Unlike DirectoryEntry (which is used when constructing directories),
DirectoryEntryView does not manage storage for file names. Names are
just StringViews.
This is much more suited to the directory traversal API and makes
it easier to implement this in file system classes since they no
longer need to create temporary name copies while traversing.
VFS no longer deals with inodes in public API, only with custodies and file
descriptions. Talk directly to the file system if you need to operate on a
inode. In most cases you actually want to go though VFS, to get proper
permission check and other niceties. For this to work, you have to provide a
custody, which describes *how* you have opened the inode, not just what the
inode is.
Sergey suggested that having a non-zero O_RDONLY would make some things
less confusing, and it seems like he's right about that.
We can now easily check read/write permissions separately instead of
dancing around with the bits.
This patch also fixes unveil() validation for O_RDWR which previously
forgot to check for "r" permission.
This syscall is a complement to pledge() and adds the same sort of
incremental relinquishing of capabilities for filesystem access.
The first call to unveil() will "drop a veil" on the process, and from
now on, only unveiled parts of the filesystem are visible to it.
Each call to unveil() specifies a path to either a directory or a file
along with permissions for that path. The permissions are a combination
of the following:
- r: Read access (like the "rpath" promise)
- w: Write access (like the "wpath" promise)
- x: Execute access
- c: Create/remove access (like the "cpath" promise)
Attempts to open a path that has not been unveiled with fail with
ENOENT. If the unveiled path lacks sufficient permissions, it will fail
with EACCES.
Like pledge(), subsequent calls to unveil() with the same path can only
remove permissions, not add them.
Once you call unveil(nullptr, nullptr), the veil is locked, and it's no
longer possible to unveil any more paths for the process, ever.
This concept comes from OpenBSD, and their implementation does various
things differently, I'm sure. This is just a first implementation for
SerenityOS, and we'll keep improving on it as we go. :^)
As suggested by Joshua, this commit adds the 2-clause BSD license as a
comment block to the top of every source file.
For the first pass, I've just added myself for simplicity. I encourage
everyone to add themselves as copyright holders of any file they've
added or modified in some significant way. If I've added myself in
error somewhere, feel free to replace it with the appropriate copyright
holder instead.
Going forward, all new source files should include a license header.
It turns out we don't even need to store the whole custody chain, as we only
ever access its last element. So we can just store one custody. This also fixes
a performance FIXME :^)
Also, rename parent_custody to out_parent.
You can now bind-mount files and directories. This essentially exposes an
existing part of the file system in another place, and can be used as an
alternative to symlinks or hardlinks.
Here's an example of doing this:
# mkdir /tmp/foo
# mount /home/anon/myfile.txt /tmp/foo -o bind
# cat /tmp/foo
This is anon's file.
We now support these mount flags:
* MS_NODEV: disallow opening any devices from this file system
* MS_NOEXEC: disallow executing any executables from this file system
* MS_NOSUID: ignore set-user-id bits on executables from this file system
The fourth flag, MS_BIND, is defined, but currently ignored.
O_EXEC is mentioned by POSIX, so let's have it. Currently, it is only used
inside the kernel to ensure the process has the right permissions when opening
an executable.
At the moment, the actual flags are ignored, but we correctly propagate them all
the way from the original mount() syscall to each custody that resides on the
mounted FS.
No need to pass around RefPtr<>s and NonnullRefPtr<>s and no need to
heap-allocate them.
Also remove VFS::mount(NonnullRefPtr<FS>&&, StringView path) - it has been
unused for a long time.
If we're creating something that should have a different owner than the
current process's UID/GID, we need to plumb that all the way through
VFS down to the FS functions.
Cautiously use 5 as a limit for now so that we don't blow the stack.
This can be increased in the future if we are sure that we won't be
blowing the stack, or if the implementation is changed to not use
recursion :^)
Files opened with O_DIRECT will now bypass the disk cache in read/write
operations (though metadata operations will still hit the disk cache.)
This will allow us to test actual disk performance instead of testing
disk *cache* performance, if that's what we want. :^)
There's room for improvment here, we're very aggressively flushing any
dirty cache entries for the specific block before reading/writing that
block. This is done by walking the entire cache, which may be slow.
This was a workaround to be able to build on case-insensitive file
systems where it might get confused about <string.h> vs <String.h>.
Let's just not support building that way, so String.h can have an
objectively nicer name. :^)
It is now possible to unmount file systems from the VFS via `umount`.
It works via looking up the `fsid` of the filesystem from the `Inode`'s
metatdata so I'm not sure how fragile it is. It seems to work for now
though as something to get us going.
- You must now have superuser privileges to use mount().
- We now verify that the mount point is a valid path first, before
trying to find a filesystem on the specified device.
- Convert some dbgprintf() to dbg().
I was messing around with this to tell the compiler that these functions
always return the same value no matter how many times you call them.
It doesn't really seem to improve code generation and it looks weird so
let's just get rid of it.
After reading a bunch of POSIX specs, I've learned that a file descriptor
is the number that refers to a file description, not the description itself.
So this patch renames FileDescriptor to FileDescription, and Process now has
FileDescription* file_description(int fd).
When encountering a symlink, we abandon the custody chain we've been working
on and start over with a new one (by recursing into a new resolution call.)
Caching symlinks in the custody model would be incredibly difficult to get
right with all the extra invalidation it would require, so let's just not.
The current working directory is now stored as a custody. Likewise for a
process executable file. This unbreaks /proc/PID/fd which has not been
working since we made the filesystem bigger.
This still needs a bunch of work, for instance when renaming or removing
a file somewhere, we have to update the relevant custody links.
