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79fa9765ca
We now use AK::Error and AK::ErrorOr<T> in both kernel and userspace! This was a slightly tedious refactoring that took a long time, so it's not unlikely that some bugs crept in. Nevertheless, it does pass basic functionality testing, and it's just real nice to finally see the same pattern in all contexts. :^)
132 lines
5.1 KiB
C++
132 lines
5.1 KiB
C++
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2018-2020, Andreas Kling <kling@serenityos.org>
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* Copyright (c) 2021, Max Wipfli <mail@maxwipfli.ch>
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*
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
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*/
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#include <AK/StringView.h>
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#include <Kernel/FileSystem/Custody.h>
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#include <Kernel/FileSystem/VirtualFileSystem.h>
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#include <Kernel/KLexicalPath.h>
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#include <Kernel/Process.h>
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namespace Kernel {
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static void update_intermediate_node_permissions(UnveilNode& root_node, UnveilAccess new_permissions)
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{
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for (auto& entry : root_node.children()) {
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auto& node = static_cast<UnveilNode&>(*entry.value);
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if (node.was_explicitly_unveiled())
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continue;
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node.set_metadata({ node.path(), new_permissions, node.was_explicitly_unveiled() });
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update_intermediate_node_permissions(node, new_permissions);
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}
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}
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ErrorOr<FlatPtr> Process::sys$unveil(Userspace<const Syscall::SC_unveil_params*> user_params)
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{
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VERIFY_PROCESS_BIG_LOCK_ACQUIRED(this)
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auto params = TRY(copy_typed_from_user(user_params));
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if (!params.path.characters && !params.permissions.characters) {
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m_veil_state = VeilState::Locked;
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return 0;
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}
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if (m_veil_state == VeilState::Locked)
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return EPERM;
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if (!params.path.characters || !params.permissions.characters)
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return EINVAL;
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if (params.permissions.length > 5)
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return EINVAL;
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auto path = TRY(get_syscall_path_argument(params.path));
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if (path->is_empty() || !path->view().starts_with('/'))
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return EINVAL;
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auto permissions = TRY(try_copy_kstring_from_user(params.permissions));
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// Let's work out permissions first...
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unsigned new_permissions = 0;
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for (const char permission : permissions->view()) {
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switch (permission) {
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case 'r':
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new_permissions |= UnveilAccess::Read;
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break;
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case 'w':
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new_permissions |= UnveilAccess::Write;
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break;
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case 'x':
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new_permissions |= UnveilAccess::Execute;
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break;
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case 'c':
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new_permissions |= UnveilAccess::CreateOrRemove;
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break;
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case 'b':
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new_permissions |= UnveilAccess::Browse;
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break;
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default:
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return EINVAL;
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}
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}
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// Now, let's try and resolve the path and obtain custody of the inode on the disk, and if not, bail out with
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// the error from resolve_path_without_veil()
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// However, if the user specified unveil() with "c" permissions, we don't set errno if ENOENT is encountered,
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// because they most likely intend the program to create the file for them later on.
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// If this case is encountered, the parent node of the path is returned and the custody of that inode is used instead.
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RefPtr<Custody> parent_custody; // Parent inode in case of ENOENT
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OwnPtr<KString> new_unveiled_path;
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auto custody_or_error = VirtualFileSystem::the().resolve_path_without_veil(path->view(), VirtualFileSystem::the().root_custody(), &parent_custody);
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if (!custody_or_error.is_error()) {
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new_unveiled_path = TRY(custody_or_error.value()->try_serialize_absolute_path());
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} else if (custody_or_error.error().code() == ENOENT && parent_custody && (new_permissions & UnveilAccess::CreateOrRemove)) {
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auto parent_custody_path = TRY(parent_custody->try_serialize_absolute_path());
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new_unveiled_path = TRY(KLexicalPath::try_join(parent_custody_path->view(), KLexicalPath::basename(path->view())));
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} else {
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// FIXME Should this be EINVAL?
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return custody_or_error.release_error();
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}
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auto path_parts = KLexicalPath::parts(new_unveiled_path->view());
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auto it = path_parts.begin();
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auto& matching_node = m_unveiled_paths.traverse_until_last_accessible_node(it, path_parts.end());
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if (it.is_end()) {
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// If the path has already been explicitly unveiled, do not allow elevating its permissions.
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if (matching_node.was_explicitly_unveiled()) {
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if (new_permissions & ~matching_node.permissions())
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return EPERM;
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}
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// It is possible that nodes that are "grandchildren" of the matching node have already been unveiled.
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// This means that there may be intermediate nodes between this one and the unveiled "grandchildren"
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// that inherited the current node's previous permissions. Those nodes now need their permissions
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// updated to match the current node.
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if (matching_node.permissions() != new_permissions)
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update_intermediate_node_permissions(matching_node, (UnveilAccess)new_permissions);
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matching_node.set_metadata({ matching_node.path(), (UnveilAccess)new_permissions, true });
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m_veil_state = VeilState::Dropped;
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return 0;
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}
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matching_node.insert(
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it,
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path_parts.end(),
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{ new_unveiled_path->view(), (UnveilAccess)new_permissions, true },
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[](auto& parent, auto& it) -> Optional<UnveilMetadata> {
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auto path = String::formatted("{}/{}", parent.path(), *it);
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return UnveilMetadata { path, parent.permissions(), false };
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});
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VERIFY(m_veil_state != VeilState::Locked);
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m_veil_state = VeilState::Dropped;
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return 0;
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}
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}
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