It seems that upstream has re-uploaded the tarball again (see
0c2683cc11).
I've verified the new hash from two different hosts.
Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@redmoonstudios.org>
The initial commit accidentally left in some commented code and if you were
using alerts, they simply didn't work.
Smokeping also includes some JS code for the webui allowing you to zoom into
graphs and it was not passed into the homedir. Additionally, generate
static html pages for other webservers to serve the cache directory.
Add additional options to specify sendmail path or mailhost and verify that both
are not set.
Add one extra config hook that allows you to bypass all of the invidual config
stanzas and just hand it a string.
Previously, the list of CA certificates was generated with a perl script
which is included in curl. As this script is not very flexible, this commit
refactors the expression to use the python script that Debian uses to
generate their CA certificates from Mozilla's trust store in NSS.
Additionally, an option was added to the cacerts derivation and the
`security.pki` module to blacklist specific CAs.
Now the tracking works with aggregated devices on aggregated devices.
So container with physical device where the device is put in a bond
which is the basis for a bridge is now handled correctly.
Test that adding physical devices to containers works, find that network setup
then doesn't work because there is no udev in the container to tell systemd
that the device is present.
Fixed by not depending on the device in the container.
Activate the new container test for release
Bonds, bridges and other network devices need the underlying not as
dependency when used inside the container. Because the device is already
there.
But the address configuration needs the aggregated device itself.
The cmake based build system did not install the pkg-config files for
capstone, which made builds depending on capstone harder to write as
they cannot automatically find the location of the capstone library.
The Yama Linux Security Module restricts the use of ptrace so that
processes cannot ptrace processes that are not their children. This
prevents attackers from compromising one user-level processes and
snooping on the memory and runtime state of other processes owned
by the same user.
