(...and ASSERT_NOT_REACHED => VERIFY_NOT_REACHED)
Since all of these checks are done in release builds as well,
let's rename them to VERIFY to prevent confusion, as everyone is
used to assertions being compiled out in release.
We can introduce a new ASSERT macro that is specifically for debug
checks, but I'm doing this wholesale conversion first since we've
accumulated thousands of these already, and it's not immediately
obvious which ones are suitable for ASSERT.
This achieves two things:
- Programs can now intentionally perform arbitrary syscalls by calling
syscall(). This allows us to work on things like syscall fuzzing.
- It restricts the ability of userspace to make syscalls to a single
4KB page of code. In order to call the kernel directly, an attacker
must now locate this page and call through it.
These changes are arbitrarily divided into multiple commits to make it
easier to find potentially introduced bugs with git bisect.Everything:
The modifications in this commit were automatically made using the
following command:
find . -name '*.cpp' -exec sed -i -E 's/dbg\(\) << ("[^"{]*");/dbgln\(\1\);/' {} \;
AT_SECURE is set in the auxiliary vector when we execute setuid/setgid
programs.
In those cases, we do not want to read environment variables that
influence the logic of the dynamic loader, as they can be controlled
by the user.
Commit a3a9016701 removed the PT_INTERP header
from Loader.so which cleaned up some kernel code in execve. Unfortunately
it prevents Loader.so from being run as an executable
Loader.so now just performs the initial self relocations and static
LibC initialisation before handing over to ELF::DynamicLinker::linker_main
to handle the rest of the process.
As a trade-off, ELF::DynamicLinker needs to be explicitly excluded from
Lagom unless we really want to try writing a cross platform dynamic loader
Modify the user mode runtime to insert stack canaries to find stack corruptions.
The `-fstack-protector-strong` variant was chosen because it catches more
issues than vanilla `-fstack-protector`, but doesn't have substantial
performance impact like `-fstack-protector-all`.
Details:
-fstack-protector enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain:
* A character array larger than 8 bytes.
* An 8-bit integer array larger than 8 bytes.
* A call to alloca() with either a variable size or a constant size bigger than 8 bytes.
-fstack-protector-strong enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain:
* An array of any size and type.
* A call to alloca().
* A local variable that has its address taken.
Example of it catching corrupting in the `stack-smash` test:
```
courage ~ $ ./user/Tests/LibC/stack-smash
[+] Starting the stack smash ...
Error: Stack protector failure, stack smashing detected!
Shell: Job 1 (/usr/Tests/LibC/stack-smash) Aborted
```
RTTI is still disabled for the Kernel, and for the Dynamic Loader. This
allows for much less awkward navigation of class heirarchies in LibCore,
LibGUI, LibWeb, and LibJS (eventually). Measured RootFS size increase
was < 1%, and libgui.so binary size was ~3.3%. The small binary size
increase here seems worth it :^)
Use the GNU LD option --no-dynamic-linker. This allows uncommenting some
code in the Kernel that gets upset if your ELF interpreter has its own
interpreter.
Loader.so is an actual executable, as well as the interpreter for dynamic
libraries. Currently launching Loader.so as a standalone executable results
in an obsucre crash as it tries to load itself over itself.
Now we at least print a helpful message saying that you're doing the wrong
thing and exit gracefully. In future we may wish to allow users to specify
additional options to learn more about what's going on during dynamic
linking, such as ld-linux.so.2 on Linux.
This commit gets rid of ELF::Loader entirely since its very ambiguous
purpose was actually to load executables for the kernel, and that is
now handled by the kernel itself.
This patch includes some drive-by cleanup in LibDebug and CrashDaemon
enabled by the fact that we no longer need to keep the ref-counted
ELF::Loader around.
Problem:
- `(void)` simply casts the expression to void. This is understood to
indicate that it is ignored, but this is really a compiler trick to
get the compiler to not generate a warning.
Solution:
- Use the `[[maybe_unused]]` attribute to indicate the value is unused.
Note:
- Functions taking a `(void)` argument list have also been changed to
`()` because this is not needed and shows up in the same grep
command.
When loading dynamic objects, the emulator loads the interpreter,
generates an auxiliary vector and starts executing the loader.
Additionally, this commits also makes the MallocTracer and backtrace
symbolication work for dynamically loaded programs.
The dynamic loader exists as /usr/lib/Loader.so and is loaded by the
kernel when ET_DYN programs are executed.
The dynamic loader is responsible for loading the dependencies of the
main program, allocating TLS storage, preparing all loaded objects for
execution and finally jumping to the entry of the main program.
