/- asn1 /+ primitive-rsa, der =* rsa primitive-rsa :::: %/lib/pkcs |% :: +rs256: RSA signatures over a sha-256 digest :: ++ rs256 |_ k=key:rsa :: +emsa:rs256: message digest :: :: Padded, DER encoded sha-256 hash (EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5). :: ++ emsa |= m=byts =/ emlen (met 3 n.pub.k) =/ pec=spec:asn1 :~ %seq [%seq [%obj sha-256:obj:asn1] [%nul ~] ~] [%oct 32 (shay wid.m dat.m)] == :: note: this asn.1 digest is rendered raw here, as we require :: big-endian bytes, and the product of +en:der is little-endian :: =/ t=(list @D) ~(ren raw:en:der pec) =/ tlen=@ud (lent t) ?: (lth emlen (add 11 tlen)) ~|(%emsa-too-short !!) =/ ps=(list @D) (reap (sub emlen (add 3 tlen)) 0xff) (rep 3 (flop (weld [0x0 0x1 ps] [0x0 t]))) :: +sign:rs256: sign message :: :: An RSA signature is the primitive decryption of the message hash. :: ++ sign |=(m=byts (de:rsa (emsa m) k)) :: +verify:rs256: verify signature :: :: RSA signature verification confirms that the primitive encryption :: of the signature matches the message hash. :: ++ verify |= [s=@ m=byts] =((emsa m) (en:rsa s k)) -- :: |pem: generic PEM implementation (rfc7468) :: :: PEM is the base64 encoding of DER encoded data, with BEGIN and :: END labels indicating some type. :: ++ pem |% :: +en:pem: PEM encode :: ++ en |= [lab=@t len=@ud der=@ux] ^- wain :: XX validate label? :- (rap 3 ['-----BEGIN ' lab '-----' ~]) =/ a (en:base64:mimes:html len `@`der) |- ^- wain ?~ a [(rap 3 ['-----END ' lab '-----' ~]) ~] [(end [3 64] a) $(a (rsh [3 64] a))] :: +de:pem: PEM decode :: ++ de |= [lab=@t mep=wain] ^- (unit [len=@ud der=@ux]) =/ a (sub (lent mep) 2) ?~ mep ~ :: XX validate label? ?. =((rap 3 ['-----BEGIN ' lab '-----' ~]) i.mep) ~ ?. =((rap 3 ['-----END ' lab '-----' ~]) (snag a t.mep)) ~ ^- (unit [@ @]) (de:base64:mimes:html (rap 3 (scag a t.mep))) -- :: |pkcs1: RSA asymmetric cryptography (rfc3447) :: ++ pkcs1 |% :: |spec:pkcs1: ASN.1 specs for RSA keys :: ++ spec |% :: |en:spec:pkcs1: ASN.1 encoding for RSA keys :: ++ en |% :: +pass:en:spec:pkcs1: encode public key to ASN.1 :: ++ pass |= k=key:rsa ^- spec:asn1 [%seq [%int n.pub.k] [%int e.pub.k] ~] :: +ring:en:spec:pkcs1: encode private key to ASN.1 :: ++ ring |= k=key:rsa ^- spec:asn1 ~| %rsa-need-ring ?> ?=(^ sek.k) :~ %seq [%int 0] [%int n.pub.k] [%int e.pub.k] [%int d.u.sek.k] [%int p.u.sek.k] [%int q.u.sek.k] [%int (mod d.u.sek.k (dec p.u.sek.k))] [%int (mod d.u.sek.k (dec q.u.sek.k))] [%int (~(inv fo p.u.sek.k) q.u.sek.k)] == -- :: |de:spec:pkcs1: ASN.1 decoding for RSA keys :: ++ de |% :: +pass:de:spec:pkcs1: decode ASN.1 public key :: ++ pass |= a=spec:asn1 ^- (unit key:rsa) ?. ?=([%seq [%int *] [%int *] ~] a) ~ =* n int.i.seq.a =* e int.i.t.seq.a `[[n e] ~] :: +ring:de:spec:pkcs1: decode ASN.1 private key :: ++ ring |= a=spec:asn1 ^- (unit key:rsa) ?. ?=([%seq *] a) ~ ?. ?= $: [%int %0] [%int *] [%int *] [%int *] [%int *] [%int *] * == seq.a ~ =* n int.i.t.seq.a =* e int.i.t.t.seq.a =* d int.i.t.t.t.seq.a =* p int.i.t.t.t.t.seq.a =* q int.i.t.t.t.t.t.seq.a `[[n e] `[d p q]] -- -- :: |der:pkcs1: DER encoding for RSA keys :: :: En(coding) and de(coding) for public (pass) and private (ring) keys. :: ++ der |% ++ en |% ++ pass |=(k=key:rsa (en:^der (pass:en:spec k))) ++ ring |=(k=key:rsa (en:^der (ring:en:spec k))) -- ++ de |% ++ pass |=([len=@ud dat=@ux] `(unit key:rsa)`(biff (de:^der len dat) pass:de:spec)) ++ ring |=([len=@ud dat=@ux] `(unit key:rsa)`(biff (de:^der len dat) ring:de:spec)) -- -- :: |pem:pkcs1: PEM encoding for RSA keys :: :: En(coding) and de(coding) for public (pass) and private (ring) keys. :: ++ pem |% ++ en |% ++ pass |=(k=key:rsa (en:^pem 'RSA PUBLIC KEY' (pass:en:der k))) ++ ring |=(k=key:rsa (en:^pem 'RSA PRIVATE KEY' (ring:en:der k))) -- ++ de |% ++ pass |=(mep=wain (biff (de:^pem 'RSA PUBLIC KEY' mep) pass:de:der)) ++ ring |=(mep=wain (biff (de:^pem 'RSA PRIVATE KEY' mep) ring:de:der)) -- -- -- :: |pkcs8: asymmetric cryptography (rfc5208, rfc5958) :: :: RSA-only for now. :: ++ pkcs8 |% :: |spec:pkcs8: ASN.1 specs for asymmetric keys :: ++ spec |% ++ en |% :: +pass:spec:pkcs8: public key ASN.1 :: :: Technically not part of pkcs8, but standardized later in :: the superseding RFC. Included here for symmetry. :: ++ pass |= k=key:rsa ^- spec:asn1 :~ %seq [%seq [[%obj rsa:obj:asn1] [%nul ~] ~]] =/ a=[len=@ud dat=@ux] (pass:en:der:pkcs1 k) [%bit (mul 8 len.a) dat.a] == :: +ring:spec:pkcs8: private key ASN.1 :: ++ ring |= k=key:rsa ^- spec:asn1 :~ %seq [%int 0] [%seq [[%obj rsa:obj:asn1] [%nul ~] ~]] [%oct (ring:en:der:pkcs1 k)] == -- :: |de:spec:pkcs8: ASN.1 decoding for asymmetric keys :: ++ de |% :: +pass:de:spec:pkcs8: decode public key ASN.1 :: ++ pass |= a=spec:asn1 ^- (unit key:rsa) ?. ?=([%seq [%seq *] [%bit *] ~] a) ~ ?. ?& ?=([[%obj *] [%nul ~] ~] seq.i.seq.a) =(rsa:obj:asn1 obj.i.seq.i.seq.a) == ~ (pass:de:der:pkcs1 (div len.i.t.seq.a 8) bit.i.t.seq.a) :: +ring:de:spec:pkcs8: decode private key ASN.1 :: ++ ring |= a=spec:asn1 ^- (unit key:rsa) ?. ?=([%seq [%int %0] [%seq *] [%oct *] ~] a) ~ ?. ?& ?=([[%obj *] [%nul ~] ~] seq.i.t.seq.a) =(rsa:obj:asn1 obj.i.seq.i.t.seq.a) == ~ (ring:de:der:pkcs1 [len oct]:i.t.t.seq.a) -- -- :: |der:pkcs8: DER encoding for asymmetric keys :: :: En(coding) and de(coding) for public (pass) and private (ring) keys. :: RSA-only for now. :: ++ der |% ++ en |% ++ pass |=(k=key:rsa `[len=@ud dat=@ux]`(en:^der (pass:en:spec k))) ++ ring |=(k=key:rsa `[len=@ud dat=@ux]`(en:^der (ring:en:spec k))) -- ++ de |% ++ pass |=([len=@ud dat=@ux] `(unit key:rsa)`(biff (de:^der len dat) pass:de:spec)) ++ ring |=([len=@ud dat=@ux] `(unit key:rsa)`(biff (de:^der len dat) ring:de:spec)) -- -- :: |pem:pkcs8: PEM encoding for asymmetric keys :: :: En(coding) and de(coding) for public (pass) and private (ring) keys. :: RSA-only for now. :: ++ pem |% ++ en |% ++ pass |=(k=key:rsa (en:^pem 'PUBLIC KEY' (pass:en:der k))) ++ ring |=(k=key:rsa (en:^pem 'PRIVATE KEY' (ring:en:der k))) -- ++ de |% ++ pass |=(mep=wain (biff (de:^pem 'PUBLIC KEY' mep) pass:de:der)) ++ ring |=(mep=wain (biff (de:^pem 'PRIVATE KEY' mep) ring:de:der)) -- -- -- :: |pkcs10: certificate signing requests (rfc2986) :: :: Only implemented for RSA keys with subject-alternate names. :: ++ pkcs10 => |% :: +csr:pkcs10: certificate request :: +$ csr [key=key:rsa hot=(list turf)] -- |% :: |spec:pkcs10: ASN.1 specs for certificate signing requests :: ++ spec |% :: +en:spec:pkcs10: ASN.1 encoding for certificate signing requests :: ++ en |= csr ^- spec:asn1 |^ =/ dat=spec:asn1 (info key hot) :~ %seq dat [%seq [[%obj rsa-sha-256:obj:asn1] [%nul ~] ~]] :: big-endian signature bits :: :: the signature bitwidth is definitionally the key length :: :+ %bit (met 0 n.pub.key) (swp 3 (~(sign rs256 key) (en:^der dat))) == :: +info:en:spec:pkcs10: certificate request info :: ++ info |= csr ^- spec:asn1 :~ %seq [%int 0] [%seq ~] (pass:en:spec:pkcs8 key) :: explicit, context-specific tag #0 (extensions) :: :+ %con `bespoke:asn1`[| 0] %~ ren raw:en:^der :~ %seq [%obj csr-ext:obj:asn1] :~ %set :~ %seq :~ %seq [%obj sub-alt:obj:asn1] [%oct (en:^der (san hot))] == == == == == :: +san:en:spec:pkcs10: subject-alternate-names :: ++ san |= hot=(list turf) ^- spec:asn1 :- %seq %+ turn hot :: implicit, context-specific tag #2 (IA5String) :: XX sanitize string? |=(=turf [%con `bespoke:asn1`[& 2] (trip (en-turf:html turf))]) -- :: |de:spec:pkcs10: ASN.1 decoding for certificate signing requests ++ de !! -- :: |der:pkcs10: DER encoding for certificate signing requests :: ++ der |% ++ en |=(a=csr `[len=@ud der=@ux]`(en:^der (en:spec a))) ++ de !! ::|=(a=@ `(unit csr)`(biff (de:^der a) de:spec)) -- :: |pem:pkcs10: PEM encoding for certificate signing requests :: ++ pem |% ++ en |=(a=csr (en:^pem 'CERTIFICATE REQUEST' (en:der a))) ++ de !! ::|=(mep=wain (biff (de:^pem 'CERTIFICATE REQUEST' mep) de:der)) -- -- --