the beginning, while the backward selection operator (!) starts from the end. Indexing always starts at zero: that is, xs @ 0 is the first element of xs, while xs ! 0 is the last. The permutation versions (@@ and !!, respectively) allow us to concisely select multiple elements: they allow us to extract elements in any order (which makes them very useful for permuting sequences).

Exercise 1.13. Try out the following Cryptol expressions:

```
[] # [1, 2]

[1, 2] # []

[1 .. 5] # [3, 6, 8]

[0 .. 9] @ 0

[0 .. 9] @ 5

[0 .. 9] @ 10

[0 .. 9] @@ [3, 4]

[0 .. 9] @@ [3, 4]

[0 .. 9] @@ [9, 12]

[0 .. 9] @@ [9, 8 .. 0]

[0 .. 9] ! 0

[0 .. 9] ! 0

[0 .. 9] ! 3

[0 .. 9] !! [3, 6]

[0 .. 9] !! [0 .. 9]

[0 .. 9] ! 12
```

Exercise 1.14. The permutation operators (@@ and !!) can be defined using sequence comprehensions. Write an expression that selects the even indexed elements out of the sequence $[0 \dots 10]$ first using @@, and then using a sequence comprehension.

1.6.4 Finite and infinite sequences

So far we have only seen finite sequences. An infinite sequence is one that has an infinite number of elements, corresponding to streams. Cryptol supports infinite sequences, where the elements are accessed *on demand*. This implies that Cryptol will *not* go into an infinite loop just because you have created an infinite sequence: it will lazily construct the sequence and make its elements available as demanded by the program.

Exercise 1.15. Try the following infinite enumerations:

```
[1:[32] ...]
[1:[32], 3 ...]
[1:[32] ...] @ 2000
[1:[32], 3 ...] @@ [300, 500, 700]
[100, 102 ...]
```

Note: We are explicitly telling Cryptol to use 32-bit words as the elements. The reason for doing so will become clear when we study arithmetic shortly.

Exercise 1.16. What happens if you use the reverse index operator (!) on an infinite sequence? Why?

1.6.5 Manipulating sequences

Sequences are at the heart of Cryptol, and there are a number of built-in functions for manipulating them in various ways. It is worthwhile to try the following exercises to gain basic familiarity with the basic operations.

Exercise 1.17. Try the following expressions:

```
take`{3} [1 .. 12]
drop`{3} [1 .. 12]
split`{3} [1 .. 12]
groupBy`{3} [1 .. 12]
join [[1 .. 4], [5 .. 8], [9 .. 12]]
join [[1, 2, 3], [4, 5, 6], [7, 8, 9], [10, 11, 12]]
transpose [[1, 2, 3, 4], [5, 6, 7, 8]]
transpose [[1, 2, 3], [4, 5, 6], [7, 8, 9]]
```

And for fun, think about what these should produce:

join [1,1] transpose [1,2]

Exercise 1.18. Based on your intuitions from the previous exercise, derive laws between the following pairs of functions: take and drop; join and split; join and groupBy; split and groupBy and transpose and itself. For instance, take and drop satisfy the following equality:

(take`{n} xs) # (drop`{n} xs) == xs

whenever n is between 0 and the length of the sequence xs. Note that there might be multiple laws these functions satisfy.

Exercise 1.19. What is the relationship between the append operator # and join?

Type-directed splits The Cryptol primitive function **split** splits a sequence into any number of equal-length parts. An explicit result type is often used with **split**, since the number of parts and the number of elements in each part are not given as arguments, but are determined by the type of the argument sequence and the result context.

Cryptol> split [1..12] : [1][12][8] [[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]] Cryptol> split [1..12] : [2][6][8] [[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]] Cryptol> split [1..12] : [3][4][8] [[1, 2, 3, 4], [5, 6, 7, 8], [9, 10, 11, 12]]

Here is what happens if we do *not* give an explicit signature on the result:

```
Cryptol> split [1..12]
Cannot evaluate polymorphic value.
Type: {n, m, a} (n * m == 12, Literal 12 a, fin m) => [n][m]a
Cryptol> :t split [1..12]
split [1 .. 12] : {n, m, a} (n * m == 12, Literal 12 a, fin m) =>
[n][m]a
```

A complex type signature like this one first defines a set of type variables $\{n, m, a\}$, a set of constraints on those variables (n * m == 12, Literal 12 a, fin m), a => and finally the shape description. In this case, Cryptol's [n] [m] a is telling us that the result will be a sequence of n things, each of which is a sequence of m things, each of which is a value of type a. The Literal constraint tells us that a is a type that can represent numbers (at least) up to

12. The other constraints are that n * m == 12, which means we should completely cover the entire input, and that the length m needs to be finite. As you can see, split is a very powerful function. The flexibility afforded by split comes in very handy in Cryptol. We shall see one example of its usage later in section 2.5.

Exercise 1.20. With a sequence of length 12, as in the above example, there are precisely 6 ways of splitting it: 1×12 , 2×6 , 3×4 , 4×3 , 6×2 , and 12×1 . We have seen the first three splits above. Write the expressions corresponding to the latter three.

Exercise 1.21. What happens when you type split [1 .. 12] : [5] [2] [8]?

Exercise 1.22. Write a split expression to turn the sequence $[1 \dots 120]$: [120] [8] into a nested sequence with type [3] [4] [10] [8], keeping the elements in the same order. (Hint Use nested comprehensions.)

1.6.6 Shifts and rotates

Common operations on sequences include shifting and rotating them. Cryptol supports both versions with left/right variants.

Exercise 1.23. Experiment with the following expressions:

 $\begin{bmatrix} 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 \end{bmatrix} \gg 2 \\ \begin{bmatrix} 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 \end{bmatrix} \gg 10 \\ \begin{bmatrix} 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 \end{bmatrix} \ll 2 \\ \begin{bmatrix} 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 \end{bmatrix} \ll 2 \\ \begin{bmatrix} 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 \end{bmatrix} \ll 10 \\ \begin{bmatrix} 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 \end{bmatrix} \gg 2 \\ \begin{bmatrix} 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 \end{bmatrix} \gg 10 \\ \begin{bmatrix} 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 \end{bmatrix} \ll 2 \\ \begin{bmatrix} 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 \end{bmatrix} \ll 2 \\ \begin{bmatrix} 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 \end{bmatrix} \ll 2$

Notice that shifting/rotating always returns a sequence precisely the same size as the original.

Exercise 1.24. Let xs be a sequence of length n. What is the result of rotating xs left or right by a multiple of n?

1.7 Words as sequences

In section 1.3 we have introduced numbers as a distinct value type in Cryptol. In fact, a number in Cryptol is nothing but a finite sequence of bits, so words are not a separate type. For instance, the literal expression 42:[6] is precisely the same as the bit-sequence [True, False, True, False, True, False]. The type [6] is really just an abbreviation for [6]Bit.

Exercise 1.25. Explain why 42 is the same as [True, False, True, False, True, False]. Is Cryptol little-endian, or big-endian?

Exercise 1.26. Try out the following words: (Hint It might help to use :set base=2 to see the bit patterns.)

```
12:[4]
12 # [False]
[False, False] # 12
[True, False] # 12
12 # [False, True]
32:[6]
12 # 32
[True, False, True, False, True, False] == 42
```

Exercise 1.27. Since words are sequences, the sequence functions from exercise 1.17 apply to words as well. Try out the following examples and explain the outputs you observe:

take`{3} 0xFF
take`{3} (12:[6])
drop`{3} (12:[6])
split`{3} (12:[6])
groupBy`{3} (12:[6])

Recall that the notation 12: [6] means the constant 12 with the type precisely 6 bits wide.

Exercise 1.28. Try exercise 1.27, this time with the constant 12: [12]. Do any of the results change? Why?

Shifts and rotates on words Consider what happens if we shift a word, say 12:[6] by one to the right:

```
(12:[6]) >> 1
= [False, False, True, True, False, False] >> 1
= [False, False, False, True, True, False]
= 6
```

That is shifting right by one effectively divides the word by 2. This is due to Cryptol's "big-endian" representation of numbers.³

Exercise 1.29. Try the following examples of shifting/rotating words:

(12:[8]) >> 2 (12:[8]) << 2

Little-endian vs Big-endian The discussion of endianness comes up often in computer science, with no clear winner. Since Cryptol allows indexing from the beginning or the end of a (finite) sequence, you can access the 0th (least-significant) bit of a sequence k with k!0, the 1st bit with k!1, and so on.

1.8 Characters and strings

Strictly speaking Cryptol does *not* have characters and strings as a separate type. However, Cryptol does allow characters in programs, which simply correspond to their ASCII equivalents. Similarly, strings are merely sequences of characters, i.e., sequences of words. The following examples illustrate:

```
Cryptol> :set base=10
Cryptol> :set ascii=off
Cryptol> 'A'
65
Cryptol> "ABC"
[65, 66, 67]
Cryptol> :set ascii=on
Cryptol> "ABC"
"ABC"
Cryptol> :set ascii=off
Cryptol> ['A' .. 'Z']
[65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79,
     80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90]
Cryptol> :set ascii=on
Cryptol> ['A' .. 'Z']
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
```

³This is a significant change from Cryptol version 1, which interpreted the leftmost element of a sequence as the lowest-ordered bit (and thus shifting right was multiplying by 2, and shifting left was dividing by 2). The way it is handled now matches the traditional interpretation.

Note: This is the reason why we have to use the :set ascii=on command to print ASCII strings. Otherwise, Cryptol will not have enough information to tell numbers from characters.

Since characters are simply 8-bit words, you can do word operations on them; including arithmetic:

```
Cryptol> 'C' - 'A'
2
```

1.9 Records: Named collections

In Cryptol, records are simply collections of named fields. In this sense, they are very similar to tuples (section 1.5), which can be thought of records without field names. Like a tuple, the fields of a record can be of any type. We construct records by listing the fields inside curly braces, separated by commas. We project fields out of a record with the usual dot-notation, similar to tuple projections. Note that the order of fields in a record is immaterial.

Record equality is defined in the standard fashion. Two records are equal if they have the same number of fields, if their field names are identical, if identically named fields are of comparable types and have equal values.

Exercise 1.30. Type in the following expressions and observe the output:

You might find the command :set ascii=on useful in viewing the output.

1.10 The zero

Before proceeding further, we have to take a detour and talk briefly about one of the most useful values in Cryptol: zero. The value zero inhabits every type in Cryptol, and stands for the value that consists of all False bits. The following examples should illustrate the idea:

```
Cryptol> zero : Bit

False

Cryptol> zero : [8]

0

Cryptol> zero : ([8], Bit)

(0, False)

Cryptol> zero : [8][3]

[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]

Cryptol> zero : [3](Bit, [4])

[(False, 0), (False, 0), (False, 0)]

Cryptol> zero : {xCoord : [12], yCoord : [5]}

{xCoord=0, yCoord=0}
```

On the other extreme, the value **zero** combined with the complement operator ~ gives us values that consist of all **True** bits:

```
Cryptol> ~zero : Bit
True
Cryptol> ~zero : [8]
255
Cryptol> ~zero : ([8], Bit)
```

```
(255, True)
Cryptol> ~zero : [8][3]
[7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7]
Cryptol> ~zero : [3](Bit, [4])
[(True, 15), (True, 15), (True, 15)]
Cryptol> ~zero : {xCoord : [12], yCoord : [5]}
{xCoord=4095, yCoord=31}
```

Exercise 1.31. We said that zero inhabits all types in Cryptol. This also includes functions. What do you think the appropriate zero value for a function would be? Try out the following examples:

(zero : ([8] -> [3])) 5 (zero : Bit -> {xCoord : [12], yCoord : [5]}) True

1.11 Arithmetic

Cryptol supports the usual binary arithmetic operators +, -, *, ^^ (exponentiation), / (integer division), % (integer modulus), along with *ceiling* base-2 logarithm 1g2 and binary min and max.

The important thing to remember is that all arithmetic in Cryptol is modular, with respect to the underlying word size. As a consequence, there is no such thing as an overflow/underflow in Cryptol, as the result will be always guaranteed to fit in the resulting word size. While this is very handy for most applications of Cryptol, it requires some care if overflow has to be treated explicitly.

Exercise 1.32. What is the value of $1 + 1 : [_]?$ Surprised?

Exercise 1.33. What is the value of 1 + 1 : [8]? Why?

Exercise 1.34. What is the value of 3 - 5 : [_]? How about 3 - 5 : [8]?

Note: Cryptol supports subtraction both as a binary operator, and as a unary operator. When used in a unary fashion (a.k.a. unary minus), it simply means subtraction from 0. For instance, -5 precisely means 0-5, and is subject to the usual modular arithmetic rules.

Exercise 1.35. Try out the following expressions:

2 / 0 2 % 0 3 + (if 3 == 2+1 then 12 else 2/0) 3 + (if 3 != 2+1 then 12 else 2/0) lg2 (-25) : Integer lg2 (-25) : [_]

In the last expression, remember that unary minus will be done in a modular fashion. What is the modulus used for this operation?

Exercise 1.36. Division truncates down. Try out the following expressions:

(6 / 3, 6 % 3) (7 / 3, 7 % 3) (8 / 3, 8 % 3) (9 / 3, 9 % 3)

What is the relationship between / and %?

Exercise 1.37. What is the value of min (5: [_]) (-2)? Why? Why are the parentheses around -2 necessary?

Exercise 1.38. How about max 5 (-2:[8])? Why?

Exercise 1.39. Write an expression that computes the sum of two sequences [1.. 10] and [10, 9 .. 1].

Comparison operators Cryptol supports the comparison operators ==, !=, >, >=, <, <=, with their usual meanings.

Exercise 1.40. Try out the following expressions:

((2 >= 3) || (3 < 6)) && (4 == 5) if 3 >= 2 then True else 1 < 12

Enumerations, revisited In exercise 1.15, we wrote the infinite enumeration starting at 1 using an explicit type as follows:

[(1:[32]) ...]

As expected, Cryptol evaluates this expression to:

[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ...]

However, while the output suggests that the numbers are increasing all the time, that is just an illusion! Since the elements of this sequence are 32-bit words, eventually they will wrap over, and go back to 0. (In fact, this will happen precisely at the element $2^{32} - 1$, starting the count at 0 as usual.) We can observe this much more simply, by using a smaller bit size for the constant 1:

Cryptol> [(1:[2])...] [1, 2, 3, 0, 1 ... Cryptol> take`{20} [(1:[2])...] [1, 2, 3, 0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 1, 2, 3, 0]

We still get an infinite sequence, but the numbers will repeat themselves eventually. Note that this is a direct consequence of Cryptol's modular arithmetic.

There is one more case to look at. What happens if we completely leave out the bit-width?

Cryptol> [1:[_] ...] [1, 0, 1, 0, 1, ...]

In this case, Cryptol figured out that the number 1 requires precisely 1 bit, and hence the arithmetic is done modulo $2^1 = 2$, giving us the sequence 1, 0, 1, 0, ... In particular, an enumeration of the form:

[k ...]

will be treated as if the user has written:

[k, (k+1) ...]

and type inference will assign the smallest bit-size possible to represent k.

Exercise 1.41. Remember from exercise 1.2 that the word 0 requires 0 bits to represent. Based on this, what is the value of the enumeration [0:[_], 1...]? How about [0:[_]...]? Surprised?

Exercise 1.42. What is the value of [1 .. 10]? Explain in terms of the above discussion on modular arithmetic.

1.12 Types

Cryptol's type system is one of its key features.⁴ You have seen that types can be used to specify the exact width of values, or shapes of sequences using a rich yet concise notation. In some cases, it may make sense to omit a type signature and let Cryptol *infer* the type for you. At the interpreter, you can check what type Cryptol inferred with the :t command.

 $^{^{4}}$ The Cryptol type system is based on the traditional Hindley-Milner style, extended with size types and arithmetic predicates (for details, see [5, 6, 7])

1.12.1 Monomorphic types

A monomorphic type is one that represents a concrete value. Most of the examples we have seen so far fall into this category. Below, we review the basic Cryptol types that make up all the monomorphic values in Cryptol.

Bits There are precisely two bit values in Cryptol: True and False. The type itself is written Bit. When we want to be explicit, we can write it as follows: $(2 \ge 3)$: Bit. However, with type inference writing the Bit type explicitly is almost never needed.

Words A word type is written [n], where n is a fixed non-negative constant. The constant can be as large (or small) as you like. So, you can talk about 2-bit quantities [2], as well as 384-bit ones [384], or even odd sizes like 17 [17], depending on the needs of your application. When we want to be explicit about the type of a value, we say 5:[8]. If we do not specify a size, Cryptol's type inference engine will pick the appropriate value depending on the context. Recall from section 1.7 that a word is, in fact, a sequence of bits. Hence, an equivalent (but verbose) way to write the type [17] is [17]Bit, which we would say in English as "a sequence of length 17, whose elements are Bits."

Tuples A tuple is a heterogeneous collection of arbitrary number of elements. Just like we write a tuple value by enclosing it in parentheses, we write the tuple type by enclosing the component types in parentheses, separated by commas: (3, 5, True) : ([8], [32], Bit). Tuples' types follow the same structure: (2, (False, 3), 5) : ([8], (Bit, [32]), [32]). A tuple component can be any type: a word, another tuple, sequence, record, etc. Again, type inference makes writing tuple types hardly ever necessary.

Sequences A sequence is simply a collection of homogeneous elements. If the element type is t, then we write the type of a sequence of n elements as [n]t. Note that t can be a sequence type itself. For instance, the type [12][3][6] reads as follows: A sequence of 12 elements, each of which is a sequence of 3 elements, each of which is a 6-bit-wide word.

The type of an infinite sequence is written [inf]t, where t is the type of the elements.

Exercise 1.43. What is the total number of bits in the type [12] [3] [6]?

Exercise 1.44. How would you write the type of an infinite sequence where each element itself is an infinite sequence of 32-bit words? What is the total bit size of this type?

Records A record is a heterogeneous collection of arbitrary number of labeled elements. In a sense, they generalize tuples by allowing the programmer to give explicit names to fields. The type of a record is written by enclosing it in braces, separated by commas: $\{x : [32], y : [32]\}$. Records can be nested and can contain arbitrary types of elements (records, sequences, functions, etc.).

1.12.2 Polymorphic types

Our focus so far has been on monomorphic types—the types that concrete Cryptol values (such as True, 3, or [1, 2]) can have. If all we had were monomorphic types, however, Cryptol would be a very verbose and boring language. Instead, we would like to be able to talk about collections of values, values whose types are instances of a given polymorphic type. This facility is especially important when we define functions, a topic we will get to shortly. In the mean time, we will look at some of the polymorphic primitive functions Cryptol provides to get a feeling for Cryptol's polymorphic type system.

The tale of tail Cryptol's built in function tail allows us to drop the first element from a sequence, returning the remainder:

```
Cryptol> tail [1 .. 5]
[2, 3, 4, 5]
Cryptol> tail [(False, (1:[8])), (True, 12), (False, 3)]
[(True, 12), (False, 3)]
```

Cryptol> tail [(1:[16])...] [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ...]

What exactly is the type of tail? If we look at the first example, one can deduce that tail must have the type:

tail : [5][8] -> [4][8]

That is, it takes a sequence of length 5, containing 8-bit values, and returns a sequence that has length 4, containing 8-bit values. (The type a -> b denotes a function that takes a value of type a and delivers a value of type b.)

However, the other example uses of tail above suggest that it must have the following types, respectively:

```
tail : [10][32] -> [9][32]
tail : [3](Bit, [8]) -> [2](Bit, [8])
tail : [inf][16] -> [inf][16]
```

As we have emphasized before, Cryptol is strongly typed, meaning that every entity (whether a Cryptol primitive or a user-defined function) must have a well-defined type. Clearly, the types we provided for tail above are quite different from each other. In particular, the first example uses numbers as the element type, while the second has tuples. So, how can tail be assigned a type that will make it work on all these inputs?

If you are familiar C++ templates or Java generics, you might think that Cryptol has some sort of an overloading mechanism that allows one to define functions that can work on multiple types. While templates and generics do provide a mental model, the correspondence is not very strong. In particular, we never write multiple definitions for the same function in Cryptol, i.e., there is no ad-hoc overloading. However, what Cryptol has is a much stronger notion: polymorphism, as would be advocated by languages such as Haskell or ML [11, 13].

Here is the type of tail in Cryptol:

Cryptol> :t tail tail : {n, a} [1 + n]a -> [n]a

This is quite a different type from what we have seen so far. In particular, it is a polymorphic type, one that can work over multiple concrete instantiations of it. Here's how we read this type in Cryptol:

tail is a polymorphic function, parameterized over n and a. The input is a sequence that contains 1 + n elements. The elements can be of an arbitrary type a; there is no restriction on their structure. The result is a sequence that contains n elements, where the elements themselves have the same type as those of the input.

In the case for tail, the parameter n is a size-parameter (since it describes the size of a sequence), while a is a shapeparameter, since it describes the shape of elements. The important thing to remember is that each use of tail must instantiate the parameters n and a appropriately. Let's see how the instantiations work for our running examples:

[n+1]a -> [n]a	n	a	Notes
[5][8] -> [4][8]	4	[8]	$1+n = 5 \Rightarrow n = 4$
[10][32] -> [9][32]	9	[32]	$1+n = 10 \Rightarrow n = 9$
[3](Bit, [8]) -> [2](Bit, [8])	2	(Bit, [8])	The type a is now a tuple
[inf][16] -> [inf][16]	inf	[16]	1+n = inf \Rightarrow n = inf

In the last instantiation, Cryptol knows that $\infty - 1 = \infty$, allowing us to apply tail on both finite and infinite sequences. The crucial point is that an instantiation must be found that satisfies the required match. It is informative to see what happens if we apply tail to an argument where an appropriate instantiation can not be found:

```
Cryptol> tail True
[error] at <interactive>:1:6--1:10:
Type mismatch:
Expected type: [1 + ?n`859]?a`860
Inferred type: Bit
where
?n`859 is type argument 'n' of 'tail' at <interactive>:1:1--1:5
?a`860 is type argument 'a' of 'tail' at <interactive>:1:1--1:5
```

Cryptol is telling us that it cannot match the types Bit and the sequence [1+n]a, causing a type error statically at compile time. (The funny notation of ?n`859 and ?a`860 are due to how type instantiations proceed under the hood. While they look funny at first, you soon get used to the notation.)

We should emphasize that Cryptol polymorphism uniformly applies to user-defined functions as well, as we shall see in section 1.13.

Exercise 1.45. Use the :t command to find the type of split. For each use case below, find out what the instantiations of its type variables are, and justify why the instantiation works. Can you find an instantiation in all these cases?

```
split`{3} [1..9]
split`{3} [1..12]
split`{3} [1..10] : [3][2][8]
split`{3} [1..10]
```

Is there any way to make the last example work by giving a type signature?

1.12.3 Predicates

In the previous section we have seen how polymorphism is a powerful tool in structuring programs. Cryptol takes the idea of polymorphism on sizes one step further by allowing predicates on sizes. To illustrate the notion, consider the type of the Cryptol primitive take:

```
Cryptol> :t take
take : {front, back, a} (fin front) => [front + back]a -> [front]a
```

The type of take says that it is parameterized over front and back, front must be a finite value, it takes a sequence front + back long, and returns a sequence front long.

The impact of this predicate shows up when we try to take more than what is available:

```
Cryptol> take`{10} [1..5]
[error] at <interactive>:1:11--1:17:
Adding 10 will always exceed 5
```

Cryptol is telling us that it is unable to satisfy this instantiation (since front is 10 and the sequence has 5 elements).

In general, type predicates exclusively describe *arithmetic constraints on type variables*. Cryptol does not have a general-purpose dependent type system, but a *size-polymorphic type system*. Often type variables' values are of finite size, indicated with the constraint fin a; otherwise no constraint is mentioned, and the variables' values are unbounded, possibly taking the value inf. Arithmetic relations are arbitrary relations over all type variables, such as $2*a+b \ge c$. We shall see more examples as we work through programs later on.

Exercise 1.46. Write a predicate that allows a word of size 128, 192, or 256, but nothing else.

Note: Type inference in the presence of arithmetic predicates is an undecidable problem [6]. This implies that there is no algorithm to decide whether a given type is inhabited, amongst other things. In practical terms, we might end up writing programs with arbitrarily complicated predicates (e.g., this "type contains all solutions to Fermat's last equation" or "this type contains all primes between two large numbers") without Cryptol being able to simplify them, or notice that there is no instantiation that will ever work. Here is a simple example of such a type:

 $\{k\}$ (2 >= k, k >= 5) => [k]

While a moment of pondering suffices to conclude that there is no such value in this particular case, there is no algorithm to decide this problem in general.

That being said, Cryptol's type inference and type checking algorithms are well-tuned to the use cases witnessed in the types necessary for cryptographic algorithms. Moreover, Cryptol uses a powerful SMT solver capable of reasoning about complex arithmetic theories within these algorithms.

1.12.4 Why typed?

There is a spectrum of type systems employed by programming languages, all the way from completely untyped to fancier dependently typed languages. There is no simple answer to the question, what type system is the best? It depends on the application domain. We have found that Cryptol's size-polymorphic type system is a good fit for programming problems that arise in the domain of cryptography. The bit-precise type system makes sure that we never pass an argument that is 32 bits wide in a buffer that can only fit 16. The motto is: *Well typed programs do not go wrong*.

In practical terms, this means that the type system catches most of the common mistakes that programmers tend to make. Size-polymorphism is a good fit for Cryptol, as it keeps track of the most important invariant in our application domain: making sure the sizes of data can be very precisely specified and the programs can be statically guaranteed to respect these sizes.

Opponents of type systems typically argue that the type system gets in the way.⁵ It is true that the type system will reject some programs that makes perfect sense. But what is more important is that the type system will reject programs that will indeed go wrong at run-time. And the price you pay to make sure your program type-checks is negligible, and the savings due to type checking can be enormous.

The crucial question is not whether we want type systems, but rather what type system is the best for a given particular application domain. We have found that the size-polymorphic type system of Cryptol provides the right balance for the domain of cryptography and bit-precise programming problems it has been designed for [10].

1.13 Defining functions

So far, we used Cryptol as a calculator: we typed in expressions and it gave us answers. This is great for experimenting, and exploring Cryptol itself. The next fundamental Cryptol idiom is the notion of a function. You have already used built-in functions +, take, etc. Of course, users can define their own functions as well. The recommended method is to define them in a file and load it, as in the next exercises.

Note: Reviewing the contents of Appendix E might help at this point. Especially the commands that will let you load files (:1 and : r) in Cryptol.

Exercise 1.47. Type the following definition into a file and save it. Then load it in Cryptol and experiment.

```
increment : [8] \rightarrow [8]
increment x = x+1
```

In particular, try the following invocations:

increment 3 increment 255 increment 912

Do you expect the last call to type-check?

Note: We do not have to parenthesize the argument to increment, as in increment(3). Function application is simply juxtaposition in Cryptol. However, you can write the parentheses if you want to, and you must use parentheses if you want to pass a negative argument, e.g. increment(-2) (recall exercise 1.37).

1.13.1 Definitions in the interpreter with let

As an alternative to creating and loading files, the Cryptol interpreter also supports simple definitions with let. Unlike file-based definitions, let-definitions are not persistent: They exist only until the same name is redefined or the interpreter exits with :q.

 $^{^{5}}$ Another complaint is that "strong types are for weak minds." We do not disagree here: Cryptol programmers want to use the type system so we do not have to think as hard about writing correct code as we would without strong types.

```
Cryptol> let r = {a = True, b = False}
Cryptol> r.a
True
```

Simple functions can be defined in the interpreter with let, with some restrictions: They must be entered on a single line, and they cannot have a separate type signature. If we want a function to have a more specific type than the inferred one, we must add type annotations to variables or other parts of the body of the definition.

Exercise 1.48. Enter the following definition into the Cryptol interpreter and check its type with :t.

let increment x = x+1

Modify the let-definition of increment so that it will have type [8] \rightarrow [8].

1.13.2 Local names: where clauses

You can create local bindings in a where clause, to increase readability and give names to common subexpressions.

Exercise 1.49. Define and experiment with the following function:

```
twoPlusXY : ([8], [8]) -> [8]
twoPlusXY (x, y) = 2 + xy
where xy = x * y
```

What is the signature of the function telling us?

Note: When calling twoPlusXY, you do need to parenthesize the arguments. But this is because you are passing it a tuple! The parentheses there are not for the application but rather in construction of the argument tuple. Cryptol does not automatically convert between tuples and curried application like in some other programming languages (e.g., one cannot pass a pair of type (a, b) to a function with type $a \rightarrow b \rightarrow c$).

Exercise 1.50. Comment out the type signature of twoPlusXY defined above, and let Cryptol infer its type. What is the inferred type? Why?

Exercise 1.51. Define a function with the following signature:

minMax4 : {a} (Cmp a) => [4]a -> (a, a)

such that the first element of the result is the minimum and the second element is the maximum of the given four elements. What happens when you try:

minMax4 [1 .. 4] minMax4 [1 .. 5]

Why do we need the (Cmp a) constraint?

Exercise 1.52. Define a function butLast that returns all the elements of a given non-empty sequence, except for the last. How can you make sure that butLast can never be called with an empty sequence? (Hint You might find the Cryptol primitive functions reverse and width useful.)

1.13.3 λ -expressions

One particular use case of a where clause is to introduce a helper function. If the function is simple enough, though, it may not be worth giving it a name. A λ -expression fits the bill in these cases, where you can introduce an unnamed function as an expression. The syntax differs from ordinary definitions in two minor details: instead of the name we use the backslash or "whack" character, '\', and the equals sign is replaced by an arrow '->'. (Since these functions do not have explicit names, they are sometimes referred to as "anonymous functions" as well. We prefer the term λ -expression, following the usual functional programming terminology [13].)

Below is an example of a λ -expression, allowing us to write functions inline:

```
Cryptol> f 8 where f x = x+1
9
Cryptol> (\x -> x+1) 8
9
```

 λ -expressions are especially handy when you need to write small functions at the command line while interacting with the interpreter.

1.13.4 Using zero in functions

The constant zero comes in very handy in Cryptol whenever we need a polymorphic shape that consists of all False bits. The following two exercises utilize zero to define the functions all and any which, later in this book, you will find are very helpful functions for producing boolean values from a sequence.

Exercise 1.53. Write a function all with the following signature:

all : {n, a} (fin n) => (a -> Bit) -> [n]a -> Bit

such that all f xs returns True if all the elements in the sequence xs yield True for the function f. (Hint Use a complemented zero.) You should see:

Cryptol> all eqTen [10, 10, 10, 10] where eqTen x = x == 10True Cryptol> all eqTen [10, 10, 10, 5] where eqTen x = x == 10False

(The where clause introduces a local definition that is in scope in the current expression. We have seen the details in section 1.13.) What is the value of all f [] for an arbitrary function f? Is this reasonable?

Exercise 1.54. Write a function **any** with the following signature:

any : {n, a} (fin n) => (a -> Bit) -> [n]a -> Bit

such that any f xs returns True if any the elements in the sequence xs yield True for the function f. What is the value of any f []? Is this reasonable?

1.14 Recursion and recurrences

Cryptol allows both recursive function and value definitions. A recursive function is one that calls itself in its definition. Cryptol also allows the more general form of mutual recursion, where multiple functions can call each other in a cyclic fashion.

Exercise 1.55. Define two functions isOdd and isEven that each take a finite arbitrary sized word and returns a Bit. The functions should be mutually recursive. What extra predicates do you have to put on the size?

Exercise 1.56. While defining isOdd and isEven mutually recursively demonstrates the concept of recursion, it is not the best way of coding these two functions in Cryptol. Can you implement them using a constant time operation? (Hint What is the least significant bit of an even number? How about an odd one?)

Recurrences While Cryptol does support recursion, the explicit recursive function style is typically discouraged: Arbitrary recursion is hard to compile down to hardware. A much better notion is that of *recurrences*. A recurrence is a way of cyclically defining a value, typically a stream. It turns out that most recursive functions can be written in a recurrence style as well, something that might first come as a surprise. In particular, most recursive definitions arise from recurrence equations in cryptographic and data flow style programs, and Cryptol's comprehensions can succinctly represent these computations.

Exercise 1.57. In this exercise, we will define a function to compute the maximum element in a given sequence of numbers. Define the following function and load it into Cryptol:

What is the type of maxSeq? Try out the following calls:

```
maxSeq []
maxSeq [1 .. 10]
maxSeq ([10, 9 .. 1] # [1 .. 10])
```

Patterns of recurrence The definition pattern for ys in the definition of maxSeq above is very common in Cryptol, and it is well worth understanding it clearly. The basic idea is to create a sequence of running results, for each prefix of the input.

Exercise 1.58. Define a variant of maxSeq (let us call it maxSeq') which returns the sequence ys, instead of its last element.

Running results It is very instructive to look at the results returned by maxSeq' that you have just defined in exercise 1.58:

```
Cryptol> maxSeq' []
[0]
Cryptol> maxSeq' [1 .. 10]
[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]
Cryptol> maxSeq' [10, 9 .. 1]
[0, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10]
Cryptol> maxSeq' [1, 3, 2, 4, 3, 5, 4, 7, 6, 8, 5]
[0, 1, 3, 3, 4, 4, 5, 5, 7, 7, 8, 8]
```

We clearly see the running results as they accumulate in ys. For the empty sequence, it only has [0] in it. For the monotonically increasing sequence $[1 \ . \ 10]$, the maximum value keeps changing at each point, as each new element of xs is larger than the previous running result. When we try the sequence that always goes down ($[10, 9 \ . \ 1]$), we find that the running maximum never changes after the first. The mixed input in the last call clearly demonstrates how the execution proceeds, the running maximum changing depending on the next element of xs and the running maximum so far. In the maxSeq function of exercise 1.57, we simply project out the last element of this sequence, obtaining the maximum of all elements in the given sequence.

Folds The pattern of recurrence employed in maxSeq is an instance of what is known as a *fold* [1]. Expressed in Cryptol terms, it looks as follows:

ys = [i] # [f (x, y) | x <- xs | y <- ys]

where \mathbf{xs} is some input sequence, \mathbf{i} is the result corresponding to the empty sequence, and \mathbf{f} is a transformer to compute the next element, using the previous result and the next input. This pattern can be viewed as generating a sequence of running values, accumulating them in \mathbf{ys} . To illustrate, if \mathbf{xs} is a sequence containing the elements $[x_1, x_2, x_3 ... x_n]$, then successive elements of \mathbf{ys} will be:

 $y_0 = i$ $y_1 = f(x_1, i)$ $y_2 = f(x_2, y_1)$ $y_3 = f(x_3, y_2)$... $y_n = f(x_n, y_{n-1})$

Note how each new element of ys is computed by using the previous element and the next element of the input. The value i provides the seed. Consequently, ys will have one more element than xs does.

While loops An important use case of the above pattern is when we are interested in the final value of the accumulating values, as in the definition of maxSeq. When used in this fashion, the execution is reminiscent of a simple while loop that you might be familiar with from other languages, such as C:

Note: If the while-loop analogy does not help you, feel free to ignore it. It is not essential. The moral of the story is this: if you feel like you need to write a while-loop in Cryptol to compute a value dependent upon the values in a datatype, you probably want to use a fold-like recurrence instead.

Exercise 1.59. Define a function that sums up a given sequence of elements. The type of the function should be:

 $sumAll : \{n, a\} (fin n, fin a) \Rightarrow [n][a] \rightarrow [a]$

(**Hint** Use the folding pattern to create a sequence containing the partial running sums. What is the last element of this sequence?) Try it out on the following examples:

sumAll []
sumAll [1]
sumAll [1, 2]
sumAll [1, 2, 3]
sumAll [1, 2, 3, 4]
sumAll [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
sumAll [1 .. 100]

Be mindful that if you do not specify the width of the result that you may get unexpected answers.

Exercise 1.60. Define a function elem with the following signature:

elem : {n, t} (fin n, Cmp t) => (t, [n]t) -> Bit

such that elem (x, xs) returns True if x appears in xs, and False otherwise.

Generalized folds The use of fold we have seen above is the simplest use case for recurrences in Cryptol. It is very common to see Cryptol programs employing some variant of this idea for most of their computations.

Exercise 1.61. Define the sequence of Fibonacci numbers fibs, so that fibs @n is the n^{th} Fibonacci number [18]. You can assume 32 bits is sufficient for representing these fast growing numbers. (Hint Use a recurrence where the seed consists of two elements.)

1.15 Stream equations

Most cryptographic algorithms are described in terms of operations on bit-streams. A common way of depicting operations on bit-streams is using a *stream equation*, as shown in Figure 1.1:

In this diagram the stream is seeded with four initial values (3F, E2, 65, CA). The subsequent elements (new) are appended to the stream, and are computed by xor-ing the current stream element with two additional elements extracted from further into the stream. The output from the stream is a sequence of values, known as *a*s.

The Cryptol code corresponding to this stream equation is:




Figure 1.1: Equation for producing a stream of as

Exercise 1.62. Write the Cryptol code corresponding to the stream equation in Figure 1.2:




Figure 1.2: Equation for producing a stream of as from an initial seed and an input stream.

1.16 Type synonyms

Types in Cryptol can become fairly complicated, especially in the presence of records. Even for simple types, meaningful names should be used for readability and documentation. Type synonyms allow users to give names to arbitrary types. In this sense, they are akin to typedef declarations in C [8]. However, Cryptol's type synonyms are significantly more powerful than C's typedefs, since they can be parameterized by other types, much like in Haskell [13].

Here are some simple type synonym definitions:

```
type Word8 = [8]
type CheckedWord = (Word8, Bit)
type Point a = {x : [a], y : [a]}
```

Type synonyms are either unparameterized (as in Word8 and CheckedWord, or parameterized with other types (as in Point). Synonyms may depend upon other synonyms, as in the CheckedWord example. Once the synonym is given, it acts as an additional name for the underlying type, making it much easier to read and maintain.

For instance, we can write the function that returns the x-coordinate of a point as follows:

xCoord : {a} Point a -> [a] xCoord p = p.x

Type synonyms look like distinct types when they are printed in the output of the :t and :browse commands. However, declaring a type synonym does not actually introduce a new *type*; it merely introduces a new *name* for an existing type. When Cryptol's type checker compares types, it expands all type synonyms first. So as far as Cryptol is concerned, Word8 and [8] are the *same* type. Cryptol preserves type synonyms in displayed types as a convenience to the user.

For example, consider the following declarations:

type Word8 = [8] type Word8' = [8]

```
type B = Word8
type A = B
type WordPair = (Word8, Word8')
type WordPair' = (Word8', Word8)
foo : Word8 -> Bit
foo x = True
bar : Word8' -> Bit
bar x = foo x
```

Within this type context, six different type *names* are declared, but there are not six distinct *types*. The first four (Word8, Word8', B, and A) are all interchangeable abbreviations for [8]. The last two are synonymous and interchangeable with the pair type ([8], [8]). Likewise, the function types of foo and bar are identical; thus bar can call foo.

Exercise 1.63. Define a type synonym for 3-dimensional points and write a function to determine if the point lies on any of the 3 axes.

Predefined type synonyms The following type synonyms are predefined in Cryptol:

```
type Bool = Bit
type Char = [8]
type String n = [n]Char
type Word n = [n]
```

For instance, a String n is simply a sequence of precisely n 8-bit words.

1.17 Type classes

Type classes are a way of describing behaviors shared by multiple types. As an example, consider the type of the function ==:

Cryptol> :t (==) (==) : {a} (Cmp a) => a -> a -> Bit

This type signature may be read as, "equality is an operator that takes two objects of any single type that can be compared and returns a Bit."

Cryptol defines a collection of basic type classes: Logic, Zero, Cmp, SignedCmp, Arith, and Literal. These appear in the type signature of operators and functions that require them. If a function you define calls, for example, +, on two arguments both of type a, the type constraints for a will include (Arith a).

- The Logic typeclass includes the binary logical operators &&, ||, and ^, as well as the unary operator ~. Cryptol types made of bits (but not those containing unbounded integers) are instances of class Logic.
- The Zero typeclass includes the special constant zero. The shifting operators << and >> are also in class Zero, because they can shift in zero values. All of the built-in types of Cryptol are instances of class Zero.
- The Cmp typeclass includes the binary relation operators <, >, <=, >=, and !=, as well as the binary functions min and max. Note that equality and other comparisons are bundled into a single typeclass. Function types are not in class Cmp and cannot be compared with ==, but Cryptol does provide a special pointwise comparison operator for functions, (===) : {a b} (Cmp b) => (a -> b) -> (a -> b) -> a -> Bit.
- The SignedCmp typeclass includes the binary relation operators <\$, >\$, <=\$, and >=\$. These are like <, >, <=, and >=, except that they interpret bitvectors as *signed* 2's complement numbers, whereas the Cmp operations use the *unsigned* ordering.

- The Arith typeclass includes the binary operators +, -, *, /, %, and ^^, as well as the unary operators lg2 and -, and the function fromInteger. Infinite sequence enumerations [x ...] and [x, y ...] are also defined for class Arith.
- The Literal typeclass includes numeric literals.

Exercise 1.64. Without including an explicit type declaration, define a function that Cryptol infers has the following type:

cmpArith : $\{a,b\}$ (Cmp a, Arith b) => a -> a -> b -> b

1.18 Type vs. value variables

Its powerful type system is one of the key features of Cryptol. We have encountered many aspects of types already. You may have noticed, in functions such as **split**, that when you call a function in Cryptol, there are two kinds of parameters you can pass: *value variables* and *type variables*.

Consider the split function that we previously examined in Exercise 1.45. Recall that split's type is:

split : {parts, each, a} (fin each) =>
 [parts * each]a -> [parts][each]a

When applying split, one typically specifies a concrete value for the formal parameter parts:

Cryptol> split`{parts=3} [1..12] [[1, 2, 3, 4], [5, 6, 7, 8], [9, 10, 11, 12]]

In this example, the term `{parts=3} passes 3 to the parts type variable argument, and the [1..12] is passing a sequence as the first (and only) value argument.

A *value variable* is the kind of variable you are used to from normal programming languages. This kind of variable represents a normal run-time value.

A type variable, on the other hand, allows you to express interesting (arithmetic) constraints on types. These variables express things like lengths of sequences or relationships between lengths of sequences. Type variable values are computed statically—they never change at runtime.⁶

1.18.1 Positional vs. named type arguments

Cryptol permits type variables to be passed either by name (as in `{parts=3} above), or by position (leaving out the name). For functions you define, the position is the order in which the type variables are declared in your function's type signature. If you are not sure what that is, you can always use the :t command to find out the position of type variables.

For example:

```
Cryptol> :t groupBy
groupBy : {each, parts, elem}
(fin each) => [parts * each]elem
-> [parts][each]elem
```

tells us that that parts is in the second position of groupBy's type signature, so the positional-style call equivalent to our example is:

```
Cryptol> groupBy`{_,3}[1..12]
```

Note the use of an underscore in order to pass 3 in the second position. Positional arguments are most often used when the type argument is the first argument and when the name of the argument does not add clarity. The groupBy`{_,3} is not as self-explanatory as groupBy`{parts=3}. On the other hand, our use of positional arguments to take in previous chapters is very clear, as in:

 $^{^{6}}$ In this way, they are similar (but more expressive than) templates in languages like C++ or Java. If you want to learn more about this area, look up the term "type-level naturals".

```
Cryptol> take`{3}[1..12] [1, 2, 3]
```

Tip: Cryptol programs that use named arguments are more maintainable and robust during program evolution. E.g., you can reorder parameters or refactor function definitions much more easily if invocations of those functions use named, rather than positional, arguments.

1.18.2 Type context vs. variable context

You have seen, in the discussion of type variables above, that Cryptol has two kinds of variables—type variables and value variables. Type variables normally show up in type signatures, and value variables normally show up in function definitions. Sometimes you may want to use a type variable in a context where value variables would normally be used. To do this, use the backtick character `.

The definition of the built-in width function is a good example of the use of backtick:

```
width : {bits, n, a} (fin n, fin bits, bits >= width n) => [n]a -> [bits] width _ = `n
```

Tip: Note there are some subtle things going on in the above definition of width. First, arithmetic constraints on types are position-independent; properties of formal parameters early in a signature can depend upon those late in a signature. Second, type constraints can refer to not only other functions, but recursively to the function that is being defined (either directly, or transitively).

Type constraints can get pretty crazy in practice, especially deep in the signature of crypto code subsystems. Our suggestion is that you should not chase the dragon's tail of feedback from the typechecker in attempting to massage your specification's types for verification. Instead, think carefully about the meaning and purpose of the concepts in your specification, introduce appropriate type synonyms, and ensure that the specification is clear and precise. Trust that the interpreter and the verifier will do the right thing.

The bounds in a finite sequence literal (such as $[1 \dots 10]$) in Cryptol are type-level values because the length of a sequence is part of its type. Only type-level values can appear in a finite sequence definition. You cannot write $[a \dots b]$ where either **a** or **b** are arguments to a function. On the other hand, an infinite sequence's type is fixed ([inf]a), so the initial value in an infinite sequence can be a runtime variable or a type variable, but type variables are escaped here using a `.

This is probably obvious, but there is no way to get a value variable to appear in a type context. Types must be known at "compile time," and (non-literal) values are not, so there is no way to use them in that way.

1.18.3 Inline argument type declarations

So far when we have defined a function, we have declared the type of its arguments and its return value in a separate type declaration. When you are initially writing code, you might not know exactly what a function's full type is (including the constraints), but you may know (and need to express) the types of the function's arguments. Cryptol's syntax for this should look familiar:

addBytes (x:[8]) (y:[8]) = x + y

This defines a function that takes two bytes as input, and returns their sum. Note that the use of parentheses () is mandatory.

Here is a more interesting example:

myWidth (x:[w]a) = `w

1.19 Type constraint synonyms

Sometimes programs have certain combinations of type constraints that appear over and over in many places. For convenience, Cryptol allows the programmer to declare named sets of type constraints that can be used in other function type signatures. Typically a named type constraint will have one or more type parameters. The syntax is very similar to a type synonym declaration:

type constraint myConstraint a b = (fin a, fin b, b >= width a)

Wherever a type constraint synonym is used, it is as if its definition is expanded in place. So the following two signatures would be equivalent:

```
width : {bits,len,elem} (fin len, fin bits, bits >= width len) =>
      [len] elem -> [bits]
width : {bits,len,elem} (myConstraint len bits) => [len] elem -> [bits]
```

1.20 Program structure with modules

When a cryptographic specification gets very large it can make sense to decompose its functions into modules. Doing this well encourages code reuse, so it's a generally good thing to do. Cryptol's module system is simple and easy to use. Here's a quick overview:

A module's name should be the same as the filename the module is defined in. For example, the utilities module should be defined in a file called utilities.cry. To specify that a file defines a module, its first non-commented line should be:

module utilities where

After that the variables and functions you define will be contained (in this example) in the *utilities* module. In the code where you want to use a module, you **import** it like this:

import utilities

Cryptol will look for the file utilities.cry in the current directory. Once you've imported a module, all of its variables and functions are available to use in your code.

If you're writing a module that has both *private* and *public* definitions, you can hide the ones that shouldn't be exported to modules that include it by using the **private** keyword, like this:

private internalDouble x = x + x
exportedDouble = x * 2

As you can tell, by default definitions are exported to including modules.

For a large project it can be convenient to place modules in a directory structure. In this case, the directory structure becomes part of the modules' names. For example, when placing SHA3.cry in the Hash directory and accessing it from HMAC.cry you would need to name the modules accordingly:

```
sha3 : {n} (fin n) => [n] -> [512]
sha3 = error "Stubbed, for demonstration only: sha3-512"
blocksize : {n} (fin n, n >= 10) => [n]
blocksize = 576
module Hash::SHA3 where
import Hash::SHA3
hmac : {keySize, msgSize} (fin keySize, fin msgSize) => [keySize] -> [msgSize] -> [512]
hmac k m = sha3 (ko # sha3 (ki # m))
where ko = zipWith (^) kFull (join (repeat 0x5c))
ki = zipWith (^) kFull (join (repeat 0x36))
kFull = if `keySize == blocksize
then take (k#zero)
else sha3 k
```

Finally, if you're importing a module that defines something with a name that you would like to define in your code, you can do a *qualified* import of that module like this:

import utilities as util

Now, instead of all the definitions being available in your module, they are qualified with the name you provided, in this case util. This means you will prefix those names with util:: when you call them, and the unqualified names are able to be defined in your own code.

```
import utilities as util
// let's say utililities.cry defines "all", and we want to use
// it in our refined definition of all:
all xs = util::all xs && (width xs) > 0
```

1.21 The road ahead

In this introductory chapter, we have seen essentially all of the language elements in Cryptol. The concepts go deeper, of course, but you now have enough knowledge to tackle large Cryptol programming tasks. As with any new language, the more exercises you do, the more you will feel comfortable with the concepts. In fact, we will take that point of view in the remainder of this document to walk you through a number of different examples (both small and large), employing the concepts we have seen thus far.

Chapter 2

Classic ciphers

Modern cryptography has come a long way. In his excellent book on cryptography, Singh traces it back to at least 5th century B.C., to the times of Herodotus and the ancient Greeks [14]. That's some 2500 years ago, and surely we do not use those methods anymore in modern day cryptography. However, the basic techniques are still relevant for appreciating the art of secret writing.

Shift ciphers construct the ciphertext from the plaintext by means of a predefined *shifting* operation, where the cipherkey of a particular shift algorithm defines the shift amount of the cipher. Transposition ciphers work by keeping the plaintext the same, but *rearrange* the order of the characters according to a certain rule. The cipherkey is essentially the description of how this transposition is done. Substitution ciphers generalize shifts and transpositions, allowing one to substitute arbitrary codes for plaintext elements. In this chapter, we will study several examples of these techniques and see how we can code them in Cryptol.

In general, ciphers boil down to pairs of functions *encrypt* and *decrypt* which "fit together" in the appropriate way. Arguing that a cryptographic function is *correct* is subtle.

Correctness of cryptography is determined by cryptanalyses by expert cryptographers. Each kind of cryptographic primitive (i.e., a hash, a symmetric cipher, an asymmetric cipher, etc.) has a set of expected properties, many of which can only be discovered and proven by hand through a lot of hard work. Thus, to check the correctness of a cryptographic function, a best practice for Cryptol use is to encode as many of these properties as one can in Cryptol itself and use Cryptol's validation and verification capabilities, discussed later in chapter 4. For example, the fundamental property of most ciphers is that encryption and decryption are inverses of each other.

To check the correctness of an *implementation I* of a cryptographic function C means that one must show that the implementation I behaves as the specification (C) stipulates. In the context of cryptography, the minimal conformance necessary is that I's output *exactly* conforms to the output characterized by C. But just because a cryptographic implementation is *functionally correct* does not mean it is *secure*. The subtleties of an implementation can leak all kinds of information that harm the security of the cryptography, including abstraction leaking of sensitive values, timing attacks, side-channel attacks, etc. These kinds of properties cannot currently be expressed or reasoned about in Cryptol.

Also, Cryptol does *not* give the user any feedback on the *strength* of a given (cryptographic) algorithm. While this is an interesting and useful feature, it is not part of Cryptol's current capabilities.

2.1 Caesar's cipher

Caesar's cipher (a.k.a. Caesar's shift) is one of the simplest ciphers. The letters in the plaintext are shifted by a fixed number of elements down the alphabet. For instance, if the shift is 2, A becomes C, B becomes D, and so on. Once we run out of letters, we circle back to A; so Y becomes A, and Z becomes B. Coding Caesar's cipher in Cryptol is quite straightforward (recall from section 1.16 that a String n is simply a sequence of n 8-bit words.):

```
caesar : {n} ([8], String n) -> String n
caesar (s, msg) = [ shift x | x <- msg ]
    where map = ['A' .. 'Z'] <<< s
        shift c = map @ (c - 'A')</pre>
```

In this definition, we simply get a message msg of type String n, and perform a shift operation on each one of the elements. The shift function is defined locally in the where clause. To compute the shift, we first find the distance of the letter from the character 'A' (via c - 'A'), and look it up in the mapping imposed by the shift. The map is simply the alphabet rotated to the left by the shift amount, s. Note how we use the enumeration ['A' ... 'Z'] to get all the letters in the alphabet.

Exercise 2.1. What is the map corresponding to a shift of 2? Use Cryptol's <<< to compute it. You can use the command :set ascii=on to print strings in ASCII, like this:

```
Cryptol> :set ascii=on
Cryptol> "Hello World"
"Hello World"
```

Why do we use a left-rotate, instead of a right-rotate?

Exercise 2.2. Use the above definition to encrypt the message "ATTACKATDAWN" by shifts 0, 3, 12, and 52. What happens when the shift is a multiple of 26? Why?

Exercise 2.3. Write a function dCaesar which will decrypt a ciphertext constructed by a Caesar's cipher. It should have the same signature as caesar. Try it on the examples from the previous exercise.

Exercise 2.4. Observe that the shift amount in a Caesar cipher is very limited: Any shift of d is equivalent to a shift by d % 26. (For instance shifting by 12 and 38 is the same thing, due to wrap around at 26.) Based on this observation, how strong do you think the Caesar's cipher is? Describe a simple attack that will recover the plaintext and automate it using Cryptol. Use your function to crack the ciphertext JHLZHYJPWOLYPZDLHR.

Exercise 2.5. One classic trick to strengthen ciphers is to use multiple keys. By repeatedly encrypting the plaintext multiple times we can hope that it will be more resistant to attacks. Do you think this scheme might make the Caesar cipher stronger?

Exercise 2.6. What happens if you pass **caesar** a plaintext that has non-uppercase letters in it? (Let's say a digit.) How can you fix this deficiency?

2.2 Vigenère cipher

The Vigenère cipher is a variation on the Caesar's cipher, where one uses multiple shift amounts according to a keyword [23]. Despite its simplicity, it earned the notorious description *le chiffre indèchiffrable* ("the indecipherable cipher" in French), as it was unbroken for a long period of time. It was very popular in the 16th century and onwards, only becoming routinely breakable by mid-19th century or so.

To illustrate the operation of the Vigenère cipher, let us consider the plaintext ATTACKATDAWN. The cryptographer picks a key, let's say CRYPTOL. We line up the plaintext and the key, repeating the key as much as as necessary, as in the top two lines of the following:

Plaintext :	ATTACKATDAWN
Cipherkey :	CRYPTOLCRYPT
Ciphertext:	CKRPVYLVUYLG

We then proceed pair by pair, shifting the plaintext character by the distance implied by the corresponding key character. The first pair is A-C. Since C is two positions away from A in the alphabet, we shift A by two positions, again obtaining C. The second pair T-R proceeds similarly: Since R is 17 positions away from A, we shift T down 17 positions, wrapping around Z, obtaining K. Proceeding in this fashion, we get the ciphertext CKRPVYLVUYLG. Note how each step of the process is a simple application of the Caesar's cipher.

Exercise 2.7. One component of the Vigenère cipher is the construction of the repeated key. Write a function cycle with the following signature:

cycle : {n, a} (fin n, n >= 1) => [n]a -> [inf]a

such that it returns the input sequence appended to itself repeatedly, turning it into an infinite sequence. Why do we need the predicate $n \ge 1$?

Exercise 2.8. Program the Vigenère cipher in Cryptol. It should have the signature:

vigenere : {n, m} (fin n, n >= 1) => (String n, String m) \rightarrow String m

where the first argument is the key and the second is the plaintext. Note how the signature ensures that the input string and the output string will have precisely the same number of characters, m. (Hint Use Caesar's cipher repeatedly.)

Exercise 2.9. Write the decryption routine for Vigenère. Then decode "XZETGSCGTYCMGEQGAGRDEQC" with the key "CRYPTOL".

Exercise 2.10. A known-plaintext attack is one where an attacker obtains a plaintext-ciphertext pair, without the key. If the attacker can figure out the key based on this pair then he can break all subsequent communication until the key is replaced. Describe how one can break the Vigenère cipher if a plaintext-ciphertext pair is known.

2.3 The atbash

The atbash cipher is a form of a shift cipher, where each letter is replaced by the letter that occupies its mirror image position in the alphabet. That is, A is replaced by Z, B by Y, etc. Needless to say the atbash is hardly worthy of cryptographic attention, as it is trivial to break.

Exercise 2.11. Program the atbash in Cryptol. What is the code for ATTACKATDAWN?

Exercise 2.12. Program the atbash decryption in Cryptol. Do you have to write any code at all? Break the code ZGYZHSRHHVOUWVXIBKGRMT.

2.4 Substitution ciphers

Substitution ciphers generalize all the ciphers we have seen so far, by allowing arbitrary substitutions to be made for individual "components" of the plaintext [22]. Note that these components need not be individual characters, but rather can be pairs or even triples of characters that appear consecutively in the text. (The multi-character approach is termed *polygraphic*.) Furthermore, there are variants utilizing multiple *polyalphabetic* mappings, as opposed to a single *monoalphabetic* mapping. We will focus on monoalphabetic simple substitutions, although the other variants are not fundamentally more difficult to implement.

Tip: For the exercises in this section we will use a running key repeatedly. To simplify your interaction with Cryptol, put the following definition in your program file:

```
substKey : String 26
substKey = "FJHWOTYRXMKBPIAZEVNULSGDCQ"
```

The intention is that substKey maps A to F, B to J, C to H, and so on.

Exercise 2.13. Implement substitution ciphers in Cryptol. Your function should have the signature:

subst : {n} (String 26, String n) \rightarrow String n

where the first element is the key (like substKey). What is the code for "SUBSTITUTIONSSAVETHEDAY" for the key substKey?

Decryption Programming decryption is more subtle. We can no longer use the simple selection operation (**Q**) on the key. Instead, we have to search for the character that maps to the given ciphertext character.

Exercise 2.14. Write a function invSubst with the following signature:

invSubst : (String 26, Char) -> Char

such that it returns the mapped plaintext character. For instance, with substKey, F should get you A, since the key maps A to F:

```
Cryptol> invSubst (substKey, 'F')
A
```

And similarly for other examples:

```
Cryptol> invSubst (substKey, 'J')
B
Cryptol> invSubst (substKey, 'C')
Y
Cryptol> invSubst (substKey, 'Q')
Z
```

One question is what happens if you search for a non-existing character. In this case you can just return 0, a non-valid ASCII character, which can be interpreted as *not found*.

Hint. Use a fold (see page 18).

Exercise 2.15. Using invSubst, write the decryption function dSubst. It should have the exact same signature as subst. Decrypt FUUFHKFUWFGI, using our running key.

Exercise 2.16. Try the substitution cipher with the key AAAABBBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGG. Does it still work? What is special about substKey?

2.5 The scytale

The scytale is one of the oldest cryptographic devices ever, dating back to at least the first century A.D. [21]. Ancient Greeks used a leather strip on which they would write their plaintext message. The strip would be wrapped around a rod of a certain diameter. Once the strip is completely wound, they would read the text row-by-row, essentially transposing the letters and constructing the ciphertext. Since the ciphertext is formed by a rearrangement of the plaintext, the scytale is an example of a transposition cipher. To decrypt, the ciphertext needs to be wrapped around a rod of the same diameter, reversing the process. The cipherkey is essentially the diameter of the rod used. Needless to say, the scytale does not provide a very strong encryption mechanism.

Abstracting away from the actual rod and the leather strip, encryption is essentially writing the message columnby-column in a matrix and reading it row-by-row. Let us illustrate with the message ATTACKATDAWN, where we can fit 4 characters per column:

ACD TKA TAW ATN

To encrypt, we read the message row-by-row, obtaining ACDTKATAWATN. If the message does not fit properly (i.e., if it has empty spaces in the last column), it can be padded by Z's or some other agreed upon character. To decrypt, we essentially reverse the process, by writing the ciphertext row-by-row and reading it column-by-column.

Notice how the scytale's operation is essentially matrix transposition. Therefore, implementing the scytale in Cryptol is merely an application of the transpose function. All we need to do is group the message by the correct number of elements using split. Below, we define the diameter to be the number of columns we have. The type synonym Message ensures we only deal with strings that properly fit the "rod," by using r number of rows:

```
scytale : {row, diameter} (fin row, fin diameter)
                => String (row * diameter) -> String (diameter * row)
scytale msg = join (transpose msg')
    where msg' : [diameter][row][8]
    msg' = split msg
```

The signature on msg' is revealing: We are taking a string that has diameter * row characters in it, and chopping it up so that it has row elements, each of which is a string that has diameter characters in it. Here is Cryptol in action, encrypting the message ATTACKATDAWN, with diameter set to 3:

```
Cryptol> :set ascii=on
Cryptol> scytale `{diameter=3} "ATTACKATDAWN"
"ACDTKATAWATN"
```

Decryption is essentially the same process, except we have to split so that we get diameter elements out:

Again, the type on msg' tells Cryptol that we now want diameter strings, each of which is row long. It is important to notice that the definitions of scytale and dScytale are precisely the same, except for the signature on msg'! When viewed as a matrix, the types precisely tell which transposition we want at each step. We have:

```
Cryptol> dScytale `{diameter=3} "ACDTKATAWATN"
"ATTACKATDAWN"
```

Exercise 2.17. What happens if you comment out the signature for msg' in the definition of scytale? Why?

Exercise 2.18. How would you attack a scytale encryption, if you don't know what the diameter is?

Chapter 3

The Enigma machine

The Enigma machine is probably the most famous of all cryptographic devices in history, due to the prominent role it played in WWII [16]. The first Enigma machines were available around 1920s, with various models in the market for commercial use. When Germans used the Enigma during WWII, they were using a particular model referred to as the *Wehrmacht Enigma*, a fairly advanced model available at the time.

The most important role of Enigma is in its role in the use of automated machines to aid in secret communication, or what is known as *mechanizing secrecy*. One has to understand that computers as we understand them today were not available when Enigma was in operation. Thus, the Enigma employed a combination of mechanical (keyboard, rotors, etc.) and electrical parts (lamps, wirings, etc.) to implement its functionality. However, our focus in this chapter will not be on the mechanical aspects of Enigma at all. For a highly readable account of that, we refer the reader to Singh's excellent book on cryptography [14]. Instead, we will model Enigma in Cryptol in an algorithmic sense, implementing Enigma's operations without any reference to the underlying mechanics. More precisely, we will model an Enigma machine that has a plugboard, three interchangeable scramblers, and a fixed reflector.

3.1 The plugboard

Enigma essentially implements a polyalphabetic substitution cipher (section 2.4), consisting of a number of rotating units that jumble up the alphabet. The first component is the so called plugboard (*Steckerbrett* in German). In the original Enigma, the plugboard provided a means of interchanging 6 pairs of letters. For instance, the plugboard could be set-up so that pressing the B key would actually engage the Q key, etc. We will slightly generalize and allow any number of pairings, as we are not limited by the availability of cables or actual space to put them in a box! Viewed in this sense, the plugboard is merely a permutation of the alphabet. In Cryptol, we can represent the plugboard combination by a string of 26 characters, corresponding to the pairings for each letter in the alphabet from A to Z:

```
type Permutation = String 26
type Plugboard = Permutation
```

For instance, the plugboard matching the pairs A-H, C-G, Q-X, T-V, U-Y, W-M, and O-L can be created as follows:

plugboard : Plugboard
plugboard = "HBGDEFCAIJKOWNLPXRSVYTMQUZ"

Note that if a letter is not paired through the plugboard, then it goes untouched, i.e., it is paired with itself.

Exercise 3.1. Use Cryptol to verify that the above plugboard definition indeed implements the pairings we wanted.

Note: In Enigma, the plugboard pairings are symmetric; if A maps to H, then H must map to A.

3.2 Scrambler rotors

The next component of the Enigma are the rotors that scramble the letters. Rotors (*walzen* in German) are essentially permutations, with one little twist: as their name implies, they rotate. This rotation ensures that the next character

the rotor will process will be encrypted using a different alphabet, thus giving Enigma its polyalphabetic nature.

The other trick employed by Enigma is how the rotations are done. In a typical setup, the rotors are arranged so that the first rotor rotates at every character, while the second rotates at every 26th, the third at every 676th (= 26 * 26), etc. In a sense, the rotors work like the odometer in your car, one full rotation of the first rotor triggers the second, whose one full rotation triggers the third, and so on. In fact, more advanced models of Enigma allowed for two notches per rotor, i.e., two distinct positions on the rotor that will allow the next rotor in sequence to rotate itself. We will allow ourselves to have any number of notches, by simply pairing each substituted letter with a bit value saying whether it has an associated notch:¹

```
type Rotor = [26](Char, Bit)
```

The function mkRotor will create a rotor for us from a given permutation of the letters and the notch locations:²

Let us create a couple of rotors with notches:

```
rotor1, rotor2, rotor3 : Rotor
rotor1 = mkRotor ("RJICAWVQZODLUPYFEHXSMTKNGB", "IO")
rotor2 = mkRotor ("DWYOLETKNVQPHURZJMSFIGXCBA", "B")
rotor3 = mkRotor ("FGKMAJWUOVNRYIZETDPSHBLCQX", "CK")
```

For instance, rotor1 maps A to R, B to J, ..., and Z to B in its initial position. It will engage its notch if one of the permuted letters I or O appear in its first position.

Exercise 3.2. Write out the encrypted letters for the sequence of 5 C's for rotor1, assuming it rotates in each step. At what points does it engage its own notch to signal the next rotor to rotate?

3.3 Connecting the rotors: notches in action

The original Enigma had three interchangeable rotors. The operator chose the order they were placed in the machine. In our model, we will allow for an arbitrary number of rotors. The tricky part of connecting the rotors is ensuring that the rotations of each are done properly.

Let us start with a simpler problem. If we are given a rotor and a particular letter to encrypt, how can we compute the output letter and the new rotor position? First of all, we will need to know if the rotor should rotate itself, that is if the notch between this rotor and the previous one was activated. Also, we need to find out if the act of rotation in this rotor is going to cause the next rotor to rotate. We will model this action using the Cryptol function scramble:

scramble : (Bit, Char, Rotor) -> (Bit, Char, Rotor)

The function scramble takes a triple (rotate, c, rotor):

- rotate: if True, this rotor will rotate before encryption. Indicates that the notch between this rotor and the previous one was engaged,
- c: the character to encrypt, and
- rotor: the current state of the rotor.

Similarly, the output will also be a triple:

[•] notch: True if the notch on this rotor engages, i.e., if the next rotor should rotate itself,

¹The type definition for **Char** was given in Example 2.4-2.14.

²The function elem was defined in exercise 1.60.

- c': the result of encrypting (substituting) for c with the current state of the rotor.
- rotor': the new state of the rotor. If no rotation was done this will be the same as rotor. Otherwise it will be the new substitution map obtained by rotating the old one to the left by one.

Coding scramble is straightforward:

```
scramble (rotate, c, rotor) = (notch, c', rotor')
where
  (c', _) = rotor @ (c - 'A')
  (_, notch) = rotor @ 0
  rotor' = if rotate then rotor <<< 1 else rotor</pre>
```

To determine c', we use the substitution map to find out what this rotor maps the given character to, with respect to its current state. Note how Cryptol's pattern matching notation helps with extraction of c', as we only need the character, not whether there is a notch at that location. (The underscore character use, '_', means that we do not need the value at the position, and hence we do not give it an explicit name.) To determine if we have our notch engaged, all we need to do is to look at the first elements notch value, using Cryptol's selection operator (@ 0), and we ignore the permutation value there this time, again using pattern matching. Finally, to determine rotor' we merely rotate left by 1 if the rotate signal was received. Otherwise, we leave the rotor unchanged.

Exercise 3.3. Redo exercise 3.2, this time using Cryptol and the scramble function.

Note: The actual mechanics of the Enigma machine were slightly more complicated: due to the keyboard mechanism and the way notches were mechanically built, the first rotor was actually rotating before the encryption took place. Also, the middle rotor could double-step if it engages its notch right after the third rotor does [2].

We will take the simpler view here and assume that each key press causes an encryption to take place, *after* which the rotors do their rotation, getting ready for the next input. The mechanical details, while historically important, are not essential for our modeling purposes here. Also, the original Enigma had *rings*, a relatively insignificant part of the whole machine, that we ignore here.

Sequencing the rotors Now that we have the rotors modeled, the next task is to figure out how to connect them in a sequence. As we mentioned, Enigma had 3 rotors originally (later versions allowing 4). The three rotors each had a single notch (later versions allowing double notches). Our model allows for arbitrary number of rotors and arbitrary number of notches on each. The question we now tackle is the following: Given a sequence of rotors, how do we run them one after the other? We are looking for a function with the following signature:

joinRotors : {n} (fin n) => ([n]Rotor, Char) -> ([n]Rotor, Char)

That is, we receive **n** rotors and the character to be encrypted, and return the updated rotors (accounting for their rotations) and the final character. The implementation is an instance of the fold pattern (section 1.14), using the **scramble** function we have just defined:

The workhorse in joinRotors is the definition of ncrs, a mnemonic for *notches-chars-rotors*. The idea is fairly simple. We simply iterate over all the given rotors (r <- rotors), and scramble the current character char, using the rotor r

and the notch value notch. These values come from ncrs itself, using the fold pattern encoded by the comprehension. The only question is what is the seed value for this fold?

The seed used in ncrs is (True, inputChar, initRotor). The first component is True, indicating that the very first rotor should always rotate itself at every step. The second element is inputChar, which is the input to the whole sequence of rotors. The only mysterious element is the last one, which we have specified as initRotor. This rotor is defined so that it simply maps the letters to themselves with no notches on it, by a call to the mkRotor function we have previously defined. This rotor is merely a place holder to kick off the computation of ncrs, it acts as the identity element in a sequence of rotors. To compute rotors', we merely project the third component of ncrs, being careful about skipping the first element using tail. Finally, outputChar is merely the output coming out of the final rotor, extracted using !0. Note how we use Cryptol's pattern matching to get the second component out of the triple in the last line.

Exercise 3.4. Is the action of initRotor ever used in the definition of joinRotors?

Exercise 3.5. What is the final character returned by the expression:

joinRotors ([rotor1 rotor2 rotor3], 'F')

Use paper and pencil to figure out the answer by tracing the execution of joinRotors before running it in Cryptol!

3.4 The reflector

The final piece of the Enigma machine is the reflector (*umkehrwalze* in German). The reflector is another substitution map. Unlike the rotors, however, the reflector did not rotate. Its main function was ensuring that the process of encryption was reversible: The reflector did one final jumbling of the letters and then sent the signal back through the rotors in the *reverse* order, thus completing the loop and allowing the signal to reach back to the lamps that would light up. For our purposes, it suffices to model it just like any other permutation:

type Reflector = Permutation

Here is one example:

```
reflector : Reflector
reflector = "FEIPBATSCYVUWZQDOXHGLKMRJN"
```

Like the plugboard, the reflector is symmetric: If it maps B to E, it should map E to B, as in the above example. Furthermore, the Enigma reflectors were designed so that they never mapped any character to themselves, which is true for the above permutation as well. Interestingly, this idea of a non-identity reflector (i.e., never mapping any character to itself) turned out to be a weakness in the design, which the allies exploited in breaking the Enigma during WWII [14].

Exercise 3.6. Write a function checkReflector with the signature:

```
checkReflector : Reflector -> Bit
```

such that it returns True if a given reflector is good (i.e., symmetric and non-self mapping) and False otherwise. Check that our definition of reflector above is a good one. (Hint Use the all function you have defined in exercise 1.53.)

3.5 Putting the pieces together

We now have all the components of the Enigma: the plugboard, rotors, and the reflector. The final task is to implement the full loop. The Enigma ran all the rotors in sequence, then passed the signal through the reflector, and ran the rotors in reverse one more time before delivering the signal to the lamps.

Before proceeding, we will define the following two helper functions:

```
substFwd, substBwd : (Permutation, Char) -> Char
substFwd (perm, c) = perm @ (c - 'A')
substBwd (perm, c) = invSubst (perm, c)
```

(You have defined the invSubst function in exercise 2.14.) The substFwd function simply returns the character that the given permutation, whether from the plugboard, a rotor, or the reflector. Conversely, substBwd returns the character that the given permutation maps *from*, i.e., the character that will be mapped to c using the permutation.

Exercise 3.7. Using Cryptol, verify that substFwd and substBwd return the same elements for each letter in the alphabet for rotor1.

Exercise 3.8. Show that substFwd and substBwd are exactly the same operations for the reflector. Why?

The route back One crucial part of the Enigma is the running of the rotors in reverse after the reflector. Note that this operation ignores the notches, i.e., the rotors do not turn while the signal is passing the second time through the rotors. (In a sense, the rotations happen after the signal completes its full loop, getting to the reflector and back.) Consequently, it is much easer to code as well (compare this code to joinRotors, defined in section 3.3):

Note that we explicitly reverse the rotors in the definition of cs. (The definition of cs is another typical example of a fold. See page 18.)

Given all this machinery, coding the entire Enigma loop is fairly straightforward:

```
//enigmaLoop : {n} (fin n) => (Plugboard, [n]Rotor, Reflector, Char)
// -> ([n]Rotor, Char)
enigmaLoop (pboard, rotors, refl, c0) = (rotors', c5)
where
    // 1. First run through the plugboard
    c1 = substFwd (pboard, c0)
    // 2. Now run all the rotors forward
    (rotors', c2) = joinRotors (rotors, c1)
    // 3. Pass through the reflector
    c3 = substFwd (refl, c2)
    // 4. Run the rotors backward
    c4 = backSignal(rotors, c3)
    // 5. Finally, back through the plugboard
    c5 = substBwd (pboard, c4)
```

3.6 The state of the machine

We are almost ready to construct our own Enigma machine in Cryptol. Before doing so, we will take a moment to represent the state of the Enigma machine as a Cryptol record, which will simplify our final construction. At any stage, the state of an Enigma machine is given by the status of its rotors. We will use the following record to represent this state, for an Enigma machine containing **n** rotors:

```
type Enigma n = { plugboard : Plugboard,
        rotors : [n]Rotor,
        reflector : Reflector
    }
```

To initialize an Enigma machine, the operator provides the plugboard settings, rotors, the reflector. Furthermore, the operator also gives the initial positions for the rotors. Rotors can be initially rotated to any position before put together into the machine. We can capture this operation with the function mkEnigma:

Note how we rotate each given rotor to the left by the amount given by its starting position.

Given this definition, let us construct an Enigma machine out of the components we have created so far, using the starting positions GCR for the rotors respectively:

We now have an operational Enigma machine coded up in Cryptol!

3.7 Encryption and decryption

Equipped with all the machinery we now have, coding Enigma encryption is fairly straightforward:

```
enigma : {n, m} (fin n, fin m) => (Enigma n, String m) -> String m
enigma (m, pt) = tail [ c | (_, c) <- rcs ]
where rcs = [(m.rotors, '*')] #
        [ enigmaLoop (m.plugboard, r, m.reflector, c)
        | c <- pt
        | (r, _) <- rcs
    ]</pre>
```

The function enigma takes a machine with n rotors and a plaintext of m characters, returning a ciphertext of m characters back. It is yet another application of the fold pattern, where we start with the initial set of rotors and the placeholder character * (which could be anything) to seed the fold. Note how the change in rotors is reflected in each iteration of the fold, through the enigmaLoop function. At the end, we simply drop the rotors from rcs, and take the tail to skip over the seed character *.

Here is our Enigma in operation:

```
Cryptol> :set ascii=on
Cryptol> enigma (modelEnigma, "ENIGMAWASAREALLYCOOLMACHINE")
"UPEKTBSDROBVTUJGNCEHHGBXGTF"
```

Decryption As we mentioned before, Enigma was a self-decrypting machine, that is, encryption and decryption are precisely the same operations. Thus, we can define:

```
dEnigma : {n, m} (fin n, fin m) => (Enigma n, String m) -> String m dEnigma = enigma
```

And decrypt our above message back:

```
Cryptol> dEnigma (modelEnigma, "UPEKTBSDROBVTUJGNCEHHGBXGTF")
"ENIGMAWASAREALLYCOOLMACHINE"
```

We have successfully performed our first Enigma encryption!

Exercise 3.9. Different models of Enigma came with different sets of rotors. You can find various rotor configurations on the web [17]. Create models of these rotors in Cryptol, and run sample encryptions through them.

Exercise 3.10. As we have mentioned before, Enigma implements a polyalphabetic substitution cipher, where the same letter gets mapped to different letters during encryption. The period of a cipher is the number of characters before the encryption repeats itself, mapping the same sequence of letters in the plaintext to the to the same sequence of letters in the ciphertext. What is the period of an Enigma machine with n rotors?

Exercise 3.11. Construct a string of the form CRYPTOLXXX...XCRYPTOL, where ...'s are filled with enough number of X's such that encrypting it with our modelEnigma machine will map the instances of "CRYPTOL" to the same ciphertext. How many X's do you need? What is the corresponding ciphertext for "CRYPTOL" in this encryption?

The code You can see all the Cryptol code for our Enigma simulator in Appendix C.

Chapter 4

High-assurance programming

Writing correct software is the holy grail of programming. Bugs inevitably exist, however, even in thoroughly tested projects. One fundamental issue is the lack of support in typical programming languages to let the programmer *state* what it means to be correct, let alone formally establish any notion of correctness. To address this shortcoming, Cryptol advocates the high-assurance programming approach: programmers explicitly state correctness properties along with their code, which are explicitly checked by the Cryptol toolset. Properties are not comments or mere annotations, so there is no concern that they will become obsolete as your code evolves. The goal of this chapter is to introduce you to these tools, and to the notion of high-assurance programming in Cryptol via examples.

4.1 Writing properties

Consider the equality:

$$x^{2} - y^{2} = (x - y) * (x + y)$$

Let us write two Cryptol functions that capture both sides of this equation:

sqDiff1 (x, y) = $x^2 - y^2$ sqDiff2 (x, y) = (x-y) * (x+y)

We would like to express the property that sqDiff1 and sqDiff2 are precisely the same functions: Given the same x and y, they should return exactly the same answer. We can express this property in Cryptol using a properties declaration:

```
sqDiffsCorrect : ([8], [8]) -> Bit
property sqDiffsCorrect (x, y) = sqDiff1 (x, y) == sqDiff2 (x, y)
```

The above declaration reads as follows: sqDiffsCorrect is a property stating that for all x and y, the expression sqDiff1 (x, y) == sqDiff2 (x, y) evaluates to True. Furthermore, the type signature restricts the type of the property to apply to only 8-bit values. As usual, the type signature is optional. If not given, Cryptol will infer one for you. Finally, note that the same property can also be expressed (more concisely) using the === operator:

sqDiffsCorrect : ([8], [8]) -> Bit
property sqDiffsCorrect = sqDiff1 === sqDiff2

Note: It is important to emphasize that the mathematical equality above and the Cryptol property are *not* stating precisely the same property. Remember that all Cryptol arithmetic is modular, while the mathematical equation is over arbitrary numbers, including negative, real, or even complex numbers. The takeaway of this discussion is that we are only using this example for illustration purposes: Cryptol properties relate to Cryptol programs, and should not be used for expressing mathematical theorems (unless, of course, you are stating group theory theorems or theorems in an appropriate algebra)! In particular, sqDiffsCorrect is a property about the Cryptol functions sqDiff1 and sqDiff2, not about the mathematical equation that inspired it.

Exercise 4.1. Write a property revRev stating that reverse of a reverse returns a sequence unchanged.

Exercise 4.2. Write a property appAssoc stating that append is an associative operator.

Exercise 4.3. Write a property revApp stating that appending two sequences and reversing the result is the same as reversing the sequences and appending them in the reverse order, as illustrated in the following expression:

reverse ("HELLO" # "WORLD") == reverse "WORLD" # reverse "HELLO"

Exercise 4.4. Write a property 1shMul stating that shifting left by k is the same as multiplying by 2^k .

Note: A property declaration simply introduces a property about your program, which may or may *not* actually hold. It is an assertion about your program, without any claim of correctness. In particular, you can clearly write properties that simply do not hold:

property bogus x = x != x

It is important to distinguish between *stating* a property and actually *proving* it. So far, our focus is purely on specification. We will focus on actual proofs in section 4.2.

4.1.1 **Property–function correspondence**

In Cryptol, properties can be used just like ordinary definitions:

```
Cryptol> sqDiffsCorrect (3, 5)
True
Cryptol> :t sqDiffsCorrect
sqDiffsCorrect : ([8],[8]) -> Bit
```

That is, a property over (x, y) is the same as a function over the tuple (x, y). We call this the property-function correspondence. Property declarations, aside from the slightly different syntax, are *precisely* the same as Cryptol functions whose return type is **Bit**. There is no separate language for writing or working with properties. We simply use the full Cryptol language write both the programs and the properties that they satisfy.

4.1.2 Capturing test vectors

One nice application of Cryptol properties is in capturing test vectors:

property inctest = [f x == y | (x, y) <- testVector] == ~zero
where f x = x + 1
testVector = [(3, 4), (4, 5), (12, 13), (78, 79)]</pre>

Notice that the property inctest does not have any parameters (no *forall* section), and thus acts as a simple Bit value that will be true precisely when the given test case succeeds.

4.1.3 Polymorphic properties

Just like functions, Cryptol properties can be polymorphic as well. If you want to write a property for a polymorphic function, for instance, your properties will naturally be polymorphic too. Here is a simple trivial example:

property multShift x = x * 2 == x << 1

If we ask Cryptol the type of multShift, we get:

```
Cryptol> :t multShift
multShift : {n} (n >= 2, fin n) => [n] -> Bit
```

That is, it is a property about all words of size at least two. The question is whether this property does indeed hold? In the particular case of multShift that is indeed the case, below are some examples using the property-function correspondence:

```
Cryptol> multShift (5 : [8])
True
Cryptol> multShift (5 : [10])
True
Cryptol> multShift (5 : [16])
True
```

However, this is *not* always the case for all polymorphic Cryptol properties! The following example demonstrates:

property flipNeverIdentity x = x != ~x

The property flipNeverIdentity states that complementing the bits of a value will always result in a different value: a property we might expect to hold intuitively. Here is the type of flipNeverIdentity:

```
Cryptol> :t flipNeverIdentity
flipNeverIdentity : {a} (Cmp a, Logic a) => a -> Bit
```

So, the only requirement on flipNeverIdentity is that it receives some type that supports comparisons and logical operations. Let us try some examples:

```
Cryptol> flipNeverIdentity True
True
Cryptol> flipNeverIdentity 3
True
Cryptol> flipNeverIdentity [1, 2]
True
```

However:

```
Cryptol> flipNeverIdentity (0 : [0])
False
```

That is, when given a 0-bit word, the complement will in fact do nothing and return its argument unchanged! Therefore, the property flipNeverIdentity is not valid, since it holds at certain monomorphic types, but not at all types.

Exercise 4.5. Demonstrate another monomorphic type where flipNeverIdentity does not hold.

Note: The moral of this discussion is that the notion of polymorphic validity (i.e., that a given polymorphic property will either hold at all of its monomorphic instances or none) does not hold in Cryptol. A polymorphic property can be valid at some, all, or no instances of it.

Exercise 4.6. The previous exercise might lead you to think that it is the 0-bit word type ([0]) that is at the root of the polymorphic validity issue. This is not true. Consider the following example:

property widthPoly x = (w == 15) || (w == 531)
where w = width x

What is the type of widthPoly? At what instances does it hold? Write a property evenWidth that holds only at even-width word instances.

4.2 Establishing correctness

Our focus so far has been using Cryptol to *state* properties of our programs, without actually trying to prove them correct. This separation of concerns is essential for a pragmatic development approach. Properties act as contracts that programmers state along with their code, which can be separately checked by the toolset [6]. This approach allows you to state the properties you want, and then work on your code until the properties are indeed satisfied. Furthermore, properties stay with your program forever, so they can be checked at a later time to ensure changes (improvements/additions/optimizations etc.) did not violate the stated properties.

4.2.1 Formal proofs

Recall our very first property, sqDiffsCorrect, from section 4.1. We will now use Cryptol to actually prove it automatically. To prove sqDiffsCorrect, use the command :prove:

```
Cryptol> :prove sqDiffsCorrect Q.E.D.
```

Note that the above might take a while to complete, as a formal proof is being produced behind the scenes. Once Cryptol formally establishes the property holds, it prints "Q.E.D." to tell the user the proof is complete.

Note: Cryptol uses off-the-shelf SAT and SMT solvers to perform these formal proofs [6]. By default, Cryptol will use Microsoft Research's Z3 SMT solver under the hood, but it can be configured to use other SAT/SMT solvers as well, such as SRI's Yices [24], or CVC4 [15].¹ Note that the :prove command is a push-button tool: once the proof starts there is no user involvement. Of course, the external tool used may not be able to complete all the proofs in a reasonable amount of time.

4.2.2 Counterexamples

Of course, properties can very well be invalid, due to bugs in code or the specifications themselves. In these cases, Cryptol will always print a counterexample value demonstrating why the property does not hold. Here is an example demonstrating what happens when things go wrong:

```
failure : [8] \rightarrow Bit
property failure x = x == x+1
```

We have:

```
Cryptol> :prove failure
failure 0 = False
```

Cryptol tells us that the property is falsifiable, and then demonstrates a particular value (0 in this case) that it fails at. These counterexamples are extremely valuable for debugging purposes.

If you try to prove an invalid property that encodes a test vector (subsection 4.1.2), then you will get a mere indication that you have a contradiction, since there are no universally quantified variables to instantiate to show you a counterexample. If the expression evaluates to **True**, then it will be a trivial proof, as expected:

```
Cryptol> :prove False

False = False

Cryptol> :prove True

Q.E.D.

Cryptol> :prove 2 == 3

(2 == 3) = False

Cryptol> :prove reverse [1, 2] == [1, 2]

(reverse [1, 2] == [1,2]) = False

Cryptol> :prove 1+1 == 0

Q.E.D.
```

The very last example demonstrates modular arithmetic in operation, as usual.

4.2.3 Dealing with polymorphism

As we mentioned before, Cryptol properties can be polymorphic. As we explored before, we cannot directly prove polymorphic properties as they may hold for certain monomorphic instances while not for others. In this cases, we must tell Cryptol what particular monomorphic instance of the property we would like it to prove. Let us demonstrate this with the multShift property from subsection 4.1.3:

 $^{^{1}}$ To do this, first install the package(s) from the URLs provided in the bibliography. Once a prover has been installed you can activate it with, for example, :set prover=cvc4.

```
Cryptol> :prove multShift
Not a monomorphic type:
{n} (n >= 2, fin n) => [n] -> Bit
```

Cryptol is telling us that it cannot prove a polymorphic property directly. We can, however, give a type annotation to specialize it, and then prove it at a desired instance:

```
Cryptol> :prove multShift : [16] -> Bit Q.E.D.
```

In fact, you can use this very same technique to pass any bit-valued function to the :prove command:

Cryptol> :prove dbl where dbl x = (x:[8]) * 2 == x+x Q.E.D.

Of course, a λ -expression (subsection 1.13.3) would work just as well too:

Cryptol> :prove $x \rightarrow (x:[8]) * 2 == x+x$ Q.E.D.

Exercise 4.7. Prove the property revRev you wrote in exercise 4.1. Try different monomorphic instantiations.

Exercise 4.8. Prove the property appAssoc you wrote in exercise 4.2, at several different monomorphic instances.

Exercise 4.9. Prove the property revApp you wrote in exercise 4.3, at several different monomorphic instances.

Exercise 4.10. Prove the property lshMul you wrote in exercise 4.4, at several different monomorphic instances.

Exercise 4.11. Use the :prove command to prove and demonstrate counterexamples for the property widthPoly defined in exercise 4.6, using appropriate monomorphic instances.

4.2.4 Conditional proofs

It is often the case that we are interested in a property that only holds under certain conditions. For instance, in exercise 1.36 we have explored the relationship between Cryptol's division, multiplication, and modulus operators, where we asserted the following property:

$$x = (x/y) \times y + (x \% y)$$

Obviously, this relationship holds only when $y \neq 0$. The idea behind a conditional Cryptol property is that we would like to capture these side-conditions formally in our specifications.

We can use ordinary if-then-else expressions in Cryptol to write conditional properties. If the condition is invalid, we simply return True, indicating that we are not interested in that particular case. Depending on how natural it is to express the side-condition or its negation, you can use one of the following two patterns:

if	side-condition-holds	if	side-condition-fails
then	property-expression	then	True
else	True	else	property-expression

Alternatively, Cryptol provides a few logical connectives (==>, \backslash /, and / \backslash) that are useful for writing conditional properties. Each is defined in terms of if-then-else as follows:

a ==> b = if a then b else True a \backslash b = if a then True else b a \backslash b = if a then b else False

Exercise 4.12. Express the relationship between division, multiplication, and modulus using a conditional Cryptol property. Prove the property for various monomorphic instances.

Recognizing messages Our work on classic ciphers (chapter 2) and the enigma (chapter 3) involved working with messages that contained the letters 'A' ... 'Z' only. When writing properties about these ciphers it will be handy to have a recognizer for such messages, as we explore in the next exercise.

Exercise 4.13. Write a function:

validMessage : {n} (fin n) => String n -> Bit

that returns True exactly when the input only consists of the letters 'A' through 'Z'. (Hint Use the functions all defined in exercise 1.53, and elem defined in exercise 1.60.)

Exercise 4.14. Recall the pair of functions caesar and dCaesar from section 2.1. Write a property, named caesarCorrect, stating that caesar and dCaesar are inverses of each other for all d (shift amount) and msg (message). Is your property valid? What extra condition do you need to assert on msg for your property to hold? Prove the property for all messages of length 10.

Exercise 4.15. Write and prove a property for the modelEnigma machine (page 38), relating the enigma and dEnigma functions from section 3.7.

This may take a long time to prove, depending on the speed of your machine, and the prover you choose.

4.3 Automated random testing

Cryptol's :prove command constructs rigorous formal proofs using push-button tools.² The underlying technique used by Cryptol (SAT- and SMT-based equivalence checking) is complete; i.e., it will always either prove the property or find a counterexample. In the worst case, however, the proof process might take infeasible amounts of resources, potentially running out of memory or taking longer than the amount of time you are willing to wait.

What is needed for daily development tasks is a mechanism to gain some confidence on the correctness of the properties without paying the price of formally proving them. This is the goal of Cryptol's :check command, inspired by Haskell's quick-check library [3]. Instead of trying to formally prove your property, :check tests it at random values to give you quick feedback. This approach is very suitable for rapid development. By using automated testing you get frequent and quick updates from Cryptol regarding the status of your properties, as you work through your code. If you introduce a bug, it is likely (although not guaranteed) that the :check command will alert you right away. Once you are satisfied with your code, you can use the :prove command to conduct the formal proofs, potentially leaving them running overnight.

The syntax of the :check command is precisely the same as the :prove command. By default, it will run your property over 100 randomly generated test cases.

Exercise 4.16. Use the :check command to test the property caesarCorrect you have defined in exercise 4.13, for messages of length 10. Use the command :set tests=1000 to change the number of test cases to 1,000. Observe the test coverage statistics reported by Cryptol. How is the total number of cases computed?

Exercise 4.17. If the property is *small* in size, :check might as well prove/disprove it. Try the following commands:

:check True :check False :check \x -> x==(x:[8])

Exercise 4.18. Write a bogus property that will be very easy to disprove using :prove, while :check will have a hard time obtaining the counterexample. The moral of this exercise is that you should try :prove early in your development and not get too comfortable with the results of :check!

Exhaustive testing The :exhaust command is a variant of :check that always uses exhaustive testing: It tests the property on every possible combination of inputs. The number of tests run by :check is limited to the value of :set

 $^{^{2}}$ While some of the solvers that Cryptol uses are capable of *emitting* proofs, such functionality is not exposed as a Cryptol feature.

tests, but :exhaust may run a much larger number. If the argument types are not sufficiently small, :exhaust may run for longer than you are willing to wait!

Exercise 4.19. Try the following command to check a conjecture about arithmetic.

:check $(x:[16]) \rightarrow (x + 6) / 3 == x / 3 + 2$

What is the result? Does the response give you much confidence in the property? Now try checking the same predicate using :exhaust. Does the property hold in general?

Bulk operations If you use :check and :prove commands without any arguments, Cryptol will check and prove all the properties defined in your program. This is a simple means of exercising all your properties automatically.

4.4 Checking satisfiability

Closely related to proving properties is the notion of checking satisfiability. In satisfiability checking, we would like to find arguments to a bit-valued function such that it will evaluate to **True**, i.e., it will be satisfied.

One way to think about satisfiability checking is *intelligently* searching for a solution. Here is a simple example. Let us assume we would like to compute the modular square root of 9 as an 8-bit value. The obvious solution is 3, of course, but we are wondering if there are other solutions to the equation $x^2 \equiv 9 \pmod{2^8}$. To get started, let us first define a function that will return **True** if its argument is a square root of 9:

isSqrtOf9 : [8] -> Bit
isSqrtOf9 x = x*x == 9

Any square root of 9 will make the function isSqrtOf9 return True, i.e., it will *satisfy* it. Thus, we can use Cryptol's satisfiability checker to find those values of x automatically:

```
Cryptol> :sat isSqrtOf9
isSqrtOf9 3 = True
```

Not surprisingly, Cryptol told us that 3 is one such value. We can search for other solutions by explicitly disallowing 3:

```
Cryptol> :sat \x -> isSqrtOf9 x && ~(elem x [3])
\x -> isSqrtOf9 x && ~(elem (x, [3])) 131 = True
```

Note the use of the λ -expression to indicate the new constraint. (Of course, we could have defined another function isSqrtOf9ButNot3 for the same effect, but the λ -expression is really handy in this case.) We have used the function elem you have defined in exercise 1.60 to express the constraint x must not be 3. In response, Cryptol told us that 125 is another solution. Indeed $125 * 125 = 9 \pmod{2^7}$, as you can verify separately. We can search for more:

```
Cryptol> :sat \x -> isSqrtOf9 x && ~(elem x [3, 125])
\x -> isSqrtOf9 x && ~(elem (x, [3, 131])) 253 = True
```

Rather than manually adding solutions we have already seen, we can search for other solutions by asking the satisfiability checker for more solutions using the satNum setting:

```
Cryptol> :set satNum = 4
Cryptol> :sat isSqrtOf9
isSqrtOf9 3 = True
isSqrtOf9 131 = True
isSqrtOf9 125 = True
isSqrtOf9 253 = True
```

By default, satNum is set to 1, so we only see one solution. When we change it to 4, the satisfiability checker will try to find *up to* 4 solutions. We can also set it to all, which will try to find as many solutions as possible.

Cryptol> :set satNum = all Cryptol> :sat isSqrtOf9 isSqrtOf9 3 = True isSqrtOf9 131 = True isSqrtOf9 125 = True isSqrtOf9 253 = True

So, we can rest assured that there are exactly four 8-bit square roots of 9: namely 3, 131, 125, and 253. (Note that Cryptol can return the satisfying solutions in any order depending on the backend-solver and other configurations. What is guaranteed is that you will get precisely the same set of solutions at the end.)

The whole point of the satisfiability checker is to be able to quickly search for particular values that are solutions to potentially complicated bit-valued functions. In this sense, satisfiability checking can also be considered as an automated way to invert a certain class of functions, going back from results to arguments. Of course, this search is not done blindly, but rather using SAT and SMT solvers to quickly find the satisfying values. Cryptol's :sat command hides the complexity, allowing the user to focus on the specification of the problem.

Exercise 4.20. Fermat's last theorem states that there are no integer solutions to the equation $a^n + b^n = c^n$ when a, b, c > 0, and n > 2. While we can code Fermat's theorem in Cryptol using the Integer type, the SMT solver backends used by Cryptol do not support symbolic exponentiation on unbounded integers. However, we can make more progress with the modular version of it where the exponentiation and addition are done modulo a fixed bit-size. Write a function modFermat with the following signature:

type Quad a = ([a], [a], [a], [a]) modFermat : {s} (fin s, s >= 2) => Quad s -> Bit

such that modFermat (a, b, c, n) will return True if the modular version of Fermat's equation is satisfied by the values of a, b, c, and n. Can you explain why you need the constraints fin s and s ≥ 2 ?

Exercise 4.21. Use the :sat command to see if there are any satisfying values for the modular version of Fermat's last theorem for various bit sizes. Surprised? What can you conclude from your observations?

Chapter 5

AES: The Advanced Encryption Standard

AES is a symmetric key encryption algorithm (a symmetric cipher, per the discussion in chapter 2), based on the Rijndael algorithm designed by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen [4]. (The term *symmetric key* means that the algorithm uses the same key for encryption and decryption.) AES was adopted in 2001 by the US government, deemed suitable for protecting classified information up to *secret* level for the key size 128, and up to the *top-secret* level for key sizes 192 and 256.

In this chapter, we will program AES in Cryptol. Our emphasis will be on clarity, as opposed to efficiency, and we shall follow the NIST standard description of AES fairly closely [12]. Referring to the standard as you work your way through this chapter is recommended.

Some surprises may be at hand for the reader who has never deeply examined a modern cryptography algorithm before.

First, algorithms like AES are typically composed of many smaller units of varying kinds. Consequently, the entire algorithm is constructed bottom-up by specifying and verifying each of its component pieces. It is wise to handle smaller and simpler components first. It is also a good practice, though hard to accomplish the first one or two times you write such a specification, to write specifications with an eye toward reuse in multiple instantiations of the same algorithm (e.g., different key sizes or configurations). The choice between encoding configurations at the type level or the value level is aesthetic and practical: some verification is only possible when one encodes information at the type level.

Second, algorithms frequently depend upon interesting data structures and mathematical constructs, the latter of which can be though of as data structures in a pure mathematics sense. The definition, shape, form, and subtleties of these data structures are critical to the *correct definition* of the crypto algorithm *as well as its security properties*. Implementing an algorithm using an alternative datatype construction that you believe has the same properties as that which is stipulated in a standard is nearly always the wrong thing to do. Also, the subtleties of these constructions usually boils down to what an engineer might think of as "magic numbers"—strange initial values or specific polynomials that appear out of thin air. Just remind yourself that the discovery and analysis of those magic values was, in general, the joint hard work of a community of cryptographers.

5.1 Parameters

The AES algorithm always takes 128 bits of input, and always produces 128 bits of output, regardless of the key size. The key-size can be one of 128 (AES128), 192 (AES192), or 256 (AES256). Following the standard, we define the following three parameters [12, section 2.2]:

- Nb: Number of columns, always set to 4 by the standard.
- Nk: Number of key-blocks, which is the number of 32-bit words in the key: 4 for AES128, 6 for AES192, and 8 for AES256;
- Nr: Number of rounds, which Nr is always 6 + Nk, according to the standard. Thus, 10 for AES128, 12 for AES192, and 14 for AES256.

The Cryptol definitions follow the above descriptions verbatim:

type AES128 = 4type AES192 = 6type AES256 = 8type Nk = AES128type Nb = 4type Nr = 6 + Nk

The following derived type is helpful in signatures:

```
type AESKeySize = (Nk*32)
```

5.2 Polynomials in $GF(2^8)$

AES works on a two-dimensional representation of the input arranged into bytes, called the *state*. For a 128-bit input, we have precisely 4 rows, each containing Nb (i.e., 4) bytes, each of which is 8 bits wide, totaling $4 \times 4 \times 8 = 128$ bits. The bytes themselves are treated as finite field elements in the Galois field GF(2⁸) [19], giving rise to the following declarations:

```
type GF28 = [8]
type State = [4][Nb]GF28
```

The hard-encoding of GF28 in this specification is completely appropriate because the construction of AES depends entirely upon the Galois field $GF(2^8)$. It is conceivable that other algorithms might be parameterized across $GF(2^k)$ for some k, in which case the underlying type declaration would also be parameterized.

While a basic understanding Galois field operations is helpful, the details are not essential for our modeling purposes. It suffices to note that $GF(2^8)$ has precisely 256 elements, each of which is a polynomial of maximum degree 7, where the coefficients are either 0 or 1. The numbers from 0 to 255 (i.e., all possible 8-bit values) are in one-to-one correspondence with these polynomials. The coefficients of the polynomial come from the successive bits of the number, and vice versa. For instance the 8-bit number 87 can be written as 0b01010111 in binary, and hence corresponds to the polynomial $x^6 + x^4 + x^2 + x^1 + 1$. Similarly, the polynomial $x^4 + x^3 + x$ corresponds to the number 0b00011010, i.e., 26. We can also compute this value by evaluating the polynomial for x = 2, obtaining $2^4 + 2^3 + 2 = 16 + 8 + 2 = 26$.

Cryptol allows you to write polynomials in $GF(2^n)$, for arbitrary n, using the following notation:

```
Cryptol> <| x<sup>6</sup> + x<sup>4</sup> + x<sup>2</sup> + x<sup>1</sup> + 1 |>
87
Cryptol> 0b1010111
87
Cryptol> <| x<sup>4</sup> + x<sup>3</sup> + x |>
26
Cryptol> 0b11010
26
```

A polynomial is similar to a decimal representation of a number, albeit in a more suggestive syntax. Like with a decimal, the Cryptol type system will default the type to be the smallest number of bits required to represent the polynomial, but it may be expanded to more bits if an expression requires it.

Addition and Subtraction Given two polynomials, adding and subtracting them in a Galois field $GF(2^n)$ results in a new polynomial where terms with the same power cancel each other out. When interpreted as a word, both addition and subtraction amount to a simple exclusive-or operation. Cryptol's $\hat{}$ operator captures this idiom concisely:

Cryptol> <| x^^4 + x^2 |> ^ <| x^5 + x^2 + 1 |> == <| x^5 + x^4 + 1 |> True

Note that the term x^2 cancels since it appears in both polynomials.

Exercise 5.1. Adding a polynomial to itself in $GF(2^n)$ will always yield 0 since all the terms will cancel each other. Write and prove a theorem polySelfAdd over GF28 to state this fact.

While adding two polynomials does not warrant a separate function, we will need a version that can add a sequence of polynomials:

Exercise 5.2. Define a function

gf28Add : {n} (fin n) => [n]GF28 -> GF28

that adds all the elements given. (Hint Use a fold, see page 18.)

Multiplication Multiplication in $GF(2^n)$ follows the usual polynomial multiplication algorithm, where we multiply the first polynomial with each term of the second, and add all the partial sums (i.e., compute their exclusive-or). While this operation can be programmed explicitly, Cryptol does provide the primitive pmult for this purpose:

Cryptol> pmult <| x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 |> <| x^2 + x + 1 |> 45 Cryptol> <| x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + 1 |> 45

Exercise 5.3. Multiply the polynomials $x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$ and $x^2 + x + 1$ by hand in GF(2⁸) and show that the result is indeed $x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$, (i.e., 45), justifying Cryptol's result above.

Reduction If you multiply two polynomials with degrees m and n, you will get a new polynomial of degree m + n. As we mentioned before, the polynomials in $GF(2^8)$ have degree at most 7. Obviously, m + n can be larger than 7 when we multiply to elements of $GF(2^8)$. So we have to find a way to map the resulting larger-degree polynomial back to an element of $GF(2^8)$. This is done by reduction, or modulus, with respect to an *irreducible polynomial*. The AES algorithm uses the following polynomial for this purpose:

irreducible = <| x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 |>

(Recall in the introduction of this chapter our warning about magic!)

Note that irreducible is *not* an element of $GF(2^8)$, since it has degree 8. However we can use this polynomial to define the multiplication routine itself, which uses Cryptol's pmod (polynomial modulus) function, as follows:

```
gf28Mult : (GF28, GF28) -> GF28
gf28Mult (x, y) = pmod (pmult x y) irreducible
```

Polynomial modulus and division operations follow the usual schoolbook algorithm for long-division—a fairly laborious process in itself, but it is well studied in mathematics [20]. Luckily for us, Cryptol's pdiv and pmod functions implement these operations, saving us the programming task.

Exercise 5.4. Divide $x^5 + x^3 + 1$ by $x^3 + x^2 + 1$ by hand, finding the quotient and the remainder. Check your answer with Cryptol's pmod and pdiv functions.

Exercise 5.5. Write and prove theorems showing that gf28Mult (i) has the polynomial 1 as its unit, (ii) is commutative, and (iii) is associative.

5.3 The SubBytes transformation

Recall that the state in AES is a 4×4 matrix of bytes. As part of its operation, AES performs the so called SubBytes transformation [12, section 5.1.1], substituting each byte in the state with another element. Given an $x \in GF(2^8)$, the substitution for x is computed as follows:

- 1. Compute the multiplicative inverse of x in $GF(2^8)$, call it b. If x is 0, then take 0 as the result.
- 2. Replace bits in b as follows: Each bit b_i becomes $b_i \oplus b_{i+4 \pmod{8}} \oplus b_{i+5 \pmod{8}} \oplus b_{i+6 \pmod{8}} \oplus b_{i+7 \pmod{8}} \oplus c_i$. Here \oplus is exclusive-or and c is 0x63.

Computing the multiplicative inverse It turns out that the inverse of any non-zero x in $GF(2^8)$ can be computed by raising x to the power 254, i.e., multiplying x by itself 254 times. (Mathematically, $GF(2^8)$ is a cyclic group such that x^{255} is always 1 for any x, making x^{254} the multiplicative inverse of x.)

Exercise 5.6. Write a function

gf28Pow : (GF28, [8]) -> GF28

such that the call gf28Pow (n, k) returns n^k using gf28Mult as the multiplication operator. (Hint Use the fact that $x^0 = 1, x^{2n} = (x^n)^2$, and $x^{2n+1} = x \times (x^n)^2$ to speed up the exponentiation.)

Exercise 5.7. Write a function

gf28Inverse : GF28 -> GF28

to compute the multiplicative inverse of a given element by raising it to the power 254. Note that gf28Inverse must map 0 to 0. Do you have to do anything special to make sure this happens?

Exercise 5.8. Write and prove a property gf28InverseCorrect, ensuring that gf28Inverse x does indeed return the multiplicative inverse of x. Do you have to do anything special when x is 0?

Transforming the result As we mentioned above, the AES specification asks us to transform each bit b_i according to the following transformation:

$$b_i \oplus b_{i+4 \pmod{8}} \oplus b_{i+5 \pmod{8}} \oplus b_{i+6 \pmod{8}} \oplus b_{i+7 \pmod{8}} \oplus c_i$$

For instance, bit b_5 becomes $b_5 \oplus b_1 \oplus b_2 \oplus b_3 \oplus c_5$. When interpreted at the word level, this basically amounts to computing:

 $b \oplus (b \gg 4) \oplus (b \gg 5) \oplus (b \gg 6) \oplus (b \gg 7) \oplus c$

by aligning the corresponding bits in the word representation.

Exercise 5.9. Write a function

xformByte : GF28 -> GF28

that computes the above described transformation.

Putting it together Armed with gf28Inverse and xformByte, we can easily code the function that transforms a single byte as follows:

```
SubByte : GF28 -> GF28
SubByte b = xformByte (gf28Inverse b)
```

AES's SubBytes transformation merely applies this function to each byte of the state:

```
SubBytes : State -> State
SubBytes state = [ [ SubByte b | b <- row ] | row <- state ]
```

Table lookup Our definition of the SubByte function above follows how the designers of AES came up with the substitution maps, i.e., it is a *reference* implementation. For efficiency purposes, however, we might prefer a version that simply performs a look-up in a table. Notice that the type of SubByte is GF28 -> GF28, i.e., it takes a value between 0 and 255. Therefore, we can make a table containing the precomputed values for all possible 256 inputs, and simply perform a table look-up instead of computing these values each time we need it. In fact, Figure 7 on page 16 of the AES standard lists these precomputed values for us [12, section 5.1.1]. We capture this table below in Cryptol:

```
sbox : [256]GF28
sbox = [
   0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67,
   0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59,
  0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7,
   0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1,
  0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05,
   0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09, 0x83,
   0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29,
   0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b,
   0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa,
   Oxfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c,
   0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc,
   0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec,
   0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19,
   0x73, 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee,
   0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49,
   0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79,
   0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4,
   Oxea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6,
   0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a, 0x70,
   0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9,
   0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e,
   0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1,
   0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0,
   0x54, 0xbb, 0x16]
```

With this definition of sbox, the look-up variants of SubByte and SubBytes becomes:

```
SubByte' : GF28 -> GF28
SubByte' x = sbox @ x
SubBytes' : State -> State
SubBytes' state = [ [ SubByte' b | b <- row ] | row <- state ]</pre>
```

Exercise 5.10. Write and prove a property stating that SubByte and SubByte' are equivalent.

Note: The SubByte' and SubBytes' versions are going to be more efficient for execution, naturally. We should emphasize that this mode of development is quite common in modern cryptography. Ciphers are typically designed using ideas from mathematics, often requiring complicated algorithms. To speed things up, however, implementors use clever optimization tricks, convert functions to look-up tables using precomputed values, etc.

What Cryptol allows us to do is to write the algorithms using both styles, and then formally show that they are indeed equivalent, as you did in exercise 5.10 above. This mode of high-assurance development makes sure that we have not made any cut-and-paste errors when we wrote down the numbers in our **sbox** table. Equivalently, our proof also establishes that the official specification [12, section 5.1.1] got its own table correct!

5.4 The ShiftRows transformation

The second transformation AES utilizes is the ShiftRows operation [12, section 5.1.2]. This operation treats the State as a 4×4 matrix, and rotates the last three row to the left by the amounts 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Implementing ShiftRows in Cryptol is trivial, using the <<< operator:

Exercise 5.11. Can you transform a state back into itself by repeated applications of ShiftRows? How many times would you need to shift? Verify your answer by writing and proving a corresponding Cryptol property.

5.5 The MixColumns transformation

The third major transformation AES performs is the MixColumns operation [12, section 5.1.3]. In this transformation, the State is viewed as a 4×4 matrix, and each successive column of it is replaced by the result of multiplying it by the matrix:

As you might recall from linear algebra, given two *compatible* matrices A and B, the *ij*th element of $A \times B$ is the dot-product of the *i*th row of A and the *j*th column of B. (By *compatible* we mean the number of columns of A must be the same as the number of rows of B. All our matrices are 4×4 , so they are always compatible.) The dot-product is defined as multiplying the corresponding elements of two same-length vectors and adding the results together. The only difference here is that we use the functions gf28Add and gf28Mult for addition and multiplication respectively. We will develop this algorithm in the following sequence of exercises.

Exercise 5.12. Write a function gf28DotProduct with the signature:

```
gf28DotProduct : {n} (fin n) => ([n]GF28, [n]GF28) -> GF28
```

such that gf28DotProduct returns the dot-product of two length n vectors of GF(2⁸) elements.

Exercise 5.13. Write properties stating that the vector operation gf28DotProduct is commutative and distributive over vector addition:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} a \cdot b & = & b \cdot a \\ a \cdot (b + c) & = & a \cdot b + a \cdot b \end{array}$$

Addition over vectors is defined element-wise. Prove the commutativity property for vectors of length 10. Distributivity will take much longer, so you might want to do a :check on it.

Exercise 5.14. Write a function

```
gf28VectorMult : {n, m} (fin n) => ([n]GF28, [m][n]GF28) -> [m]GF28
```

computing the dot-product of its first argument with each of the m rows of the second argument, returning the resulting values as a vector of m elements.

Exercise 5.15. Write a function

```
gf28MatrixMult : {n, m, k} (fin m) => ([n][m]GF28, [m][k]GF28) -> [n][k]GF28
```

which multiplies the given matrices in $GF(2^8)$.

Now that we have the matrix multiplication machinery built, we can code MixColumns fairly easily. Following the description in the AES standard [12, section 5.3.1], all we have to do is to multiply the matrix we have seen at the beginning of this section with the state:

```
MixColumns : State -> State
MixColumns state = gf28MatrixMult (m, state)
where m = [[2, 3, 1, 1],
        [1, 2, 3, 1],
        [1, 1, 2, 3],
        [3, 1, 1, 2]]
```

Note that Cryptol makes no built-in assumption about row- or column-ordering of multidimensional matrices. Of course, given Cryptol's concrete syntax, it makes little sense to do anything but row-based ordering.

5.6 Key expansion

Recall from section 5.1 that AES takes 128, 192, or 256-bit keys. The key is not used as-is, however. Instead, AES expands the key into a number of round keys, called the *key schedule*. Construction of the key schedule relies on a number of auxiliary definitions, as we shall see shortly.

Round constants The AES standard refers to the constant array Rcon used during key expansion. For each i, Rcon[i] contains 4 words, the last three being 0 [12, section 5.2]. The first element is given by x^{i-1} , where exponentiation is done using the gf28Pow function you have defined in exercise 5.6. In Cryptol, it is easiest to define Rcon as a function:

Rcon : [8] -> [4]GF28 Rcon i = [(gf28Pow (<| x |>, i-1)), 0, 0, 0]

Exercise 5.16. By definition, AES only calls Rcon with the parameters ranging from 1–10. Based on this, create a table-lookup version

Rcon' : [8] -> [4]GF28

that simply performs a look-up instead. (Hint Use Cryptol to find out what the elements of your table should be.)

Exercise 5.17. Write and prove a property that Rcon and Rcon' are equivalent when called with numbers in the range 1–10.

The SubWord function The AES specification refers to a function named **SubWord** [12, section 5.2], that takes a 32-bit word and applies the **SubByte** transformation from section 5.3. This function is trivial to code in Cryptol:

SubWord : [4]GF28 -> [4]GF28 SubWord bs = [SubByte' b | b <- bs]

Note that we have used the table-lookup version (SubByte', page 53) above.

The RotWord function The last function we need for key expansion is named **RotWord** by the AES standard [12, section 5.2]. This function merely rotates a given word cyclically to the left:

RotWord : [4]GF28 -> [4]GF28 RotWord [a0, a1, a2, a3] = [a1, a2, a3, a0]

We could have used <<< to implement RotWord as well, but the above definition textually looks exactly the one given in the standard specification, and hence is preferable for the purposes of clarity.

The key schedule Recall that AES operates on 128, 192, or 256 bit keys. These keys are used to construct a sequence of so-called *round keys*, each of which is 128 bits wide, and is viewed the same way as the **State**:

```
type RoundKey = State
```

The expanded key schedule contains Nr+1 round-keys. (Recall from section 5.1 that Nr is the number of rounds.) It also helps to separate out the first and the last keys, as they are used in a slightly different fashion. Based on this discussion, we use the following Cryptol type to capture the key schedule:

```
type KeySchedule = (RoundKey, [Nr-1]RoundKey, RoundKey)
```

The key schedule is computed by seeding it with the initial key and computing the successive elements from the previous entries. In particular, the *i*th element of the expanded key is determined as follows, copied verbatim from the AES specification [12, figure 11; section 5.2]:

```
temp = w[i-1]
if (i mod Nk = 0)
   temp = SubWord(RotWord(temp)) xor Rcon[i/Nk]
else if (Nk > 6 and i mod Nk = 4)
   temp = SubWord(temp)
end if
w[i] = w[i-Nk] xor temp
```

In the pseudo-code, the w array contains the expanded key. We are computing w[i], using the values w[i-1] and w[i-Nk]. The result is the exclusive-or of w[i-Nk] and a mask value, called temp above. The mask is computed using w[i-1], the Rcon array we have seen before, the current index i, and Nk. This computation is best expressed as a function in Cryptol that we will call NextWord. We will name the w[i-1] argument prev, and the w[i-Nk] argument old. Otherwise, the Cryptol code just follows the pseudo-code above, written in a functional style to compute the mask:

Note: It is well worth studying the pseudo-code above and the Cryptol equivalent to convince yourself they are expressing the same idea!

To compute the key schedule we start with the initial key as the seed. We then make calls to NextWord with a sliding window of Nk elements, computing the subsequent elements. Let us first write a function that will apply this algorithm to generate an infinite regression of elements:

Note how **prev** tracks the previous 32 bits of the expanded key (by dropping the first Nk-1 elements), while **old** tracks the **i-Nkth** recurrence for keyWS. Once we have the infinite expansion, it is easy to extract just the amount we need by using number of rounds (Nr) as our guide:

```
ExpandKey : [AESKeySize] -> KeySchedule
ExpandKey key = (keys @ 0, keys @@ [1 .. (Nr - 1)], keys @ `Nr)
where seed : [Nk][4][8]
    seed = split (split key)
    keys = ExpandKeyForever seed
```

The call split key chops AESKey into [Nk*4][8], and the outer call to split further constructs the [Nk][4][8] elements.

Testing ExpandKey The completion of **ExpandKey** is an important milestone in our AES development, and it is worth testing it before we proceed. The AES specification has example key expansions that we can use. The following function will be handy in viewing the output correctly aligned:

Here is the example from Appendix A.1 of the AES specification [12]:

```
Cryptol> fromKS (ExpandKey 0x2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c)
[[0x2b7e1516, 0x28aed2a6, 0xabf71588, 0x09cf4f3c],
[0xa0fafe17, 0x88542cb1, 0x23a33939, 0x2a6c7605],
[0xf2c295f2, 0x7a96b943, 0x5935807a, 0x7359f67f],
[0x3d80477d, 0x4716fe3e, 0x1e237e44, 0x6d7a883b],
[0xef44a541, 0xa8525b7f, 0xb671253b, 0xdb0bad00],
[0xd4d1c6f8, 0x7c839d87, 0xcaf2b8bc, 0x11f915bc],
[0x6d88a37a, 0x110b3efd, 0xdbf98641, 0xca0093fd],
[0x4e54f70e, 0x5f5fc9f3, 0x84a64fb2, 0x4ea6dc4f],
[0xead27321, 0xb58dbad2, 0x312bf560, 0x7f8d292f],
[0xac7766f3, 0x19fadc21, 0x28d12941, 0x575c006e],
[0xd014f9a8, 0xc9ee2589, 0xe13f0cc8, 0xb6630ca6]]
```

As you can verify this output matches the last column of the table in Appendix A.1 of the reference specification for AES.

5.7 The AddRoundKey transformation

AddRoundKey is the simplest of all the transformations in AES [12, section 5.1.4]. It merely amounts to the exclusive-or of the state and the current round key:

AddRoundKey : (RoundKey, State) -> State AddRoundKey (rk, s) = rk ^ s

Notice that Cryptol's ^ operator applies structurally to arbitrary shapes, computing the exclusive-or element-wise.

5.8 AES encryption

We now have all the necessary machinery to perform AES encryption.

AES rounds As mentioned before, AES performs encryption in rounds. Each round consists of performing SubBytes (section 5.3), ShiftRows (section 5.4), and MixColumns (section 5.5). Before finishing up, each round also adds the current round key to the state [12, section 5.1]. The Cryptol code for the rounds is fairly trivial:

AESRound : (RoundKey, State) -> State AESRound (rk, s) = AddRoundKey (rk, MixColumns (ShiftRows (SubBytes s)))

The final round The last round of AES is slightly different than the others. It omits the MixColumns transformation:

AESFinalRound : (RoundKey, State) -> State
AESFinalRound (rk, s) = AddRoundKey (rk, ShiftRows (SubBytes s))

Forming the input/output blocks Recall that AES processes input in blocks of 128 bits, producing 128 bits of output, regardless of the key size. We will need two helper functions to convert 128-bit messages to and from AES states. Conversion from a message to a state is easy to define:

msgToState : [128] -> State
msgToState msg = transpose (split (split msg))

The first call to **split** gives us four 32-bit words, which we again split into bytes. We then form the AES state by transposing the resulting matrix. In the other direction, we simply transpose the state and perform the necessary joins:

stateToMsg : State -> [128]
stateToMsg st = join (join (transpose st))

Exercise 5.18. Write and prove a pair of properties stating that msgToState and stateToMsg are inverses of each other.

Putting it together To encrypt, AES merely expands the given key and calls the round functions. The starting state (state0 below) is constructed by adding the first round key to the input. We then run all the middle rounds using a simple comprehension, and finish up by applying the last round [12, figure 5, section 5.1]:

```
aesEncrypt : ([128], [AESKeySize]) -> [128]
aesEncrypt (pt, key) = stateToMsg (AESFinalRound (kFinal, rounds ! 0))
where (kInit, ks, kFinal) = ExpandKey key
state0 = AddRoundKey(kInit, msgToState pt)
rounds = [state0] # [ AESRound (rk, s) | rk <- ks
| s <- rounds
]
```

Testing We can now run some test vectors. Note that, just because a handful of test vectors pass, we cannot claim that our implementation of AES is correct.

The first example comes from Appendix B of the AES standard [12]:

```
Cryptol> aesEncrypt (0x3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734, \
0x2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c)
0x3925841d02dc09fbdc118597196a0b32
```

which is what the standard asserts to be the answer. (Note that you have to read the final box in Appendix B column-wise!) The second example comes from Appendix C.1:

```
Cryptol> aesEncrypt (0x00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff, \
0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f)
0x69c4e0d86a7b0430d8cdb78070b4c55a
```

Again, the result agrees with the standard.

Other key sizes Our development of AES has been key-size agnostic, relying on the definition of the parameter Nk. (See section 5.1.) To obtain AES192, all we need is to set Nk to be 6, no additional code change is needed. Similarly, we merely need to set Nk to be 8 for AES256.

Exercise 5.19. By setting Nk to be 6 and 8 respectively, try the test vectors given in Appendices C.2 and C.3 of the AES standard [12].

5.9 Decryption

AES decryption is fairly similar to encryption, except it uses inverse transformations [12, figure 12, section 5.3]. Armed with all the machinery we have built so far, the inverse transformations are relatively easy to define.

5.9.1 The InvSubBytes transformation

The InvSubBytes transformation reverses the SubBytes transformation of section 5.3. As with SubBytes, we have a choice to either do a table lookup implementation, or follow the mathematical description. We will do the former in these examples; you are welcome to do the latter on your own and prove the equivalence of the two versions. To do so, we need to invert the transformation given by:

$$b \oplus b \gg 4 \oplus b \gg 5 \oplus b \gg 6 \oplus b \gg 7 \oplus c$$

where c is 0x63. It turns out that the inverse of this transformation can be computed by

$$b \gg 2 \oplus b \gg 5 \oplus b \gg 7 \oplus d$$

where d is 0x05. It is easy to code this inverse transform in Cryptol:

```
xformByte' : GF28 -> GF28
xformByte' b = gf28Add [(b >>> 2), (b >>> 5), (b >>> 7), d]
where d = 0x05
```

Exercise 5.20. Write and prove a Cryptol property stating that xformByte' is the inverse of the function xformByte that you have defined in exercise 5.9.

We can now define the inverse S-box transform, using the multiplicative inverse function gf28Inverse you have defined in exercise 5.7:

Exercise 5.21. Write and prove a Cryptol property showing that InvSubByte reverses SubByte.

Exercise 5.22. The AES specification provides an inverse S-box table [12, figure 14, section 5.3.2]. Write a Cryptol function InvSubBytes' using the table lookup technique. Make sure your implementation is correct (i.e., equivalent to InvSubBytes) by writing and proving a corresponding property.

5.9.2 The InvShiftRows transformation

The InvShiftRows transformation simply reverses the ShiftRows transformation from section 5.4:

Exercise 5.23. Write and prove a property stating that InvShiftRows is the inverse of ShiftRows.

5.9.3 The InvMixColumns transformation

Recall from section 5.5 that MixColumns amounts to matrix multiplication in $GF(2^8)$. The inverse transform turns out to be the same, except with a different matrix:

```
InvMixColumns : State -> State
InvMixColumns state = gf28MatrixMult (m, state)
where m = [[0x0e, 0x0b, 0x0d, 0x09],
                    [0x09, 0x0e, 0x0b, 0x0d],
                    [0x0d, 0x09, 0x0e, 0x0b],
                    [0x0b, 0x0d, 0x09, 0x0e]]
```

Exercise 5.24. Write and prove a property stating that InvMixColumns is the inverse of MixColumns.

5.10 The inverse cipher

We now also have all the ingredients to encode AES decryption. Following figure 12 (section 5.3) of the AES standard [12]:

Note how we use the results of ExpandedKey, by carefully naming the first and last round keys and using the middle keys in reverse.

Testing Let us repeat the tests for AES encryption. Again, the first example comes from Appendix B of the AES standard [12]:

```
Cryptol> aesDecrypt (0x3925841d02dc09fbdc118597196a0b32, \
0x2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c)
0x3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734
```

which agrees with the original value. The second example comes from Appendix C.1:

```
Cryptol> aesDecrypt (0x69c4e0d86a7b0430d8cdb78070b4c55a,
0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f)
0x00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
```

Again, the result agrees with the standard.

Other key sizes Similar to encryption, all we need to obtain AES192 decryption is to set Nk to be 6 in section 5.1. Setting Nk to 8 will correspondingly give us AES256.

١

The code You can see all the Cryptol code for AES in Appendix D.

5.11 Correctness

While test vectors do provide good evidence of AES working correctly, they do not provide a proof that we have implemented the standard faithfully. In fact, for a block cipher like AES, it is not possible to state what correctness would mean. Tweaking some parameters, or changing the S-box appropriately can give us a brand new cipher. And it would be impossible to tell this new cipher apart from AES aside from running it against published test vectors.

What we can do, however, is gain assurance that our implementation demonstrably has the desired properties. We have done this throughout this chapter by stating and proving a number of properties about AES and its constituent parts. The Cryptol methodology allows us to construct the code together with expected properties, allowing high-assurance development. We conclude this chapter with one final property, stating that aesEncrypt and aesDecrypt do indeed form an encryption-decryption pair:

```
property AESCorrect msg key = aesDecrypt (aesEncrypt (msg, key), key) == msg
```

Can we hope to automatically prove this theorem? For 128-bit AES, the state space for this theorem has 2^{256} elements. It would be naive to expect that we can prove this theorem by a push-button tool very quickly.¹ We can however, gain some assurance by running it through the :check command:

Using random testing. Passed 100 tests. Expected test coverage: 0.00% (100 of 2^{^2}256 values)

You will notice that even running quick-check will take a while for the above theorem, and the total state space for this function means that we have not even scratched the surface! That said, being able to specify these properties together with very high level code is what distinguishes Cryptol from other languages when it comes to cryptographic algorithm programming.

¹Note that, for a general algorithm with this large a state space, it is entirely possible to perform automatic verification using modern solvers, but if one carefully reflects upon the nature of cryptographic functions, it becomes clear why it should *not* be the case here.

Appendix A

Solutions to selected exercises

As with any language, there are usually multiple ways to write the same function in Cryptol. We have tried to use the most idiomatic Cryptol code segments in our solutions. Note that Cryptol prints numbers out in hexadecimal by default. In most of the answers below, we have implicitly used the command :set base=10 to print numbers out in decimal for readability.

Section 1.2 Bits: Booleans (p. 1)

Exercise 1.1. (p. 1) Here is the response from Cryptol, in order:

```
True
[error] at <interactive>:1:1--1:6 Value not in scope: false
False
0x4
True
True
True
False
```

Section 1.3 Words: Numbers (p. 2)

Exercise 1.2. (p. 2) Cryptol prints the error "Unsolvable constraint: $4 \ge 5$ ", because 19 requires at least 5 bits to represent. 255: [8] is the largest value of type [8]. [6] is the smallest type for 32. [0] is the smallest type for 0.

Exercise 1.3. (p. 2) Oxfeedfacef00d.

Section 1.4 Integers: Unbounded numbers (p. 2)

Exercise 1.4. (p. 3) Here are Cryptol's responses:

0x1 17 11 0x8 + 0x9 evaluates to 0x1 because addition on 4-bit words wraps around when the sum is 16 or more and it overflows. On the other hand, Integer addition never overflows, so the answer is 17. The final result is also due to wraparound: - 0x5 evaluates to 0xb or 11, which is -5 + 16.

Section 1.5 Tuples: Heterogeneous collections (p. 3)

Exercise 1.5. (p. 3) Here are Cryptol's responses:

(1, 6)
(True, False, True)
((1, 2), False, (2, (4, True)))

Exercise 1.6. (p. 3) Here are Cryptol's responses:

Cryptol> (1, 2+4).0 1 Cryptol> (1, 2+4).1 6 Cryptol> ((1, 2), False, (3-1, (4, True))).2.1 (4, True)

The required expression would be:

((1, 2), (2, 6, (True, 4)), False).1.2.0

Section 1.6 Sequences: Homogeneous collections (p. 3)

Exercise 1.8. (p. 3) In each case we get a type error:

```
Cryptol> [True, [True]]
[error] at <interactive>:1:8--1:14:
Type mismatch:
Expected type: Bit
Inferred type: [1]
Cryptol> [[1, 2, 3], [4, 5]]
[error] at <interactive>:1:13--1:19:
Type mismatch:
Expected type: 3
Inferred type: 2
```

In the first case, we are trying to put a bit (True) and a singleton sequence containing a bit ([True]) in the same sequence, which have different types. In the second case, we are trying to put two sequences of different lengths into a sequence, which again breaks the homogeneity requirement.

Exercise 1.9. (p. 4) Here are the responses from Cryptol:

```
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]
[1, 3, 5, 7, 9]
[10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1]
[]
[10, 7, 4, 1]
[]
```

Note how [10, 11 .. 1] and [10, 9 .. 20] give us empty sequences, since the upper bound is smaller than the lower bound in the former, and larger in the latter.

Exercise 1.10. (p. 4) Here are the responses from Cryptol:

[(1, 4) (1, 5) (2, 4) (2, 5) (3, 4) (3, 5)] [] [(2, 3) (2, 4) (3, 3) (3, 4)]

The size of the result will be the sizes of the components multiplied. For instance, in the first example, the generator $x \leftarrow [1 \dots 3]$ assigns 3 values to x, and the generator $y \leftarrow [4, 5]$ assigns 2 values to y; and hence the result has $2 \times 3 = 6$ elements.

Exercise 1.11. (p. 4) Here are the responses from Cryptol:

[(1, 4) (2, 5)] [] [(2, 3)]

In this case, the size of the result will be the minimum of the component sizes. For the first example, the generator $x \leftarrow [1 \dots 3]$ assigns 3 values to x, and the generator $y \leftarrow [4, 5]$ assigns 2 values to y; and hence the result has $\min(2,3) = 2$ elements.

Exercise 1.12. (p. 5) Here is one way of writing such an expression, laid out in multiple lines to show the structure:

The outer comprehension is a comprehension (and hence is nested). In particular the expression is:

[(i, j) | j <- [1 .. 3]]

You can enter the whole expression in Cryptol all in one line, or recall that you can put $\$ at line ends to continue to the next line. If you are writing such an expression in a program file, then you can lay it out as shown above or however most makes sense to you.

Exercise 1.13. (p. 5) Here are Cryptol's responses:

```
Cryptol> :set warnDefaulting=off
Cryptol> [] # [1, 2]
[1, 2]
Cryptol> [1, 2] # []
[1, 2]
Cryptol> [1 .. 5] # [3, 6, 8]
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 3, 6, 8]
Cryptol> [0 .. 9] @ 0
0
Cryptol> [0 .. 9] @ 5
5
Cryptol> [0 .. 9] @ 10
invalid sequence index: 10
Cryptol> [0 .. 9] @ [3, 4]
[3, 4]
```

Cryptol> [0 .. 9] @@ [] [] Cryptol> [0 .. 9] @@ [9, 12] invalid sequence index: 12 Cryptol> [0 .. 9] @@ [9, 8 .. 0] [9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0] Cryptol> [0 .. 9] ! 0 9 Cryptol> [0 .. 9] ! 3 6 Cryptol> [0 .. 9] !! [3, 6] [6, 3] Cryptol> [0 .. 9] !! [0 .. 9] [9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0] Cryptol> [0 .. 9] ! 12 invalid sequence index: 12

Exercise 1.14. (p. 5) Using a permutation operator, we can simply write:

[0 .. 10] @@ [0, 2 .. 10]

Using a comprehension, we can express the same idea using:

[[0...10]@i|i<-[0,2...10]]

Strictly speaking, permutation operations are indeed redundant. However, they lead to more concise and easier-to-read expressions.

Exercise 1.15. (p. 5) When you type in an infinite sequence, Cryptol will only print the first 5 elements of it and will indicate that it is an infinite value by putting \ldots at the end.² Here are the responses:

```
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ...]
[1, 3, 5, 7, 9, ...]
2001
[601, 1001, 1401]
[100, 102, 104, 106, 108, ...]
```

Exercise 1.16. (p. 6) Here is a simple test case:

Cryptol> [1:[32] ...] ! 3

```
[error] at <interactive>:1:1--1:17:
Expected a finite type, but found `inf`.
```

The error message is telling us that we *cannot* apply the reverse index operator (!) on an infinite sequence (inf). This is a natural consequence of the fact that one can never reach the end of an infinite sequence to count backwards. It is important to emphasize that this is a *type error*, i.e., the user gets this message at compile time; instead of Cryptol going into an infinite loop to reach the end of an infinite sequence.

Exercise 1.17. (p. 6) Here are Cryptol's responses:

```
Cryptol> take`{3} [1 .. 12]
[1, 2, 3]
Cryptol> drop`{3} [1 .. 12]
```

²You can change this behavior by setting the infLength variable, like so: Cryptol> :set infLength=10 will show the first 10 elements of infinite sequences

```
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]
Cryptol> split`{3}[1 .. 12]
[[1, 2, 3, 4], [5, 6, 7, 8], [9, 10, 11, 12]]
Cryptol> groupBy`{3} [1 .. 12]
[[1, 2, 3], [4, 5, 6], [7, 8, 9], [10, 11, 12]]
Cryptol> join [[1 .. 4], [5 .. 8], [9 .. 12]]
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]
Cryptol> join [[1, 2, 3], [4, 5, 6], [7, 8, 9], [10, 11, 12]]
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]
Cryptol> transpose [[1, 2, 3, 4], [5, 6, 7, 8]]
[[1, 5], [2, 6], [3, 7], [4, 8]]
Cryptol> transpose [[1, 2, 3], [4, 5, 6], [7, 8, 9]]
[[1, 4, 7], [2, 5, 8], [3, 6, 9]]
```

And for the fun bonus problems:

```
Cryptol> join [1,1]

Showing a specific instance of polymorphic result:

* Using '1' for type argument 'each' of 'Cryptol::join'

3

Cryptol> transpose [1,2]

Showing a specific instance of polymorphic result:

* Using '2' for type argument 'cols' of 'Cryptol::transpose'

[1, 2]
```

The argument to join must be a sequence of sequences, so each 1 must have a bitvector type. Cryptol defaults to the smallest possible type, [1]. So join [1,1] becomes join [[True], [True]], which equals [True, True], or 3.

With transpose, Cryptol similarly chooses the smallest possible bitvector type [2] for the sequence elements. Then [1,2] becomes [[False, True], [True, False]], which transposes to the same value.

Exercise 1.18. (p. 6) The following equalities are the simplest candidates:

join (split`{parts=n} xs) == xs
join (groupBy`{each=n} xs) == xs
split`{parts=n} xs == groupBy`{each=m} xs
transpose (transpose xs) == xs

In the first two equalities n must be a divisor of the length of the sequence xs. In the third equation, $n \times m$ must equal the length of the sequence xs.

Exercise 1.19. (p. 6) Append (#) joins two sequences of arbitrary length, while join appends a sequence of equal length sequences. In particular, the equality:

join [xs0, xs1, xs2, .. xsN] = xs0 # xs1 # xs2 ... # xsN

holds for all equal length sequences xs0, xs1, ..., xsN.

Exercise 1.20. (p. 7) Here they are:

```
Cryptol> split [1..12] : [4][3][8]
[[1, 2, 3], [4, 5, 6], [7, 8, 9], [10, 11, 12]]
Cryptol> split [1..12] : [6][2][8]
[[1, 2], [3, 4], [5, 6], [7, 8], [9, 10], [11, 12]]
Cryptol> split [1..12] : [12][1][8]
[[1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]]
```

Exercise 1.21. (p. 7) Cryptol will issue a type error:

Cryptol> split [1..12] : [5][2][8] [error] at <interactive>:1:7--1:14: Type mismatch: Expected type: 10 Inferred type: 12

Cryptol is telling us that we have requested 10 elements in the final result (5×2) , but the input has 12.

Exercise 1.22. (p. 7) We can split 120 elements first into 3×40 , splitting each of the the elements (level1 below) into 4×10 . A nested comprehension fits the bill:

```
[ split level1 : [4][10][8]
| level1 <- split ([1 .. 120] : [120][8]) : [3][40][8]
]</pre>
```

(Note again that you can enter the above in the command line all in one line, or by putting the line continuation character λ at the end of the first two lines.)

Exercise 1.23. (p. 7) Here are Cryptol's responses:

 [0, 0, 1, 2, 3]

 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0]

 [3, 4, 5, 0, 0]

 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0]

 [4, 5, 1, 2, 3]

 [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

 [3, 4, 5, 1, 2]

 [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

Exercise 1.24. (p. 7) Rotating (left or right) by a multiple of the size of a sequence will leave it unchanged.

Section 1.7 Words as sequences (p. 7)

Exercise 1.25. (p. 7) Cryptol is big-endian, meaning that the most-significant-bit comes first. In the sequence [True, False, True, False, True, False], the first element corresponds to the most-significant-digit, i.e., 2^5 , the next element corresponds to the coefficient of 2^4 , etc. A False bit yields a coefficient of 0 and a True bit gives 1. Hence, we have:

 $1 \times 2^5 + 0 \times 2^4 + 1 \times 2^3 + 0 \times 2^2 + 1 \times 2^1 + 0 \times 2^0 = 32 + 0 + 8 + 0 + 2 + 0 = 42$

Exercise 1.26. (p. 7) After issuing :set base=2, here are Cryptol's responses:

0b1100 0b11000 0b10100 0b101100 0b110001 0b100000 0b1100100000 True

Exercise 1.27. (p. 7) Remember that Cryptol is big-endian and hence 12:[6] is precisely [False, False, True, True, False, False]. Here are Cryptol's responses:

```
Cryptol> take`{3} 0xFF
7
Cryptol> take`{3} (12:[6])
1
Cryptol> drop`{3} (12:[6])
4
Cryptol> split`{3} (12:[6])
[0, 3, 0]
Cryptol> groupBy`{3} (12:[6])
[1, 4]
```

For instance, the expression $take^{3}$ (12:[6]) evaluates as follows:

```
take`{3} (12:[6])
= take (3, [False, False, True, True, False, False])
= [False, False, True]
= 1
```

Follow similar lines of reasoning to justify the results for the remaining expressions.

Exercise 1.28. (p. 8) Because of the leading zeros in 12: [12], they all produce different results:

```
Cryptol> take`{3} (12:[12])

0

Cryptol> drop`{3} (12:[12])

12

Cryptol> split`{3} (12:[12])

[0, 0, 12]

Cryptol> groupBy`{3} (12:[12])

[0, 0, 1, 4]
```

We will show the evaluation steps for groupBy here, and urge the reader to do the same for split:

```
groupBy`{3} (12:[12])
= groupBy`{3} [False, False, False]
= [[False, False, True], [True, False, False]]
= [0, 0, 1, 4]
```

Exercise 1.29. (p. 8) Here are Cryptol's responses:

```
3
48
```

Section 1.9 Records: Named collections (p. 9)

Exercise 1.30. (p. 9) Here are Cryptol's responses:

```
Cryptol> {xCoord = 12:[32], yCoord = 21:[32]}

{xCoord = 12, yCoord = 21}

Cryptol> {xCoord = 12:[32], yCoord = 21:[32]}.yCoord

21

Cryptol> {name = "Cryptol", address = "Galois"}

{name = "Cryptol", address = "Galois"}
```

Section 1.10 The zero (p. 9)

Exercise 1.31. (p. 10) Here are Cryptol's responses:

Cryptol> (zero : ([8] -> [3])) 5 0 Cryptol> (zero : Bit -> {xCoord : [12], yCoord : [5]}) True {xCoord=0, yCoord=0}

The ${\tt zero}$ function returns 0, ignoring its argument.

Section 1.11 Arithmetic (p. 10)

Exercise 1.32. (p. 10) Since 1 requires only 1 bit to represent, the result also has 1 bit. In other words, the arithmetic is done modulo $2^1 = 2$. Therefore, 1+1 = 0.

Exercise 1.33. (p. 10) Now we have 8 bits to work with, so the result is 2. Since we have 8 bits to work with, overflow will not happen until we get a sum that is at least 256.

Exercise 1.34. (p. 10) Recall from section 1.3 that there are no negative numbers in Cryptol. The values 3 and 5 can be represented in 3 bits, so Cryptol uses 3 bits to represent the result, so the arithmetic is done modulo $2^3 = 8$. Hence, the result is 6. In the second expression, we have 8 bits to work with, so the modulus is $2^8 = 256$; so the subtraction results in 254 (or 0xfe).

Exercise 1.35. (p. 10) The first, second, and fourth examples give a "division by 0" error message. In the third example, the division by zero occurs only in an unreachable branch, so the result is not an error. The logarithm at type Integer gives a "logarithm of negative" error.

In the last expression, the number 25 fits in 5 bits, so the modulus is $2^5 = 32$. The unary minus yields 7, hence the result is 3. Note that lg2 is the *floor log base 2* function. The width function is the *ceiling log base 2* function.

Exercise 1.36. (p. 10) Here are Cryptol's answers:

(2, 0)
(2, 1)
(2, 2)
(3, 0)

The following equation holds regarding / and %

$$x = (x/y) * y + (x\% y)$$

whenever $y \neq 0$.

Exercise 1.37. (p. 10) The bit-width in this case is 3 (to accommodate for the number 5), and hence arithmetic is done modulo $2^3 = 8$. Thus, -2 evaluates to 6, leading to the result min 5, (-2) == 5. The parentheses are necessary because unary negation is handled in Cryptol's parser, not in its lexer, because whitespace is ignored. If this were not the case, reflect upon how you would differentiate the expressions min 5 - 2 and min 5 - 2.

Exercise 1.38. (p. 10) This time we are telling Cryptol to use precisely 8 bits, so -2 is equivalent to 254. Therefore the result is 254.

Exercise 1.39. (p. 10) The idiomatic Cryptol way of summing two sequences is to use a comprehension:

[i+j | i <- [1 .. 10] | j <- [10, 9 .. 1]]

However, you will notice that the following will work as well:

[1 .. 10] + [10, 9 .. 1]

That is, Cryptol automatically lifts arithmetic operators to sequences, element-wise. However, it is often best to keep the explicit style of writing the comprehension, even though it is a bit longer, since that makes it absolutely clear what the intention is and how the new sequence is constructed, without depending implicitely upon Cryptol's automatic lifting.

Exercise 1.40. (p. 11) Here are Cryptol's responses:

```
Cryptol> ((2 >= 3) || (3 < 6)) && (4 == 5)
False
Cryptol> if 3 >= 2 then True else 1 < 12
True
```

Exercise 1.41. (p. 11) Here are Cryptol's responses:

[0, 1, 0, 1, 0, ...] [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ...]

The first example gets an element type of [1], because of the explicit use of the numeral 1, while the second example's element type is [0]. This is one case where [k...] is subtly different from [k, k+1...].

Exercise 1.42. (p. 11) The expression [1 .. 10] is equivalent to [1, (1+1) .. 10], and Cryptol knows that 10 requires at least 4 bits to represent and uses the minimum implied by all the available information. Hence we get: [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. You can use the :t command to see the type Cryptol infers for this expression explicitly:

Cryptol> :t [1 .. 10] {a} (a >= 4, fin a) => [10][a]

Cryptol tells us that the sequence has precisely 10 elements, and each element is at least 4 bits wide.

Section 1.12 Types (p. 11)

Exercise 1.43. (p. 12) We have 12 elements, each of which is a sequence of 3 elements; so we have 12 * 3 = 36 elements total. Each element is a 6-bit word; so the total number of bits is 36 * 6 = 216.

Exercise 1.44. (p. 12) [inf][inf][32]. The size of such a value would be infinite!

Exercise 1.45. (p. 14) Here is the type of split:

```
Cryptol> :t split
split : {parts, each, a} (fin each) =>
[parts * each]a -> [parts][each]a
```

At every use case of split we must instantiate the parameters parts, each, and a, so that the resulting instantiation will match the use case. In the first example, we can simply take: parts = 3, each = 3, and a = [4]. In the second, we can take parts=3, each=4, and a=[4]. The third expression does not type-check. Cryptol tells us:

```
Cryptol> split`{3} [1..10] : [3][2][8]
[error] at <interactive>:1:11--1:18:
Type mismatch:
Expected type: 6
Inferred type: 10
```

In this case, we are telling Cryptol that parts = 3, each = 2, and a = [8] by providing the explicit type signature. Using this information, Cryptol must ensure that the argument matches the instantiation of the the polymorphic type. The argument to split must have type [parts * each]a; instantiating the type variables, this is [3 * 2] [8], or [6] [8]. However, the given argument has length 10, which is not equal to 6. It is not hard to see that there is no instantiation to make this work, since 10 is not divisible by 3.

Exercise 1.46. (p. 14) Here is one way of writing this predicate, following the fact that 128 = 2 * 64, 192 = 3 * 64, and 256 = 4 * 64:

 $\{k\}$ (2 <= k, k <= 4) => [k*64]

Here is another way, more direct but somewhat less satisfying:

 $\{k\}$ ((k - 128) * (k - 192) * (k - 256) == 0) => [k]

Note that Cryptol's type constraints do not include or predicates, hence we cannot just list the possibilities in a list.

Section 1.13 Defining functions (p. 15)

Exercise 1.47. (p. 15) Here are some example uses of increment:

```
Cryptol> increment 3
4
Cryptol> increment 255
0
Cryptol> increment 912
[error] at <interactive>:1:1--1:14:
Unsolvable constraint: 8 >= 10
```

Note how type inference rejects application when applied to an argument of the wrong size: 912 is too big to fit into 8 bits.

Exercise 1.48. (p. 16) Any of the following definitions will have the desired type:

```
Cryptol> let increment (x : [8]) = x + 1
Cryptol> let increment x = (x : [8]) + 1
Cryptol> let increment x = x + (1 : [8])
Cryptol> let increment x = x + 1 : [8]
Cryptol> :t increment
increment : [8] -> [8]
```

Exercise 1.49. (p. 16) The signature indicates that twoPlusXY is a function that takes two 8-bit words as a tuple, and returns an 8-bit word.

Exercise 1.50. (p. 16) Here is the type Cryptol infers:

Cryptol> :t twoPlusXY twoPlusXY : {a} (a >= 2, fin a) => ([a],[a]) -> [a]

That is, our function will actually work over arbitrary (finite) sized words, as long as they are at least 2 bits wide. The 2-bit requirement comes from the constant 2, which requires at least 2 bits to represent.

Exercise 1.51. (p. 16) Here is one way of defining this function:

minMax4 : {a} (Cmp a) => [4]a -> (a, a)
minMax4 [a, b, c, d] = (e, f)
where e = min a (min b (min c d))
f = max a (max b (max c d))

Note that ill-typed arguments will be caught at compile time! So, the second invocation with the 5 element sequence will fail to type-check. The Cmp a constraint arises from the types of min and max primitives:

min, max : {a} (Cmp a) \Rightarrow a \Rightarrow a \Rightarrow a

Exercise 1.52. (p. 16) Using reverse and tail, butLast is easy to define:

butLast : {n, t} (fin n) => [n+1]t -> [n]t butLast xs = reverse (tail (reverse xs))

Here is another way to define butLast:

butLast' : {count, x} (fin count) => [count+1]x -> [count]x butLast' xs = take`{count} xs

The type signature sets count to the desired width of the output, which is one shorter than the width of the input:

```
Cryptol> butLast []
[error] at <interactive>:1:1--1:11:
Unsolved constraint:
0 >= 1
arising from
matching types
at <interactive>:1:1--1:11
```

At first the error message might be confusing. What Cryptol is telling us that it deduced count+1 must be 1, which makes count have value 0. But the count+1 we gave it was 0, which is not greater than or equal to 1.

Finally, note that butLast requires a finite sequence as input, for obvious reasons, and hence the fin n constraint.

Exercise 1.53. (p. 17)

all f xs = [f x | x <- xs] == ~zero

Note how we apply f to each element in the sequence and check that the result consists of all Trues, by using a complemented zero. If we pass any an empty sequence, then we will always get False:

Cryptol> any eqTen [] where eqTen x = x == 10 False

This is intuitively the correct behavior as well. The predicate is satisfied by *none* of the elements in the sequence, but any requires at least one.

Exercise 1.54. (p. 17)

any f xs = [f x | x < -xs] != zero

This time all we need to make sure is that the result is not zero, i.e., at least one of elements yielded True. If we pass all an empty sequence, then we will always get False:

```
Cryptol> any eqTen [] where eqTen x = x == 10 False
```

Again, this is the correct response since there are no elements in an empty sequence that can satisfy the predicate.

Section 1.14 Recursion and recurrences (p. 17)

Exercise 1.55. (p. 17)

```
isOdd, isEven : {n} (fin n, n >= 1) => [n] -> Bit
isOdd x = if x == 0 then False else isEven (x - 1)
isEven x = if x == 0 then True else isOdd (x - 1)
```

The extra predicate we need to add is $n \ge 1$. This constraint comes from the subtraction with 1, which requires at least 1 bit to represent.

Exercise 1.56. (p. 17) A number is even if its least least significant bit is False, and odd otherwise. Hence, we can define these functions as:

isOdd', isEven' : {n} (fin n, n >= 1) => [n] -> Bit isOdd' x = x ! zero isEven' x = \sim (x ! zero)

Note the use of zero which permits Cryptol to choose the width of the 0 constant appropriately.

Exercise 1.57. (p. 17) The type of maxSeq is:

maxSeq : $\{a, b\}$ (fin a, fin b) => $[a][b] \rightarrow [b]$

It takes a sequence of words and returns a word of the same size. The suggested expressions produce 0, 10, and 10, respectively.

Exercise 1.58. (p. 18) We can simply drop the selection of the last element (! 0), and write maxSeq' as follows:

Exercise 1.59. (p. 19) Here is one answer. Note that in this solution the width of the answer is specified in terms of the width of the elements, so is likely to overflow. You can prevent the overflow by explicitly specifying the width of the output.

In this code, the sequence ys contains the partial running sums. This is precisely the same pattern we have seen in Example 1.58. The output for the example calls are:

```
CrashCourse> sumAll []

0

CrashCourse> sumAll [1]

1

CrashCourse> sumAll [1, 2]

3

CrashCourse> sumAll [1, 2, 3]

2

CrashCourse> sumAll [1, 2, 3, 4]

2

CrashCourse> sumAll [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

7

CrashCourse> sumAll [1 .. 100]

58
```

If we do not explicitly tell Cryptol how wide the result is, then it will pick the width of the input elements, which will cause overflow and be subject to modular arithmetic as usual. Experiment with different signatures for sumAll, to avoid the overflow automatically, to get the answers:

Exercise 1.60. (p. 19) Using a fold, it is easy to write elem:

Note how we or (||) the previous result m with the current match, accumulating the result as we walk over the sequence. Starting with False ensures that if none of the matches succeed we will end up returning False. We have:

```
Cryptol> elem (2, [1..10])

True

Cryptol> elem (0, [1..10])

False

Cryptol> elem (10, [])

False

Exercise 1.61. (p. 19)

fibs : [inf][32]

fibs = [0, 1] # [ x+y | x <- fibs
```

```
1bs = [0, 1] # [ x+y | x <- f1bs
| y <- drop`{1} fibs
]
```

In this case we use the sequence [0, 1] as the seed, and both branches recursively refer to the defined value fibs. In the second branch, we drop the first element to skip over the first element of the sequence, effectively pairing the previous two elements at each step. The *n*th fibonacci number is obtained by the expression fibs @ n:

Cryptol> fibs @ 3 2 Cryptol> fibs @ 4 3 Cryptol> take`{10} fibs [0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34]

Note that **fibs** is an infinite stream of 32 bit numbers, so it will eventually be subject to wrap-around due to modular arithmetic.

Section 1.15 Stream equations (p. 19)

Exercise 1.62. (p. 20)

Section 1.16 Type synonyms (p. 20)

Exercise 1.63. (p. 21) A point is on the *a*th axis if its non-*a*th components are 0. Hence we have:

```
type Point3D a = {x : [a], y : [a], z : [a]}
onAnAxis : {a} (fin a) => Point3D a -> Bit
onAnAxis p = onX || onY || onZ
where onX = (p.y == 0) && (p.z == 0)
onY = (p.x == 0) && (p.z == 0)
onZ = (p.x == 0) && (p.y == 0)
```

Exercise 1.64. (p. 22) This code:

cmpArith x y z = if x == y then z else z+z

yields the inferred type:

cmpArith : {a, b} (Arith b, Cmp a) \Rightarrow a \Rightarrow a \Rightarrow b \Rightarrow b

Section 2.1 Caesar's cipher (p. 27)

Exercise 2.1. (p. 28) Here is the alphabet and the corresponding shift-2 Caesar's alphabet:

```
Cryptol> ['A'..'Z']
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
Cryptol> ['A'..'Z'] <<< 2
"CDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZAB"
```

We use a left rotate to get the characters lined up correctly, as illustrated above.

Exercise 2.2. (p. 28) Here are Cryptol's responses:

```
Cryptol> caesar (0, "ATTACKATDAWN")
"ATTACKATDAWN"
Cryptol> caesar (3, "ATTACKATDAWN")
"DWWDFNDWGDZQ"
Cryptol> caesar (12, "ATTACKATDAWN")
"MFFMOWMFPMIZ"
Cryptol> caesar (52, "ATTACKATDAWN")
"ATTACKATDAWN"
```

If the shift is a multiple of 26 (as in 0 and 52 above), the letters will cycle back to their original values, so encryption will leave the message unchanged. Users of the Caesar's cipher should be careful about picking the shift amount!

Exercise 2.3. (p. 28) The code is almost identical, except we need to use a right rotate:

```
dCaesar : {n} ([8], String n) -> String n
dCaesar (s, msg) = [ shift x | x <- msg ]
    where map = ['A' .. 'Z'] >>> s
        shift c = map @ (c - 'A')
```

We have:

```
Cryptol> caesar (12, "ATTACKATDAWN")
"MFFMOWMFPMIZ"
Cryptol> dCaesar (12, "MFFMOWMFPMIZ")
"ATTACKATDAWN"
```

Exercise 2.4. (p. 28) For the Caesar's cipher, the only good shifts are 1 through 25, since shifting by 0 would return the plaintext unchanged, and any shift amount d that is larger than 26 and over is essentially the same as shifting by d % 26 due to wrap around. Therefore, all it takes to break the Caesar cipher is to try the sizes 1 through 25, and see if we have a valid message. We can automate this in Cryptol by returning all possible plaintexts using these shift amounts:

attackCaesar : {n} (String n) \rightarrow [25](String n) attackCaesar msg = [dCaesar(i, msg) | i <- [1 .. 25]]

If we apply this function to JHLZHYJPWOLYPZDLHR, we get:

```
Cryptol> :set ascii=on
Cryptol> attackCaesar "JHLZHYJPWOLYPZDLHR",
["IGKYGXIOVNKXOYCKGQ", "HFJXFWHNUMJWNXBJFP", "GEIWEVGMTLIVMWAIEO"
"FDHVDUFLSKHULVZHDN", "ECGUCTEKRJGTKUYGCM", "DBFTBSDJQIFSJTXFBL"
"CAESARCIPHERISWEAK", "BZDRZQBHOGDQHRVDZJ", "AYCQYPAGNFCPGQUCYI"
"ZXBPXOZFMEBOFPTBXH", "YWAOWNYELDANEOSAWG", "XVZNVMXDKCZMDNRZVF"
"WUYMULWCJBYLCMQYUE", "VTXLTKVBIAXKBLPXTD", "USWKSJUAHZWJAKOWSC"
"TRVJRITZGYVIZJNVRB", "SQUIQHSYFXUHYIMUQA", "RPTHPGRXEWTGXHLTPZ"
"QOSGOFQWDVSFWGKSOY", "PNRFNEPVCUREVFJRNX", "OMQEMDOUBTQDUEIQMW"
"NLPDLCNTASPCTDHPLV", "MKOCKBMSZROBSCGOKU", "LJNBJALRYQNARBFNJT"
```

If you skim through the potential ciphertexts, you will see that the 7^{th} entry is probably the one we are looking for. Hence the key must be 7. Indeed, the message is CAESARCIPHERISWEAK.

Exercise 2.5. (p. 28) No. Using two shifts d_1 and d_2 is essentially the same as using just one shift with the amount $d_1 + d_2$. Our attack function would work just fine on this schema as well. In fact, we wouldn't even have to know how

many rounds of encryption was applied. Multiple rounds is just as weak as a single round when it comes to breaking the Caesar's cipher.

Exercise 2.6. (p. 28) In this case we will fail to find a mapping:

Cryptol> caesar (3, "12") ... index of 240 is out of bounds (valid range is 0 thru 25).

What happened here is that Cryptol computed the offset '1' - 'A' to obtain the 8-bit index 240 (remember, modular arithmetic!), but our alphabet only has 26 entries, causing the out-of-bounds error. We can simply remedy this problem by allowing our alphabet to contain all 8-bit numbers:

```
caesar' : {n} ([8], String n) -> String n
caesar' (s, msg) = [ shift x | x <- msg ]
where map = [0 .. 255] <<< s
shift c = map @ c</pre>
```

Note that we no longer have to subtract 'A', since we are allowing a much wider range for our plaintext and ciphertext. (Another way to put this is that we are subtracting the value of the first element in the alphabet, which happens to be 0 in this case! Consequently, the number of "good" shifts increase from 25 to 255.) The change in dCaesar' is analogous:

```
dCaesar' : {n} ([8], String n) -> String n
dCaesar' (s, msg) = [ shift x | x <- msg ]
where map = [0 .. 255] >>> s
shift c = map @ c
```

Section 2.2 Vigenère cipher (p. 28)

Exercise 2.7. (p. 28) Here is one way to define cycle, using a recursive definition:

```
cycle xs = xss
where xss = xs # xss
```

We have:

Cryptol> cycle [1 .. 3] [1, 2, 3, 1, 2, ...]

If we do not have the $n \ge 1$ predicate, then we can pass cycle the empty sequence, which would cause an infinite loop emitting nothing. The predicate $n \ge 1$ makes sure the input is non-empty, guaranteeing that cycle can produce the infinite sequence.

```
Exercise 2.8. (p. 29)
```

Note the shift is determined by the distance from the letter 'A' for each character. Here is the cipher in action:

```
Cryptol> vigenere ("CRYPTOL", "ATTACKATDAWN")
"CKRPVYLVUYLG"
```

Exercise 2.9. (p. 29) Following the lead of the encryption, we can rely on dCaesar:

The secret code is:

```
Cryptol> dVigenere ("CRYPTOL", "XZETGSCGTYCMGEQGAGRDEQC")
"VIGENERECANTSTOPCRYPTOL"
```

Exercise 2.10. (p. 29) All it takes is to decrypt using using the plaintext as the key and message as the cipherkey. Here is this process in action. Recall from the previous exercise that encrypting ATTACKATDAWN by the key CRYPTOL yields CKRPVYLVUYLG. Now, if an attacker knows that ATTACKATDAWN and CKRPVYLVUYLG form a pair, he/she can find the key simply by:

Cryptol> dVigenere ("ATTACKATDAWN", "CKRPVYLVUYLG") "CRYPTOLCRYPT"

Note that this process will not always tell us what the key is precisely. It will only be the key repeated for the given message size. For sufficiently large messages, or when the key does not repeat any characters, however, it would be really easy for an attacker to glean the actual key from this information.

This trick works since the act of using the plaintext as the key and the ciphertext as the message essentially reverses the shifting process, revealing the shift amounts for each pair of characters. The same attack would essentially work for the Caesar's cipher as well, where we would only need one character to crack it.

Section 2.3 The atbash (p. 29)

Exercise 2.11. (p. 29) Using the reverse index operator, coding atbash is trivial:

```
atbash : {n} String n -> String n
atbash pt = [ alph ! (c - 'A') | c <- pt ]
where alph = ['A' .. 'Z']</pre>
```

We have:

Cryptol> atbash "ATTACKATDAWN" "ZGGZXPZGWZDM"

Exercise 2.12. (p. 29) Notice that decryption for atbash is precisely the same as encryption, the process is entirely the same. So, we do not have to write any code at all, we can simply define:

```
dAtbash : {n} String n -> String n
dAtbash = atbash
```

We have:

```
Cryptol> dAtbash "ZGYZHSRHHVOUWVXIBKGRMT"
"ATBASHISSELFDECRYPTING"
```

Section 2.4 Substitution ciphers (p. 29)

Exercise 2.13. (p. 29)

subst (key, pt) = [key @ (p - 'A') | p <- pt]</pre>

We have:

```
Cryptol> subst(substKey, "SUBSTITUTIONSSAVETHEDAY")
"NLJNUXULUXAINNFSOUROWFC"
```

Exercise 2.14. (p. 29)

The comprehension defining candidates uses a fold (see page 18). The first branch ($k \leq key$) walks through all the key elements, the second branch walks through the ordinary alphabet ($a \leq ['A' ... 'Z']$), and the final branch walks through the candidate match so far. At the end of the fold, we simply return the final element of candidates. Note that we start with 0 as the first element, so that if no match is found we get a 0 back.

Exercise 2.15. (p. 30)

```
dSubst: {n} (String 26, String n) -> String n
dSubst (key, ct) = [ invSubst (key, c) | c <- ct ]
```

We have:

```
Cryptol> dSubst (substKey, "FUUFHKFUWFGI")
"ATTACKATDAWN"
```

Exercise 2.16. (p. 30) No, with this key we cannot decrypt properly:

```
Cryptol> subst ("AAAABBBBBCCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGG", "HELLOWORLD")
"BBCCDFDECA"
Cryptol> dSubst ("AAAABBBBBCCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGG", "BBCCDFDECA")
"HHLLPXPTLD"
```

This is because the given key maps multiple plaintext letters to the same ciphertext letter. (For instance, it maps all of A, B, C, and D to the letter A.) For substitution ciphers to work the key should not repeat the elements, providing a 1-to-1 mapping. This property clearly holds for substKey. Note that there is no shortage of keys, since for 26 letters we have 26! possible ways to choose keys, which gives us over 4-billion different choices.

Section 2.5 The scytale (p. 30)

Exercise 2.17. (p. 31) If you do not provide a signature for msg', you will get the following type-error message from Cryptol:

```
Failed to validate user-specified signature.
In the definition of 'scytale', at classic.cry:40:1--40:8:
   for any type row, diameter
      fin row
      fin diameter
   =>
   fin ?b
      arising from use of expression split at classic.cry:42:17--42:22
```

```
fin ?d
arising from use of expression join at classic.cry:40:15--40:19
row * diameter == ?a * ?b
arising from matching types at classic.cry:1:1--1:1
```

Essentially, Cryptol is complaining that it was asked to do a split and it figured that the constraint diameter * row = a * b must hold, but that is not sufficient to determine what a and b should really be. (There could be multiple ways to assign a and b to satisfy that requirement, for instance a=4, b=row; or a=2 and b=2*row, resulting in differing behavior.) This is why it is unable to "validate the user-specified signature". By putting the explicit signature for msg', we are giving Cryptol more information to resolve the ambiguity. Notice that since the code for scytale and dScytale are precisely the same except for the type on msg'. This is a clear indication that the type signature plays an essential role here.

Exercise 2.18. (p. 31) Even if we do not know the diameter, we do know that it is a divisor of the length of the message. For any given message size, we can compute the number of divisors of the size and try decryption until we find a meaningful plaintext. Of course, the number of potential divisors will be large for large messages, but the practicality of scytale stems from the choice of relatively small diameters, hence the search would not take too long. (With large diameters, the ancient Greeks would have to carry around very thick rods, which would not be very practical in a battle scenario!)

Section 3.1 The plugboard (p. 33)

Exercise 3.1. (p. 33) We can simply ask Cryptol what the implied mappings are:

Cryptol> [plugboard @ (c - 'A') | c <- "ACQTUWO"] "HGXVYML"

Why do we subtract the 'A' when indexing?

Section 3.2 Scrambler rotors (p. 33)

Exercise 3.2. (p. 34) Recall that rotor1 was defined as:

rotor1 = mkRotor ("RJICAWVQZODLUPYFEHXSMTKNGB", "IO")

Here is a listing of the new mappings and the characters we will get at the output for each successive C:

starting map	output	notch engaged?
RJICAWVQZODLUPYFEHXSMTKNGB	I	no
JICAWVQZODLUPYFEHXSMTKNGBR	С	no
ICAWVQZODLUPYFEHXSMTKNGBRJ	А	yes
CAWVQZODLUPYFEHXSMTKNGBRJI	W	no
AWVQZODLUPYFEHXSMTKNGBRJIC	V	no

Note how we get different letters as output, even though we are providing the same input (all C's.) This is the essence of the Enigma: the same input will not cause the same output necessarily, making it a polyalphabetic substitution cipher.

Section 3.3 Connecting the rotors: notches in action (p. 34)

Exercise 3.3. (p. 35) We can define the following value to simulate the operation of always telling scramble to rotate the rotor and providing it with the input C.

```
rotor1CCCCC = [(c1, n1), (c2, n2), (c3, n3), (c4, n4), (c5, n5)]
where (n1, c1, r1) = scramble (True, 'C', rotor1)
        (n2, c2, r2) = scramble (True, 'C', r1)
        (n3, c3, r3) = scramble (True, 'C', r2)
        (n4, c4, r4) = scramble (True, 'C', r3)
        (n5, c5, r5) = scramble (True, 'C', r4)
```

Note how we chained the output rotor values in the calls, through the values r1-r2-r3 and r4. We have:

```
Cryptol> rotor1CCCCC
[(I, False), (C, False), (A, True), (W, False), (V, False)]
```

Note that we get precisely the same results from Cryptol as we predicted in the previous exercise.

Exercise 3.4. (p. 36) Not unless we receive an empty sequence of rotors, i.e., a call of the form: joinRotors ([], c) for some character c. In this case, it does make sense to return c directly, which is what initRotor will do. Note that unless we do receive an empty sequence of rotors, the value of initRotor will not be used when computing the joinRotors function.

Exercise 3.5. (p. 36) The crucial part is the value of ncrs. Let us write it out by substituting the values of rotors and inputChar:

Clearly, the first element of ncrs will be:

(True, 'F', initRotor)

Therefore, the second element will be the result of the call:

```
scramble (True, 'F', rotor1)
```

Recall that rotor1 was defined as:

```
rotor1 = mkRotor ("RJICAWVQZODLUPYFEHXSMTKNGB", "IO")
```

What letter does rotor1 map F to? Since F is the 5th character (counting from 0), rotor1 maps it to the 5th element of its permutation, i.e., W, remembering to count from 0! The topmost element in rotor1 is R, which is not its notch-list, hence it will *not* tell the next rotor to rotate. But it will rotate itself, since it received the True signal. Thus, the second element of ncrs will be:

(False, 'W', ...)

where we used ... to denote the one left-rotation of rotor1. (Note that we do not need to know the precise arrangement of rotor1 now for the purposes of this exercise.) Now we move to rotor2, we have to compute the result of the call:

```
scramble (False, 'W', rotor2)
```

Recall that rotor2 was defined as:

```
rotor2 = mkRotor ("DWYOLETKNVQPHURZJMSFIGXCBA", "B")
```

So, it maps W to X. (The fourth letter from the end.) It will not rotate itself, and it will not tell rotor3 to rotate itself either since the topmost element is D in its current configuration, and D which is not in the notch-list "B". Thus, the final scramble call will be:

```
scramble (False, 'X', rotor3)
```

where

```
rotor3 = mkRotor ("FGKMAJWUOVNRYIZETDPSHBLCQX", "CK")
```

It is easy to see that rotor3 will map X to C. Thus the final value coming out of this expression must be C. Indeed, we have:

```
Cryptol> project(2, 2, joinRotors ([rotor1 rotor2 rotor3], 'F'))
C
```

Of course, Cryptol also keeps track of the new rotor positions as well, which we have glossed over in this discussion.

Section 3.4 The reflector (p. 36)

Exercise 3.6. (p. 36)

For each character in the alphabet, we first figure out what it maps to using the reflector, named m above. We also find out what m gets mapped to, named c' above. To be a valid reflector it must hold that c is not m (no character maps to itself), and c must be c'. We have:

Cryptol> checkReflector reflector True

Note how we used all to make sure check holds for all the elements of the alphabet.

Section 3.5 Putting the pieces together (p. 36)

Exercise 3.7. (p. 37) We can define the following helper function, using the function all you have defined in exercise 1.53:

Note that we have to check both ways (first substFwd then substBwd, and also the other way around) in case the substitution is badly formed, for instance if it is mapping the same character twice. We have:

Cryptol> checkPermutation [c | (c, _) <- rotor1] True

For a bad permutation we would get False:

```
Cryptol> checkPermutation (['A' .. 'Y'] # ['A'])
False
```

Exercise 3.8. (p. 37) Since the reflector is symmetric, substituting backwards or forwards does not matter. We can verify this with the following helper function:

We have:

```
Cryptol> checkReflectorFwdBwd reflector
True
```

Section 3.7 Encryption and decryption (p. 38)

Exercise 3.10. (p. 39) Enigma will start repeating once the rotors go back to their original position. With *n* rotors, this will take 26^n characters. In the case of the traditional 3-rotor Enigma this amounts to $26^3 = 17576$ characters. Note that we are assuming an ideal Enigma here with no double-stepping [2].

Exercise 3.11. (p. 39) Since the period for the 3-rotor Enigma is 17576 (see the previous exercise), we need to make sure two instances of CRYPTOL are 17576 characters apart. Since CRYPTOL has 7 characters, we should have 17569 X's. The following Cryptol definition would return the relevant pieces:

We have:

Cryptol> enigmaCryptol ("KGSHMPK", "KGSHMPK")

As predicted, both instances of CRYPTOL get encrypted as KGSHMPK.

Section 4.1 Writing properties (p. 41)

```
Exercise 4.1. (p. 42)
property revRev xs = reverse (reverse xs) == xs
Exercise 4.2. (p. 42)
property appAssoc (xs, ys, zs) = xs # (ys # zs) == (xs # ys) # zs
Exercise 4.3. (p. 42)
property revApp (xs, ys) = reverse (xs # ys)
== reverse ys # reverse xs
```

Exercise 4.4. (p. 42)

property lshMul (n, k) = n << k == n * 2^{k}

Exercise 4.5. (p. 43) There are many such types, all sharing the property that they do not take any space to represent. Here are a couple examples:

```
Cryptol> flipNeverIdentity (zero : ([0], [0]))
False
Cryptol> flipNeverIdentity (zero : [0][8])
False
```

Exercise 4.6. (p. 43)

Cryptol> :t widthPoly widthPoly : {a, b} (fin a) => [a]b -> Bit

It is easy to see that widthPoly holds at the instances:

{b} [15]b -> Bit

and

{b} [531]b -> Bit

but at no other. Based on this, we can write evenWidth as follows:

property evenWidth x = (width x) ! 0 == False

remembering that the 0'th bit of an even number is always False. We have:

```
Cryptol> evenWidth (0:[1])
False
Cryptol> evenWidth (0:[2])
True
Cryptol> evenWidth (0:[3])
False
Cryptol> evenWidth (0:[4])
True
Cryptol> evenWidth (0:[5])
False
```

Section 4.2 Establishing correctness (p. 43)

Exercise 4.7. (p. 45) If we try to prove revRev directly, we will get an error from Cryptol:

```
Cryptol> :prove revRev
Not a monomorphic type:
{n, a} (Cmp a, fin n) => [n]a -> Bit
```

Cryptol is telling us that the property has a polymorphic type, and hence cannot be proven. We can easily prove instances of it, by either creating new properties with fixed type signatures, or by specializing it via type annotations. Several examples are given below:

```
Cryptol> :prove revRev : [10][8] -> Bit
Q.E.D.
Cryptol> :prove revRev : [100][32] -> Bit
Q.E.D.
Cryptol> :prove revRev : [0][4] -> Bit
Q.E.D.
```

Exercise 4.11. (p. 45) We have:

```
Cryptol> :prove widthPoly : [15] -> Bit
Q.E.D.
Cryptol> :prove widthPoly : [531] -> Bit
Q.E.D.
Cryptol> :prove widthPoly : [8] -> Bit
widthPoly:[8] -> Bit 0 = False
Cryptol> :prove widthPoly : [32] -> Bit
widthPoly:[32] -> Bit 0 = False
```

Exercise 4.12. (p. 45)

We have:

```
Cryptol> :prove divModMul : ([4], [4]) -> Bit
Q.E.D.
Cryptol> :prove divModMul : ([8], [8]) -> Bit
Q.E.D.
```

Exercise 4.13. (p. 46) Using all and elem, it is easy to express validMessage:

```
validMessage = all (\c -> elem (c, ['A' .. 'Z']))
```

Note the use of a λ -expression to pass the function to all. Of course, we could have defined a separate function for it in a where-clause, but the function is short enough to directly write it inline.

Exercise 4.14. (p. 46) A naive attempt would be to write:

However, this property is not correct for all msg, since Caesar's cipher only works for messages containing the letters 'A' ...'Z', not arbitrary 8-bit values as the above property suggests. We can see this easily by providing a bad input:

```
Cryptol> caesar (3, "1")
invalid sequence index: 240
```

(240 is the difference between the ASCII value of '1', 49, and the letter 'A', 65, interpreted as an 8-bit offset.) We should use the validMessage function of the previous exercise to write a conditional property instead:

We have:

```
Cryptol> :prove caesarCorrect : ([8], String(10)) -> Bit
Q.E.D.
Exercise 4.15. (p. 46)
property modelEnigmaCorrect pt =
    if validMessage pt
    then dEnigma (modelEnigma, enigma (modelEnigma, pt)) == pt
    else True
We have:
Cryptol> :prove modelEnigmaCorrect : String(10) -> Bit
Q.E.D.
```

Section 4.3 Automated random testing (p. 46)

Exercise 4.16. (p. 46) Here is the interaction with Cryptol (when you actually run this, you will see the test cases counting up as they are performed):

```
Cryptol> :check (caesarCorrect : ([8], String 10) -> Bit)
Using random testing.
Passed 100 tests.
Expected test coverage: 0.00% (100 of 2^88 values)
Cryptol> :set tests=1000
Cryptol> :check (caesarCorrect : ([8], String 10) -> Bit)
Using random testing.
Passed 1000 tests.
Expected test coverage: 0.00% (1000 of 2^88 values)
```

In each case, Cryptol tells us that it checked a minuscule portion of all possible test cases: A good reminder of what :check is really doing. The number of test cases is: $2^{8+8\times10} = 2^{88}$. We have 8-bits for the d value, and 10×8 bits total for the 10 characters in msg, giving us a total of 88 bits. Since the input is 88 bits wide, we have 2^{88} potential test cases. Note how the number of test cases increase exponentially with the size of the message.

Exercise 4.17. (p. 46)

```
Cryptol> :check True
Using exhaustive testing.
Passed 1 tests.
Q.E.D.
Cryptol> :check False
Using exhaustive testing.
False = False0%
Cryptol> :check \x -> x == (x:[8])
Using exhaustive testing.
Passed 256 tests.
Q.E.D.
```

Note that when Cryptol is able to exhaust all possible inputs, it returns Q.E.D., since the property is effectively proven.

Exercise 4.18. (p. 46)

property easyBug x = x != (76123:[64])

The :prove command will find the counterexample almost instantaneously, while :check will have a hard time!

Exercise 4.19. (p. 47) The predicate passes 100 tests, with a test coverage of 0.15%.

Cryptol> :exhaust $(x:[16]) \rightarrow (x + 6) / 3 == x / 3 + 2$ Using exhaustive testing. $((x : [16]) \rightarrow (x + 6) / 3 == x / 3 + 2)$ Oxfffa = False

The property does not hold in general.

Section 4.4 Checking satisfiability (p. 47)

Exercise 4.20. (p. 48)

modFermat (a, b, c, n) = (a > 0) & (b > 0) & (c > 0) & (n > 2) & & (a^n + b^n == c^n)

The fin s predicate comes from the fact that we are doing arithmetic and comparisons. The predicate $s \ge 2$ comes from the fact that we are comparing n to 2, which needs at least 2 bits to represent.

Exercise 4.21. (p. 48) We can try different instantiations as follows:

Cryptol> :sat modFermat : Quad(2) -> Bit modFermat : Quad(2) -> Bit (1, 2, 1, 3) = True Cryptol> :sat modFermat : Quad(3) -> Bit modFermat : Quad(3) -> Bit (4, 4, 4, 4) = True Cryptol> :sat modFermat : Quad(4) -> Bit modFermat : Quad(4) -> Bit (4, 4, 4, 8) = True

The modular form of Fermat's last theorem does not hold for any of the instances up to and including 12 bits wide, when I stopped experimenting myself. It is unlikely that it will hold for any particular bit-size, although the above demonstration is not a proof. (We would need to consult a mathematician for the general result!) Also note that Cryptol takes longer and longer to find a satisfying instance as you increase the bit-size.

Section 5.2 Polynomials in $GF(2^8)$ (p. 50)

```
Exercise 5.1. (p. 50)
polySelfAdd: GF28 -> Bit
property polySelfAdd x = (x ^ x) == zero
We have:
Cryptol> :prove polySelfAdd
Q.E.D.
Exercise 5.2. (p. 51)
gf28Add ps = sums ! 0
where sums = [zero] # [ p ^ s | p <- ps
| s <- sums
]</pre>
```

Exercise 5.3. (p. 51) We first compute the results of multiplying our first polynomial $(x^3 + x^2 + x + 1)$ with each term in the second polynomial $(x^2 + x + 1)$ separately:

$$(x^{3} + x^{2} + x + 1) \times x^{2} = x^{5} + x^{4} + x^{3} + x^{2}$$
$$(x^{3} + x^{2} + x + 1) \times x = x^{4} + x^{3} + x^{2} + x$$
$$(x^{3} + x^{2} + x + 1) \times 1 = x^{3} + x^{2} + x + 1$$

We now add the resulting polynomials, remembering the adding the same powered terms cancel each other out. For instance, we have two instances each of x^4 , x^2 , and x, which all get canceled. We have three instances each of x^3 and x^2 , so they survive the addition, etc. After the addition, we are left with the polynomial $x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$, which can be interpreted as 0b00101101, i.e., 45.

Exercise 5.4. (p. 51) The long division algorithm is laborious, but not particularly hard:

Therefore, the quotient is $x^2 + x$ and the remainder is $x^2 + x + 1$. We can verify this easily with Cryptol:

Another way to check your result would be to multiply the quotient by the divisor and add the remainder, and check that it gives us precisely the polynomial we started with:

```
Cryptol> pmult <| x^^2 + x |> <| x^^3 + x^2 + 1 |> \
^ <| x^2 + x + 1 |>
0x29
Cryptol> <| x^5 + x^3 + 1 |>
0x29
```

Exercise 5.5. (p. 51)

```
property gf28MultUnit x = gf28Mult(x, 1) == x
property gf28MultCommutative x y = gf28Mult(x, y) == gf28Mult(y, x)
property gf28MultAssociative x y z = gf28Mult(x, gf28Mult(y, z))
== gf28Mult(gf28Mult(x, y), z)
```

It turns out that proving the unit and commutativity are fairly trivial:

Cryptol> :prove gf28MultUnit Q.E.D. Cryptol> :prove gf28MultCommutative Q.E.D.

But aesMultAssociative takes much longer! We show the results of :check below:

Cryptol> :check gf28MultAssociative Checking case 1000 of 1000 (100.00%) 1000 tests passed OK Note that the coverage is pretty small (on the order of 0.006%) in this case. Proving associativity of multiplication algorithms using SAT/SMT based technologies is a notoriously hard task [9, section 6.3.1]. If you have the time, you can let Cryptol run long enough to complete the :prove gf28MultAssociative command, however.

Section 5.3 The SubBytes transformation (p. 51)

```
Exercise 5.6. (p. 52)
```

```
gf28Pow (n, k) = pow k
where sq x = gf28Mult (x, x)
    odd x = x ! 0
    pow i = if i == 0 then 1
        else if odd i
            then gf28Mult (n, sq (pow (i >> 1)))
            else sq (pow (i >> 1))
```

Here is a version that follows the stream-recursion pattern:

Exercise 5.7. (p. 52)

```
gf28Inverse x = gf28Pow (x, 254)
```

We do not have to do anything special about 0, since our gf28Inverse function yields 0 in that case:

```
Cryptol> gf28Inverse 0
0x00
```

Exercise 5.8. (p. 52) Since 0 does not have a multiplicative inverse, we have to write a conditional property:

```
property gf28InverseCorrect x =
    if x == 0 then x' == 0 else gf28Mult(x, x') == 1
    where x' = gf28Inverse x
```

We have:

```
Cryptol> :prove gf28InverseCorrect Q.E.D.
```

Exercise 5.9. (p. 52)

Exercise 5.10. (p. 53)

```
property SubByteCorrect x = SubByte x == SubByte' x
```

We have:

```
Cryptol> :prove SubByteCorrect Q.E.D.
```

Section 5.4 The ShiftRows transformation (p. 53)

Exercise 5.11. (p. 53) Consider what happens after 4 calls to ShiftRows. The first row will stay the same, since it never moves. The second row moves one position each time, and hence it will move 4 positions at the end, restoring it back to its original starting configuration. Similarly, row 3 will rotate $2 \times 4 = 8$ times, again restoring it. Finally, row 4 rotates 3 times each for a total of $3 \times 4 = 12$ times, cycling back to its starting position. Hence, every 4th rotation will restore the entire state back. We can verify this in Cryptol by the following property:

```
shiftRow4RestoresBack : State -> Bit
property shiftRow4RestoresBack state = states @ 4 == state
where states = [state] # [ ShiftRows s | s <- states ]</pre>
```

We have:

```
Cryptol> :prove shiftRow4RestoresBack Q.E.D.
```

Of course, any multiple of 4 would have the same effect.

Section 5.5 The MixColumns transformation (p. 54)

```
Exercise 5.12. (p. 54)
  gf28DotProduct (xs, ys) = gf28Add [ gf28Mult (x, y) | x <- xs
                                                         | y <- ys
                                      ٦
Exercise 5.13. (p. 54)
  property DPComm a b =
                          gf28DotProduct (a, b) == gf28DotProduct (b, a)
 property DPDist a b c =
                          gf28DotProduct (a, vectorAdd(b, c)) ==
                          gf28Add [ab, ac]
    where
           ab = gf28DotProduct (a, b)
            ac = gf28DotProduct (a, c)
            vectorAdd (xs, ys) = [ gf28Add [x, y] | x < -xs
                                                | y <- ys
                                1
We have:
  AES> :prove DPComm : [10]GF28 -> [10]GF28 -> Bit
  Q.E.D.
  AES> :check DPDist : [10]GF28 -> [10]GF28 -> [10]GF28 -> Bit
  Using random testing.
  Passed 1000 tests.
```

You might be surprised that the total number of cases for this property is $2^{3*10*8} = 2^{240}$ —a truly ginormous number!

Exercise 5.14. (p. 54)

gf28VectorMult (v, ms) = [gf28DotProduct(v, m) | m <- ms]</pre>

Exercise 5.15. (p. 54) We simply need to call gfVectorMult of the previous exercise on every row of the first matrix, after transposing the second matrix to make sure columns are properly aligned. We have:

Section 5.6 Key expansion (p. 55)

Exercise 5.16. (p. 55) Finding out the elements is easy:

Cryptol> [(Rcon i)@0 | i <- [1 .. 10]] [1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 27, 54]

Note that we only capture the first element in each Rcon value, since we know that the rest are 0. We can now use this table to define Rcon' as follows:

Rcon' i = [(rcons @ (i-1)), 0, 0, 0]
where rcons : [10]GF28
rcons = [1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 27, 54]

Note that we subtract 1 before indexing into the **rcons** sequence to get the indexing right.

Exercise 5.17. (p. 55) We need to write a conditional property (subsection 4.2.4). Below, we use the function elem you have defined in exercise 1.60:

We have:

```
Cryptol> :prove RconCorrect Q.E.D.
```

Section 5.8 AES encryption (p. 57)

Exercise 5.18. (p. 58)

```
property msgToStateToMsg msg = stateToMsg(msgToState(msg)) == msg
property stToMsgToSt s = msgToState(stateToMsg s) == s
We have:
Cryptol> :prove msgToStateToMsg
```

```
Q.E.D.
Cryptol> :prove stToMsgToSt
Q.E.D.
```

Section 5.9 Decryption (p. 58)

Exercise 5.20. (p. 59)

property xformByteInverse x = xformByte' (xformByte x) == x

We have:

Cryptol> :prove xformByteInverse Q.E.D.

Exercise 5.21. (p. 59)

```
property sboxInverse s = InvSubBytes (SubBytes s) == s
```

We have:

Cryptol> :prove xformByteInverse Q.E.D.

Exercise 5.23. (p. 59)

```
property shiftRowsInverse s = InvShiftRows (ShiftRows s) == s
```

We have:

```
Cryptol> :prove shiftRowsInverse Q.E.D.
```

Exercise 5.24. (p. 59)

property mixColumnsInverse s = InvMixColumns (MixColumns s) == s

Unlike others, this property is harder to prove automatically and will take much longer. Below we show the :check results instead:

Cryptol> :check mixColumnsInverse Checking case 1000 of 1000 (100.00%) 1000 tests passed OK

Appendix B

Cryptol prelude functions

Bitwise and logical operations

True, False : Bit &&, ||, ^ : {a} (Logic a) => a -> a -> a ~ : {a} (Logic a) => a -> a ==>, /\, \/ : Bit -> Bit -> Bit

Comparisons

==, != : {a} (Cmp a) => a -> a -> Bit <, >, <=, >= : {a} (Cmp a) => a -> a -> Bit <\$, >\$, <=\$, >=\$: {a} (SignedCmp a) => a -> a -> Bit min, max : {a} (Cmp a) => a -> a -> a ===, !== : {a, b} (Cmp b) => (a -> b) -> (a -> b) -> a -> Bit

Arithmetic

+, -, *, /, %, ^^ : {a} (Arith a) => a -> a -> a negate, lg2 : {a} (Arith a) => a -> a fromInteger : {a} (Arith a) => Integer -> a

Polynomial arithmetic

pdiv : {u, v} (fin u, fin v) => [u] -> [v] -> [u] pmod : {u, v} (fin u, fin v) => [u] -> [1 + v] -> [v] pmult : {u, v} (fin u, fin v) => [1 + u] -> [1 + v] -> [1 + u + v]

Sequences

```
take
          : {front, back, a} (fin front) => [front + back]a -> [front]a
drop
          : {front, back, a} (fin front) => [front + back]a -> [back]a
          : {front, back, a} (fin front) => [front]a -> [back]a -> [front + back]a
#
join
          : {parts, each, a} (fin each) => [parts][each]a -> [parts * each]a
          : {parts, each, a} (fin each) => [parts * each]a -> [parts][each]a
split
groupBy
        : {each, parts, a} (fin each) => [parts * each]a -> [parts][each]a
transpose : {rows, cols, a} [rows][cols]a -> [cols][rows]a
reverse : {n, a} (fin n) \Rightarrow [n]a \rightarrow [n]a
        : {n, a} [1 + n]a -> a
head
          : {n, a} [1 + n]a -> [n]a
tail
          : {n, a} (fin n) => [1 + n]a -> a
last
```

Indexing, updates

```
0 : {n, a, ix} (fin ix) => [n]a -> [ix] -> a
! : {n, a, ix} (fin n, fin ix) => [n]a -> [ix] -> a
00 : {n, k, ix, a} (fin ix) => [n]a -> [k][ix] -> [k]a
!! : {n, k, ix, a} (fin n, fin ix) => [n]a -> [k][ix] -> [k]a
update : {n, a, ix} (fin ix) => [n]a -> [ix] -> a -> [n]a
updateEnd : {n, a, ix} (fin n, fin ix) => [n]a -> [ix] -> a -> [n]a
updates : {n, k, ix, a} (fin ix, fin k) => [n]a -> [k][ix] -> [k]a -> [n]a
```

Shifting, rotating

```
>>>, <<< : {n, ix, a} (fin n, fin ix) => [n]a -> [ix] -> [n]a
>>, << : {n, ix, a} (fin ix, Zero a) => [n]a -> [ix] -> [n]a
>>$ : {n, ix} (fin n, n >= 1, fin ix) => [n] -> [ix] -> [n]
```

Functional programming

iterate : {a} (a \rightarrow a) \rightarrow a \rightarrow [inf]a repeat : {n, a} a -> [n]a map : {n, a, b} (a -> b) -> [n]a -> [n]b : {n, a, b} [n]a -> [n]b -> [n](a, b) zip zipWith : {n, a, b, c} (a \rightarrow b \rightarrow c) \rightarrow [n]a \rightarrow [n]b \rightarrow [n]c : {n, a, b} (fin n) \Rightarrow (a \rightarrow b \rightarrow a) \rightarrow a \rightarrow [n]b \rightarrow a foldl : {n, a, b} (fin n) \Rightarrow (a \rightarrow b \rightarrow b) \rightarrow b \rightarrow [n]a \rightarrow b foldr scanl : {n, b, a} (b -> a -> b) -> b -> [n]a -> [1 + n]b : {n, a, b} (fin n) => (a -> b -> b) -> b -> [n]a -> [1 + n]b scanr : $\{n, a\}$ (fin n, Arith a) => $[n]a \rightarrow a$ sum and, or : $\{n\}$ (fin n) => [n] -> Bit all, any : {n, a} (fin n) => (a -> Bit) -> [n]a -> Bit curry : {a, b, c} ((a, b) -> c) -> a -> b -> c uncurry : {a, b, c} (a \rightarrow b \rightarrow c) \rightarrow (a, b) \rightarrow c

Miscellaneous

width : {bits, n, a} (fin n, fin bits, bits >= width n) => $[n]a \rightarrow [bits]$ zero : {a} (Zero a) => a

Representing exceptions

error : {a, len} (fin len) => [len][8] -> a undefined : {a} a trace : {n, a, b} [n][8] -> a -> b -> b traceVal : {n, a} [n][8] -> a -> a

Appendix C

Enigma simulator

In this appendix we present the Cryptol code for the enigma machine in its entirety for reference purposes. Chapter 3 has a detailed discussion on how the enigma machine worked, and the construction of the Cryptol model below.

```
1
    /*
2
     * Cryptol Enigma Simulator
3
     * Copyright (c) 2010-2018 Galois, Inc.
4
     * Distributed under the terms of the BSD3 license (see LICENSE file)
\mathbf{5}
     */
6
7
    // Helper synonyms:
8
    // type Char
                    = [8]
9
    module Enigma where
10
11
    type Permutation = String 26
^{12}
^{13}
    // Enigma components:
14
15
    type Plugboard = Permutation
    type Rotor
                      = [26](Char, Bit)
16
    type Reflector = Permutation
17
18
    // An enigma machine with n rotors:
19
^{20}
    type Enigma n
                     = { plugboard : Plugboard,
                          rotors : [n]Rotor,
^{21}
                           reflector : Reflector
^{22}
                         }
23
^{24}
    // Check membership in a sequence:
25
    elem : {a, b} (fin 0, fin a, Cmp b) => (b, [a]b) -> Bit
26
27
    elem (x, xs) = matches ! 0
      where matches = [False] # [ m || (x == e) | e <- xs
^{28}
                                                    | m <- matches
^{29}
                                  1
30
    // Inverting a permutation lookup:
31
32
    private
      invSubst : (Permutation, Char) -> Char
33
      invSubst (key, c) = candidates ! 0
34
        where candidates = [0] # [ if c == k then a else p
35
36
                                   | k <- key
                                   | a <- ['Å' .. 'Z']
\mathbf{37}
                                   | p <- candidates
38
                                   ]
39
40
    // Constructing a rotor
^{41}
^{42}
    mkRotor : {n} (fin n) => (Permutation, String n) -> Rotor
    mkRotor (perm, notchLocations) = [ (p, elem (p, notchLocations))
43
^{44}
                                        | p <- perm
                                        ]
45
46
```

```
// Action of a single rotor on a character
47
     // Note that we encrypt and then rotate, if necessary
48
49
     scramble : (Bit, Char, Rotor) -> (Bit, Char, Rotor)
     scramble (rotate, c, rotor) = (notch, c', rotor')
50
51
       where
                    = rotor @ (c - 'A')
52
         (c', _)
         (_, notch) = rotor @ 0
53
         rotor'
                    = if rotate then rotor <<< 1 else rotor
54
55
56
     // Connecting rotors in a sequence
     joinRotors : {n} (fin n) => ([n]Rotor, Char) -> ([n]Rotor, Char)
57
     joinRotors (rotors, inputChar) = (rotors', outputChar)
58
59
       where
         initRotor = mkRotor (['A' .. 'Z'], [])
60
61
         ncrs : [n+1](Bit, [8], Rotor)
         ncrs = [(True, inputChar, initRotor)]
62
                     # [ scramble (notch, char, r)
63
64
                       | r <- rotors
                       | (notch, char, rotor') <- ncrs</pre>
65
                      ٦
66
         rotors' = tail [ r | (_, _, r) <- ncrs ]
67
         (_, outputChar, _) = ncrs ! 0
68
69
     // Following the signal through a single rotor, forward and backward
70
71
     substFwd, substBwd : (Permutation, Char) -> Char
     substFwd (perm, c) = perm @ (c - 'A')
72
     substBwd (perm, c) = invSubst (perm, c)
73
74
75
     // Route the signal back from the reflector, chase through rotors
76
     backSignal : {n} (fin n) => ([n]Rotor, Char) -> Char
     backSignal (rotors, inputChar) = cs ! 0
77
78
       where cs = [inputChar] # [ substBwd ([ p | (p, _) <- r ], c)
                                   | r <- reverse rotors
79
                                   | c <- cs
80
                                   1
81
82
     // The full enigma loop, from keyboard to lamps:
83
     // The signal goes through the plugboard, rotors, and the reflector,
84
85
     // then goes back through the sequence in reverse, out of the
     // plugboard and to the lamps
86
     enigmaLoop : {n} (fin n) => (Plugboard, [n]Rotor, Reflector, Char) -> ([n]Rotor, Char)
87
88
     enigmaLoop (pboard, rotors, refl, c0) = (rotors', c5)
       where
89
         c1 = substFwd (pboard, c0)
90
         (rotors', c2) = joinRotors (rotors, c1)
91
92
         c3 = substFwd (refl, c2)
         c4 = backSignal(rotors, c3)
93
         c5 = substBwd (pboard, c4)
^{94}
95
     // Construct a machine out of parts
96
     mkEnigma : {n} (Plugboard, [n]Rotor, Reflector, [n]Char) -> Enigma n
97
     mkEnigma (pboard, rs, refl, startingPositions) =
98
         { plugboard = pboard
99
                      = [ r <<< (s - 'A')
         , rotors
100
                        | r <- rs
101
                         | s <- startingPositions
102
103
                        1
         , reflector = refl
104
105
         7
106
     // Encryption/Decryption
107
     enigma : {n, m} (fin n, fin m) => (Enigma n, String m) -> String m
108
109
     enigma (m, pt) = tail [ c | (_, c) <- rcs ]
       where rcs = [(m.rotors, '*')] #
110
                    [ enigmaLoop (m.plugboard, r, m.reflector, c)
111
                    | c <- pt
112
                   | (r, _) <- rcs
113
                   ]
114
```

```
115
     // Decryption is the same as encryption:
116
117
     // dEnigma : {n, m} (fin n, fin m) => (Enigma n, String m) -> String m
     dEnigma = enigma
118
119
120
     // Build an example enigma machine:
121
^{122}
     plugboard : Plugboard
     plugboard = "HBGDEFCAIJKOWNLPXRSVYTMQUZ"
123
124
     rotor1, rotor2, rotor3 : Rotor
125
     rotor1 = mkRotor ("RJICAWVQZODLUPYFEHXSMTKNGB", "IO")
126
     rotor2 = mkRotor ("DWYOLETKNVQPHURZJMSFIGXCBA", "B")
127
     rotor3 = mkRotor ("FGKMAJWUOVNRYIZETDPSHBLCQX", "CK")
128
129
     reflector : Reflector
130
     reflector = "FEIPBATSCYVUWZQDOXHGLKMRJN"
131
132
     modelEnigma : Enigma 3
133
     modelEnigma = mkEnigma (plugboard, [rotor1, rotor2, rotor3], reflector, "GCR")
134
135
     /* Example run:
136
137
        cryptol> :set ascii=on
138
        cryptol> enigma (modelEnigma, "ENIGMAWASAREALLYCOOLMACHINE")
139
        UPEKTBSDROBVTUJGNCEHHGBXGTF
140
        cryptol> dEnigma (modelEnigma, "UPEKTBSDROBVTUJGNCEHHGBXGTF")
141
        ENIGMAWASAREALLYCOOLMACHINE
142
     */
143
144
     all: {a, n} (fin n) => (a->Bit) -> [n]a -> Bit
145
146
     all fn xs = folds ! 0 where
         folds = [True] # [ fn x && p | x <- xs
147
                                       | p <- folds]
148
     checkReflectorFwdBwd : Reflector -> Bit
149
     checkReflectorFwdBwd refl = all check ['A' .. 'Z']
150
151
         where check c = substFwd (refl, c) == substBwd (refl, c)
152
```

Appendix D

AES in Cryptol

In this appendix we present the Cryptol code for the AES in its entirety for reference purposes. Chapter 5 has a detailed discussion on how AES works, and the construction of the Cryptol model below.

In the below code, simply set Nk to be 4 for AES128, 6 for AES192, and 8 for AES256 on line 19. No other modifications are required for obtaining these AES variants. Note that we have rearranged the code given in chapter 5 below for ease of reading.

```
// Cryptol AES Implementation
1
    // Copyright (c) 2010-2013, Galois Inc.
2
    // www.cryptol.net
3
    // You can freely use this source code for educational purposes.
^{4}
5
    // This is a fairly close implementation of the FIPS-197 standard:
6
    // http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
7
8
    // Nk: Number of blocks in the key
9
    // Must be one of 4 (AES128), 6 (AES192), or 8 (AES256)
10
    // Aside from this line, no other code below needs to change for
11
12
    // implementing AES128, AES192, or AES256
    module AES where
13
14
    type AES128 = 4
15
    type AES192 = 6
16
17
    type AES256 = 8
18
    type Nk = AES128
^{19}
20
21
    // For Cryptol 2.x \mid x > 0
    // NkValid: `Nk -> Bit
22
    // property NkValid k = (k == `AES128) || (k == `AES192) || (k == `AES256)
23
^{24}
    // Number of blocks and Number of rounds
25
    type Nb = 4
^{26}
    type Nr = 6 + Nk
27
^{28}
^{29}
    type AESKeySize = (Nk*32)
30
    // Helper type definitions
31
32
    type GF28
                     = [8]
                      = [4] [Nb] GF28
33
    type State
^{34}
    type RoundKey
                      = State
    type KeySchedule = (RoundKey, [Nr-1]RoundKey, RoundKey)
35
    // GF28 operations
36
    gf28Add : {n} (fin n) => [n]GF28 -> GF28
37
    gf28Add ps = sums ! 0
38
      where sums = [zero] # [ p \hat{s} | p \leq ps | s \leq sums ]
39
40
    irreducible = <| x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 |>
^{41}
42
    gf28Mult : (GF28, GF28) -> GF28
43
```

```
gf28Mult (x, y) = pmod(pmult x y) irreducible
44
45
     gf28Pow : (GF28, [8]) -> GF28
46
     gf28Pow (n, k) = pow k
47
               sq x = gf28Mult (x, x)
^{48}
       where
                odd x = x ! 0
49
                pow i = if i == 0 then 1
50
                        else if odd i
51
                             then gf28Mult(n, sq (pow (i >> 1)))
52
53
                             else sq (pow (i >> 1))
54
     gf28Inverse : GF28 -> GF28
55
56
     gf28Inverse x = gf28Pow (x, 254)
57
58
     gf28DotProduct : {n} (fin n) => ([n]GF28, [n]GF28) -> GF28
     gf28DotProduct (xs, ys) = gf28Add [ gf28Mult (x, y) | x <- xs
59
                                                            | y <- ys ]
60
61
     gf28VectorMult : {n, m} (fin n) => ([n]GF28, [m][n]GF28) -> [m]GF28
62
     gf28VectorMult (v, ms) = [ gf28DotProduct(v, m) | m <- ms ]</pre>
63
64
     gf28MatrixMult : {n, m, k} (fin m) => ([n][m]GF28, [m][k]GF28) -> [n][k]GF28
65
     gf28MatrixMult (xss, yss) = [ gf28VectorMult(xs, yss') | xs <- xss ]</pre>
66
67
        where yss' = transpose yss
68
     // The affine transform and its inverse
69
     xformByte : GF28 -> GF28
70
     xformByte b = gf28Add [b, (b >>> 4), (b >>> 5), (b >>> 6), (b >>> 7), c]
71
        where c = 0x63
72
73
     xformByte' : GF28 -> GF28
74
75
     xformByte' b = gf28Add [(b >>> 2), (b >>> 5), (b >>> 7), d] where d = 0x05
     // The SubBytes transform and its inverse
76
     SubByte : GF28 -> GF28
77
78
     SubByte b = xformByte (gf28Inverse b)
79
     SubByte' : GF28 -> GF28
80
     SubByte' b = sbox@b
81
82
     SubBytes : State -> State
83
     SubBytes state = [ [ SubByte' b | b <- row ] | row <- state ]</pre>
84
85
86
     InvSubByte : GF28 -> GF28
87
     InvSubByte b = gf28Inverse (xformByte' b)
88
89
     InvSubBytes : State -> State
90
     InvSubBytes state = [ [ InvSubByte b | b <- row ] | row <- state ]</pre>
91
92
     // The ShiftRows transform and its inverse
93
     ShiftRows : State -> State
94
     ShiftRows state = [ row <<< shiftAmount | row <- state</pre>
95
                                               | shiftAmount <- [0 .. 3]
96
                        ٦
97
98
     InvShiftRows : State -> State
99
     InvShiftRows state = [ row >>> shiftAmount | row <- state</pre>
100
                                                   | shiftAmount <- [0 .. 3]
101
102
                           1
103
     // The MixColumns transform and its inverse
104
     MixColumns : State -> State
105
106
     MixColumns state = gf28MatrixMult (m, state)
         where m = [[2, 3, 1, 1]],
107
                     [1, 2, 3, 1],
108
109
                     [1, 1, 2, 3],
                     [3, 1, 1, 2]]
110
111
```

```
InvMixColumns : State -> State
112
     InvMixColumns state = gf28MatrixMult (m, state)
113
         where m = [[0x0e, 0x0b, 0x0d, 0x09],
114
                     [0x09, 0x0e, 0x0b, 0x0d],
115
                     [0x0d, 0x09, 0x0e, 0x0b],
116
117
                     [0x0b, 0x0d, 0x09, 0x0e]]
118
     // The AddRoundKey transform
119
     AddRoundKey : (RoundKey, State) -> State
120
     AddRoundKey (rk, s) = rk \hat{} s
121
122
     // Key expansion
     Rcon : [8] -> [4]GF28
123
124
     Rcon i = [(gf28Pow (<| x |>, i-1)), 0, 0, 0]
125
126
     SubWord : [4]GF28 -> [4]GF28
     SubWord bs = [ SubByte' b | b <- bs ]
127
128
     RotWord : [4]GF28 -> [4]GF28
129
     RotWord [a0, a1, a2, a3] = [a1, a2, a3, a0]
130
131
     NextWord : ([8], [4] [8], [4] [8]) \rightarrow [4] [8]
132
     NextWord(i, prev, old) = old ^ mask
133
        where mask = if i % `Nk == 0
134
                      then SubWord(RotWord(prev)) ^ Rcon (i / `Nk)
135
                      else if (`Nk > 6) && (i % `Nk == 4)
136
                           then SubWord(prev)
137
                            else prev
138
139
140
     ExpandKeyForever : [Nk][4][8] -> [inf]RoundKey
141
     ExpandKeyForever seed = [ transpose g | g <- groupBy`{4} (keyWS seed) ]</pre>
142
143
     keyWS : [Nk][4][8] -> [inf][4][8]
144
145
     kevWS seed
                   = xs
          where xs = seed # [ NextWord(i, prev, old)
146
                                   <- [ `Nk ... ]
                              | i
147
                              | prev <- drop`{Nk-1} xs
148
                              | old <- xs
149
150
                              ٦
151
     ExpandKey : [AESKeySize] -> KeySchedule
152
153
     ExpandKey key = (keys @ 0, keys @@ [1 .. (Nr - 1)], keys @ `Nr)
       where
               seed : [Nk] [4] [8]
154
                seed = split (split key)
155
                keys = ExpandKeyForever seed
156
157
     fromKS : KeySchedule -> [Nr+1][4][32]
158
     fromKS (f, ms, l) = [ formKeyWords (transpose k) | k <- [f] # ms # [l] ]</pre>
159
         where formKeyWords bbs = [ join bs | bs <- bbs ]
160
161
     // AES rounds and inverses
162
     AESRound : (RoundKey, State) -> State
163
     AESRound (rk, s) = AddRoundKey (rk, MixColumns (ShiftRows (SubBytes s)))
164
165
     AESFinalRound : (RoundKey, State) -> State
166
     AESFinalRound (rk, s) = AddRoundKey (rk, ShiftRows (SubBytes s))
167
168
     AESInvRound : (RoundKey, State) -> State
169
170
     AESInvRound (rk, s) =
           InvMixColumns (AddRoundKey (rk, InvSubBytes (InvShiftRows s)))
171
     AESFinalInvRound : (RoundKey, State) -> State
172
     AESFinalInvRound (rk, s) = AddRoundKey (rk, InvSubBytes (InvShiftRows s))
173
174
     // Converting a 128 bit message to a State and back
175
     msgToState : [128] -> State
176
     msgToState msg = transpose (split (split msg))
177
178
     stateToMsg : State -> [128]
179
```

```
stateToMsg st = join (join (transpose st))
180
181
     // AES Encryption
182
     aesEncrypt : ([128], [AESKeySize]) -> [128]
183
     aesEncrypt (pt, key) = stateToMsg (AESFinalRound (kFinal, rounds ! 0))
184
              (kInit, ks, kFinal) = ExpandKey key
185
       where
               state0 = AddRoundKey(kInit, msgToState pt)
186
               rounds = [state0] # [ AESRound (rk, s) | rk <- ks
187
                                                        | s <- rounds
188
189
                                    ٦
190
     // AES Decryption
191
     aesDecrypt : ([128], [AESKeySize]) -> [128]
192
     aesDecrypt (ct, key) = stateToMsg (AESFinalInvRound (kFinal, rounds ! 0))
193
194
       where
               (kFinal, ks, kInit) = ExpandKey key
               state0 = AddRoundKey(kInit, msgToState ct)
195
               rounds = [state0] # [ AESInvRound (rk, s)
196
                                    | rk <- reverse ks
197
                                    | s <- rounds
198
                                    ٦
199
200
     sbox : [256]GF28
201
202
     sbox = [
      0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67,
203
      0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59,
204
      0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7,
205
      Oxfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1,
206
      0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05,
207
      0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09, 0x83,
208
      0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29,
209
      0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b,
210
211
      0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa,
      Oxfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c,
212
      0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc,
213
      0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec,
214
215
      0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19,
      0x73, 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee,
216
      0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49,
217
218
      0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79,
      0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4,
219
      Oxea, Ox65, Ox7a, Oxae, Ox08, Oxba, Ox78, Ox25, Ox2e, Ox1c, Oxa6,
220
221
      0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a, 0x70,
      0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9,
222
      0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e,
223
      0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1,
224
225
      0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0,
      0x54, 0xbb, 0x16]
226
227
     // Test runs:
228
229
     // cryptol> aesEncrypt (0x3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734,
230
                                                                     ١
                              0x2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c)
231
     11
232
     // 0x3925841d02dc09fbdc118597196a0b32
     // cryptol> aesEncrypt (0x00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff,
233
                              0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f)
     11
234
     // 0x69c4e0d86a7b0430d8cdb78070b4c55a
235
236
     property AESCorrect msg key = aesDecrypt (aesEncrypt (msg, key), key) == msg
```

Appendix E

Technicalities

The summary below describes language features, as well as commands that are available at the Cryptol> prompt. Commands all begin with the : character.

E.1 Language features

The Cryptol language is a size-polymorphic dependently-typed programming language with support for polymorphic recursive functions. It has a small syntax tuned for applied cryptography, a lightweight module system, a Read–Eval–Print loop (REPL) top-level, and a rich set of built-in tools for performing high-assurance (literate) programming. Cryptol performs fairly advanced type inference, though as with most mainstream strongly typed functional languages, types can be manually specified as well. What follows is a brief tour of Cryptol's most salient language features.

Case sensitivity Cryptol identifiers are case sensitive. A and a are two different things.

Indentation and whitespace Cryptol uses indentation level (instead of {}) to denote blocks. Whitespace within a line is immaterial, as is the specific amount of indentation. However, consistent indentation will save you tons of trouble down the road! Do not mix tabs and spaces for your indentation. Spaces are generally preferred.

Escape characters Long lines can be continued with the end-of-line escape character \backslash , as in many programming languages. There are no built-in character escape characters, as Cryptol performs no interpretation on bytes beyond printing byte streams out in ASCII, as discussed above.

Comments Block comments are enclosed in /* and */, and they can be nested. Line comments start with // and run to the end of the line.

Order of definitions The order of definitions is immaterial. You can write your definitions in any order, and earlier entries can refer to later ones.

Typing Cryptol is strongly typed. This means that the interpreter will catch most common mistakes in programming during the type-checking phase, before runtime.

Type inference Cryptol has type inference. This means that the user can omit type signatures because the inference engine will supply them.

Type signatures While explicit type signatures are optional, writing them down is considered good practice.

Polymorphism Cryptol functions can be polymorphic, which means they can operate on many different types. Be aware that the type that Cryptol infers might be too polymorphic, so it is good practice to write your signatures, or at least check that what Cryptol inferred is what you had in mind.

Module system Each Cryptol file defines a *module*. Modules allow Cryptol developers to manage which definitions are exported (the default behavior) and which definitions are internal-only (*private*). At the beginning of each Cryptol file, you specify its name and use **import** to specify the modules on which it relies. Definitions are **public** by default, but you can hide them from modules that import your code via the **private** keyword at the start of each private definition, like this:

```
module test where
private
hiddenConst = 0x5 // hidden from importing modules
// end of indented block indicates symbols are available to importing modules
revealedConst = 0x15
```

Note that the filename should correspond to the module name, so module test must be defined in a file called test.cry.

Literate programming You can feed LATEX files to Cryptol (i.e., files with extension .tex). Cryptol will look for \begin{code} and \end{code} marks to extract Cryptol code. Everything else will be comments as far as Cryptol is concerned. In fact, the book you are reading is a literate Cryptol program.

Completion On UNIX-based machines, you can press tab at any time and Cryptol will suggest completions based on the context. You can retrieve your prior commands using the usual means (arrow keys or Emacs keybindings).

E.2 Commands

Querying types You can ask Cryptol to tell you the type of an expression by typing :type <expr> (or :t for short). If foo is the name of a definition (function or otherwise), you can ask its type by issuing :type foo. It is common practice to define a function, ask Cryptol its type, and copy the response back to your source code. While this is somewhat contrived, it is usually better than not writing signatures at all. In order to query the type of an infix operator (e.g., +, ==, etc.) you will need to surround the operator with (), like this:

Cryptol> :t (+) (+) : {a} (Arith a) => a -> a -> a

Browsing definitions The command :browse (or :b for short) will display all the names you have defined, along with their types. Using :browse with the name of a loaded module will show the declarations from that module only.

Getting help The command :help will show you all the available commands. Using :help with the name of a defined function or type synonym will display its corresponding help text. Other useful implicit help invocations are: (a) to type tab at the Cryptol> prompt, which will list all of the operators available in Cryptol code, (b) typing :set with no argument, which shows you the parameters that can be set, and (c), as noted elsewhere, :browse to see the names of functions and type aliases you have defined, along with their types.

Option	Default value	Meaning
ascii	off	print sequences of bytes as a string
base	16	numeric base for printing words
debug	off	whether to print verbose debugging information
infLength	5	number of elements to show from an infinite sequence
prover	z3	which SMT solver to use for :prove
satNum	1	maximum number of solutions to show for :sat
tests	100	number of tests to run for :check
warnDefaulting	on	

Environment options A variety of environment options are set through the use of the :set command. These options may change over time and some options may be available only on specific platforms. The current options are summarized in section E.2.

Quitting You can quit Cryptol by using the command :quit (aka :q). On Mac/Linux you can press Ctrl-D, and on Windows use Ctrl-Z, for the same effect.

Loading and reloading files You load your program in Cryptol using :load <filename> (or :l for short). However, it is customary to use the extension .cry for Cryptol programs. If you edit the source file loaded into Cryptol from a separate context, you can reload it into Cryptol using the command :reload (abbreviated :r).

Invoking your editor You can invoke your editor using the command :edit (abbreviated :e). The default editor invoked is vi. You override the default using the standard EDITOR environmental variable in your shell.

Running shell commands You can run Unix shell commands from within Cryptol like this: :! cat test.cry.

Changing working directory You can change the current working directory of Cryptol like this: :cd some/path. Note that the path syntax is platform-dependent.

Loading a module At the Cryptol prompt you can load a module by name with the :module command.

The next three commands all operate on *properties*. All take either one or zero arguments. If one argument is provided, then that property is the focus of the command; otherwise all properties in the current context are checked. All three commands are covered in detail in chapter 4.

Checking a property through random testing The :check command performs random value testing on a property to increase one's confidence that the property is valid. See section 4.3 for more detailed information.

Verifying a property through automated theorem proving The :prove command uses an external SMT solver to attempt to automatically formally prove that a given property is valid. See subsection 4.2.1 for more detailed information.

Finding a satisfying assignment for a property The :sat command uses an external SAT solver to attempt to find a satisfying assignment to a property. See section 4.4 for more detailed information.

Appendix F

Cryptol Syntax

F.1 Layout

Groups of declarations are organized based on indentation. Declarations with the same indentation belong to the same group. Lines of text that are indented more than the beginning of a declaration belong to that declaration, while lines of text that are indented less terminate a group of declarations. Groups of declarations appear at the top level of a Cryptol file, and inside where blocks in expressions. For example, consider the following declaration group:

```
f x = x + y + z
where
y = x * x
z = x + y
```

g y = y

This group has two declarations, one for f and one for g. All the lines between f and g that are indented more than f belong to f.

This example also illustrates how groups of declarations may be nested within each other. For example, the where expression in the definition of f starts another group of declarations, containing y and z. This group ends just before g, because g is indented less than y and z.

F.2 Comments

Cryptol supports block comments, which start with /* and end with */, and line comments, which start with // and terminate at the end of the line. Block comments may be nested arbitrarily.

Examples:

```
/* This is a block comment */
// This is a line comment
/* This is a /* Nested */ block comment */
```

F.3 Identifiers

Cryptol identifiers consist of one or more characters. The first character must be either an English letter or underscore (_). The following characters may be an English letter, a decimal digit, underscore (_), or a prime ('). Some identifiers have special meaning in the language, so they may not be used in programmer-defined names (see Keywords).

Examples:

name	name1	name'	longer_name
Name	Name2	Name''	longerName

F.4 Keywords and Built-in Operators

The following identifiers have special meanings in Cryptol, and may not be used for programmer defined names:

else	include	property	let	newtype	primitive
extern	module	then	import	infixl	parameter
if	newtype	type	as	infixr	constraint
private	pragma	where	hiding	infix	

The following table contains Cryptol's operators and their associativity with lowest precedence operators first, and highest precedence last.

Operator	Associativity
-> (types)	right
==>	right
$\backslash /$	right
\land	right
== != === !===	not associative
> < <= >= >\$ <\$ <=\$ >=\$	not associative
11	right
^	left
33	right
#	right
>> << >>> << >>\$	left
+ -	left
* / %	left
~~	right
0 00 ! !!	left
(unary) - ~	right

Table F.1: Operator precedences.

F.5 Built-in Type-level Operators

Cryptol includes a variety of operators that allow computations on the numeric types used to specify the sizes of sequences.

Table F.2: Type-level operators

Operator	Meaning
+	Size addition
-	Size subtraction
*	Size multiplication
/	Size division
/^	Size ceiling division (/ rounded up)
%	Size modulus
%^	Size ceiling modulus (% rounded up)
^^	Size exponentiation
lg2	Size logarithm (base-2)
width	Size width (lg2 rounded up)
max	Size maximum
min	Size minimum

F.6 Numeric Literals

Numeric literals may be written in binary, octal, decimal, or hexadecimal notation. The base of a literal is determined by its prefix: 0b for binary, 0o for octal, no special prefix for decimal, and 0x for hexadecimal.

Examples:

254	// Decimal literal
0254	// Decimal literal
Ob11111110	// Binary literal
0o376	// Octal literal
OxFE	// Hexadecimal literal
Oxfe	// Hexadecimal literal

Numeric literals in binary, octal, or hexadecimal notation result in bit sequences of a fixed length (i.e., they have type [n] for some n). The length is determined by the base and the number of digits in the literal. Decimal literals are overloaded, and so the type is inferred from context in which the literal is used. Examples:

0b1010	<pre>// : [4], 1 * number of digits</pre>
0o1234	<pre>// : [12], 3 * number of digits</pre>
0x1234	<pre>// : [16], 4 * number of digits</pre>
10	<pre>// : {a}. (Literal 10 a) => a // a = Integer or [n] where n >= width 10</pre>

F.7 Bits

The type Bit has two inhabitants: True and False. These values may be combined using various logical operators, or constructed as results of comparisons.

Operator	Associativity	Description
	right	Logical or
&&	right	Logical and
!= ==	none	Not equals, equals
> < <= >=	none	Comparisons
^	left	Exclusive-or
~	right	Logical negation

Table	F.3:	Bit	operations

F.8 Multi-way Conditionals

The if ... then ... else construct can be used with multiple branches. For example:

F.9 Tuples and Records

Tuples and records are used for packaging multiple values together. Tuples are enclosed in parentheses, while records are enclosed in curly braces. The components of both tuples and records are separated by commas. The components of tuples are expressions, while the components of records are a label and a value separated by an equal sign. Examples:

(1,2,3)	<pre>// A tuple with 3 component</pre>
()	<pre>// A tuple with no components</pre>
{ x = 1, y = 2 }	<pre>// A record with two fields, `x` and `y`</pre>
{}	// A record with no fields

The components of tuples are identified by position, while the components of records are identified by their label, and so the ordering of record components is not important. Examples:

(1,2) == (1,2)	// True
(1,2) == (2,1)	// False
{ x = 1, y = 2 } == { x = 1, y = 2 } { x = 1, y = 2 } == { y = 2, x = 1 }	

The components of a record or a tuple may be accessed in two ways: via pattern matching or by using explicit component selectors. Explicit component selectors are written as follows:

(15,	20).	0			==	15
(15,	20).	1			==	20
{ x =	: 15,	y =	20	}.x	==	15

Explicit record selectors may be used only if the program contains sufficient type information to determine the shape of the tuple or record. For example:

type T = { sign : Bit, number : [15] }

```
// Valid definition:
// the type of the record is known.
isPositive : T -> Bit
isPositive x = x.sign
// Invalid definition:
// insufficient type information.
badDef x = x.f
```

The components of a tuple or a record may also be accessed using pattern matching. Patterns for tuples and records mirror the syntax for constructing values: tuple patterns use parentheses, while record patterns use braces. Examples:

```
getFst (x,_) = x
distance2 { x = xPos, y = yPos } = xPos ^ 2 + yPos ^ 2
f p = x + y where
   (x, y) = p
```

F.10 Sequences

A sequence is a fixed-length collection of elements of the same type. The type of a finite sequence of length n, with elements of type a is [n] a. Often, a finite sequence of bits, [n] Bit, is called a *word*. We may abbreviate the type [n] Bit as [n]. An infinite sequence with elements of type a has type [inf] a, and [inf] is an infinite stream of bits.

[e1,e2,e3]	// A sequence with three elements
<pre>[t] [t1, t2] [t1 t3] [t1, t2 t3]</pre>	<pre>// Sequence enumerations // Step by t2 - t1</pre>
[e1] [e1, e2]	<pre>// Infinite sequence starting at e1 // Infinite sequence stepping by e2-e1</pre>
[e p11 <- e11, p12 <- e12 p21 <- e21, p22 <- e22]	// Sequence comprehensions

Note: the bounds in finite unbounded (those with ..) sequences are type expressions, while the bounds in boundedfinite and infinite sequences are value expressions.

Operator	Description
#	Sequence concatenation
>> <<	Shift (right, left)
>>> <<<	Rotate (right, left)
Q !	Access elements (front, back)
00 !!	Access sub-sequence (front, back)
update updateEnd updates updatesEnd	Update the value of a sequence at a location (front, back) Update multiple values of a sequence (front, back)

Table F.4: Sequence operations.

There are also lifted pointwise operations.

[p1, p2, p3, p4]	// Sequence pattern
p1 # p2	<pre>// Split sequence pattern</pre>

F.11 Functions

\p1 p2 -> e	// Lambda expression
f p1 p2 = e	<pre>// Function definition</pre>

F.12 Local Declarations

e where ds

Note that by default, any local declarations without type signatures are monomorphized. If you need a local declaration to be polymorphic, use an explicit type signature.

F.13 Explicit Type Instantiation

If **f** is a polymorphic value with type:

```
f : { tyParam } tyParam
f = zero
```

you can evaluate f, passing it a type parameter:

```
f \{ tyParam = 13 \}
```

F.14 Demoting Numeric Types to Values

The value corresponding to a numeric type may be accessed using the following notation:

`t

Here t should be a type expression with numeric kind. The resulting expression is a finite word, which is sufficiently large to accommodate the value of the type:

```
`t : {a} (fin a, a >= width t} => [a]
```

F.15 Explicit Type Annotations

Explicit type annotations may be added on expressions, patterns, and in argument definitions.

```
e : t
p : t
```

```
f (x : t) = ...
```

F.16 Type Signatures

f,g : {a,b} (fin a) \Rightarrow [a] b

F.17 Type Synonym Declarations

type T a b = [a] b

F.18 Module Imports

To use the definitions from one module in another module, we use import declarations:

```
// Provide some definitions
module M where
f : [8]
f = 2
// Uses definitions from `M`
module N where
import M // import all definitions from `M`
g = f // `f` was imported from `M`
```

F.19 Import Lists

module M where

Sometimes, we may want to import only some of the definitions from a module. To do so, we use an import declaration with an *import list*.

f = 0x02 g = 0x03 h = 0x04 module N where import M(f,g) // Imports only `f` and `g`, but not `h` x = f + g

Using explicit import lists helps reduce name collisions. It also tends to make code easier to understand, because it makes it easy to see the source of definitions.

F.20 Hiding Imports

Sometimes a module may provide many definitions, and we want to use most of them but with a few exceptions (e.g., because those would result to a name clash). In such situations it is convenient to use a *hiding* import:

module M where
f = 0x02
g = 0x03
h = 0x04

module N where

import M hiding (h) // Import everything but `h`

x = f + g

F.21 Qualified Module Imports

Another way to avoid name collisions is by using a *qualified* import.

module M where
f : [8]
f = 2
module N where
import M as P
g = P::f

```
// `f` was imported from `M`
// but when used it needs to be prefixed by the qualified `P`
```

Qualified imports make it possible to work with definitions that happen to have the same name but are defined in different modules.

Qualified imports may be combined with import lists or hiding clauses:

It is also possible the use the same qualifier prefix for imports from different modules. For example:

import A as B
import X as B

Such declarations will introduces all definitions from A and X but to use them, you would have to qualify using the prefix $B\!:\!:\!:\!:$

F.22 Private Blocks

In some cases, definitions in a module might use helper functions that are not intended to be used outside the module. It is good practice to place such declarations in *private blocks*:

```
module M where
f : [8]
f = 0x01 + helper1 + helper2
private
helper1 : [8]
helper1 = 2
helper2 : [8]
helper2 = 3
```

The keyword **private** introduce a new layout scope, and all declarations in the block are considered to be private to the module. A single module may contain multiple private blocks. For example, the following module is equivalent to the previous one:

```
module M where
```

```
f : [8]
f = 0x01 + helper1 + helper2
private
    helper1 : [8]
    helper1 = 2
private
    helper2 : [8]
    helper2 = 3
```

F.23 Parameterized Modules

```
module M where
parameter
type n : # // `n` is a numeric type parameter
type constraint (fin n, n >= 1)
    // Assumptions about the parameter
x : [n] // A value parameter
// This definition uses the parameters.
f : [n]
f = 1 + x
```

F.24 Named Module Instantiations

One way to use a parameterized module is through a named instantiation:

```
// A parameterized module
module M where
parameter
 type n : #
         : [n]
 х
         : [n]
 у
f : [n]
f = x + y
// A module instantiation
module N = M where
type n = 32
       = 11
х
       = helper
у
helper = 12
```

The second module, N, is computed by instantiating the parameterized module M. Module N will provide the exact same definitions as M, except that the parameters will be replaced by the values in the body of N. In this example, N provides just a single definition, f.

Note that the only purpose of the body of $\tt N$ (the declarations after the where keyword) is to define the parameters for $\tt M.$

F.25 Parameterized Instantiations

It is possible for a module instantiations to be itself parameterized. This could be useful if we need to define some of a module's parameters but not others.

```
// A parameterized module
module M where
```

```
parameter
  type n : #
  х
         : [n]
  у
         : [n]
f : [n]
f = x + y
// A parameterized instantiation
module N = M where
parameter
  x : [32]
type n = 32
       = helper
у
helper = 12
```

In this case N has a single parameter x. The result of instantiating N would result in instantiating M using the value of x and 12 for the value of y.

F.26 Importing Parameterized Modules

It is also possible to import a parameterized module without using a module instantiation:

```
module M where
parameter
  x : [8]
  y : [8]
f : [8]
f = x + y
module N where
import `M
g = f { x = 2, y = 3 }
```

A *backtick* at the start of the name of an imported module indicates that we are importing a parameterized module. In this case, Cryptol will import all definitions from the module as usual, however every definition will have some additional parameters corresponding to the parameters of a module. All value parameters are grouped in a record.

This is why in the example f is applied to a record of values, even though its definition in M does not look like a function.

Glossary

- **AES** The Advanced Encryption Standard [12], 49
- Cipherkey The key used in a particular encryption/decryption task, 27
- Ciphertext The result of encrypting a plaintext message, "unreadable" unless the key is known, 27
- Fibonacci numbers The sequence 0,1,1,2,3,5,... After the elements 0 and 1, each consecutive element is the sum of the two previous numbers [18], 19
- NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology. The institution in charge of standardizing cryptoalgorithms (amongst many other things) in USA., 49
- Plaintext A "readable" message that we would like to encrypt, the message in the clear, 27
- **SAT Solver** An automated tool for solving boolean satisfiability problems. Cryptol uses SAT/SMT solvers in order to provide its high-assurance capabilities, 44, 46, 48
- **SMT Solver** Satisfiability Modulo Theories: An automated tool for establishing satisfiability problems with respect to certain theories. One of the theories of interest to Cryptol is that of bit-vectors, as it provides a natural medium for translating Cryptol's bit-precise theorems, 44, 46, 48

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