ares/hoon/scaffolding/naive-cradle.hoon
Philip Monk ff603d01f6 [ares] add pill to run azimuth events
Also includes various functions changes to allow printing nouns in gdb,
printing direct atoms as ascii when possible, etc.
2023-02-17 18:51:51 -07:00

1655 lines
41 KiB
Plaintext

!.
!=
:: begin cradle.hoon
=>
=> %a50
~% %a.50 ~ ~
|%
:: Types
::
+$ ship @p
+$ life @ud
+$ rift @ud
+$ pass @
+$ bloq @
+$ step _`@u`1
+$ bite $@(bloq [=bloq =step])
+$ octs [p=@ud q=@]
+$ mold $~(* $-(* *))
++ unit |$ [item] $@(~ [~ u=item])
++ list |$ [item] $@(~ [i=item t=(list item)])
++ lest |$ [item] [i=item t=(list item)]
++ tree |$ [node] $@(~ [n=node l=(tree node) r=(tree node)])
++ pair |$ [head tail] [p=head q=tail]
++ map
|$ [key value]
$| (tree (pair key value))
|=(a=(tree (pair)) ?:(=(~ a) & ~(apt by a)))
::
++ set
|$ [item]
$| (tree item)
|=(a=(tree) ?:(=(~ a) & ~(apt in a)))
::
++ jug |$ [key value] (map key (set value))
::
:: Bits
::
++ dec :: decrement
~/ %dec
|= a=@
~> %sham.%dec
~_ leaf+"decrement-underflow"
?< =(0 a)
=+ b=0
|- ^- @
?: =(a +(b)) b
$(b +(b))
::
++ add :: plus
~/ %add
|= [a=@ b=@]
~> %sham.%add
^- @
?: =(0 a) b
$(a (dec a), b +(b))
::
++ sub :: subtract
~/ %sub
|= [a=@ b=@]
~> %sham.%sub
~_ leaf+"subtract-underflow"
:: difference
^- @
?: =(0 b) a
$(a (dec a), b (dec b))
::
++ mul :: multiply
~/ %mul
|: [a=`@`1 b=`@`1]
~> %sham.%mul
^- @
=+ c=0
|-
?: =(0 a) c
$(a (dec a), c (add b c))
::
++ div :: divide
~/ %div
|: [a=`@`1 b=`@`1]
~> %sham.%div
^- @
~_ leaf+"divide-by-zero"
?< =(0 b)
=+ c=0
|-
?: (lth a b) c
$(a (sub a b), c +(c))
::
++ dvr :: divide w/remainder
~/ %dvr
|: [a=`@`1 b=`@`1]
~> %sham.%dvr
^- [p=@ q=@]
[(div a b) (mod a b)]
::
++ mod :: modulus
~/ %mod
|: [a=`@`1 b=`@`1]
~> %sham.%mod
^- @
?< =(0 b)
(sub a (mul b (div a b)))
::
++ bex :: binary exponent
~/ %bex
|= a=bloq
~> %sham.%bex
^- @
?: =(0 a) 1
(mul 2 $(a (dec a)))
::
++ lsh :: left-shift
~/ %lsh
|= [a=bite b=@]
~> %sham.%lsh
=/ [=bloq =step] ?^(a a [a *step])
(mul b (bex (mul (bex bloq) step)))
::
++ rsh :: right-shift
~/ %rsh
|= [a=bite b=@]
~> %sham.%rsh
=/ [=bloq =step] ?^(a a [a *step])
(div b (bex (mul (bex bloq) step)))
::
++ con :: binary or
~/ %con
|= [a=@ b=@]
~> %sham.%con
=+ [c=0 d=0]
|- ^- @
?: ?&(=(0 a) =(0 b)) d
%= $
a (rsh 0 a)
b (rsh 0 b)
c +(c)
d %+ add d
%+ lsh [0 c]
?& =(0 (end 0 a))
=(0 (end 0 b))
==
==
::
++ dis :: binary and
~/ %dis
|= [a=@ b=@]
~> %sham.%dis
=| [c=@ d=@]
|- ^- @
?: ?|(=(0 a) =(0 b)) d
%= $
a (rsh 0 a)
b (rsh 0 b)
c +(c)
d %+ add d
%+ lsh [0 c]
?| =(0 (end 0 a))
=(0 (end 0 b))
==
==
::
++ mix :: binary xor
~/ %mix
|= [a=@ b=@]
~> %sham.%mix
^- @
=+ [c=0 d=0]
|-
?: ?&(=(0 a) =(0 b)) d
%= $
a (rsh 0 a)
b (rsh 0 b)
c +(c)
d (add d (lsh [0 c] =((end 0 a) (end 0 b))))
==
::
++ lth :: less
~/ %lth
|= [a=@ b=@]
~> %sham.%lth
^- ?
?& !=(a b)
|-
?| =(0 a)
?& !=(0 b)
$(a (dec a), b (dec b))
== == ==
::
++ lte :: less or equal
~/ %lte
|= [a=@ b=@]
~> %sham.%lte
|(=(a b) (lth a b))
::
++ gte :: greater or equal
~/ %gte
|= [a=@ b=@]
~> %sham.%gte
^- ?
!(lth a b)
::
++ gth :: greater
~/ %gth
|= [a=@ b=@]
~> %sham.%gth
^- ?
!(lte a b)
::
++ swp :: naive rev bloq order
~/ %swp
|= [a=bloq b=@]
~> %sham.%swp
(rep a (flop (rip a b)))
::
++ met :: measure
~/ %met
|= [a=bloq b=@]
~> %sham.%met
^- @
=+ c=0
|-
?: =(0 b) c
$(b (rsh a b), c +(c))
::
++ end :: tail
~/ %end
|= [a=bite b=@]
~> %sham.%end
=/ [=bloq =step] ?^(a a [a *step])
(mod b (bex (mul (bex bloq) step)))
::
++ cat :: concatenate
~/ %cat
|= [a=bloq b=@ c=@]
~> %sham.%cat
(add (lsh [a (met a b)] c) b)
::
++ cut :: slice
~/ %cut
|= [a=bloq [b=step c=step] d=@]
~> %sham.%cut
(end [a c] (rsh [a b] d))
::
++ can :: assemble
~/ %can
|= [a=bloq b=(list [p=step q=@])]
~> %sham.%can
^- @
?~ b 0
(add (end [a p.i.b] q.i.b) (lsh [a p.i.b] $(b t.b)))
::
++ cad :: assemble specific
~/ %cad
|= [a=bloq b=(list [p=step q=@])]
~> %sham.%cad
^- [=step @]
:_ (can a b)
|-
?~ b
0
(add p.i.b $(b t.b))
::
++ rep :: assemble fixed
~/ %rep
|= [a=bite b=(list @)]
~> %sham.%rep
=/ [=bloq =step] ?^(a a [a *step])
=| i=@ud
|- ^- @
?~ b 0
%+ add $(i +(i), b t.b)
(lsh [bloq (mul step i)] (end [bloq step] i.b))
::
++ rip :: disassemble
~/ %rip
|= [a=bite b=@]
~> %sham.%rip
^- (list @)
?: =(0 b) ~
[(end a b) $(b (rsh a b))]
::
::
:: Lists
::
++ lent :: length
~/ %lent
|= a=(list)
~> %sham.%lent
^- @
=+ b=0
|-
?~ a b
$(a t.a, b +(b))
::
++ slag :: suffix
~/ %slag
|* [a=@ b=(list)]
~> %sham.%slag
|- ^+ b
?: =(0 a) b
?~ b ~
$(b t.b, a (dec a))
::
++ snag :: index
~/ %snag
|* [a=@ b=(list)]
~> %sham.%snag
|- ^+ ?>(?=(^ b) i.b)
?~ b
~_ leaf+"snag-fail"
!!
?: =(0 a) i.b
$(b t.b, a (dec a))
::
++ homo :: homogenize
|* a=(list)
^+ =< $
|@ ++ $ ?:(*? ~ [i=(snag 0 a) t=$])
--
a
::
++ flop :: reverse
~/ %flop
|* a=(list)
~> %sham.%flop
=> .(a (homo a))
^+ a
=+ b=`_a`~
|-
?~ a b
$(a t.a, b [i.a b])
::
++ welp :: concatenate
~/ %welp
=| [* *]
~> %sham.%welp
|@
++ $
?~ +<-
+<-(. +<+)
+<-(+ $(+<- +<->))
--
::
++ reap :: replicate
~/ %reap
|* [a=@ b=*]
~> %sham.%reap
|- ^- (list _b)
?~ a ~
[b $(a (dec a))]
::
:: Modular arithmetic
::
++ fe :: modulo bloq
|_ a=bloq
++ rol |= [b=bloq c=@ d=@] ^- @ :: roll left
=+ e=(sit d)
=+ f=(bex (sub a b))
=+ g=(mod c f)
(sit (con (lsh [b g] e) (rsh [b (sub f g)] e)))
++ sum |=([b=@ c=@] (sit (add b c))) :: wrapping add
++ sit |=(b=@ (end a b)) :: enforce modulo
--
::
:: Hashes
::
++ muk :: standard murmur3
~% %muk ..muk ~
=+ ~(. fe 5)
|= [syd=@ len=@ key=@]
=. syd (end 5 syd)
=/ pad (sub len (met 3 key))
=/ data (welp (rip 3 key) (reap pad 0))
=/ nblocks (div len 4) :: intentionally off-by-one
=/ h1 syd
=+ [c1=0xcc9e.2d51 c2=0x1b87.3593]
=/ blocks (rip 5 key)
=/ i nblocks
=. h1 =/ hi h1 |-
?: =(0 i) hi
=/ k1 (snag (sub nblocks i) blocks) :: negative array index
=. k1 (sit (mul k1 c1))
=. k1 (rol 0 15 k1)
=. k1 (sit (mul k1 c2))
=. hi (mix hi k1)
=. hi (rol 0 13 hi)
=. hi (sum (sit (mul hi 5)) 0xe654.6b64)
$(i (dec i))
=/ tail (slag (mul 4 nblocks) data)
=/ k1 0
=/ tlen (dis len 3)
=. h1
?+ tlen h1 :: fallthrough switch
%3 =. k1 (mix k1 (lsh [0 16] (snag 2 tail)))
=. k1 (mix k1 (lsh [0 8] (snag 1 tail)))
=. k1 (mix k1 (snag 0 tail))
=. k1 (sit (mul k1 c1))
=. k1 (rol 0 15 k1)
=. k1 (sit (mul k1 c2))
(mix h1 k1)
%2 =. k1 (mix k1 (lsh [0 8] (snag 1 tail)))
=. k1 (mix k1 (snag 0 tail))
=. k1 (sit (mul k1 c1))
=. k1 (rol 0 15 k1)
=. k1 (sit (mul k1 c2))
(mix h1 k1)
%1 =. k1 (mix k1 (snag 0 tail))
=. k1 (sit (mul k1 c1))
=. k1 (rol 0 15 k1)
=. k1 (sit (mul k1 c2))
(mix h1 k1)
==
=. h1 (mix h1 len)
|^ (fmix32 h1)
++ fmix32
|= h=@
=. h (mix h (rsh [0 16] h))
=. h (sit (mul h 0x85eb.ca6b))
=. h (mix h (rsh [0 13] h))
=. h (sit (mul h 0xc2b2.ae35))
=. h (mix h (rsh [0 16] h))
h
--
::
++ mug :: mug with murmur3
~/ %mug
|= a=*
~> %sham.%mug
|^ ?@ a (mum 0xcafe.babe 0x7fff a)
=/ b (cat 5 $(a -.a) $(a +.a))
(mum 0xdead.beef 0xfffe b)
::
++ mum
|= [syd=@uxF fal=@F key=@]
=/ wyd (met 3 key)
=| i=@ud
|- ^- @F
?: =(8 i) fal
=/ haz=@F (muk syd wyd key)
=/ ham=@F (mix (rsh [0 31] haz) (end [0 31] haz))
?.(=(0 ham) ham $(i +(i), syd +(syd)))
--
::
++ gor :: mug order
~/ %gor
|= [a=* b=*]
~> %sham.%gor
^- ?
=+ [c=(mug a) d=(mug b)]
?: =(c d)
(dor a b)
(lth c d)
::
++ mor :: more mug order
~/ %mor
|= [a=* b=*]
~> %sham.%mor
^- ?
=+ [c=(mug (mug a)) d=(mug (mug b))]
?: =(c d)
(dor a b)
(lth c d)
::
++ dor :: tree order
~/ %dor
|= [a=* b=*]
~> %sham.%dor
^- ?
?: =(a b) &
?. ?=(@ a)
?: ?=(@ b) |
?: =(-.a -.b)
$(a +.a, b +.b)
$(a -.a, b -.b)
?. ?=(@ b) &
(lth a b)
::
++ por :: parent order
~/ %por
|= [a=@p b=@p]
~> %sham.%por
^- ?
?: =(a b) &
=| i=@
|-
?: =(i 2)
:: second two bytes
(lte a b)
:: first two bytes
=+ [c=(end 3 a) d=(end 3 b)]
?: =(c d)
$(a (rsh 3 a), b (rsh 3 b), i +(i))
(lth c d)
::
:: Maps
::
++ by
~/ %by
=| a=(tree (pair)) :: (map)
~> %sham.%by
=* node ?>(?=(^ a) n.a)
|@
++ get
~/ %get
|* b=*
~> %sham.%get
=> .(b `_?>(?=(^ a) p.n.a)`b)
|- ^- (unit _?>(?=(^ a) q.n.a))
?~ a
~
?: =(b p.n.a)
`q.n.a
?: (gor b p.n.a)
$(a l.a)
$(a r.a)
::
++ put
~/ %put
|* [b=* c=*]
~> %sham.%put
|- ^+ a
~> %sham.%putt
?~ a
[[b c] ~ ~]
?: =(b p.n.a)
?: =(c q.n.a)
a
a(n [b c])
?: (gor b p.n.a)
=+ d=$(a l.a)
?> ?=(^ d)
?: (mor p.n.a p.n.d)
a(l d)
d(r a(l r.d))
=+ d=$(a r.a)
?> ?=(^ d)
?: (mor p.n.a p.n.d)
a(r d)
d(l a(r l.d))
::
++ del
~/ %del
|* b=*
~> %sham.%del
|- ^+ a
?~ a
~
?. =(b p.n.a)
?: (gor b p.n.a)
a(l $(a l.a))
a(r $(a r.a))
|- ^- [$?(~ _a)]
?~ l.a r.a
?~ r.a l.a
?: (mor p.n.l.a p.n.r.a)
l.a(r $(l.a r.l.a))
r.a(l $(r.a l.r.a))
::
++ apt
=< $
~/ %apt
=| [l=(unit) r=(unit)]
~> %sham.%apt
|. ^- ?
?~ a &
?& ?~(l & &((gor p.n.a u.l) !=(p.n.a u.l)))
?~(r & &((gor u.r p.n.a) !=(u.r p.n.a)))
?~ l.a &
&((mor p.n.a p.n.l.a) !=(p.n.a p.n.l.a) $(a l.a, l `p.n.a))
?~ r.a &
&((mor p.n.a p.n.r.a) !=(p.n.a p.n.r.a) $(a r.a, r `p.n.a))
==
--
::
++ on :: ordered map
~/ %on
|* [key=mold val=mold]
~> %sham.%on
=> |%
+$ item [key=key val=val]
--
::
~% %comp +>+ ~
|= compare=$-([key key] ?)
~% %core + ~
|%
::
++ apt
~/ %apt
|= a=(tree item)
~> %sham.%apt
=| [l=(unit key) r=(unit key)]
|- ^- ?
?~ a %.y
?& ?~(l %.y (compare key.n.a u.l))
?~(r %.y (compare u.r key.n.a))
?~(l.a %.y &((mor key.n.a key.n.l.a) $(a l.a, l `key.n.a)))
?~(r.a %.y &((mor key.n.a key.n.r.a) $(a r.a, r `key.n.a)))
==
::
++ get
~/ %get
|= [a=(tree item) b=key]
~> %sham.%get
^- (unit val)
?~ a ~
?: =(b key.n.a)
`val.n.a
?: (compare b key.n.a)
$(a l.a)
$(a r.a)
::
++ has
~/ %has
|= [a=(tree item) b=key]
~> %sham.%has
^- ?
!=(~ (get a b))
::
++ put
~/ %put
|= [a=(tree item) =key =val]
~> %sham.%put
^- (tree item)
?~ a [n=[key val] l=~ r=~]
?: =(key.n.a key) a(val.n val)
?: (compare key key.n.a)
=/ l $(a l.a)
?> ?=(^ l)
?: (mor key.n.a key.n.l)
a(l l)
l(r a(l r.l))
=/ r $(a r.a)
?> ?=(^ r)
?: (mor key.n.a key.n.r)
a(r r)
r(l a(r l.r))
--
::
:: Sets
::
++ in
~/ %in
=| a=(tree) :: (set)
~> %sham.%in
|@
++ put
~/ %put
|* b=*
~> %sham.%put
|- ^+ a
?~ a
[b ~ ~]
?: =(b n.a)
a
?: (gor b n.a)
=+ c=$(a l.a)
?> ?=(^ c)
?: (mor n.a n.c)
a(l c)
c(r a(l r.c))
=+ c=$(a r.a)
?> ?=(^ c)
?: (mor n.a n.c)
a(r c)
c(l a(r l.c))
::
++ del
~/ %del
|* b=*
~> %sham.%del
|- ^+ a
?~ a
~
?. =(b n.a)
?: (gor b n.a)
a(l $(a l.a))
a(r $(a r.a))
|- ^- [$?(~ _a)]
?~ l.a r.a
?~ r.a l.a
?: (mor n.l.a n.r.a)
l.a(r $(l.a r.l.a))
r.a(l $(r.a l.r.a))
::
++ apt
=< $
~/ %apt
=| [l=(unit) r=(unit)]
~> %sham.%apt
|. ^- ?
?~ a &
?& ?~(l & (gor n.a u.l))
?~(r & (gor u.r n.a))
?~(l.a & ?&((mor n.a n.l.a) $(a l.a, l `n.a)))
?~(r.a & ?&((mor n.a n.r.a) $(a r.a, r `n.a)))
==
--
::
:: Jugs
::
++ ju
=| a=(tree (pair * (tree))) :: (jug)
|@
++ get
|* b=*
=+ c=(~(get by a) b)
?~(c ~ u.c)
::
++ del
|* [b=* c=*]
^+ a
=+ d=(get b)
=+ e=(~(del in d) c)
?~ e
(~(del by a) b)
(~(put by a) b e)
::
++ put
|* [b=* c=*]
^+ a
=+ d=(get b)
(~(put by a) b (~(put in d) c))
--
--
::
:: Begin naive.hoon
::
=>
:: Laconic bit
::
=| lac=?
:: Constants
::
|%
:: Transfers on L1 to this address count as depositing to L2
::
++ deposit-address 0x1111.1111.1111.1111.1111.1111.1111.1111.1111.1111
++ log-names
|%
:: Generated with (keccak-256:keccak:crypto (as-octs:mimes:html name))
::
:: OwnerChanged(uint32,address)
++ owner-changed
0x16d0.f539.d49c.6cad.822b.767a.9445.bfb1.
cf7e.a6f2.a6c2.b120.a7ea.4cc7.660d.8fda
::
:: Activated(uint32)
++ activated
0xe74c.0380.9d07.69e1.b1f7.06cc.8414.258c.
d1f3.b6fe.020c.d15d.0165.c210.ba50.3a0f
::
:: Spawned(uint32,uint32)
++ spawned
0xb2d3.a6e7.a339.f5c8.ff96.265e.2f03.a010.
a854.1070.f374.4a24.7090.9644.1508.1546
::
:: OwnershipTransferred(address,address)
++ ownership-transferred
0x8be0.079c.5316.5914.1344.cd1f.d0a4.f284.
1949.7f97.22a3.daaf.e3b4.186f.6b64.57e0
::
:: EscapeRequested(uint32,uint32)
++ escape-requested
0xb4d4.850b.8f21.8218.141c.5665.cba3.79e5.
3e9b.b015.b51e.8d93.4be7.0210.aead.874a
::
:: EscapeCanceled(uint32,uint32)
++ escape-canceled
0xd653.bb0e.0bb7.ce83.93e6.24d9.8fbf.17cd.
a590.2c83.28ed.0cd0.9988.f368.90d9.932a
::
:: EscapeAccepted(uint32,uint32)
++ escape-accepted
0x7e44.7c9b.1bda.4b17.4b07.96e1.00bf.7f34.
ebf3.6dbb.7fe6.6549.0b1b.fce6.246a.9da5
::
:: LostSponsor(uint32,uint32)
++ lost-sponsor
0xd770.4f9a.2519.3dbd.0b0c.b4a8.09fe.ffff.
a7f1.9d1a.ae88.17a7.1346.c194.4482.10d5
::
:: ChangedKeys(uint32,bytes32,bytes32,uint32,uint32)
++ changed-keys
0xaa10.e7a0.117d.4323.f1d9.9d63.0ec1.69be.
bb3a.988e.8957.70e3.5198.7e01.ff54.23d5
::
:: BrokeContinuity(uint32,uint32)
++ broke-continuity
0x2929.4799.f1c2.1a37.ef83.8e15.f79d.d91b.
cee2.df99.d63c.d1c1.8ac9.68b1.2951.4e6e
::
:: ChangedSpawnProxy(uint32,address)
++ changed-spawn-proxy
0x9027.36af.7b3c.efe1.0d9e.840a.ed0d.687e.
35c8.4095.122b.2505.1a20.ead8.866f.006d
::
:: ChangedTransferProxy(uint32,address)
++ changed-transfer-proxy
0xcfe3.69b7.197e.7f0c.f067.93ae.2472.a9b1.
3583.fecb.ed2f.78df.a14d.1f10.796b.847c
::
:: ChangedManagementProxy(uint32,address)
++ changed-management-proxy
0xab9c.9327.cffd.2acc.168f.afed.be06.139f.
5f55.cb84.c761.df05.e051.1c25.1e2e.e9bf
::
:: ChangedVotingProxy(uint32,address)
++ changed-voting-proxy
0xcbd6.269e.c714.57f2.c7b1.a227.74f2.46f6.
c5a2.eae3.795e.d730.0db5.1768.0c61.c805
::
:: ChangedDns(string,string,string)
++ changed-dns
0xfafd.04ad.e1da.ae2e.1fdb.0fc1.cc6a.899f.
d424.063e.d5c9.2120.e67e.0730.53b9.4898
::
:: ApprovalForAll(address,address,bool)
++ approval-for-all
0x1730.7eab.39ab.6107.e889.9845.ad3d.59bd.
9653.f200.f220.9204.89ca.2b59.3769.6c31
--
-- =>
:: Types
|%
:: ethereum address, 20 bytes.
::
+$ address @ux
+$ nonce @ud
+$ dominion ?(%l1 %l2 %spawn)
+$ keys [=life suite=@ud auth=@ crypt=@]
++ orm ((on ship point) por)
++ point
$: :: domain
::
=dominion
::
:: ownership
::
$= own
$: owner=[=address =nonce]
spawn-proxy=[=address =nonce]
management-proxy=[=address =nonce]
voting-proxy=[=address =nonce]
transfer-proxy=[=address =nonce]
==
::
:: networking
::
$= net
$: rift=@ud
=keys
sponsor=[has=? who=@p]
escape=(unit @p)
==
==
::
++ diff
$% [%nonce =ship =proxy =nonce]
[%tx =raw-tx err=(unit @tas)]
[%operator owner=address operator=address approved=?]
[%dns domains=(list @t)]
$: %point =ship
$% [%rift =rift]
[%keys =keys]
[%sponsor sponsor=(unit @p)]
[%escape to=(unit @p)]
[%owner =address]
[%spawn-proxy =address]
[%management-proxy =address]
[%voting-proxy =address]
[%transfer-proxy =address]
[%dominion =dominion]
== == ==
::
+$ state
$: %0
=points
=operators
dns=(list @t)
==
+$ points (tree [ship point])
+$ operators (jug address address)
+$ effects (list diff)
+$ proxy ?(%own %spawn %manage %vote %transfer)
+$ roll (list raw-tx)
+$ raw-tx [sig=@ raw=octs =tx]
+$ tx [from=[=ship =proxy] skim-tx]
+$ skim-tx
$% [%transfer-point =address reset=?]
[%spawn =ship =address]
[%configure-keys encrypt=@ auth=@ crypto-suite=@ breach=?]
[%escape parent=ship]
[%cancel-escape parent=ship]
[%adopt =ship]
[%reject =ship]
[%detach =ship]
[%set-management-proxy =address]
[%set-spawn-proxy =address]
[%set-transfer-proxy =address]
==
::
+$ event-log
$: address=@ux
data=@ux
topics=(lest @ux)
==
+$ input
$: block=@ud
$% [%bat batch=@]
[%log =event-log]
== ==
:: ECDSA verifier.
::
:: Must keccak `dat` and recover the ethereum address which signed.
:: Must not crash. `v` will normally be between 0 and 3; if it is not,
:: should produce null.
::
+$ verifier $-([dat=octs v=@ r=@ s=@] (unit address))
-- =>
::
|%
++ debug
|* [meg=@t *]
?: lac
+<+
~> %slog.[0 meg]
+<+
::
++ parse-roll
|= batch=@
=| =roll
=| pos=@ud
=/ las (met 0 batch)
|- ^+ roll
?: (gte pos las)
(flop roll)
=/ parse-result (parse-raw-tx pos batch)
:: Parsing failed, abort batch
::
?~ parse-result
(debug %parse-failed ~)
=^ =raw-tx pos u.parse-result
$(roll [raw-tx roll])
::
++ parse-raw-tx
|= [pos=@ud batch=@]
^- (unit [raw-tx pos=@ud])
|^
=^ sig pos (take 3 65)
=/ res=(unit [=tx pos=@ud]) parse-tx
?~ res ~
=/ dif (sub pos.u.res pos)
=/ len =>((dvr dif 8) ?>(=(0 q) p))
:- ~ :_ pos.u.res
[sig [len (cut 0 [pos dif] batch)] tx.u.res]
::
++ parse-tx
^- (unit [tx pos=@ud])
=^ from-proxy=@ pos (take 0 3)
?. ?=(?(%0 %1 %2 %3 %4) from-proxy) (debug %bad-proxy ~)
=/ =proxy
?- from-proxy
%0 %own
%1 %spawn
%2 %manage
%3 %vote
%4 %transfer
==
=^ pad pos (take 0 5)
=^ from-ship=ship pos (take 3 4)
=- ?~ res
~
`[[[from-ship proxy] skim-tx.u.res] pos.u.res]
^- res=(unit [=skim-tx pos=@ud])
=^ op pos (take 0 7)
?+ op (debug %strange-opcode ~)
%0
=^ reset=@ pos (take 0)
=^ =address pos (take 3 20)
`[[%transfer-point address =(0 reset)] pos]
::
%1
=^ pad=@ pos (take 0)
=^ =ship pos (take 3 4)
=^ =address pos (take 3 20)
`[[%spawn ship address] pos]
::
%2
=^ breach=@ pos (take 0)
=^ encrypt=@ pos (take 3 32)
=^ auth=@ pos (take 3 32)
=^ crypto-suite=@ pos (take 3 4)
`[[%configure-keys encrypt auth crypto-suite =(0 breach)] pos]
::
%3 =^(res pos take-ship `[[%escape res] pos])
%4 =^(res pos take-ship `[[%cancel-escape res] pos])
%5 =^(res pos take-ship `[[%adopt res] pos])
%6 =^(res pos take-ship `[[%reject res] pos])
%7 =^(res pos take-ship `[[%detach res] pos])
%8 =^(res pos take-address `[[%set-management-proxy res] pos])
%9 =^(res pos take-address `[[%set-spawn-proxy res] pos])
%10 =^(res pos take-address `[[%set-transfer-proxy res] pos])
==
::
:: Take a bite
::
++ take
|= =bite
^- [@ @ud]
=/ =step
?@ bite (bex bite)
(mul step.bite (bex bloq.bite))
[(cut 0 [pos step] batch) (add pos step)]
:: Encode ship and address
::
++ take-address
^- [address @ud]
=^ pad=@ pos (take 0)
=^ =address pos (take 3 20)
[address pos]
:: Encode escape-related txs
::
++ take-ship
^- [ship @ud]
=^ pad=@ pos (take 0)
=^ other=ship pos (take 3 4)
[other pos]
--
::
++ proxy-from-point
|= [=proxy point]
^- [=address =nonce]
?- proxy
%own owner.own
%spawn spawn-proxy.own
%manage management-proxy.own
%vote voting-proxy.own
%transfer transfer-proxy.own
==
::
++ verify-sig-and-nonce
|= [=verifier chain-t=@t =state =raw-tx]
^- ?
|^
=/ point (get-point state ship.from.tx.raw-tx)
?> ?=(^ point) :: we never parse more than four bytes for a ship
=/ need=[=address =nonce]
(proxy-from-point proxy.from.tx.raw-tx u.point)
:: We include a domain separator to avoid letting signatures be
:: accidentally reused with other applications. We include the name
:: UrbitID, a signature format version number, and the EIP-155 chain
:: ID.
::
:: We also include a nonce so that a transaction cannot be
:: rebroadcast.
::
=/ prepared-data=octs
%: cad 3
14^'UrbitIDV1Chain'
(met 3 chain-t)^chain-t
1^':'
4^nonce.need
raw.raw-tx
~
==
:: Wallets which support personal_sign include this preamble to avoid
:: letting personal_sign be used to sign ethereum transactions
::
=/ signed-data=octs
=/ len (ud-to-ascii p.prepared-data)
%: cad 3
26^'\19Ethereum Signed Message:\0a'
(met 3 len)^len
prepared-data
~
==
=/ dress (verify-sig sig.raw-tx signed-data)
?~ dress
|
=(address.need u.dress)
:: Verify signature and produce signer address
::
++ verify-sig
|= [sig=@ txdata=octs]
^- (unit address)
|^
:: Reversed of the usual r-s-v order because Ethereum integers are
:: big-endian
::
=^ v sig (take 3)
=^ s sig (take 3 32)
=^ r sig (take 3 32)
:: In Ethereum, v is generally 27 + recid, and verifier expects a
:: recid. Old versions of geth used 0 + recid, so most software
:: now supports either format. See:
::
:: https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/issues/2053
::
=? v (gte v 27) (sub v 27)
(verifier txdata v r s)
::
++ take
|= =bite
[(end bite sig) (rsh bite sig)]
--
--
:: ASCII-decimal encode
::
++ ud-to-ascii
|= n=@ud
?~ n '0'
=| l=(list @)
|- ^- @t
?~ n (rep 3 l)
=+ (dvr n 10)
$(n p, l [(add '0' q) l])
::
++ ship-rank
|= =ship
^- ?(%0 %1 %2 %3 %4)
?: (lth ship 0x100) %0
?: (lth ship 0x1.0000) %1
?: (lth ship 0x1.0000.0000) %2
?: (lth ship 0x1.0000.0000.0000.0000) %3
%4
::
++ sein :: autoboss
|= who=ship
^- ship
=/ mir (ship-rank who)
?- mir
%0 who
%1 (end 3 who)
%2 (end 4 who)
%3 (end 5 who)
%4 (end 4 who)
==
::
:: Produces null only if ship is not a galaxy, star, or planet
::
++ get-point
|= [=state =ship]
^- (unit point)
=/ existing (get:orm points.state ship)
?^ existing
`u.existing
=| =point
=. who.sponsor.net.point (sein ship)
?+ (ship-rank ship) (debug %strange-point ~)
%0 `point(dominion %l1)
?(%1 %2)
=/ existing-parent $(ship (sein ship))
?~ existing-parent ~
:- ~
%= point
dominion
?- dominion.u.existing-parent
%l1 %l1
%l2 %l2
%spawn %l2
==
==
==
-- =>
|%
:: Receive log from L1 transaction
::
++ receive-log
|= [=state log=event-log]
^- [effects ^state]
=* log-name i.topics.log
?: =(log-name activated:log-names) `state
?: =(log-name spawned:log-names) `state
?: =(log-name ownership-transferred:log-names) `state
?: =(log-name changed-dns:log-names)
?> ?=(~ t.topics.log)
=/ words (rip 8 data.log)
:: This is only true if each domain is <= 32 bytes
::
?. ?=([c=@ @ b=@ @ a=@ @ @ @ @ ~] words) `state
=* one &5.words
=* two &3.words
=* tri &1.words
=/ domains ~[(swp 3 one) (swp 3 two) (swp 3 tri)]
:- [%dns domains]~
state(dns domains)
::
?: =(log-name approval-for-all:log-names)
?> ?=([@ @ ~] t.topics.log)
=* owner i.t.topics.log
=* operator i.t.t.topics.log
=/ approved !=(0 data.log)
:- [%operator owner operator approved]~
=- state(operators -)
?: approved
(~(put ju operators.state) owner operator)
(~(del ju operators.state) owner operator)
::
:: The rest of the logs modify a particular ship, specified in the
:: second topic. We fetch it, and insert the modification back into
:: our state.
::
?> ?=([@ *] t.topics.log)
=* ship=@ i.t.topics.log
=/ the-point (get-point state ship)
?> ?=(^ the-point)
=* point u.the-point
::
:: Important to fully no-op on failure so we don't insert an entry
:: into points.state
::
=- ?~ res
`state
=/ p (put:orm points.state ship new-point.u.res)
[effects.u.res state(points p)]
^- res=(unit [=effects new-point=^point])
::
?: =(log-name changed-spawn-proxy:log-names)
?. ?=(%l1 -.point) ~
?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
=* to i.t.t.topics.log
:: Depositing to L2 is represented by a spawn proxy change on L1,
:: but it doesn't change the actual spawn proxy.
::
?: =(deposit-address to)
:+ ~ [%point ship %dominion %spawn]~
point(dominion %spawn)
:+ ~ [%point ship %spawn-proxy to]~
point(address.spawn-proxy.own to)
::
?: =(log-name escape-accepted:log-names)
?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
=* parent=@ i.t.t.topics.log
=/ parent-point (get-point state parent)
?> ?=(^ parent-point)
?: ?=(%l2 -.u.parent-point) ~
:+ ~ [%point ship %sponsor `parent]~
point(escape.net ~, sponsor.net [%& parent])
::
?: =(log-name lost-sponsor:log-names)
?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
=* parent=@ i.t.t.topics.log
:: If the sponsor we lost was not our actual sponsor, we didn't
:: actually lose anything.
::
?. =(parent who.sponsor.net.point) ~
::
=/ parent-point (get-point state parent)
?> ?=(^ parent-point)
::
:: We can detach even if the child is on L2, as long as the parent
:: is on L1.
::
?: ?=(%l2 -.u.parent-point) ~
:+ ~ [%point ship %sponsor ~]~
point(has.sponsor.net %|)
::
:: The rest can be done by any ship on L1, even if their spawn proxy
:: is set to L2
::
?: ?=(%l2 -.point) ~
::
?: =(log-name escape-requested:log-names)
?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
=* parent=@ i.t.t.topics.log
=/ parent-point (get-point state parent)
?> ?=(^ parent-point)
:+ ~ [%point ship %escape `parent]~
point(escape.net `parent)
::
?: =(log-name escape-canceled:log-names)
?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
=* parent=@ i.t.t.topics.log
=/ parent-point (get-point state parent)
?> ?=(^ parent-point)
:+ ~ [%point ship %escape ~]~
point(escape.net ~)
::
?: =(log-name broke-continuity:log-names)
?> ?=(~ t.t.topics.log)
=* rift=@ data.log
:+ ~ [%point ship %rift rift]~
point(rift.net rift)
::
?: =(log-name changed-keys:log-names)
?> ?=(~ t.t.topics.log)
=/ =keys
:* life=(cut 8 [0 1] data.log)
suite=(cut 8 [1 1] data.log)
auth=(cut 8 [2 1] data.log)
crypt=(cut 8 [3 1] data.log)
==
:+ ~ [%point ship %keys keys]~
point(keys.net keys)
::
?: =(log-name owner-changed:log-names)
?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
=* to i.t.t.topics.log
:: Depositing to L2 is represented by an ownership change on L1,
:: but it doesn't change who actually owns the ship.
::
?: =(deposit-address to)
:+ ~ [%point ship %dominion %l2]~
point(dominion %l2)
:+ ~ [%point ship %owner to]~
point(address.owner.own to)
::
?: =(log-name changed-transfer-proxy:log-names)
?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
=* to i.t.t.topics.log
:: XX
:+ ~ [%point ship %transfer-proxy to]~
point(address.transfer-proxy.own to)
::
?: =(log-name changed-management-proxy:log-names)
?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
=* to i.t.t.topics.log
:+ ~ [%point ship %management-proxy to]~
point(address.management-proxy.own to)
::
?: =(log-name changed-voting-proxy:log-names)
?> ?=([@ ~] t.t.topics.log)
=* to i.t.t.topics.log
:+ ~ [%point ship %voting-proxy to]~
point(address.voting-proxy.own to)
::
(debug %unknown-log ~)
::
:: Receive batch of L2 transactions
::
++ receive-batch
|= [=verifier chain-id=@ud =state batch=@]
=/ chain-t (ud-to-ascii chain-id)
=/ =roll (parse-roll batch)
|- ^- [effects ^state]
?~ roll
[~ state]
:: Verify signature, else skip tx
::
?. (verify-sig-and-nonce verifier chain-t state i.roll)
%+ debug %l2-sig-failed
=^ effects state $(roll t.roll)
:_ state
[[%tx i.roll `%sig-or-nonce-failed] effects]
:: Increment nonce, even if it later fails
::
=^ effects-1 points.state (increment-nonce state from.tx.i.roll)
:: Process tx
::
=^ effects-2 state
=/ tx-result=(unit [=effects =^state]) (receive-tx state tx.i.roll)
?~ tx-result
%+ debug %l2-tx-failed
[[%tx i.roll `%tx-failed]~ state]
[[[%tx i.roll ~] effects.u.tx-result] state.u.tx-result]
=^ effects-3 state $(roll t.roll)
[:(welp effects-1 effects-2 effects-3) state]
::
++ increment-nonce
|= [=state =ship =proxy]
=/ point (get-point state ship)
?> ?=(^ point) :: we only parsed 4 bytes
=* own own.u.point
=^ nonce u.point
?- proxy
%own
:- nonce.owner.own
u.point(nonce.owner.own +(nonce.owner.own))
::
%spawn
:- nonce.spawn-proxy.own
u.point(nonce.spawn-proxy.own +(nonce.spawn-proxy.own))
::
%manage
:- nonce.management-proxy.own
u.point(nonce.management-proxy.own +(nonce.management-proxy.own))
::
%vote
:- nonce.voting-proxy.own
u.point(nonce.voting-proxy.own +(nonce.voting-proxy.own))
::
%transfer
:- nonce.transfer-proxy.own
u.point(nonce.transfer-proxy.own +(nonce.transfer-proxy.own))
==
::
:- [%nonce ship proxy nonce]~
(put:orm points.state ship u.point)
::
:: Receive an individual L2 transaction
::
++ receive-tx
|= [=state =tx]
|^
^- (unit [effects ^state])
?- +<.tx
%spawn (process-spawn +>.tx)
%transfer-point (w-point process-transfer-point ship.from.tx +>.tx)
%configure-keys (w-point process-configure-keys ship.from.tx +>.tx)
%escape (w-point-esc process-escape ship.from.tx +>.tx)
%cancel-escape (w-point-esc process-cancel-escape ship.from.tx +>.tx)
%adopt (w-point-esc process-adopt ship.tx +>.tx)
%reject (w-point-esc process-reject ship.tx +>.tx)
%detach (w-point-esc process-detach ship.tx +>.tx)
%set-spawn-proxy
(w-point-spawn process-set-spawn-proxy ship.from.tx +>.tx)
::
%set-transfer-proxy
(w-point process-set-transfer-proxy ship.from.tx +>.tx)
::
%set-management-proxy
(w-point process-set-management-proxy ship.from.tx +>.tx)
==
::
++ w-point
|* [fun=$-([ship point *] (unit [effects point])) =ship rest=*]
^- (unit [effects ^state])
=/ point (get-point state ship)
?~ point (debug %strange-ship ~)
?. ?=(%l2 -.u.point) (debug %ship-not-on-l2 ~)
:: Important to fully no-op on failure so we don't insert an entry
:: into points.state
::
=/ res=(unit [=effects new-point=^point]) (fun u.point rest)
?~ res
~
`[effects.u.res state(points (put:orm points.state ship new-point.u.res))]
::
++ w-point-esc
|* [fun=$-([ship point *] (unit [effects point])) =ship rest=*]
^- (unit [effects ^state])
=/ point (get-point state ship)
?~ point (debug %strange-ship ~)
=/ res=(unit [=effects new-point=^point]) (fun u.point rest)
?~ res
~
`[effects.u.res state(points (put:orm points.state ship new-point.u.res))]
::
++ w-point-spawn
|* [fun=$-([ship point *] (unit [effects point])) =ship rest=*]
^- (unit [effects ^state])
=/ point (get-point state ship)
?~ point (debug %strange-ship ~)
?: ?=(%l1 -.u.point) (debug %ship-on-l2 ~)
=/ res=(unit [=effects new-point=^point]) (fun u.point rest)
?~ res
~
`[effects.u.res state(points (put:orm points.state ship new-point.u.res))]
::
++ process-transfer-point
|= [=point to=address reset=?]
=* ship ship.from.tx
:: Assert from owner or transfer prxoy
::
?. |(=(%own proxy.from.tx) =(%transfer proxy.from.tx))
(debug %bad-permission ~)
:: Execute transfer
::
=/ effects-1
~[[%point ship %owner to] [%point ship %transfer-proxy *address]]
=: address.owner.own.point to
address.transfer-proxy.own.point *address
==
:: Execute reset if requested
::
?. reset
`[effects-1 point]
::
=^ effects-2 net.point
?: =([0 0 0] +.keys.net.point)
`net.point
=/ =keys [+(life.keys.net.point) 0 0 0]
:- [%point ship %keys keys]~
[rift.net.point keys sponsor.net.point escape.net.point]
=^ effects-3 rift.net.point
?: =(0 life.keys.net.point)
`rift.net.point
:- [%point ship %rift +(rift.net.point)]~
+(rift.net.point)
=/ effects-4
:~ [%point ship %spawn-proxy *address]
[%point ship %management-proxy *address]
[%point ship %voting-proxy *address]
[%point ship %transfer-proxy *address]
==
=: address.spawn-proxy.own.point *address
address.management-proxy.own.point *address
address.voting-proxy.own.point *address
address.transfer-proxy.own.point *address
==
`[:(welp effects-1 effects-2 effects-3 effects-4) point]
::
++ process-spawn
|= [=ship to=address]
^- (unit [effects ^state])
=/ parent=^ship (sein ship)
:: Assert parent is on L2
::
=/ parent-point (get-point state parent)
?~ parent-point ~
?. ?=(?(%l2 %spawn) -.u.parent-point) ~
:: Assert from owner or spawn proxy
::
?. ?& =(parent ship.from.tx)
|(=(%own proxy.from.tx) =(%spawn proxy.from.tx))
==
(debug %bad-permission ~)
:: Assert child not already spawned
::
?^ (get:orm points.state ship) (debug %spawn-exists ~)
:: Assert one-level-down
::
?. =(+((ship-rank parent)) (ship-rank ship)) (debug %bad-rank ~)
::
=/ [=effects new-point=point]
=/ point=(unit point) (get-point state ship)
?> ?=(^ point) :: only parsed 4 bytes
:: If spawning to self, just do it
::
?: ?| ?& =(%own proxy.from.tx)
=(to address.owner.own.u.parent-point)
==
?& =(%spawn proxy.from.tx)
=(to address.spawn-proxy.own.u.parent-point)
==
==
:- ~[[%point ship %dominion %l2] [%point ship %owner to]]
u.point(address.owner.own to)
:: Else spawn to parent and set transfer proxy
::
:- :~ [%point ship %dominion %l2]
[%point ship %owner address.owner.own.u.parent-point]
[%point ship %transfer-proxy to]
==
%= u.point
address.owner.own address.owner.own.u.parent-point
address.transfer-proxy.own to
==
`[effects state(points (put:orm points.state ship new-point))]
::
++ process-configure-keys
|= [=point crypt=@ auth=@ suite=@ breach=?]
=* ship ship.from.tx
::
?. |(=(%own proxy.from.tx) =(%manage proxy.from.tx))
(debug %bad-permission ~)
::
=^ rift-effects rift.net.point
?. breach
`rift.net.point
[[%point ship %rift +(rift.net.point)]~ +(rift.net.point)]
::
=^ keys-effects keys.net.point
?: =(+.keys.net.point [suite auth crypt])
`keys.net.point
=/ =keys
[+(life.keys.net.point) suite auth crypt]
[[%point ship %keys keys]~ keys]
::
`[(welp rift-effects keys-effects) point]
::
++ process-escape
|= [=point parent=ship]
=* ship ship.from.tx
?. |(=(%own proxy.from.tx) =(%manage proxy.from.tx))
(debug %bad-permission ~)
::
?. =(+((ship-rank parent)) (ship-rank ship))
(debug %bad-rank ~)
::
:+ ~ [%point ship %escape `parent]~
point(escape.net `parent)
::
++ process-cancel-escape
|= [=point parent=ship]
=* ship ship.from.tx
?. |(=(%own proxy.from.tx) =(%manage proxy.from.tx))
(debug %bad-permission ~)
::
:+ ~ [%point ship %escape ~]~
point(escape.net ~)
::
++ process-adopt
|= [=point =ship]
=* parent ship.from.tx
?. |(=(%own proxy.from.tx) =(%manage proxy.from.tx))
(debug %bad-permission ~)
::
?. =(escape.net.point `parent) (debug %no-adopt ~)
:+ ~ [%point ship %sponsor `parent]~
point(escape.net ~, sponsor.net [%& parent])
::
++ process-reject
|= [=point =ship]
=* parent ship.from.tx
?. |(=(%own proxy.from.tx) =(%manage proxy.from.tx))
(debug %bad-permission ~)
::
?. =(escape.net.point `parent) (debug %no-reject ~)
:+ ~ [%point ship %escape ~]~
point(escape.net ~)
::
++ process-detach
|= [=point =ship]
=* parent ship.from.tx
?. |(=(%own proxy.from.tx) =(%manage proxy.from.tx))
(debug %bad-permission ~)
::
?. =(who.sponsor.net.point parent) (debug %no-detach ~)
:+ ~ [%point ship %sponsor ~]~
point(has.sponsor.net %|)
::
++ process-set-management-proxy
|= [=point =address]
?. |(=(%own proxy.from.tx) =(%manage proxy.from.tx))
(debug %bad-permission ~)
::
:+ ~ [%point ship.from.tx %management-proxy address]~
point(address.management-proxy.own address)
::
++ process-set-spawn-proxy
|= [=point =address]
?. |(=(%own proxy.from.tx) =(%spawn proxy.from.tx))
(debug %bad-permission ~)
::
?: (gte (ship-rank ship.from.tx) 2)
(debug %spawn-proxy-planet ~)
::
:+ ~ [%point ship.from.tx %spawn-proxy address]~
point(address.spawn-proxy.own address)
::
++ process-set-transfer-proxy
|= [=point =address]
?. |(=(%own proxy.from.tx) =(%transfer proxy.from.tx))
(debug %bad-permission ~)
::
:+ ~ [%point ship.from.tx %transfer-proxy address]~
point(address.transfer-proxy.own address)
--
--
::
:: State transition function
::
|= [=verifier chain-id=@ud =state =input]
^- [effects ^state]
?: ?=(%log +<.input)
:: Received log from L1 transaction
::
(receive-log state event-log.input)
:: Received L2 batch
::
:: %+ debug %batch
(receive-batch verifier chain-id state batch.input)