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8930db0900
This also changes the UnveilState to Dropped when the path unveil() is called for already has a node. This fixes a bug where unveiling "/" would previously keep the UnveilState as None, which meant that everything was still accessible until unveil() was called with any non-root path (or nullptr).
138 lines
5.2 KiB
C++
138 lines
5.2 KiB
C++
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2018-2020, Andreas Kling <kling@serenityos.org>
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* Copyright (c) 2021, Max Wipfli <mail@maxwipfli.ch>
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*
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
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*/
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#include <AK/LexicalPath.h>
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#include <AK/StringView.h>
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#include <Kernel/FileSystem/Custody.h>
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#include <Kernel/FileSystem/VirtualFileSystem.h>
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#include <Kernel/Process.h>
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namespace Kernel {
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static void update_intermediate_node_permissions(UnveilNode& root_node, UnveilAccess new_permissions)
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{
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for (auto& entry : root_node.children()) {
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auto& node = static_cast<UnveilNode&>(*entry.value);
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if (node.was_explicitly_unveiled())
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continue;
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node.set_metadata({ node.path(), new_permissions, node.was_explicitly_unveiled() });
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update_intermediate_node_permissions(node, new_permissions);
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}
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}
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KResultOr<int> Process::sys$unveil(Userspace<const Syscall::SC_unveil_params*> user_params)
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{
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Syscall::SC_unveil_params params;
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if (!copy_from_user(¶ms, user_params))
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return EFAULT;
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if (!params.path.characters && !params.permissions.characters) {
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m_veil_state = VeilState::Locked;
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return 0;
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}
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if (m_veil_state == VeilState::Locked)
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return EPERM;
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if (!params.path.characters || !params.permissions.characters)
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return EINVAL;
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if (params.permissions.length > 5)
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return EINVAL;
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auto path_or_error = get_syscall_path_argument(params.path);
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if (path_or_error.is_error())
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return path_or_error.error();
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auto& path = *path_or_error.value();
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if (path.is_empty() || !path.view().starts_with('/'))
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return EINVAL;
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auto permissions = copy_string_from_user(params.permissions);
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if (permissions.is_null())
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return EFAULT;
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// Let's work out permissions first...
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unsigned new_permissions = 0;
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for (const char permission : permissions) {
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switch (permission) {
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case 'r':
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new_permissions |= UnveilAccess::Read;
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break;
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case 'w':
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new_permissions |= UnveilAccess::Write;
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break;
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case 'x':
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new_permissions |= UnveilAccess::Execute;
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break;
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case 'c':
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new_permissions |= UnveilAccess::CreateOrRemove;
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break;
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case 'b':
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new_permissions |= UnveilAccess::Browse;
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break;
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default:
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return EINVAL;
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}
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}
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// Now, let's try and resolve the path and obtain custody of the inode on the disk, and if not, bail out with
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// the error from resolve_path_without_veil()
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// However, if the user specified unveil() with "c" permissions, we don't set errno if ENOENT is encountered,
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// because they most likely intend the program to create the file for them later on.
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// If this case is encountered, the parent node of the path is returned and the custody of that inode is used instead.
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RefPtr<Custody> parent_custody; // Parent inode in case of ENOENT
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String new_unveiled_path;
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auto custody_or_error = VFS::the().resolve_path_without_veil(path.view(), root_directory(), &parent_custody);
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if (!custody_or_error.is_error()) {
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new_unveiled_path = custody_or_error.value()->absolute_path();
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} else if (custody_or_error.error() == -ENOENT && parent_custody && (new_permissions & UnveilAccess::CreateOrRemove)) {
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String basename = LexicalPath(path.view()).basename();
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new_unveiled_path = String::formatted("{}/{}", parent_custody->absolute_path(), basename);
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} else {
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// FIXME Should this be EINVAL?
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return custody_or_error.error();
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}
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LexicalPath lexical_path(new_unveiled_path);
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auto it = lexical_path.parts().begin();
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auto& matching_node = m_unveiled_paths.traverse_until_last_accessible_node(it, lexical_path.parts().end());
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if (it.is_end()) {
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// If the path has already been explicitly unveiled, do not allow elevating its permissions.
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if (matching_node.was_explicitly_unveiled()) {
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if (new_permissions & ~matching_node.permissions())
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return EPERM;
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}
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// It is possible that nodes that are "grandchildren" of the matching node have already been unveiled.
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// This means that there may be intermediate nodes between this one and the unveiled "grandchildren"
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// that inherited the current node's previous permissions. Those nodes now need their permissions
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// updated to match the current node.
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if (matching_node.permissions() != new_permissions)
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update_intermediate_node_permissions(matching_node, (UnveilAccess)new_permissions);
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matching_node.set_metadata({ matching_node.path(), (UnveilAccess)new_permissions, true });
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m_veil_state = VeilState::Dropped;
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return 0;
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}
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matching_node.insert(
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it,
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lexical_path.parts().end(),
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{ new_unveiled_path, (UnveilAccess)new_permissions, true },
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[](auto& parent, auto& it) -> Optional<UnveilMetadata> {
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auto path = LexicalPath::join(parent.path(), *it).string();
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return UnveilMetadata { path, parent.permissions(), false };
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});
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VERIFY(m_veil_state != VeilState::Locked);
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m_veil_state = VeilState::Dropped;
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return 0;
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}
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}
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