For example, the code point U+002F could be encoded as UTF-8 with the
bytes 0x80 0xAF. This trick has historically been used to bypass
security checks.
We have a new, improved string type coming up in AK (OOM aware, no null
state), and while it's going to use UTF-8, the name UTF8String is a
mouthful - so let's free up the String name by renaming the existing
class.
Making the old one have an annoying name will hopefully also help with
quick adoption :^)
Instead of doing anything reasonable, Utf8CodePointIterator returned
invalid code points, for example U+123456. However, many callers of this
iterator assume that a code point is always at most 0x10FFFF.
In fact, this is one of two reasons for the following OSS Fuzz issue:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=49184
This is probably a very old bug.
In the particular case of URLParser, AK::is_url_code_point got confused:
return /* ... */ || code_point >= 0xA0;
If code_point is a "code point" beyond 0x10FFFF, this violates the
condition given in the preceding comment, but satisfies the given
condition, which eventually causes URLParser to crash.
This commit fixes *only* the erroneous UTF-8 decoding, and does not
fully resolve OSS-Fuzz#49184.
This commit moves the length calculations out to be directly on the
StringView users. This is an important step towards the goal of removing
StringView(char const*), as it moves the responsibility of calculating
the size of the string to the user of the StringView (which will prevent
naive uses causing OOB access).
On oss-fuzz, the LibJS REPL is provided a file encoded with Windows-1252
with the following contents:
/ô¡°½/
The REPL assumes the input file is UTF-8. So in Windows-1252, the above
is represented as [0x2f 0xf4 0xa1 0xb0 0xbd 0x2f]. The inner 4 bytes are
actually a valid UTF-8 encoding if we only look at the most significant
bits to parse leading/continuation bytes. However, it decodes to the
code point U+121c3d, which is not a valid code point.
This commit adds additional validation to ensure the decoded code point
itself is also valid.
The previous behavior was to always VERIFY that the UTF-8 bytes were
valid when iterating over the code points of an UTF8View. This change
makes it so we instead output the 0xFFFD 'REPLACEMENT CHARACTER'
code point when encountering invalid bytes, and keep iterating the
view after skipping one byte.
Leaving the decision to the consumer would break symmetry with the
UTF32View API, which would in turn require heavy refactoring and/or
code duplication in generic code such as the one found in
Gfx::Painter and the Shell.
To make it easier for the consumers to detect the original bytes, we
provide a new method on the iterator that returns a Span over the
data that has been decoded. This method is immediately used in the
TextNode::compute_text_for_rendering method, which previously did
this in a ad-hoc waay.
This also add tests for the new behavior in TestUtf8.cpp, as well
as reinforcements to the existing tests to check if the underlying
bytes match up with their expected values.
This adds a peek method for Utf8CodepointIterator, which enables it to
be used in some parsing cases where peeking is necessary.
peek(0) is equivalent to operator*, expect that peek() does not contain
any assertions and will just return an empty Optional<u32>.
This also implements a test case for iterating UTF-8.
