mirror of
https://github.com/urbit/shrub.git
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Redo how we perform ECC math for ring signatures.
This makes three new functions in +ed:crypto which are designed to be jetted by the ed25519 implementation. It then moves the ring signature library stuff onto two of them. Previously, it took three minutes to sign+verify an unlinked ring of 3 public keys; now it is instantaneous with the jets written so far. This comments out all the linkage handling code, since a jet isn't written for that stuff yet.
This commit is contained in:
parent
29ab566cbc
commit
d33fc1ef3f
@ -9,40 +9,34 @@
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=/ key-num=@ 2
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:: create a list of public/private keypairs
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::
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=/ keys=(list [pk=point sk=@])
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=/ keys=(list [pk=@udpoint sk=@udscalar])
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=| count=@
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=| keys=(list [pk=point sk=@])
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=| keys=(list [pk=@udpoint sk=@udscalar])
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::
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|-
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?: =(count 3)
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?: =(count 58)
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keys
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:: using key-num as our "secret" key.
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::
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:: In the end, what was the problem with the key generation was that
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:: etch/scam/deco/puck don't return things in the real format we need. The
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:: math above assumes that the public key above is priv-key * G.
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::
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:: =/ sk=@ (etch:ed:crypto (scam:ed:crypto bb:ed:crypto key-num))
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:: =/ pk=point (need (deco:ed (puck:ed:crypto sk)))
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=/ pk=point (point-base-mul key-num)
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::
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=/ pk=@udpoint (scalarmult-base:ed:crypto key-num)
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::
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$(keys [[pk key-num] keys], count +(count), key-num +(key-num))
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:: create the key set the interface expects
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::
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=/ key-set=(set point)
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=/ key-set=(set @udpoint)
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(sy (turn keys head))
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::
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=/ my-key (snag 0 keys)
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=/ my-public-key=point (head my-key)
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=/ my-private-key=@ (tail my-key)
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=/ my-key (snag 13 keys)
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=/ my-public-key=@udpoint (head my-key)
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=/ my-private-key=@udscalar (tail my-key)
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::
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~& %start----------signing
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::
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=/ message "blah"
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=/ scope [~ [%link-scope 52]]
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:: =/ scope ~
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::=/ scope [~ [%link-scope 52]]
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=/ scope ~
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::
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=/ signature
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=/ signature=ring-signature
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(sign message scope key-set my-public-key my-private-key eny)
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~& [%signature signature]
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::
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218
lib/ring.hoon
218
lib/ring.hoon
@ -2,123 +2,23 @@
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:: ring signatures over the edwards curve
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::
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|%
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:: an ugly copy/paste of the private parts of +ed:crypto here
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::
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++ ed
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=+ ~+
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:: q: prime modulus of field
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::
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=+ [b=256 q=(sub (bex 255) 19)]
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=+ fq=~(. fo q)
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:: l: prime order
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::
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=+ ^= l
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%+ add
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(bex 252)
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27.742.317.777.372.353.535.851.937.790.883.648.493
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=+ d=(dif.fq 0 (fra.fq 121.665 121.666))
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=+ ii=(exp.fq (div (dec q) 4) 2)
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[b=b q=q fq=fq l=l d=d ii=ii]
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::
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|%
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:: :: ++norm:ed:crypto
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++ norm ::
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|=(x/@ ?:(=(0 (mod x 2)) x (sub q x)))
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:: :: ++xrec:ed:crypto
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++ xrec :: recover x-coord
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|= y/@ ^- @
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=+ ^= xx
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%+ mul (dif.fq (mul y y) 1)
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(inv.fq +(:(mul d y y)))
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=+ x=(exp.fq (div (add 3 q) 8) xx)
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?: !=(0 (dif.fq (mul x x) (sit.fq xx)))
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(norm (pro.fq x ii))
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(norm x)
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::
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++ ward :: edwards multiply
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|= {pp/{@ @} qq/{@ @}} ^- {@ @}
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=+ dp=:(pro.fq d -.pp -.qq +.pp +.qq)
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=+ ^= xt
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%+ pro.fq
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%+ sum.fq
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(pro.fq -.pp +.qq)
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(pro.fq -.qq +.pp)
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(inv.fq (sum.fq 1 dp))
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=+ ^= yt
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%+ pro.fq
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%+ sum.fq
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(pro.fq +.pp +.qq)
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(pro.fq -.pp -.qq)
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(inv.fq (dif.fq 1 dp))
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[xt yt]
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:: :: ++scam:ed:crypto
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++ scam :: scalar multiply
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|= {pp/{@ @} e/@} ^- {@ @}
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?: =(0 e)
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[0 1]
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=+ qq=$(e (div e 2))
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=> .(qq (ward qq qq))
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?: =(1 (dis 1 e))
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(ward qq pp)
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qq
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:: :: ++curv:ed:crypto
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++ curv :: point on curve?
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|= {x/@ y/@} ^- ?
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.= 0
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%+ dif.fq
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%+ sum.fq
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(pro.fq (sub q (sit.fq x)) x)
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(pro.fq y y)
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(sum.fq 1 :(pro.fq d x x y y))
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:: :: ++deco:ed:crypto
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++ deco :: decode point
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|= s/@ ^- (unit {@ @})
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=+ y=(cut 0 [0 (dec b)] s)
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=+ si=(cut 0 [(dec b) 1] s)
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=+ x=(xrec y)
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=> .(x ?:(!=(si (dis 1 x)) (sub q x) x))
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=+ pp=[x y]
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?. (curv pp)
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~
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[~ pp]
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:: +prime-order: the prime order of the edwards curve
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::
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++ l
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^l
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:: :: ++bb:ed:crypto
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++ bb ::
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=+ bby=(pro.fq 4 (inv.fq 5))
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[(xrec bby) bby]
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--
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:: +ecc-n: order of the elliptic group curve ed25519
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::
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++ ecc-n
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~+
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l:ed
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:: +ecc-g: the curve base point of ed25519
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::
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++ ecc-g
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~+
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bb:ed
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:: +point-mul: scalar multiplication (module operation on elliptic curve)
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::
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++ point-mul
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|= [scalar=@ =point]
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(scam:ed point scalar)
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:: +point-add: addition (group operation on elliptic curve)
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::
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++ point-add
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ward:ed
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:: +point-base-mul: scalar multiplication over the base point
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::
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++ point-base-mul
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|= scalar=@
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(point-mul scalar ecc-g)
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:: +oracle: deterministic random response on input
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::
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++ oracle
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|= input=*
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(mod (shaz (jam input)) ecc-n)
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:: l:ed is ecc-n
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(mod (shaz (jam input)) l:ed:crypto)
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:: TODO: naked +point-mul needs to be jetted, but for now I want to just see
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:: how fast things are.
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::
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++ point-mul
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|= [s=@udscalar p=@udpoint]
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^- @udpoint
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::
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%- etch:ed:crypto
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%+ scam:ed:crypto
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(need (deco:ed:crypto p))
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s
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::
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::::
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::
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@ -126,10 +26,10 @@
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::
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++ generate-public-linkage
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|= link-scope=*
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^- [data=@ h=point]
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^- [data=@ h=@udpoint]
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::
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=/ data=@ (oracle link-scope)
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=/ h=point (point-base-mul data)
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=/ h=@udpoint (scalarmult-base:ed:crypto data)
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[data h]
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:: +generate-linkage: generates linkage information from scope and private key
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@ -139,13 +39,13 @@
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:: y: y = [x] * h
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++ generate-linkage
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|= [link-scope=(unit *) my-private-key=@]
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^- (unit [data=@ h=point y=point])
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^- (unit [data=@ h=@udpoint y=@udpoint])
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::
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?~ link-scope
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~
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::
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=+ [data=@ h=point]=(generate-public-linkage u.link-scope)
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=/ y=point (point-mul my-private-key h)
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=+ [data=@ h=@udpoint]=(generate-public-linkage u.link-scope)
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=/ y=@udpoint (point-mul my-private-key h)
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[~ data h y]
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:: +generate-challenge: generate challenge from a given message
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::
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@ -156,13 +56,13 @@
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++ generate-challenge
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|= $: :: common to both linked and unlinked
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message=*
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g=point
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g=@udpoint
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:: high level universal state
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::
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link-state=(unit [data=@ h=point y=point])
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link-state=(unit [data=@ h=@udpoint y=@udpoint])
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:: point to include in challenge when link-state isn't ~
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::
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h=(unit point)
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h=(unit @udpoint)
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==
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^- @
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::
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@ -173,9 +73,9 @@
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:: +generate-challenges: generates the full list of challenges
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::
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++ generate-challenges
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|= $: link-state=(unit [data=@ h=point y=point])
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|= $: link-state=(unit [data=@ h=@udpoint y=@udpoint])
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message=*
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public-keys=(list point)
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public-keys=(list @udpoint)
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ss=(list @)
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::
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prev-k=@u
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@ -185,19 +85,17 @@
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==
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^- (list @)
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::
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=/ gs=point
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%+ point-add
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(point-mul prev-s ecc-g)
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(point-mul prev-ch (snag prev-k public-keys))
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=/ gs=@udpoint
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(double-scalarmult:ed:crypto prev-ch (snag prev-k public-keys) prev-s)
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::
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=/ hs=(unit point)
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?~ link-state
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=/ hs=(unit @udpoint)
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:: ?~ link-state
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~
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::
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:- ~
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%+ point-add
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(point-mul prev-s h.u.link-state)
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(point-mul prev-ch y.u.link-state)
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:: ::
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:: :- ~
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:: %+ point-add
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:: (point-mul prev-s h.u.link-state)
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:: (point-mul prev-ch y.u.link-state)
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::
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=/ ch=@
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(generate-challenge message gs link-state hs)
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@ -219,8 +117,8 @@
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:: to generate the (unit point) consumed by +generate-challenge.
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::
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++ point-mul-h
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|= [u=@ linkage=(unit [data=@ h=point y=point])]
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^- (unit point)
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|= [u=@ linkage=(unit [data=@ h=@udpoint y=@udpoint])]
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^- (unit @udpoint)
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?~ linkage
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~
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[~ (point-mul u h.u.linkage)]
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@ -243,9 +141,9 @@
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|= $: message=*
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link-scope=(unit *)
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::
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anonymity-set=(set point)
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my-public-key=point
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my-private-key=@
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anonymity-set=(set @udpoint)
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my-public-key=@udpoint
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my-private-key=@udscalar
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::
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eny=@uvJ
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==
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@ -262,7 +160,7 @@
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(need (find [my-public-key ~] anonymity-list))
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:: Generate linkage information if given
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::
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=/ linkage=(unit [data=@ h=point y=point])
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=/ linkage=(unit [data=@ h=@udpoint y=@udpoint])
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(generate-linkage link-scope my-private-key)
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:: initialize our random number generator from entropy
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::
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@ -276,7 +174,7 @@
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?: =(count (sub participants 1))
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[random-s-values rand]
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::
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=^ v=@ rand (rads:rand ecc-n)
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=^ v=@ rand (rads:rand l:ed:crypto)
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$(count (add 1 count), random-s-values [v random-s-values])
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::
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?> ?=(^ random-s-values)
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@ -285,13 +183,13 @@
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:: Pick a random :u
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::
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=^ u=@ rand
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(rads:rand ecc-n)
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(rads:rand l:ed:crypto)
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:: Compute challenge at k + 1
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::
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=/ chk1=@
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%- generate-challenge :*
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message
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(point-mul u ecc-g)
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(scalarmult-base:ed:crypto u)
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linkage
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(point-mul-h u linkage)
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==
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@ -325,7 +223,7 @@
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:: But I must be doing something wrong here because this sk doesn't
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:: line up with the rest of the ring.
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::
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=/ sk=@ (~(dif fo ecc-n) u (mul my-private-key chk))
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=/ sk=@ (~(dif fo l:ed:crypto) u (mul my-private-key chk))
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::
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=/ ordered-challenges=(list @)
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(order-challenges k (flop reversed-chk-to-chk1))
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@ -355,7 +253,7 @@
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|= $: message=*
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link-scope=(unit *)
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::
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anonymity-set=(set point)
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anonymity-set=(set @udpoint)
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signature=ring-signature
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==
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^- ?
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@ -371,7 +269,7 @@
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=/ s2-to-end=(list @) t.t.s.signature
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:: anonymity-list: set of public keys listified in ring order
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::
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=/ anonymity-list=(list point)
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=/ anonymity-list=(list @udpoint)
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~(tap in anonymity-set)
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~& [%message message]
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@ -384,27 +282,24 @@
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=/ participants=@u
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(lent anonymity-list)
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::
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=/ z0p=point
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%+ point-add
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(point-mul s0 ecc-g)
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::
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(point-mul ch0.signature (head anonymity-list))
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=/ z0p=@udpoint
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(double-scalarmult:ed:crypto ch0.signature (head anonymity-list) s0)
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:: generate the linkage using public data, and the y point from the signature
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::
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=/ linkage=(unit [data=@ h=point y=point])
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=/ linkage=(unit [data=@ h=@udpoint y=@udpoint])
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?~ link-scope
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~
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=+ [data=@ h=point]=(generate-public-linkage u.link-scope)
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=+ [data=@ h=@udpoint]=(generate-public-linkage u.link-scope)
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:- ~
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[data h (need y.signature)]
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::
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=/ z0pp=(unit point)
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?~ linkage
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=/ z0pp=(unit @udpoint)
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:: ?~ linkage
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~
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:- ~
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%+ point-add
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(point-mul s0 h.u.linkage)
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(point-mul ch0.signature y.u.linkage)
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:: :- ~
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:: %+ point-add
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:: (point-mul s0 h.u.linkage)
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:: (point-mul ch0.signature y.u.linkage)
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:: initial challenge
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::
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=/ ch1=@
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@ -424,6 +319,7 @@
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==
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::
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=(ch0.signature (head challenges))
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:: +public-key-for-ship:
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::
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:: TODO: We should go talk to Azimuth to get the ship's real public key. But
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@ -431,7 +327,7 @@
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::
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++ public-key-for-ship
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|= p=@p
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^- point
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^- @udpoint
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::
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(point-base-mul p)
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(scalarmult-base:ed:crypto `@udscalar`p)
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--
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|
20
sur/ring.hoon
Normal file
20
sur/ring.hoon
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
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|%
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:: +ring-signature: low level ring signature type
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::
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:: The :s field of a ring signature grows O(n) with the number of
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:: participants in the ring.
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::
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++ ring-signature
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$: ch0=@
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::
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s=(list @)
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:: linked ring signature tag
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::
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:: Two linked ring signatures with the same link scope can be shown to
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:: have been made by the same private key, leading to Sybil
|
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:: resistance...but if your private keys are compromised, your
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:: adversary can determine which signatures you made.
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::
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y=(unit @udpoint)
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==
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--
|
@ -3126,6 +3126,38 @@
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-- ::
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~% %ed + ~
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|%
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::
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++ scalarmult-base
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~/ %scalarmult-base
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|= scalar=@udscalar
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^- @udpoint
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%- etch
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(scam bb scalar)
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::
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++ double-scalarmult
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~/ %double-scalarmult
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|= [a=@udscalar a-point=@udpoint b=@udscalar]
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^- @udpoint
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::
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=/ a-point-decoded=[@ @] (need (deco a-point))
|
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::
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%- etch
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%+ ward
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(scam bb b)
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(scam a-point-decoded a)
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::
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++ double-mult
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~/ %double-mult
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|= [a=@udscalar a-point=@udpoint b=@udscalar b-point=@udpoint]
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^- @udpoint
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::
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=/ a-point-decoded=[@ @] (need (deco:ed a-point))
|
||||
=/ b-point-decoded=[@ @] (need (deco:ed b-point))
|
||||
::
|
||||
%- etch:ed:crypto
|
||||
%+ ward:ed
|
||||
(scam:ed a-point-decoded a)
|
||||
(scam:ed b-point-decoded b)
|
||||
:: :: ++puck:ed:crypto
|
||||
++ puck :: public key
|
||||
~/ %puck
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user