mirror of
https://github.com/ilyakooo0/urbit.git
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654 lines
19 KiB
Plaintext
654 lines
19 KiB
Plaintext
:: L1 contract changes:
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:: - Enforce that once spawn proxy is set to deposit address, it can't
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:: switched back
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:: - Enforce that once spawn proxy is set to deposit address, you can't
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:: spawn children
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:: - Possibly the same for approveForAll
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:: - Enforce that only ownership key can set spawn proxy to rollup
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:: - Disallow depositing galaxy to L2
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::
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:: TODO: maybe split out a generic "modify state" core, and have both
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:: L1 and L2 transactions reduce to that? Would need to see what that
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:: looks like for L2 transactions, since they need to assert various
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:: things, but maybe those reduce to just asserting the signer is
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:: correct? Also need to handle depositing and managing l1 vs l2 to
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:: some extent.
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::
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:: TODO: can an L1 star adopt an L2 planet? It's not obvious how --
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:: maybe they need to adopt as an L2 transaction? That sounds right I
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:: think. Can an L2 star adopt an L1 planet? I guess, but L1 wouldn't
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:: know about it. Should L1 check whether the escape target is on L2
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:: for some reason?
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::
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:: TODO: make kid and net in point not a unit
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::
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:: TODO: consider the implications of having two operator lists, on L1
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:: and L2. Are they the same list, or different?
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::
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:: TODO: should we emit all the events azimuth.sol does? might be
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:: convenient for tracking edges?
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::
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:: TODO: decide about adopt/reject/detach. right now i add specifying
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:: the parent because it feels safer and cleaner, at the cost of four
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:: bytes. without specifying the parent, are there race conditions
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:: involving multiple possible sponsors owned/managed by the same
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:: address?
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::
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:: TODO: add nonces to txs. how to keep track of them? need replay
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:: protection. maybe we can add nonces to ships instead of addresses?
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:: Then what about operators?
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::
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:: TODO: if sig fails to verify, skip instead of crashing
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::
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:: TODO: is it possible to spawn directly to the deposit address? if
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:: so, should we find its parent's owner to control it?
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::
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:: TODO: should we add any protection in the L1 contracts that you
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:: don't deposit from a contract?
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::
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/+ ethereum
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:: Constants
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::
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|%
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:: Transfers on L1 to this address count as depositing to L2
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::
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++ deposit-address 0x1234.5678.9012.3456.7890.1234.5678.9012.3456.7890
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--
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:: Types
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|%
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:: ethereum address, 20 bytes.
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::
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+$ address @ux
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++ point
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$: :: domain
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::
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dominion=?(%l1 %l2 %spawn)
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::
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:: ownership
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::
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$= own
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$: owner=address
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management-proxy=address
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voting-proxy=address
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transfer-proxy=address
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==
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::
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:: networking
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::
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$= net
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$: =life
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=pass
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continuity-number=@ud
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sponsor=[has=? who=@p]
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escape=(unit @p)
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==
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::
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:: spawning
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::
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$= kid
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$: spawn-proxy=address
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spawned=(set @p)
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==
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==
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::
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++ diff
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$% [%rift =rift]
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[%keys =life crypto-suite=@ud =pass]
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[%spon sponsor=(unit @p)]
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==
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::
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+$ state
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$: =points
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=operators
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dns=(list @t)
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==
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+$ points (map ship point)
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+$ operators (jug address address)
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+$ effects (list [ship diff])
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+$ tx
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$% [%transfer-point =ship =address reset=?]
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[%spawn =ship =address]
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[%set-dns-domains primary=@t secondary=@t tertiary=@t]
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[%set-operator operator=address add=?]
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[%configure-keys =ship encrypt=@ auth=@ crypto-suite=@ breach=?]
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[%escape =ship parent=ship]
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[%cancel-escape =ship parent=ship]
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[%adopt =ship parent=ship]
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[%reject =ship parent=ship]
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[%detach =ship parent=ship]
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[%set-management-proxy =ship =address]
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[%set-spawn-proxy =ship =address]
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[%set-voting-proxy =ship =address]
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[%set-transfer-proxy =ship =address]
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==
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::
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+$ input
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$% [%bat batch=@]
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[%log =event-log:rpc:ethereum]
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==
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:: ECDSA verifier
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::
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+$ verifier $-([dat=@ v=@ r=@ s=@] =address)
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--
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::
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|%
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++ parse-batch
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|= [batch=@ =verifier]
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^- (list [address tx])
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?~ batch
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~
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=^ [signer=address =tx] batch (parse-tx batch verifier)
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[[signer tx] $]
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::
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++ parse-tx
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|= [batch=@ =verifier]
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^- [[address tx] rest=@]
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=/ batch [0 batch]
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|^
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=^ sig batch (take 3 65)
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=/ signed-batch +.batch
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=- =/ signer=address
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(verify-tx sig (end [0 len] signed-batch))
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[[signer tx] rest]
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^- [=tx [len=@ rest=@]]
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=^ op batch (take 0 7)
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?+ op ~|([%strange-opcode op] !!)
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%0
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=^ reset=@ batch (take 0)
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=^ =ship batch (take 3 4)
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=^ =address batch (take 3 20)
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[[%transfer-point ship address (,? reset)] batch]
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::
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%1 =^(res batch take-ship-address [[%spawn res] batch])
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%2
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=^ breach=@ batch (take 0)
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=^ =ship batch (take 3 4)
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=^ encrypt=@ batch (take 3 32)
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=^ auth=@ batch (take 3 32)
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=^ crypto-suite=@ batch (take 3 4)
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[[%configure-keys ship encrypt auth crypto-suite (,? breach)] batch]
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::
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%3 =^(res batch take-escape [[%escape res] batch])
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%4 =^(res batch take-escape [[%cancel-escape res] batch])
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%5 =^(res batch take-escape [[%adopt res] batch])
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%6 =^(res batch take-escape [[%reject res] batch])
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%7 =^(res batch take-escape [[%detach res] batch])
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%8 =^(res batch take-ship-address [[%set-management-proxy res] batch])
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%9 =^(res batch take-ship-address [[%set-spawn-proxy res] batch])
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%10 =^(res batch take-ship-address [[%set-voting-proxy res] batch])
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%11 =^(res batch take-ship-address [[%set-transfer-proxy res] batch])
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%12
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=^ pad=@ batch (take 0)
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=^ primary=@t batch take-string
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=^ secondary=@t batch take-string
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=^ tertiary=@t batch take-string
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[[%set-dns-domains primary secondary tertiary] batch]
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::
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%13
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=^ add=@ batch (take 0)
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=^ =address batch (take 3 20)
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[[%set-operator address (,? add)] batch]
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==
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::
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:: Take a bite
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::
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++ take
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|= =bite
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^- [@ _batch]
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:- (end bite +.batch)
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:- %+ add -.batch
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?@ bite (bex bite)
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(mul step.bite (bex bloq.bite))
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(rsh bite +.batch)
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:: Dumb encoding of strings up to 255 bytes
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::
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++ take-string
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^- [string=@t _batch]
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=^ len=@ batch (take 3)
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(take 3 len)
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:: Encode ship and address
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::
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++ take-ship-address
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^- [[ship address] _batch]
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=^ pad=@ batch (take 0)
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=^ =ship batch (take 3 4)
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=^ =address batch (take 3 20)
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[[ship address] batch]
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:: Encode escape-related txs
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::
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++ take-escape
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^- [[ship ship] _batch]
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=^ pad=@ batch (take 0)
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=^ child=ship batch (take 3 4)
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=^ parent=ship batch (take 3 4)
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[[child parent] batch]
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:: Verify signature and produce signer address
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::
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++ verify-tx
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|= [sig=@ txdata=@]
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^- address
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|^
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=^ v sig (take 3)
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=^ r sig (take 3 32)
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=^ s sig (take 3 32)
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(verifier txdata v r s)
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::
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++ take
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|= =bite
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[(end bite sig) (rsh bite sig)]
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--
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--
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::
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++ get-point-size
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|= =ship
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^- @
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?: (lth ship 0x100) 0
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?: (lth ship 0x1.0000) 1
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2
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::
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++ hash-log-name
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|= name=@t
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^- @ux
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(keccak-256:keccak:crypto (as-octs:mimes:html name))
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::
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++ pass-from-eth
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|= [enc=octs aut=octs sut=@ud]
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^- pass
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%^ cat 3 'b'
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?. &(=(1 sut) =(p.enc 32) =(p.aut 32))
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(cat 8 0 0)
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(cat 8 q.aut q.enc)
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::
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++ get-point
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|= [=state =ship]
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^- point
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=/ existing (~(get by points.state) ship)
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?^ existing
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u.existing
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%* . *point
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dominion
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?+ (clan:title ship) ~|(%strange-point !!)
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%czar %l1
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?(%king %duke)
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=/ existing-parent $(ship (^sein:title ship))
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?- dominion.existing-parent
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%l1 %l1
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%l2 %l2
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%spawn %l2
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==
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==
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==
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--
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|%
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:: Receive log from L1 transaction
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::
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++ receive-log
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|= [=state log=event-log:rpc:ethereum]
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^- [(list [ship diff]) ^state]
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=* log-name i.topics.log
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?: =(log-name ^~((hash-log-name 'ChangedDns(string,string,string)')))
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?> ?=(~ t.topics.log)
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=/ words (rip 8 data.log)
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?> ?=([a=@ @ b=@ @ c=@ @ @ @ @ ~] words)
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=* one &1.words
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=* two &3.words
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=* tri &5.words
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`state(dns (turn ~[one two tri] (cury swp 3)))
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::
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?: =(log-name ^~((hash-log-name 'ApprovalForAll(address,address,bool)')))
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?> ?=([@ @ ~] t.topics.log)
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=* owner i.t.topics.log
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=* operator i.t.t.topics.log
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=/ approved !(,? data.log)
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=- `state(operators -)
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?: approved
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(~(put ju operators.state) owner operator)
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(~(del ju operators.state) owner operator)
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::
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:: The rest of the logs modify a particular ship, specified in the
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:: second topic. We fetch it, and insert the modification back into
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:: our state.
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::
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?> ?=([@ *] t.topics.log)
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=* ship i.t.topics.log
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=/ point (get-point state `@`ship)
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=- [effects state(points (~(put by points.state) `@`ship new-point))]
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^- [=effects new-point=^point]
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::
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?: =(log-name ^~((hash-log-name 'ChangedSpawnProxy(uint32,address)')))
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?> ?=(%l1 -.point)
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?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
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=* to i.t.t.topics.log
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:- ~
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?. =(deposit-address to)
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point(spawn-proxy.kid to)
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point(dominion %spawn)
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::
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:: The rest can be done by any ship on L1, even if their spawn proxy
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:: is set to L2
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::
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?< ?=(%l2 -.point)
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::
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?: =(log-name ^~((hash-log-name 'BrokeContinuity(uint32,uint32)')))
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?> ?=(~ t.t.topics.log)
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=* rift data.log
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:- [`@`ship %rift `@`rift]~
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point(continuity-number.net `@`rift)
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::
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=/ changed-keys-hash
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^~((hash-log-name 'ChangedKeys(uint32,bytes32,bytes32,uint32,uint32)'))
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?: =(log-name changed-keys-hash)
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?> ?=(~ t.t.topics.log)
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=/ words (rip 8 data.log)
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?> ?=([@ @ @ @ ~] words)
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=* encryption i.words
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=* authentication i.t.words
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=* crypto-suite i.t.t.words :: TODO: store in state, or add to pass
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=* life i.t.t.t.words
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=/ =pass (pass-from-eth 32^encryption 32^authentication crypto-suite)
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:- [`@`ship %keys life crypto-suite pass]~
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point(life.net life, pass.net pass)
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::
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?: =(log-name ^~((hash-log-name 'EscapeAccepted(uint32,uint32)')))
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?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
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=* parent i.t.t.topics.log
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:- [`@`ship %spon ``@`parent]~
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point(escape.net ~, sponsor.net [%& `@`parent])
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::
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?: =(log-name ^~((hash-log-name 'LostSponsor(uint32,uint32)')))
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?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
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=* parent i.t.t.topics.log
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:- [`@`ship %spon ~]~
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point(has.sponsor.net %|)
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::
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:: The rest do not produce effects
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::
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:- ~
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::
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?: =(log-name ^~((hash-log-name 'EscapeRequested(uint32,uint32)')))
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?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
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=* parent i.t.t.topics.log
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point(escape.net ``@`parent)
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::
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?: =(log-name ^~((hash-log-name 'EscapeCanceled(uint32,uint32)')))
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?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
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=* parent i.t.t.topics.log
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point(escape.net ~)
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::
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?: =(log-name ^~((hash-log-name 'OwnerChanged(uint32,address)')))
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?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
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=* to i.t.t.topics.log
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::
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?: =(deposit-address to)
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point(dominion %l2)
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point(owner.own to)
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::
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?: =(log-name ^~((hash-log-name 'ChangedTransferProxy(uint32,address)')))
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?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
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=* to i.t.t.topics.log
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point(transfer-proxy.own to)
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::
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?: =(log-name ^~((hash-log-name 'ChangedManagementProxy(uint32,address)')))
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?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
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=* to i.t.t.topics.log
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point(management-proxy.own to)
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::
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?: =(log-name ^~((hash-log-name 'ChangedVotingProxy(uint32,address)')))
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?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
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=* to i.t.t.topics.log
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point(voting-proxy.own to)
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::
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~| [%unknown-log log]
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!!
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::
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:: Receive batch of L2 transactions
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::
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++ receive-batch
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|= [=state batch=@ =verifier]
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=/ txs=(list [signer=address =tx]) (parse-batch batch verifier)
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|- ^- [effects ^state]
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?~ txs
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[~ state]
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=^ effects-1 state (receive-tx state signer.i.txs tx.i.txs)
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=^ effects-2 state $(txs t.txs)
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[(welp effects-1 effects-2) state]
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::
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:: Receive an individual L2 transaction
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::
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++ receive-tx
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|= [=state signer=address =tx]
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|^
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^- [effects ^state]
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?- -.tx
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%set-dns-domains (process-set-dns-domains +.tx)
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%set-operator (process-set-operator +.tx)
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%spawn (process-spawn +.tx)
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%transfer-point (w-point process-transfer-point +.tx)
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%configure-keys (w-point-fx process-configure-keys +.tx)
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%escape (w-point process-escape +.tx)
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%cancel-escape (w-point process-cancel-escape +.tx)
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%adopt (w-point-fx process-adopt +.tx)
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%reject (w-point process-reject +.tx)
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%detach (w-point-fx process-detach +.tx)
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%set-management-proxy (w-point process-set-management-proxy +.tx)
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%set-spawn-proxy (w-point process-set-spawn-proxy +.tx)
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%set-voting-proxy (w-point process-set-voting-proxy +.tx)
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%set-transfer-proxy (w-point process-set-transfer-proxy +.tx)
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==
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::
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++ w-point-fx
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|* [fun=$-([ship point *] [effects point]) =ship rest=*]
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^- [effects ^state]
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=/ point (get-point state ship)
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?> ?=(%l2 -.point)
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=/ [=effects new-point=^point] (fun ship point rest)
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[effects state(points (~(put by points.state) ship new-point))]
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::
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++ w-point
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|* [fun=$-([ship point *] point) =ship rest=*]
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^- [effects ^state]
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=/ point (get-point state ship)
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?> ?=(%l2 -.point)
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=/ new-point (fun ship point rest)
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`state(points (~(put by points.state) ship new-point))
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::
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++ process-set-dns-domains
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|= [primary=@t secondary=@t tertiary=@t]
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?> =(signer 0x0) :: TODO: who?
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`state(dns ~[primary secondary tertiary])
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::
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++ process-set-operator
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|= [operator=address add=?]
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=- `state(operators -)
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?< =(0x0 operator)
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?: add
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(~(put ju operators.state) signer operator)
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(~(del ju operators.state) signer operator)
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::
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++ process-transfer-point
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|= [=ship =point to=address reset=?]
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:: Assert ship is on L2
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::
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:: Assert signer is owner or transfer prxoy
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::
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?> ?| =(owner.own.point signer)
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=(transfer-proxy.own.point signer)
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==
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:: Execute transfer
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::
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=: owner.own.point to
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transfer-proxy.own.point *address
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==
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:: Execute reset if requested
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::
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?. reset
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point
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::
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=? net.point (gth life.net.point 0)
|
|
[+(life) 0 +(continuity-number) sponsor escape]:net.point
|
|
=. own.point [owner.own.point *address *address *address]
|
|
=. spawn-proxy.kid.point *address
|
|
point
|
|
::
|
|
++ process-spawn
|
|
|= [=ship to=address]
|
|
^- [effects ^state]
|
|
=/ parent=^ship (^sein:title ship)
|
|
:: Assert parent is on L2
|
|
::
|
|
=/ parent-point (get-point state parent)
|
|
?> ?=(?(%l2 %spawn) -.parent-point)
|
|
:: Assert signer is owner or spawn proxy
|
|
::
|
|
?> ?| =(owner.own.parent-point signer)
|
|
=(spawn-proxy.kid.parent-point signer)
|
|
==
|
|
:: Assert child not already spawned
|
|
::
|
|
:: TODO: verify this means the ship exists on neither L1 nor L2
|
|
::
|
|
?< (~(has by points.state) ship)
|
|
:: Assert one-level-down
|
|
::
|
|
?> =(+((get-point-size parent)) (get-point-size ship))
|
|
:: TODO check spawnlimit
|
|
::
|
|
=. points.state
|
|
%+ ~(put by points.state) ship
|
|
?: =(to signer)
|
|
:: If spawning to self, just do it
|
|
::
|
|
%* . *point
|
|
dominion %l2
|
|
owner.own to
|
|
==
|
|
:: Else spawn to parent and set transfer proxy
|
|
::
|
|
%* . *point
|
|
dominion %l2
|
|
owner.own owner.own.parent-point
|
|
transfer-proxy.own to
|
|
==
|
|
`state
|
|
::
|
|
++ process-configure-keys
|
|
|= [=ship =point encrypt=@ auth=@ crypto-suite=@ breach=?]
|
|
::
|
|
?> ?| =(owner.own.point signer)
|
|
=(management-proxy.own.point signer)
|
|
==
|
|
::
|
|
=? continuity-number.net.point breach +(continuity-number.net.point)
|
|
=/ rift-effects ?:(breach [ship %rift continuity-number.net.point]~ ~)
|
|
::
|
|
=/ =pass (pass-from-eth 32^encrypt 32^auth crypto-suite)
|
|
=? net.point !=(pass.net.point pass) :: TODO: check crypto-suite
|
|
net.point(life +(life.net.point), pass pass)
|
|
=/ keys-effects
|
|
?: =(pass.net.point pass)
|
|
~
|
|
[ship %keys life.net.point crypto-suite pass]~
|
|
::
|
|
[(welp rift-effects keys-effects) point]
|
|
::
|
|
++ process-escape
|
|
|= [=ship =point parent=ship]
|
|
?> ?| =(owner.own.point signer)
|
|
=(management-proxy.own.point signer)
|
|
==
|
|
::
|
|
:: TODO: don't allow "peer escape"?
|
|
?> =(+((get-point-size parent)) (get-point-size ship))
|
|
::
|
|
point(escape.net `parent) :: TODO: omitting a lot of source material?
|
|
::
|
|
++ process-cancel-escape
|
|
|= [=ship =point parent=ship]
|
|
?> ?| =(owner.own.point signer)
|
|
=(management-proxy.own.point signer)
|
|
==
|
|
::
|
|
point(escape.net ~)
|
|
::
|
|
++ process-adopt
|
|
|= [=ship =point parent=ship]
|
|
=/ parent-point (get-point state parent) :: TODO: assert child/parent on L2?
|
|
::
|
|
?> ?| =(owner.own.parent-point signer)
|
|
=(management-proxy.own.parent-point signer)
|
|
==
|
|
::
|
|
?> =(escape.net.point `ship)
|
|
:- [ship %spon `parent]~
|
|
point(escape.net ~, sponsor.net [%& parent])
|
|
::
|
|
++ process-reject
|
|
|= [=ship =point parent=ship]
|
|
=/ parent-point (get-point state parent) :: TODO: assert child/parent on L2?
|
|
::
|
|
?> ?| =(owner.own.parent-point signer)
|
|
=(management-proxy.own.parent-point signer)
|
|
==
|
|
::
|
|
point(escape.net ~)
|
|
::
|
|
++ process-detach
|
|
|= [=ship =point parent=ship]
|
|
=/ parent-point (get-point state parent) :: TODO: assert child/parent on L2?
|
|
::
|
|
?> ?| =(owner.own.parent-point signer)
|
|
=(management-proxy.own.parent-point signer)
|
|
==
|
|
::
|
|
:- [ship %spon ~]~
|
|
point(has.sponsor.net %|)
|
|
::
|
|
++ process-set-management-proxy
|
|
|= [=ship =point =address]
|
|
?> ?| =(owner.own.point signer)
|
|
=(management-proxy.own.point signer)
|
|
==
|
|
::
|
|
point(management-proxy.own address)
|
|
::
|
|
++ process-set-spawn-proxy
|
|
|= [=ship =point =address]
|
|
?> ?| =(owner.own.point signer)
|
|
=(spawn-proxy.kid.point signer)
|
|
==
|
|
::
|
|
point(spawn-proxy.kid address)
|
|
::
|
|
++ process-set-voting-proxy
|
|
|= [=ship =point =address]
|
|
?> ?| =(owner.own.point signer)
|
|
=(voting-proxy.own.point signer)
|
|
==
|
|
::
|
|
point(voting-proxy.own address)
|
|
::
|
|
++ process-set-transfer-proxy
|
|
|= [=ship =point =address]
|
|
?> ?| =(owner.own.point signer)
|
|
=(transfer-proxy.own.point signer)
|
|
==
|
|
::
|
|
point(transfer-proxy.own address)
|
|
--
|
|
--
|
|
::
|
|
:: State transition function
|
|
::
|
|
:: TODO: wrap in mule to no-op instead of crash? perhaps that's better
|
|
:: as part of the spec? it's not a clear part of the nock spec, though
|
|
::
|
|
|= [=verifier =state =input]
|
|
^- [effects ^state]
|
|
?: ?=(%log -.input)
|
|
:: Received log from L1 transaction
|
|
::
|
|
(receive-log state event-log.input)
|
|
:: Received batch
|
|
::
|
|
(receive-batch state batch.input verifier)
|