There's no real system here, I just added it to various functions
that I don't believe we ever want to call after initialization
has finished.
With these changes, we're able to unmap 60 KiB of kernel text
after init. :^)
You can now declare functions with UNMAP_AFTER_INIT and they'll get
segregated into a separate kernel section that gets completely
unmapped at the end of initialization.
This can be used for anything we don't need to call once we've booted
into userspace.
There are two nice things about this mechanism:
- It allows us to free up entire pages of memory for other use.
(Note that this patch does not actually make use of the freed
pages yet, but in the future we totally could!)
- It allows us to get rid of obviously dangerous gadgets like
write-to-CR0 and write-to-CR4 which are very useful for an attacker
trying to disable SMAP/SMEP/etc.
I've also made sure to include a helpful panic message in case you
hit a kernel crash because of this protection. :^)
You can now use the READONLY_AFTER_INIT macro when declaring a variable
and we will put it in a special ".ro_after_init" section in the kernel.
Data in that section remains writable during the boot and init process,
and is then marked read-only just before launching the SystemServer.
This is based on an idea from the Linux kernel. :^)
If we try to align a number above 0xfffff000 to the next multiple of
the page size (4 KiB), it would wrap around to 0. This is most likely
never what we want, so let's assert if that happens.
Now that we no longer need to support the signal trampolines being
user-accessible inside the kernel memory range, we can get rid of the
"kernel" and "user-accessible" flags on Region and simply use the
address of the region to determine whether it's kernel or user.
This also tightens the page table mapping code, since it can now set
user-accessibility based solely on the virtual address of a page.
This patch adds Space, a class representing a process's address space.
- Each Process has a Space.
- The Space owns the PageDirectory and all Regions in the Process.
This allows us to reorganize sys$execve() so that it constructs and
populates a new Space fully before committing to it.
Previously, we would construct the new address space while still
running in the old one, and encountering an error meant we had to do
tedious and error-prone rollback.
Those problems are now gone, replaced by what's hopefully a set of much
smaller problems and missing cleanups. :^)
This patch adds sys$msyscall() which is loosely based on an OpenBSD
mechanism for preventing syscalls from non-blessed memory regions.
It works similarly to pledge and unveil, you can call it as many
times as you like, and when you're finished, you call it with a null
pointer and it will stop accepting new regions from then on.
If a syscall later happens and doesn't originate from one of the
previously blessed regions, the kernel will simply crash the process.
The random address proposals were not checked with the size so it was
increasely likely to try to allocate outside of available space with
larger and larger sizes.
Now they will be ignored instead of triggering a Kernel assertion
failure.
This is a continuation of: c8e7baf4b8
This patch adds enforcement of two new rules:
- Memory that was previously writable cannot become executable
- Memory that was previously executable cannot become writable
Unfortunately we have to make an exception for text relocations in the
dynamic loader. Since those necessitate writing into a private copy
of library code, we allow programs to transition from RW to RX under
very specific conditions. See the implementation of sys$mprotect()'s
should_make_executable_exception_for_dynamic_loader() for details.
This can be used to request random VM placement instead of the highly
predictable regular mmap(nullptr, ...) VM allocation strategy.
It will soon be used to implement ASLR in the dynamic loader. :^)
We need to make sure other processors can grab the MM lock while we
wait, so release it when we might block. Reading the page from
disk may also block, so release it during that time as well.
This eliminates the window between calling Processor::current and
the member function where a thread could be moved to another
processor. This is generally not as big of a concern as with
Processor::current_thread, but also slightly more light weight.
If we find ourselves with a user-accessible, non-shared Region backed by
a SharedInodeVMObject, that's pretty bad news, so let's just panic the
kernel instead of getting abused.
There might be a better place for this kind of check, so I've added a
FIXME about putting more thought into that.
This was exploitable since the shared flag determines whether inode
permission checks are applied in sys$mprotect().
The bug was pretty hard to spot due to default arguments being used
instead. This patch removes the default arguments to make explicit
at each call site what's being done.
This was done with the help of several scripts, I dump them here to
easily find them later:
awk '/#ifdef/ { print "#cmakedefine01 "$2 }' AK/Debug.h.in
for debug_macro in $(awk '/#ifdef/ { print $2 }' AK/Debug.h.in)
do
find . \( -name '*.cpp' -o -name '*.h' -o -name '*.in' \) -not -path './Toolchain/*' -not -path './Build/*' -exec sed -i -E 's/#ifdef '$debug_macro'/#if '$debug_macro'/' {} \;
done
# Remember to remove WRAPPER_GERNERATOR_DEBUG from the list.
awk '/#cmake/ { print "set("$2" ON)" }' AK/Debug.h.in
The kernel ignored the first 8 MiB of RAM while parsing the memory map
because the kmalloc heaps and the super physical pages lived here. Move
all that stuff inside the .bss segment so that those memory regions are
accounted for, otherwise we risk overwriting boot modules placed next
to the kernel.
