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landscape/desk/lib/pkcs.hoon
Patrick O'Sullivan 517fa6fa88 Add desk and ui dirs
2022-08-02 10:43:52 -05:00

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/- asn1
/+ primitive-rsa, der
=* rsa primitive-rsa
:::: %/lib/pkcs
|%
:: +rs256: RSA signatures over a sha-256 digest
::
++ rs256
|_ k=key:rsa
:: +emsa:rs256: message digest
::
:: Padded, DER encoded sha-256 hash (EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5).
::
++ emsa
|= m=byts
=/ emlen (met 3 n.pub.k)
=/ pec=spec:asn1
:~ %seq
[%seq [%obj sha-256:obj:asn1] [%nul ~] ~]
[%oct 32 (shay wid.m dat.m)]
==
:: note: this asn.1 digest is rendered raw here, as we require
:: big-endian bytes, and the product of +en:der is little-endian
::
=/ t=(list @D) ~(ren raw:en:der pec)
=/ tlen=@ud (lent t)
?: (lth emlen (add 11 tlen))
~|(%emsa-too-short !!)
=/ ps=(list @D)
(reap (sub emlen (add 3 tlen)) 0xff)
(rep 3 (flop (weld [0x0 0x1 ps] [0x0 t])))
:: +sign:rs256: sign message
::
:: An RSA signature is the primitive decryption of the message hash.
::
++ sign
|=(m=byts (de:rsa (emsa m) k))
:: +verify:rs256: verify signature
::
:: RSA signature verification confirms that the primitive encryption
:: of the signature matches the message hash.
::
++ verify
|= [s=@ m=byts]
=((emsa m) (en:rsa s k))
--
:: |pem: generic PEM implementation (rfc7468)
::
:: PEM is the base64 encoding of DER encoded data, with BEGIN and
:: END labels indicating some type.
::
++ pem
|%
:: +en:pem: PEM encode
::
++ en
|= [lab=@t len=@ud der=@ux]
^- wain
:: XX validate label?
:- (rap 3 ['-----BEGIN ' lab '-----' ~])
=/ a (en:base64:mimes:html len `@`der)
|- ^- wain
?~ a
[(rap 3 ['-----END ' lab '-----' ~]) ~]
[(end [3 64] a) $(a (rsh [3 64] a))]
:: +de:pem: PEM decode
::
++ de
|= [lab=@t mep=wain]
^- (unit [len=@ud der=@ux])
=/ a (sub (lent mep) 2)
?~ mep ~
:: XX validate label?
?. =((rap 3 ['-----BEGIN ' lab '-----' ~]) i.mep) ~
?. =((rap 3 ['-----END ' lab '-----' ~]) (snag a t.mep)) ~
^- (unit [@ @])
(de:base64:mimes:html (rap 3 (scag a t.mep)))
--
:: |pkcs1: RSA asymmetric cryptography (rfc3447)
::
++ pkcs1
|%
:: |spec:pkcs1: ASN.1 specs for RSA keys
::
++ spec
|%
:: |en:spec:pkcs1: ASN.1 encoding for RSA keys
::
++ en
|%
:: +pass:en:spec:pkcs1: encode public key to ASN.1
::
++ pass
|= k=key:rsa
^- spec:asn1
[%seq [%int n.pub.k] [%int e.pub.k] ~]
:: +ring:en:spec:pkcs1: encode private key to ASN.1
::
++ ring
|= k=key:rsa
^- spec:asn1
~| %rsa-need-ring
?> ?=(^ sek.k)
:~ %seq
[%int 0]
[%int n.pub.k]
[%int e.pub.k]
[%int d.u.sek.k]
[%int p.u.sek.k]
[%int q.u.sek.k]
[%int (mod d.u.sek.k (dec p.u.sek.k))]
[%int (mod d.u.sek.k (dec q.u.sek.k))]
[%int (~(inv fo p.u.sek.k) q.u.sek.k)]
==
--
:: |de:spec:pkcs1: ASN.1 decoding for RSA keys
::
++ de
|%
:: +pass:de:spec:pkcs1: decode ASN.1 public key
::
++ pass
|= a=spec:asn1
^- (unit key:rsa)
?. ?=([%seq [%int *] [%int *] ~] a)
~
=* n int.i.seq.a
=* e int.i.t.seq.a
`[[n e] ~]
:: +ring:de:spec:pkcs1: decode ASN.1 private key
::
++ ring
|= a=spec:asn1
^- (unit key:rsa)
?. ?=([%seq *] a) ~
?. ?= $: [%int %0]
[%int *]
[%int *]
[%int *]
[%int *]
[%int *]
*
==
seq.a
~
=* n int.i.t.seq.a
=* e int.i.t.t.seq.a
=* d int.i.t.t.t.seq.a
=* p int.i.t.t.t.t.seq.a
=* q int.i.t.t.t.t.t.seq.a
`[[n e] `[d p q]]
--
--
:: |der:pkcs1: DER encoding for RSA keys
::
:: En(coding) and de(coding) for public (pass) and private (ring) keys.
::
++ der
|%
++ en
|%
++ pass |=(k=key:rsa (en:^der (pass:en:spec k)))
++ ring |=(k=key:rsa (en:^der (ring:en:spec k)))
--
++ de
|%
++ pass |=([len=@ud dat=@ux] `(unit key:rsa)`(biff (de:^der len dat) pass:de:spec))
++ ring |=([len=@ud dat=@ux] `(unit key:rsa)`(biff (de:^der len dat) ring:de:spec))
--
--
:: |pem:pkcs1: PEM encoding for RSA keys
::
:: En(coding) and de(coding) for public (pass) and private (ring) keys.
::
++ pem
|%
++ en
|%
++ pass |=(k=key:rsa (en:^pem 'RSA PUBLIC KEY' (pass:en:der k)))
++ ring |=(k=key:rsa (en:^pem 'RSA PRIVATE KEY' (ring:en:der k)))
--
++ de
|%
++ pass |=(mep=wain (biff (de:^pem 'RSA PUBLIC KEY' mep) pass:de:der))
++ ring |=(mep=wain (biff (de:^pem 'RSA PRIVATE KEY' mep) ring:de:der))
--
--
--
:: |pkcs8: asymmetric cryptography (rfc5208, rfc5958)
::
:: RSA-only for now.
::
++ pkcs8
|%
:: |spec:pkcs8: ASN.1 specs for asymmetric keys
::
++ spec
|%
++ en
|%
:: +pass:spec:pkcs8: public key ASN.1
::
:: Technically not part of pkcs8, but standardized later in
:: the superseding RFC. Included here for symmetry.
::
++ pass
|= k=key:rsa
^- spec:asn1
:~ %seq
[%seq [[%obj rsa:obj:asn1] [%nul ~] ~]]
=/ a=[len=@ud dat=@ux]
(pass:en:der:pkcs1 k)
[%bit (mul 8 len.a) dat.a]
==
:: +ring:spec:pkcs8: private key ASN.1
::
++ ring
|= k=key:rsa
^- spec:asn1
:~ %seq
[%int 0]
[%seq [[%obj rsa:obj:asn1] [%nul ~] ~]]
[%oct (ring:en:der:pkcs1 k)]
==
--
:: |de:spec:pkcs8: ASN.1 decoding for asymmetric keys
::
++ de
|%
:: +pass:de:spec:pkcs8: decode public key ASN.1
::
++ pass
|= a=spec:asn1
^- (unit key:rsa)
?. ?=([%seq [%seq *] [%bit *] ~] a)
~
?. ?& ?=([[%obj *] [%nul ~] ~] seq.i.seq.a)
=(rsa:obj:asn1 obj.i.seq.i.seq.a)
==
~
(pass:de:der:pkcs1 (div len.i.t.seq.a 8) bit.i.t.seq.a)
:: +ring:de:spec:pkcs8: decode private key ASN.1
::
++ ring
|= a=spec:asn1
^- (unit key:rsa)
?. ?=([%seq [%int %0] [%seq *] [%oct *] ~] a)
~
?. ?& ?=([[%obj *] [%nul ~] ~] seq.i.t.seq.a)
=(rsa:obj:asn1 obj.i.seq.i.t.seq.a)
==
~
(ring:de:der:pkcs1 [len oct]:i.t.t.seq.a)
--
--
:: |der:pkcs8: DER encoding for asymmetric keys
::
:: En(coding) and de(coding) for public (pass) and private (ring) keys.
:: RSA-only for now.
::
++ der
|%
++ en
|%
++ pass |=(k=key:rsa `[len=@ud dat=@ux]`(en:^der (pass:en:spec k)))
++ ring |=(k=key:rsa `[len=@ud dat=@ux]`(en:^der (ring:en:spec k)))
--
++ de
|%
++ pass |=([len=@ud dat=@ux] `(unit key:rsa)`(biff (de:^der len dat) pass:de:spec))
++ ring |=([len=@ud dat=@ux] `(unit key:rsa)`(biff (de:^der len dat) ring:de:spec))
--
--
:: |pem:pkcs8: PEM encoding for asymmetric keys
::
:: En(coding) and de(coding) for public (pass) and private (ring) keys.
:: RSA-only for now.
::
++ pem
|%
++ en
|%
++ pass |=(k=key:rsa (en:^pem 'PUBLIC KEY' (pass:en:der k)))
++ ring |=(k=key:rsa (en:^pem 'PRIVATE KEY' (ring:en:der k)))
--
++ de
|%
++ pass |=(mep=wain (biff (de:^pem 'PUBLIC KEY' mep) pass:de:der))
++ ring |=(mep=wain (biff (de:^pem 'PRIVATE KEY' mep) ring:de:der))
--
--
--
:: |pkcs10: certificate signing requests (rfc2986)
::
:: Only implemented for RSA keys with subject-alternate names.
::
++ pkcs10
=> |%
:: +csr:pkcs10: certificate request
::
+$ csr [key=key:rsa hot=(list turf)]
--
|%
:: |spec:pkcs10: ASN.1 specs for certificate signing requests
::
++ spec
|%
:: +en:spec:pkcs10: ASN.1 encoding for certificate signing requests
::
++ en
|= csr
^- spec:asn1
|^ =/ dat=spec:asn1 (info key hot)
:~ %seq
dat
[%seq [[%obj rsa-sha-256:obj:asn1] [%nul ~] ~]]
:: big-endian signature bits
::
:: the signature bitwidth is definitionally the key length
::
:+ %bit
(met 0 n.pub.key)
(swp 3 (~(sign rs256 key) (en:^der dat)))
==
:: +info:en:spec:pkcs10: certificate request info
::
++ info
|= csr
^- spec:asn1
:~ %seq
[%int 0]
[%seq ~]
(pass:en:spec:pkcs8 key)
:: explicit, context-specific tag #0 (extensions)
::
:+ %con
`bespoke:asn1`[| 0]
%~ ren
raw:en:^der
:~ %seq
[%obj csr-ext:obj:asn1]
:~ %set
:~ %seq
:~ %seq
[%obj sub-alt:obj:asn1]
[%oct (en:^der (san hot))]
== == == == ==
:: +san:en:spec:pkcs10: subject-alternate-names
::
++ san
|= hot=(list turf)
^- spec:asn1
:- %seq
%+ turn hot
:: implicit, context-specific tag #2 (IA5String)
:: XX sanitize string?
|=(=turf [%con `bespoke:asn1`[& 2] (trip (en-turf:html turf))])
--
:: |de:spec:pkcs10: ASN.1 decoding for certificate signing requests
++ de !!
--
:: |der:pkcs10: DER encoding for certificate signing requests
::
++ der
|%
++ en |=(a=csr `[len=@ud der=@ux]`(en:^der (en:spec a)))
++ de !! ::|=(a=@ `(unit csr)`(biff (de:^der a) de:spec))
--
:: |pem:pkcs10: PEM encoding for certificate signing requests
::
++ pem
|%
++ en |=(a=csr (en:^pem 'CERTIFICATE REQUEST' (en:der a)))
++ de !! ::|=(mep=wain (biff (de:^pem 'CERTIFICATE REQUEST' mep) de:der))
--
--
--
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