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nixos/wrappers: allow setuid and setgid wrappers to run in user namespaces

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In user namespaces where an unprivileged user is mapped as root and root
is unmapped, setuid bits have no effect. However setuid root
executables like mount are still usable *in the namespace* as the user
already has the required privileges. This commit detects the situation
where the wrapper gained no privileges that the parent process did not
already have and in this case does less sanity checking. In short there
is no need to be picky since the parent already can execute the foo.real
executable themselves.

Details:
man 7 user_namespaces:
   Set-user-ID and set-group-ID programs
       When a process inside a user namespace executes a set-user-ID
       (set-group-ID) program, the process's effective user (group) ID
       inside the namespace is changed to whatever value is mapped for
       the user (group) ID of the file.  However, if either the user or
       the group ID of the file has no mapping inside the namespace, the
       set-user-ID (set-group-ID) bit is silently ignored: the new
       program is executed, but the process's effective user (group) ID
       is left unchanged.  (This mirrors the semantics of executing a
       set-user-ID or set-group-ID program that resides on a filesystem
       that was mounted with the MS_NOSUID flag, as described in
       mount(2).)

The effect of the setuid bit is that the real user id is preserved and
the effective and set user ids are changed to the owner of the wrapper.
We detect that no privilege was gained by checking that euid == suid
== ruid. In this case we stop checking that euid == owner of the
wrapper file.

As a reminder here are the values of euid, ruid, suid, stat.st_uid and
stat.st_mode & S_ISUID in various cases when running a setuid 42 executable as user 1000:

Normal case:
ruid=1000 euid=42 suid=42
setuid=2048, st_uid=42

nosuid mount:
ruid=1000 euid=1000 suid=1000
setuid=2048, st_uid=42

inside unshare -rm:
ruid=0 euid=0 suid=0
setuid=2048, st_uid=65534

inside unshare -rm, on a suid mount:
ruid=0 euid=0 suid=0
setuid=2048, st_uid=65534
This commit is contained in:
Guillaume Girol 2023-05-13 12:00:00 +00:00
parent f292b4964c
commit 0e4b8a05b2
2 changed files with 55 additions and 6 deletions
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40
nixos/modules/security/wrappers/wrapper.c
View File

@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -16,7 +17,10 @@
#include <syscall.h>
#include <byteswap.h>
// aborts when false, printing the failed expression
#define ASSERT(expr) ((expr) ? (void) 0 : assert_failure(#expr))
// aborts when returns non-zero, printing the failed expression and errno
#define MUSTSUCCEED(expr) ((expr) ? print_errno_and_die(#expr) : (void) 0)
extern char **environ;
@ -41,6 +45,12 @@ static noreturn void assert_failure(const char *assertion) {
abort();
}
static noreturn void print_errno_and_die(const char *assertion) {
fprintf(stderr, "Call `%s` in NixOS's wrapper.c failed: %s\n", assertion, strerror(errno));
fflush(stderr);
abort();
}
int get_last_cap(unsigned *last_cap) {
FILE* file = fopen("/proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap", "r");
if (file == NULL) {
@ -177,6 +187,17 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot readlink /proc/self/exe: %s", strerror(-self_path_size));
}
unsigned int ruid, euid, suid, rgid, egid, sgid;
MUSTSUCCEED(getresuid(&ruid, &euid, &suid));
MUSTSUCCEED(getresgid(&rgid, &egid, &sgid));
// If true, then we did not benefit from setuid privilege escalation,
// where the original uid is still in ruid and different from euid == suid.
int didnt_suid = (ruid == euid) && (euid == suid);
// If true, then we did not benefit from setgid privilege escalation
int didnt_sgid = (rgid == egid) && (egid == sgid);
// Make sure that we are being executed from the right location,
// i.e., `safe_wrapper_dir'. This is to prevent someone from creating
// hard link `X' from some other location, along with a false
@ -189,15 +210,22 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
ASSERT('/' == wrapper_dir[0]);
ASSERT('/' == self_path[len]);
// Make *really* *really* sure that we were executed as
// `self_path', and not, say, as some other setuid program. That
// is, our effective uid/gid should match the uid/gid of
// `self_path'.
// If we got privileges with the fs set[ug]id bit, check that the privilege we
// got matches the one one we expected, ie that our effective uid/gid
// matches the uid/gid of `self_path`. This ensures that we were executed as
// `self_path', and not, say, as some other setuid program.
// We don't check that if we did not benefit from the set[ug]id bit, as
// can be the case in nosuid mounts or user namespaces.
struct stat st;
ASSERT(lstat(self_path, &st) != -1);
ASSERT(!(st.st_mode & S_ISUID) || (st.st_uid == geteuid()));
ASSERT(!(st.st_mode & S_ISGID) || (st.st_gid == getegid()));
// if the wrapper gained privilege with suid, check that we got the uid of the file owner
ASSERT(!((st.st_mode & S_ISUID) && !didnt_suid) || (st.st_uid == euid));
// if the wrapper gained privilege with sgid, check that we got the gid of the file group
ASSERT(!((st.st_mode & S_ISGID) && !didnt_sgid) || (st.st_gid == egid));
// same, but with suid instead of euid
ASSERT(!((st.st_mode & S_ISUID) && !didnt_suid) || (st.st_uid == suid));
ASSERT(!((st.st_mode & S_ISGID) && !didnt_sgid) || (st.st_gid == sgid));
// And, of course, we shouldn't be writable.
ASSERT(!(st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH)));

21
nixos/tests/wrappers.nix
View File

@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ in
out = machine.succeed(cmd_as_regular(cmd)).strip()
assert out == expected, "Expected {0} to output {1}, but got {2}".format(cmd, expected, out)
def test_as_regular_in_userns_mapped_as_root(cmd, expected):
out = machine.succeed(f"su -l regular -c '${pkgs.util-linux}/bin/unshare -rm {cmd}'").strip()
assert out == expected, "Expected {0} to output {1}, but got {2}".format(cmd, expected, out)
test_as_regular('${busybox pkgs}/bin/busybox id -u', '${toString userUid}')
test_as_regular('${busybox pkgs}/bin/busybox id -ru', '${toString userUid}')
test_as_regular('${busybox pkgs}/bin/busybox id -g', '${toString usersGid}')
@ -70,10 +74,27 @@ in
test_as_regular('/run/wrappers/bin/sgid_root_busybox id -g', '0')
test_as_regular('/run/wrappers/bin/sgid_root_busybox id -rg', '${toString usersGid}')
test_as_regular_in_userns_mapped_as_root('/run/wrappers/bin/suid_root_busybox id -u', '0')
test_as_regular_in_userns_mapped_as_root('/run/wrappers/bin/suid_root_busybox id -ru', '0')
test_as_regular_in_userns_mapped_as_root('/run/wrappers/bin/suid_root_busybox id -g', '0')
test_as_regular_in_userns_mapped_as_root('/run/wrappers/bin/suid_root_busybox id -rg', '0')
test_as_regular_in_userns_mapped_as_root('/run/wrappers/bin/sgid_root_busybox id -u', '0')
test_as_regular_in_userns_mapped_as_root('/run/wrappers/bin/sgid_root_busybox id -ru', '0')
test_as_regular_in_userns_mapped_as_root('/run/wrappers/bin/sgid_root_busybox id -g', '0')
test_as_regular_in_userns_mapped_as_root('/run/wrappers/bin/sgid_root_busybox id -rg', '0')
# We are only testing the permitted set, because it's easiest to look at with capsh.
machine.fail(cmd_as_regular('${pkgs.libcap}/bin/capsh --has-p=CAP_CHOWN'))
machine.fail(cmd_as_regular('${pkgs.libcap}/bin/capsh --has-p=CAP_SYS_ADMIN'))
machine.succeed(cmd_as_regular('/run/wrappers/bin/capsh_with_chown --has-p=CAP_CHOWN'))
machine.fail(cmd_as_regular('/run/wrappers/bin/capsh_with_chown --has-p=CAP_SYS_ADMIN'))
# test a few "attacks" against which the wrapper protects itself
machine.succeed("cp /run/wrappers/bin/suid_root_busybox{,.real} /tmp/")
machine.fail(cmd_as_regular("/tmp/suid_root_busybox id -u"))
machine.succeed("chmod u+s,a+w /run/wrappers/bin/suid_root_busybox")
machine.fail(cmd_as_regular("/run/wrappers/bin/suid_root_busybox id -u"))
'';
})